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ORGANIZATION THEORY AND POLITICAL THEORY*

HERBERT KAUFMAN
Yale University

If two men of similar talents, identical training, shared values, and common interests were to study the same phenomena it would not be at all remarkable if they approached the phenomena in the same way, described them in the same terms, employed the same logic in analyzing them, drew the same conclusions from them, and formulated the same theories about their causes.

If, however, two men of similar talents but of rather divergent training, professing differing objectives, and displaying varied (perhaps even conflicting) concerns were to pursue studies of phenomena each believed to be quite distinct from the other's field of inquiry, it would be most astounding if their findings and inferences should turn out to be closely parallel in many important respects, particularly if there were little evidence of communication between them.

That is why the parallels between political theory, probably the oldest of the social sciences, and organization theory, perhaps the newest such discipline, are so totally unexpected. If there is any conscious agreement between the two fields, it is on their separateness from each other: political theorists and organization theorists alike seem to take for granted the impossibility of encompassing within a single theoretical framework propositions about states—that is, the relation of governments to subjects, and the relations of governments to each other—and propositions about other forms of human association. In the literature on organization theory, one rarely finds references even to contemporary political theorists and almost never to those who wrote in the past. By the same token, political theorists rarely seem to find anything relevant to their interests in the work of students of organization. Measured by the acknowledged exchange of information between the disciplines, the gulf between them is wide and seldom bridged.

Perhaps such a gulf is inescapable. Political theorists draw heavily upon history, philosophy, and personal experience for their ideas and evidence; organization theorists rely heavily upon sociology, social psychology, economics, and, when possible, on controlled experimentation. Political theorists are frankly normative; organization theorists generally believe their work is value-free. Political theorists deal willingly with the intangible aspects of human associations, for it is difficult to measure the outputs of governments and governmental agencies; organization theorists are more at home with organizations producing tangible products and measuring their performance ultimately in terms of profit. The fields do seem to have quite different traditions, methods, goals, and subject-matters.

But all this merely makes the similarities in in the problems they investigate and in their findings more surprising and intriguing.

I

For example, both organization theorists and political theorists encountered the same enigma: In order that the human systems may come into being and continue, men often have to do, at the behest of others, tasks that are unpleasant or even hazardous (such as working on assembly lines or going to war), and must refrain from doing what they would greatly enjoy (such as helping themselves to the property of others or saying whatever they please wherever and whenever the spirit moves them). What accounts for obedience and docility entailing such self-sacrifice, self-restraint, self-denial, without which neither states nor other associations could long survive?

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* A paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York City, September, 1963. I should like to acknowledge the patient criticism and instruction given me by my colleague, Professor Roger Masters, who saved me from many errors, misinterpretations, and oversights, and tried vainly to save me from those that remain in the text.

Political philosophers and organization theorists have offered essentially the same range of explanations: the rationality of men and the conditioning of men's minds.[1]

Because men are rational, they can calculate what they would lose if everyone were to follow his own impulses and preferences without restraint. They can also see that collective action will be taken against individuals who disobey. Out of fear of the consequences, they submit. They can calculate, too, the advantages they may gain from organized life and activity. They can see that the gains usually outweigh the costs. Out of hope for the benefits, then, as well as out of fear, rational men yield to the wills of others.[2]

At the same time, according to many political and organization theorists, men obey because obedience to certain commands from certain sources is a conditioned reflex. Even in infancy, every individual is introduced to the exercise of authority; maturation is in many ways a process of learning when to obey, whom to command, and under what circumstances to do either. That is, from his social environment generally, and also by virtue of the deliberate drill and indoctrination to which he is subject, every man is prepared for his social roles. He comes to yield to others because he learns it is right and proper to do so, and he may even come to cherish his submission. The will to obey is implanted in him; depending on the discipline one draws upon for appropriate language, he is educated, indoctrinated, trained, socialized, acculturated, programmed, or brainwashed.[3]

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[1] A third explanation, offered initially by political philosophers of classical antiquity, was that some men are by nature followers and others are by nature rulers. The followers obey because it is their nature to do so, just as leaders command because that is *their* nature. This argument has few defenders among contemporary political theorists, and it is seldom articulated by organization theorists. But one may wonder whether the batteries of personality and aptitude and intelligence tests used for selecting executives do not rest ultimately on the assumption that there are "natural" leaders who should be identified, separated from the "naturally" subservient mass, and elevated to their "natural" managerial roles.

[2] This reasoning underlies most social-contract philosophies of the origins of civil and political society. The emphasis was placed in some cases on escape from the risks and uncertainties of anarchy (as in Hobbes and Locke), in others on ascension to a higher, richer, distinctively human and civilized life (as in Rousseau, whose logic, in turn, parallels that of classical political theory). The hypothesized reasoning in men's decisions to form or join groups in which they must then submit to others is not far removed from the analysis by J. G. March and H. A. Simon, *Organizations* (New York, 1957), of individual calculations regarding "the decision to participate" in organizations (ch. 4). See also Simon's assertion that a distinctive feature of organization theory is its treatment of joining an organization as an "all-or-none choice of participation or non-participation," in *Models of Man* (New York, 1957), p. 74 and chs. 10 and 11.

Organization theorists and most political philosophers exhibit little confidence in fear as a long-range mode of eliciting obedience. But for a few political theorists (Hobbes, for example), and for more than a few rulers and managers, it is the cornerstone of theory and practice.

[3] Many political theorists recognized this. For example, according to H. V. Jaffa ("Aristotle," in L. Strauss and J. Cropsey, eds., *History of Political Philosophy* (Chicago, 1963), p. 75, Aristotle held that "Trained obedience, as distinct from brute direction, is the characteristic of being ruled politically or royally." Hume, says R. S. Hill ("David Hume," *ibid.*, pp. 511–12), considered that "The main support of the rule of the few over the many . . . is the opinion that those in authority have a right to that authority. This opinion is usually the fruit of time and habit. Custom is the great guide of human life; most men never think of inquiring into the reasons for the authority of the form of government to which they have become habituated." Rousseau (see A. Bloom, "Jean-Jacques Rousseau," *ibid.*, pp. 527, 531) believed "the manners of society are of as much or more concern than the institutions of government because manners underlie institutions and give them their force," and he saw an advantage in the ancient city "because it is small enough . . . for citizens to share a common heritage and a common way, because the particular wills can more easily be submerged in custom, and because the statesman can control the entirety." Burke (see F. Canavan, "Edmund Burke," *ibid.*, p. 603) also ascribed obedience to governments and laws to "opinion, habit, and acquired sentiment," and to the fact that "men think it right to submit to them," and Bentham (see H. M. Magid, "Jeremy Bentham," *ibid.*, p. 623) ex-

Interestingly enough, political theorists have from the very beginning made more strenuous efforts to incorporate the non-rational (*i.e.*, the conditioned) elements of men's behavior into their hypotheses than have the organization theorists. For men are born into political systems, and the possibilities of withdrawal are much more limited. It is not clear that joining or remaining in a political system is really a matter of rational choice at all, except in isolated instances. Organization theorists, on the other hand, deal more extensively with associations that men presumably choose to enter and may leave at any time. To explain membership and all it entails, students of organization lean toward a rather literal application of social-contract theory and utilitarianism; many eighteenth- and nineteenth-century political philosophers, who employed these concepts as metaphors to aid in understanding the rational component of behavior, would find little in most modern organization theory with which to quarrel. And some organization theorists would doubtless be surprised to discover how many political philosophers in ancient and medieval times were aware there were social norms and group loyalties that a ruler dared not violate without risking extensive disobedience.

At any rate, more or less independently of each other, drawing in different ways on different bodies of experience, political theorists and organization theorists have dealt in very similar fashion with the obedience of man to man.

II

They have also dealt similarly with organizational structures for the achievement of coordination. For purposes of this discussion, coordination means ordering the direction, volume, and timing of flows of activities, goods, and services so that the functioning of one element in a system at least does not prevent or negate or hamper the functioning of other elements, and at best facilitates and assists the functioning of other elements. Coordination is not always a goal of system designers; the separation of powers, for example, encourages some contradictions and deadlocks in order to protect other values. But it is often among the principal values, and practically never is a matter of total indifference. And when political theorists and organization theorists discuss methods of promoting coordination, they end up in much the same positions.

Fundamentally, coordination is accomplished by two processes: central direction, which means that the activities of the elements of a system respond chiefly to cues and signals from some common source, and reciprocal relations, which means that the elements respond to cues and signals from each other. Every system employs some blend of the two processes. Moreover, the systems are not mutually exclusive; an increase in reliance on one does not necessarily produce a decrease in the other. On the contrary, effective central direction often permits a higher degree of reciprocal cueing, as in a well-trained platoon, and *vice versa*. Whatever the blend of modes of coordination and whatever the general level of coordination in any system, these may be explained in terms of the relative weight assigned to each of the two underlying processes.

Political theorists who believe men are inclined to take advantage of one another tend to stress central direction as the best means of coordinating them. Without an overriding central figure, according to them, any system breaks down in disorder, confusion, and internal warfare. Hobbes, of course, presented this argument in its purest, most logical form.[4] On the other side, philosophers who assume the interests and tendencies of men are harmonious emphasize the possibility and desirability of coordination through reciprocity, and regard central direction as an exploitative or disturbing factor in what would otherwise be a highly coordinated system distributing maximum satisfaction to all its members. The anarchists, both Marxist and non-Marxist, pushed this reason-

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plained political society as arising from "the habit of obedience."

These interpretations may be compared with similar formulations by H. A Simon, D. W. Smithburg, and V. A. Thompson in their *Public Administration* (New York, 1950), at pp. 188–201, attributing obedience in part to the authority of confidence (or expertise), of identification (or group loyalty), and of legitimacy (the feeling that one ought to obey). In like fashion, P. M. Blau and W. R. Scott, *Formal Organizations* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1962), at pp. 27–32, 140–45, stress "culturally defined role expectations" (p. 30) and internalization of social values (p. 144). R. V. Presthus, "Authority in Organizations," in S. Mailick and E. H. Van Ness, eds., *Concepts and Issues in Administrative Behavior* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1962), at p. 125, emphasizes socialization, or the acceptance of societal or group norms and values, as a key process producing acceptance of authority.

[4] For a brief summary of his logic, see G. H. Sabine, *A History of Political Theory* (New York, 3d ed., 1961), pp. 167–69.

ing to its logical extreme.[5] It matters little for this discussion whether the extremists on both sides meant their doctrines to be taken literally or as analogies for the sake of clarity and vigor of statement. They bracketed the range of possibilities. In the history of political thought, not only the extremes, but virtually all conceivable intermediate positions, have at some time or other been advanced or defended.

During most of the short history of organization theory, few theorists seriously questioned the premise that central direction (expressed structurally as a hierarchy of authority because of the need of leaders to delegate formal powers and because of the assumed inability of men to supervise directly more than a small number of colleagues) is the primary method of achieving coordination; indeed, *hierarchy* and *organization* were sometimes treated as almost synonymous.[6] Yet very early some questioning voices were heard, particularly after experimental studies in the sociology of industry drew attention to the responsiveness of workers to cues and signals emanating from sources other than (and sometimes hostile to) the designated managers of the firms examined. Mary Parker Follett, a political scientist of Pluralist persuasion, became well known to students of organization for her advocacy of "power with rather than power over" and for her criticism of "the illusion of final responsibility."[7] Later on, Argyris[8] and Thompson and others[9] would search explicitly for a pattern of organization that is non-hierarchical. An electronics firm on the West Coast recently reorganized itself on what are alleged to be non-hierarchical lines.[10] It would be grossly inaccurate to equate these organizational analysts with the anarchists, but there can be no question that organization theory has begun to display an awareness of a range of positions on the central-reciprocal scale that political philosophers have explored extensively for centuries.

I do not intend to imply that political philosophy is somehow superior to organization theory, or that organization theory is a mere branch of the history of political thought. My object in pointing out similarities between their treatments of coordination is simply to demonstrate that these seemingly unrelated disciplines confront common problems in common ways.

III

Another such problem is the reconciliation of individual or other narrow objectives with the objectives of the collectivity. Political theorists discuss it in terms of special interests as against the general or public interest. Organization theorists speak of personal or sub-group goals

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[5] For an outline of recent anarchist thought (which is an updated version of anarchist philosophies of ancient times), see F. W. Coker, *Recent Political Thought* (New York, 1934), ch. VII. Also relevant are chs. VIII (on syndicalism), IX (on guild socialism), and XVIII (on pluralism).

[6] *E. g.*, J. O. Mooney, *The Principles of Organization* (New York, 1947), pp. 14–15: "The scalar principle is the same form in organization that is sometimes called hierarchical. . . . The common impression regards this scale or chain merely as a 'type' of organization, characteristic only of the vaster institutions of government, army, church, and industry. This impression is erroneous. It is likewise misleading, for it seems to imply that the scalar chain in organization lacks universality. These great organizations differ from others only in that the chain is longer. The truth is that wherever we find an organization even of two people, related as superior and subordinate, we have the scalar principle. This chain constitutes the universal process of coordination, through which the supreme coordinating authority becomes effective throughout the entire structure." See also, M. G. Weiner, "Observations on the Growth of Information-Processing Centers," in A. H. Rubenstein and C. J. Haberstroh, eds., *Some Theories of Organization* (Homewood: Dorsey and Irwin, 1960), p. 150: "The transition from individuality to division of labor and the acceptance of hierarchy in the form of a leadership structure . . . represents the point at which an 'organization' can be said to exist."

[7] H. C. Metcalf and L. Urwick, eds., *Dynamic Administration: The Collected Papers of Mary Parker Follett* (New York, 1941), especially pp. 101 ff. and ch. VII.

[8] C. Argyris, *Personality and Organization* (New York, 1957).

[9] V. A. Thompson, *Modern Organizations* (New York, 1961); G. G. Fisch, "Line-Staff is Obsolete," *Harvard Business Review*, Vol. 39, pp. 67–79 (1961); B. M. Bass, "Industrial Organization for the Space Age," unpublished manuscript, Graduate School of Business Administration, University of Pittsburgh, 1963. See also the query of W. M. Evan, "Indices of the Hierarchical Structure of Industrial Organizations," 9 *Management Science*, Vol. 9, pp 468–77 (1963), regarding the validity of the "iron law of hierarchy."

[10] The firm is Non-Linear Systems, Inc., of Del Mar, California. Its structure and procedures are described by A. H. Kuriloff, "Management by Integration and Self-Control," *Proceedings of the Industrial Engineering Institute*, February, 1963.

vis-à-vis organizational goals. But the issues are the same.

In both fields, the dominant opinion seems to be that every collectivity is in some sense goal-seeking, or purposive. That is, there is some general interest or organizational goal shared or at least acknowledged by nearly all the participants in the system, and although the overarching purpose is accomplished by the labor of individuals, it is distinct from the goals or interests of individuals; rather, it is viewed as an attribute of the system as a whole. There is little agreement on the specifics of the general interest, and even a given commentator may switch from one to another interpretation as conditions change. (Implicitly, however, one goal can be discerned in every interpretation: the survival of the system.) Yet, although students of states and of organizations may never arrive at a consensus on exactly what the shared interests of human associations are, many of them tend to take it for granted that one exists for every human association.[11]

A substantial number of political theorists, on the other hand, have taken the view that virtually every definition of the public interest is but a reflection of the personal interests of the definer, and consequently, the only realistic way to understand the performance of a system is to construe its output (or its policies) as nothing more than the resultant of the interplay of many special interests. The representatives of each interest may invoke the symbol of the public interest as an honorific, perhaps even with sincere conviction that the actions they espouse *are* better for the system and all the members of the system, but what is actually decided and done is the product of negotiations and understandings among specialized groups and individuals.[12]

Among organization theorists, the counterpart to this point of view is seldom advanced even tacitly, let alone explicitly; it is distinctly a minority position. Barnard, however, comes close to it. Although he discusses organizational purposes at length, and attributes great importance to them, they are not central to his analysis. He defines formal organizations without referring to goals, and he describes them largely in terms of individual motivations and objectives coordinated with each other through an "economy of incentives." The "absolute test" of efficiency is survival of the organization. An organization is thus portrayed as a kind of marketplace in which each man pursues his own goals by offering a contribution in return for those inducements (selected from the range of inducements provided, consciously or unwittingly, by the system) that appeal to him. The enterprise is an arena in which each participant offers his wares and services in exchange for what he can get. From the elaborate network of agreements, accommodations, and behaviors come products, wages, salaries, profits, prices, dividends, interest, taxes, working conditions, and all the other outputs of a complex system. Managers, workers, suppliers, customers, stockholders, creditors, competitors, government regulators, consultants, academics, and others may all see different transcendent purposes in the undertaking, so that its ends are in a sense the sum of all the special purposes.[13] To this extent, this view resembles in many respects the view of the state espoused by the political theorists mentioned above. What is sometimes referred to as a collective purpose is merely the resultant of a constantly shifting adjustment among individual and subgroup purposes.

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[11] Plato and Aristotle, for example, saw as the purpose of the city-state the promotion of the highest moral development of its citizens. For Hobbes, the end of government was the preservation of order. For Locke, it was the protection of "natural rights," such as the right to private property. For the Utilitarians, it was to produce the greatest good for the greatest number. For the early liberal economists, it was to furnish just enough service and regulation to permit the reciprocal processes of the market place to operate effectively. In all these instances, selected haphazardly from the broad array of goals postulated in political thought, the existence of a common purpose and interest is axiomatic.

The same is true of most contemporary organization theory, although the specification of common interests is rarely articulated as explicitly as in political philosophy. Rather, it is assumed that every human association has *some* goals shared by all its members, and can be understood only in terms of those common purposes. *E. g.*, in H. S. Simon, D. W. Smithburg, and V. A. Thompson, *op. cit.*, at p. 3, purpose and cooperative action are described as the "two basic processes of what has come to be called administration. . . . Administration can be defined as the activities of groups cooperating to accomplish common goals." Similarly, P. M. Blau and W. R. Scott, *op. cit.*, at p. 1, declare that what organizations "all have in common is that a number of men have become organized into a social unit—an organization—that has been established for the explicit purpose of achieving certain goals." And C. Argyris, *Understanding Organizational Behavior* (Homewood: Dorsey, 1960) hypothesizes, at pp. 10–11, "that organizations are intricate human strategies designed to achieve certain objectives," and that the objectives of any organization include "achieving its goals (intended consequences)."

[12] Bentham, for instance, defined the interest of any community as the sum of the interests of those who compose it (H. M. Magid, *op. cit.*, p. 622). A. F. Bentley, in *The Process of Government* (Bloomington: Principia, 1935), said (at p. 269), "All phenomena of government are phenomena of groups pressing one another, forming one another, and pushing out new groups and group representatives (the organs and agencies of government) to mediate the adjustments." D. B. Truman, using a similar framework of analysis in *The Governmental Process* (New York, 1953), added (at p. 51), "In developing a group interpretation of politics, . . . we do not need to account for a totally inclusive interest, because one does not exist." See also, E. P. Herring, *The Politics of Democracy* (New York, 1940), ch. 30.

Over the relationship of private interests to the general interest, organization theorists and political theorists have divided into similar camps. Again, the resemblances between the fields are impressive.

IV

The foregoing illustrations do not exhaust the parallels between organization theory and political theory.[14] But they are probably sufficient to establish the point of departure for this discussion, namely, that striking similarities have developed in two disciplines that seem to be quite different in their interests and methods.

Why should this occur? Why should two fields of study with such discrepant premises and perspectives converge?

Perhaps it is because the discrepancies are, after all, merely the distinctions between different species of the same genus. When all is said and done, they both treat of phenomena that encompass vast areas, if not all, of human life. We are all members of at least several organizations, and organizations give characteristic content and general form to our lives. Moreover, states, governments, the branches and agencies of governments, political parties, and interest groups are organizations like other organizations even though they have their unique attributes. What aspect of civilized existence then lies outside the scope of organization theory?

At the same time, every organization is sometimes construed as a political system, with all the problems of leadership, policy formation, succession, strategy, rivalry, resistance, revolution, and influence that this implies.[15] If organizations are an all-embracing subject of inquiry, politics is an equally comprehensive theme. To be sure, organization theorists tend to avoid political institutions in searching for data, and political philosophers tend to concentrate on those institutions immediately associated with public governments. But they may end with strong similarities because they are both addressed to phenomena permeating the whole of human affairs. Fields that take so much for their province must have far more overlap than is immediately obvious.

Furthermore, they both start from normative bases. Political theorists were historically engaged in a quest for the ideal political system; organization theorists began by seeking "the one best way"—*i.e.*, the most efficient way—to organize production and distribution. There are probably some in both disciplines who still believe such ideal arrangements, superior to all alternatives under any conditions and at any time, are attainable; most contemporary theorists, I believe, now adopt a relativist position, holding that the definition of the ideal changes as circumstances change, and perhaps even that a wide variety of organizational and political patterns may satisfy equally well the requirements of any particular definition. At any rate, men in both fields set out to discover the "laws" or "principles" governing social behavior so as to formulate proposals for improvement consonant with the constraints imposed by reality. Sometimes they try to sharpen their thinking by reasoning from admittedly oversimplified hypotheses, such as man in a state of nature or completely rational man. Eventually, however, they complicate their models by adding variables that render the hypotheses better approximations of the real world. (Such variables are more often discovered by non-normative research of an historical or experimental kind than by intuition.) Conceivably, the fields may come to resemble each other because they have parallel normative underpinnings.

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[13] C. I. Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938), pp. 73 ("a formal organization . . . [is] a system of consciously coordinated activities or forces of two or more persons"), 93, 137 ("The individual is always the basic strategic factor in organization."), ch. XI, and pp. 161–75. See also, H. A. Simon, *Administrative Behavior* (New York, 1947), pp. 103–07; Simon describes coordination in terms of adjustments among individuals' behaviors. But he does observe that the individuals must find one plan agreeable to all participants if they are to cooperate, thus introducing the equivalent of common purpose.

[14] For an exploration of the political theory implicit in the writings of organization theorists, see D. Waldo, *The Administrative State* (New York, 1948).

[15] *E. g.*, N. Long, "The Administrative Organization as a Political System," in S. Mailick and E. H. Van Ness, *op. cit.*

But the explanation of the resemblances may not lie in the character of the disciplines at all; perhaps it is to be found rather in the nature of the world the disciplines purport to describe. The convergence *could* result from the existence of such pronounced and persistent regularities in large-scale human associations that no matter which such associations one examines and what approach one adopts, the sum of the findings of each set of observers will inevitably be much the same as those of any other set. When all the blind men compare their notes, they *do* end up with a description of an elephant, and the description by each team of blind men will not differ materially from the description produced by any other team, because, after all, it *is* an elephant they are studying. The consensus of two relatively insulated fields, when the whole range of their content is reviewed, lends corroboration to the impression that our ideas about organizations and politics have a substantial degree of validity.

V

Whatever the explanation of the similarities between organization theory and political theory, one obvious implication of the similarities is that the two fields can probably learn a great deal from each other. In the literature on organizations, political theorists will find reports on experiments and rigorous logical analyses bearing heavily on the concerns of political philosophy. In the history of political thought, which may be regarded as a collection of descriptive models of social behavior or a series of tentative propositions about the ways men act in organized groups, organization theorists will find a rich store of ideas they seem to be toiling to reproduce independently.

But my purpose in writing this piece is not merely to labor the obvious point that scholars in two disciplines stand to gain by sharing their materials more extensively in the future than they have in the past. More important are the indications that theory in both areas is to a large extent imprisoned by the premises and perspectives and reasoning of an earlier day, trapped into recapitulating and refining familiar concepts instead of developing new approaches and assumptions that might free theory from the cycling loop into which it has fallen. Although there are important exceptions, it appears that much modern writing in both fields tends to retrace established paths instead of finding new ones. Those who are not conversant with the history of thought often devote their energies to rediscovering triumphantly old and even ancient ideas, and to reviving traditional controversies. Those who have mastered the history of thought often apply themselves to proving there is nothing new under the sun. Each for his own reasons ends up operating within confines identified with prior generations. Each for his own reasons fetters his imagination.

To be sure, the exceptions are notable. Some strikingly original recent approaches to the study of human behavior, such as computer simulation of individual thought processes and social situations, may well have dramatic consequences for the viewpoints and findings of the social sciences. By and large, however, it is the *scarcity* of unconventional ideas rather than the problems of choosing among them that impresses the observer. Even sophisticated methods of research and analysis, bound by the outlooks and assumptions of earlier times, add only a little to our knowledge and insight.

This is hardly surprising; we are all products of our heritage, and it is not easy to conceive of altogether new ways of looking at things, however urgent may be the need for novel ideas. That is why it is important to try not only to invent new concepts, but also to seek them out in our current environment by borrowing from seemingly unrelated disciplines, and by picking up the threads of inquiry previously explored and prematurely dropped. One such concept seems to me to hold particularly great promise of putting organization behavior in a perspective quite unlike the one from which we seem unable to escape, and thus to provide stimuli and generate perceptions which apparently lie beyond the scope of our ordinary frame of reference. I refer to what in its broadest terms may be described as the treatment of human organizations as a form of life rather than as an artifact designed, created, and directed exclusively by the human intellect.

Such a biological analogy in political theory was drawn in classical antiquity and occasionally in later periods of Western history,[16] and it has even appeared in the writings of one or two contemporary organization theorists.[17] But the logic of it has never been rigorously followed out in the light of modern knowledge and, perhaps even more pertinently, in the light of the growth and evolution of organizational forms in recent times. Currently out of fashion in political science, and in the social sciences generally,[18] this now neglected tradition strikes me as more likely to improve our understanding of human associations than it ever could before. And it probably requires a discipline as boldly inclusive, as young and therefore as flexible and open-minded, and as vigorous as organization theory, to dare to reopen this approach and to employ it successfully.

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[16] Plato, for instance, drew a parallel between the body and the city, and Hegel also turned to the metaphor of the organism. *Cf.* L. Strauss and J. Cropsey, *op. cit.*, pp. 16, 25, 630. And after Darwin, comparisons between social and biological evolution were commonly employed, though usually in a fashion that did violence to the biological theory.

VI

Seen from this angle, what would the world of organizations look like? Probably crowded, continually changing, difficult to analyze, viscous. For compared to an individual organism, organizations do not display a notably high level of integration most of the time; the responsiveness of their components to each other is relatively slow and uncertain. Their boundaries are often loosely defined, easily changed, and permeable. Most organizations contain, are contained by, and overlap other organizations; they are unusual among the forms of life in that they can share constituent elements with each other. They interact with their surroundings, usually exchanging something (either acquired or produced) from inside their boundaries for something beyond their boundaries. Generally, there are subsets of elements within them that exercise greater influence over the other elements with respect to certain processes than the other elements exercise over these subsets; and some subsets interact extensively with the environment beyond the boundaries as well as with elements within the boundaries. There are reasons to suspect that organizations have a high rate of mortality, and though one can point to many individual cases of long-lived organizations, the number that disappear every year is probably staggering.[19]

Yet the number of human organizations in the world at any given moment is also probably enormous. Virtually every individual is a member of at least several organizations, and while this does not mean there are necessarily more organizations in the world than there are people, it indicates that the ratio of organizations to people is quite substantial. Consequently, with so many organizational claims on the resources at the disposal of human beings, including time and obedience, some organizations lose out in the competition for these resources. (In part, the shortage results from a highly unbalanced distribution of claims and resources. But it is also plausible that the number of organizations making claims on resources increases more rapidly than the volume of available resources—by a kind of Malthusian law—so that the possible ways of allocating resources are likely always to exceed the reservoir of resources available.) That is, as is true with other forms of life, organizations make upon the resources essential to their survival demands that tend to press beyond the limit of supply, and the demands are kept more or less in check by the demise of organizations or declines in the rate at which new ones form. It should be noted, incidentally, that from this standpoint, an employer, a veterans association, a trade union, a political party, a neighborhood civic group, a bowling club, a church, and a government agency, and other groups, though superficially unconnected, may all be in competition with one another, for they may all be rivals for the resources (again including the time and obedience) of the same persons.[20]

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[17] See C. Barnard, *op. cit.*, p. 79: "Systems of cooperation which we call organizations I regard as social creatures, 'alive,' just as I regard an individual human being . . . " (His argument that an organization is more than the sum of its parts, as a person is more than the sum of his parts, is almost identical with that of Aristotle; *cf.* H. V. Jaffa, *op. cit.*, p. 66.) See also M. Haire, "Biological Models and Empirical Histories of the Growth of Organizations," in M. Haire, ed., *Modern Organization Theory* (New York, 1959), pp. 272–306; and P. Selznick, "Foundations of the Theory of Organization," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 13, pp. 25–35 (1948), and *Leadership in Administration* (New York, 1957).

[18] But see D. T. Campbell, "Evolutionary Theory in Social Science: A Reappraisal," unpublished paper, Northwestern University, 1961, and the references cited therein. See also R. Redfield, ed., *Levels of Integration in Biological and Social Systems* (Lancaster: Jacques Cattell Press, 1942).

[19] The impression that large numbers of organizational fatalities occur is suggested in part by the frequency of business failures. Barnard, for example (*op. cit.*, p. 5), comments, "successful cooperation in or by formal organizations is the abnormal, not the normal, condition. What are observed from day to day are the successful survivors among innumerable failures. . . . Failure to cooperate, failure of cooperation, failure of organization, disorganization, disintegration, destruction of organization—and reorganization—are characteristic facts of human history."

Under these circumstances, what determines which organizations will survive? One possible determinant is the deliberate strategy of organizations to adapt to conditions; those making the appropriate choices will continue. Much of organization theory, economic theory, and political theory is devoted to the analysis of this sort of rationality.

But it is also conceivable that the biologist's approach could be useful here. When conditions prove fatal to some members of a population while other members survive and even flourish, biologists tend to ascribe the good fortune of the survivors to chance variations in their make-up that protect or even favor them under prevailing conditions. May we not also postulate that in the world population of organizations—those comparatively poorly integrated, sluggish, fragile entities—random variations occur which may make no difference under one set of circumstances, but which may favor or impede some organizations when circumstances change? Admittedly, the calculated strategies may in the end turn out to *be* the critical factor; the biological analogy does not preclude this possibility. But it directs attention also to other factors that may be important, factors easily neglected if we concentrate exclusively on rationality.

For example, size may be more important in survival than anything an organization *does* in response to a challenge; all organizations of a greater than given size may endure even though they all respond differently, while smaller organizations may disappear no matter what they do. (By the same token, of course, a change of conditions may wipe out the giants and multiply the pygmies.) Or a substantial measure of self-containment may characterize all the organizations that persist after a drastic modification of the environment (though another environmental shift may favor organizations highly dependent on outside sources). Or in one context, all surviving organizations may exhibit extreme centralization; in another, only the decentralized ones may remain. Sometimes, highly specialized organizations may be the only ones to come through; at other times, only diversified ones may weather a new situation. Those attributes an organization happens to have when changes occur may be more significant than the course of action its leaders elect to pursue; indeed, the paths of action themselves may be determined as much by organizational characteristics as by human intellect.

Now, it is true that an organization can take steps to increase or decrease its size or its self-containment or its centralization or its specialization; these do not lie beyond the scope of manipulation. Thus, organizational *characteristics* as well as organizational *policies* are subject to rational adjustment. Nevertheless, at any given time, any population of organizations will include exceedingly diverse members. For there will be many different judgments as to what adjustments will be advantageous, what adjustments dysfunctional; all organizations will not estimate the future in the same way, and even those that do will differ about the appropriate preparations for that future. Moreover, fortuitous elements, such as personality, the unique history of an organization, tradition, acts of nature, and unplanned internal developments, will produce different consequences in different organizations. So even if all relevant organizational attributes could be rationally controlled, organizations would vary, and every environmental change would benefit some organizations and injure others. But there is no obvious reason to assume that all such attributes are rationally planned; many seem quite accidental, and the selective process is thus intensified.

But human organizations enjoy an advantage that their biological counterparts do not: they have the capacity, at least theoretically, to observe and imitate their more successful fellow-organizations. Logically, then, when conditions change, can they not wait to see the effects and follow the lead of the flourishing ones? In this way, it would seem, most could survive any challenge. In fact, however, organizations can rarely adjust very swiftly. To maintain flexibility for speedy transformation may require the sacrifice of other advantages. Furthermore, every organization contains equilibrium-maintaining mechanisms that resist and moderate change; stability cannot be thrown to the winds. Most organizations therefore cannot alter themselves instantaneously, and differences among them will remain even after the initial impact of environmental changes has indicated which forms are favored.

For these reasons, then, organizational forms may play no less a part in organizational survival than do organizational policies, and we may anticipate that environmental variations will always wipe out some organizations and improve the fortunes of others. A kind of "natural selection" is taking place; in other words, an evolutionary process going on continuously.

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[20] In this connection see P. M. Blau and W. R. Scott, *op. cit.*, pp. 215–17.

Even if this could be demonstrated, what difference would it make? What contribution could it make to the development of organization theory? Where does it lead?

Since we have hardly explored the process, it would be rash to venture a prediction. We can only hope it may prove as useful to the study of organizations as it did to the study of biology. And we can only speculate on what the nature of its utility might be. For example, it might stimulate comparisons of long-lived organizations that give us a better understanding of their longevity. It might facilitate evaluation of allegedly consistent and widespread trends toward specific patterns of organization, and explanation of those trends that do in fact occur.[21] It could encourage a more sophisticated typology of organizations than any we now have, and a better catalogue of relevant environmental conditions and their effects on each category. It might even improve our assessment of organizational survival strategies. But while no one can say exactly what will be uncovered by research based on a theory of organizational evolution, it is a line of inquiry, not well investigated up to now, that has a potential for illuminating regularities hitherto unperceived, or at least unarticulated, in the social sciences. And organization theorists are in the best position to conduct the inquiry because they do not limit themselves to any particular type or aspect of organization.

VII

I am not here proposing a simple return to Social Darwinism—which, in fact, is an egregious misnomer, since the doctrines thus alluded to have little to do with the principles of natural selection described by Darwin and other biologists. Nor do I intend to suggest that organizations should be regarded as identical with organisms; on the contrary, it is their unique character as life-forms that I would emphasize. Nor, finally, do I consider this approach a substitute for others; if it has any value, it will be as an addition to our other instruments of analysis, not as a replacement for them. I am arguing only that the possibilities of employing this method rigorously have not been fully realized, and that it seems especially applicable to the study of organizational behavior.

The biological analogy is disturbing to many modern political theorists and organization theorists because it appears to many of them to downgrade human beings, to deny the importance of the gift of thought, to reduce persons to the level of social insects or of cells in a living system. Even if this were the case, it would not justify refusal to consider this frame of reference. When the people of the Western world were compelled by the findings of modern astronomers to abandon the belief that they were at the center of the universe (and thus to recognize what many of the ancients knew), when they were taught by modern biology that they are part of nature (which was also the ancient view), and when they were reminded by modern psychologists that they are something less than wholly rational creatures, the demotions were painful and met with resistance. Yet they added to man's intellectual stature by giving him a fuller and more accurate picture of the world in which he lives, and liberated him from flattering myths and misconceptions, in many ways more degrading than the truth. Men may conceivably become more godlike by accepting their own limitations than by refusing to envisage them at all. There can be excesses in individual-centered philosophies as well as in community-centered doctrines.

But the lesson from early political philosophy is that it is by no means necessary to deny the distinctively human qualities of mankind in order to treat human associations as natural phenomena. On the contrary, the classical opinion was that men fulfilled their potentialities as human beings *only* in the associations as natural to them as the air they breathe. For organization theorists to regard organizations as living forms, then, is not to equate human society with an anthill and people with ants. It may simply be a path to observations and to speculative and empirical inquiries to which our prevailing biases and preoccupations now blind us.

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[21] For illustrations of the impression that there is a secular trend toward increasing centralization in modern life, see H. A. Simon, D. W. Smithburg, and V. A. Thompson, *op. cit.*, pp. 272 ff.; R. Redfield, *op. cit.*; R. Seidenberg, *Post-Historic Man* (Boston: Beacon, 1957).

CAUSALITY AND TIME IN POLITICAL PROCESS: A SPECULATION

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"All philosophers, of every school, imagine that causation is one of the fundamental axioms of science, yet, oddly enough, in advanced science . . . the word 'cause' never occurs. . . . The Law of Causality, I believe, like much that passes among philosophers, is a relic of a bygone age, surviving like the monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm."—Bertrand Russell (1928)

Causality is an invention of the formal reason, a product of philosophers and scientists. As an idea, however, "cause" finds its basis in ordinary experience. Objects move. How? By being acted upon by other objects or by human agency; exert a pull here, create an effect there. In the world of experience unrefined by science or philosophy, it sometimes seems as if every thing is connected in some way with every other thing, all are parts in a cosmic puppet show. A simple string model appears natural and true and is a prototype of common-sense notions of causality. Even in science, at least until recently, such notions were given expression as well. The string model, for instance, was to be found equally in the simplest interpretations of Newtonian mechanics as in the implicit theories of the carpenter, the plumber, or the agriculturist. Particles exist and forces act between them as causes, producing change. The very idea of force introduces a feeling of compulsion and the causal connection between events seems a physical necessity, reinforcing the lessons taught by every-day experience.

The social scientist engaged in either theoretical or empirical work at the turn of the century permitted a curious blend of common-sense notions and scientific ideas of causality to serve his instinct for order. In addition to what he knew, existentially, to be the case in society, he was privileged to draw upon Newtonian science if he chose, Hegelian dialectics, or Darwinian biology to explain why things are the way they are. His causal arsenal packed weapons of great versatility: should simple forces prove inadequate, developmental factors were ready to hand; when simple logic failed to point the way, victory could still be snatched by dialectics. Marx and the Marxians might offer one type of explanation, the classical economists, the orthodox school of German sociologists, or the Darwinians still others. But whether the device was the class-struggle or individual interest, whether social will or instinctual competitiveness, the goal was identical—explanation. It was as if Hume had never happened.

I

In *The Process of Government*, published in 1908, Arthur F. Bentley sought to release social science from thralldom to all such views of the social universe, whether conceived in common-sense terms or expressed in the authoritative language of science. He begins by challenging feelings and ideas as causal forces, then touches off a brilliant and joyous *auto de fé*. Into the fire go ideals, motives, desires, instincts, faculties, impulses, myths, legal fictions, altruism, egoism, intellect, racial qualities, religious sentiments, moral attachments, purposes, theories, and ideologies—these serve as explanations of nothing, but "stand for ignorance." In social science there is "no more room for animistic 'causes' " than in any other science. Before Bentley is through it is not only specific causal agents which are consigned to the flames, but traditional causality itself. All is movement and flux, all is *process*. Not "why," but "how" is the appropriate question to address to social phenomena; not ultimate explanation but complete description is the goal.

Beyond question Bentley had an eye to the other sciences, particularly physics. There the temptation to ask why had given way before an effort to understand how events are related to one another. With the advent of field theory a more detailed description of causal process was possible, and the older simplistic force view lost some of its influence. Whatever happens at a given time and place within the field depends only upon the values of the field quantities existing in the immediate past, and the proximity of events under observation. Causal relations are transmitted from point to point through an action-by-contact, and the inverse-square law becomes the prototype of causality. Causality is specified as the law according to which force acts through space with an intensity proportional to the inverse-square power of the distance.

For purposes of the present discussion, the chief contribution of field theory is this: the length of the causal chain is now limited; it is finite, and broken completely at certain points. There are always events between which no causal relation can be established, since action cannot reach from a single event to every other event. Though all events may be members of some causal sequence the sequences themselves need not, and cannot, be related to one another. In this interpretation, action rather than force is the salient characteristic of causality. Since force and cause are no longer identified, cause loses the quality of efficiency it enjoyed when force had been the key term.

Bentley saw the possibilities for social theory contained in the model of the field, yet even that model failed to satisfy him. True, the idea of field laid the stress where it properly belongs, upon action rather than upon the thing-in-itself. But it was an action which still required contact and was expressed in the classical language of force rather than in strictly relational terms. As a determined foe of determinism in all its forms, Bentley could not feel at home in 1908 even in the sciences. The social science he was striving to create was to be entirely descriptive, more akin in spirit to quantum mechanics than to classical physics. Unfortunately, aside from the discovery of the quantum itself, the great discoveries and fantastic interpretations of quantum mechanics were still in the future. When at last they did come, the comfortable determinism in which most scientists thought and worked was shaken to the roots. But curiously enough, although all was yet bare possibility in science, the revolution which Bentley itched to foment in social science had already begun elsewhere before the turn of the century. There is no evidence to indicate that he was aware of the events which by his time had occurred in philosophy and the arts to the second generation, let alone the affinity which they held for his own style of thought. Still it might prove instructive to look briefly to some of those developments, especially since they were remarkably prescient for Bentley's scientific vision and remain, even today, richly suggestive for the problems faced by political scientists. Besides, if there is any beauty or utility to the intellectual historian's pursuit of that elusive consciousness of Western man, ever emerging in ways that surprise and delight, it might be found in the uncanny singleness of purpose which appears to have motivated the most daring, and isolated, among the philosophers and artists in the last half of the nineteenth century. I refer to the blows dealt the narrative form, whether in language or symbolism, which laid waste the determinism of Enlightenment art and thought.

Peering out upon a world dazzling in its variety of shapes and colors, the painter chafed against the walls which held him prisoner. He began, in the words of Gauguin, "to think of a complete liberation" from conventional narrative art and was determined "to break windows" if he must, even "at the risk of cutting [his] fingers." Gauguin tells us that he threw himself "into the battle body and soul, the battle against all the schools." What was at stake is clearly set forth by Van Gogh: it was nothing less than the transformation of static painting into dynamic painting, formalistic shapes into a flow of activity, narrative into process. "I want," he wrote, in words almost identical with those used a generation later by Bentley, "I want to make *groups of people who are in action* some way or other. But how difficult it is to impart life and movement, and *to put figures in their places and apart from each other!*" The academies teemed with painters capable of achieving correct proportion and anatomy in a figure. "But the figure will [not] *live.*" What Van Gogh wished above all to paint was a digger actually digging, a picker actually picking; no, more than that, to capture the *activity* of digging, the *activity* of picking, to paint *"the action for the sake of the action."* Bentley was to state his own vision in terms strikingly similar to those of Van Gogh: "If we say activity, we have said all." Expose cliché, and you shatter conventional notions of causality. But in order to expose cliché, "to get [his] drawing more spontaneous," it was necessary for Van Gogh to "exaggerate the essential, and, of set purpose, to leave the obvious vague." To express his new view of the world the artist must fashion a tool.

Corot, Constable, Daumier had already seized upon the sketch as a way of escape to the freedom they sought from narrative art. According to Malraux, the new art was not "a question of technique and a series of discoveries, but a language independent of the thing portrayed—as specific, *sui generis,* as music." Not that the success of such efforts was enough to discourage others from continuing along the old path. "Long after the turn of the century," Malraux says, "our artists went on piling up 'subjects' and 'stories' and the walls of our official Salons were cluttered up with these; only henceforth these were the works of artists who no longer counted. Poetry shared in the great adventure and was similarly transformed;

with Baudelaire it utterly discarded the 'story,' though traditionalist poetry continued wallowing for years in narrative and dramatic lyrics." Nor has process, as we shall see, succeeded in replacing narrative in political science. Bentley has had less impact even upon those who call themselves Bentleyans than we are wont to believe.

In the world of letters the artist was undergoing a similar shattering experience. The poet's ladder, symbol of a lawful deterministic universe, had been splintered and the poet himself, in Yeats' lines, was made to "lie down where all ladders start,/In the foul rag-and-bone shop of the heart." Flouting the demands of classical narrative literature, the artists were busy in the rag-and-bone shop fashioning new techniques founded on the new vision. It is enough perhaps to mention Stendhal and Flaubert, Baudelaire and Dostoyevsky, later Joyce, D. H. Lawrence, and Faulkner. "The question is," said the classical critic, "whether you *can* make words mean so many different things." "The question is," replied the literary artist, "which is to be master—that's all." Once shatter the determinism even of ordinary language and you, not words, are the master. As Wittgenstein was to sum up it in our own day: "A *picture* held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language, and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably." If I appear to place inordinate stress upon language as the guardian of determinism, it is because Bentley himself devoted the many years remaining to him after *The Process of Government* in quest of a language in which to embody his vision.

Ibsen and Strindberg began in the theater an effort carried forward into the present day by playwrights such as Ionesco, who recently characterized it as an attempt to "break up our language so that it can be put together again in order to re-establish contact . . . with multiple reality." The absolute is brought under challenge: reality is multiple, a system of systems, acting together or in isolation, and forever in a state of internal excitement. "Where was you born?," asks a character in Ring Lardner's *I Gaspiri*. "Out of wedlock." "That's a mighty pretty country around there." Or a brief exchange from another of Lardner's plays, *Dinner Bridge:* "How long were you married to her?" asks one stranger of another who has just stated that his first wife was dead. "Right up to the time she died." A riposte worthy of the most sophisticated quantum theorist—or a Samuel Beckett. Not only cause, but time as well is a captive of language.

In music one is put immediately in mind of the revolution begun by Wagner which has eventuated in the works of Schoenberg and his pupils. Schoenberg's system of composition with twelve tones proceeds on an assumption entirely congenial to process and hostile to traditional "narrative." The assumption, in Schoenberg's words, is that "The two-or-more dimensional space in which musical ideas are presented is a unit. Though the elements of these ideas appear separate and independent to the eye and the ear, they reveal their true meaning only through their cooperation, even as no single word alone can express a thought without relation to other words. All that happens at any point of this musical space has more than a local effect. It functions not only in its own plane, but also in all other directions and planes, and is not without influence even at remote points." Thus Schoenberg conceived a composition as a process. And he tells us that he first formulated it in the year 1908, at the very time Bentley was conceiving his political process. What is even more remarkable, if Schoenberg sounds like a scientist or a mathematician, Bentley could express his conception in the language of the arts. "All of the groups," he wrote, "whether underlying interests, or discussion groups, or organization groups, have values in terms of each other, just as have the colors in a painting, or the sounds in music. No color for itself alone, no sound for itself alone, but each gets its meaning from all. There is not a bit of the process that does not have its meaning in terms of the other parts." No color *for itself alone*, no sound *for itself alone:* Bentley no less than Schoenberg was persuaded that meaning comes only from apprehension of the total flow.

Before turning to political science proper, I should like to examine in the briefest way two thinkers of the Nineteenth Century who perhaps more than any others helped shake men from their comfortable and unreflective acceptance of traditional causality; two who paid the price exacted of those who have already sloughed off the old without yet being able to give coherent expression to the new. I refer to Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. When Kierkegaard enunciated his idea of universal "shipwreck" and Nietzsche prolaimed the death of God, conventional causality was subjected to the most scathing attack since Hume. Let me ignore the serious differences between these two rebels and, taking a leaf from Karl Jaspers, treat them as of a single school. For both, first of all, the "will to system" was nothing so much as a lack of intellectual courage, what Bentley later characterized as a shabby attempt to cover the nakedness of ignorance. Both understood their own thought as interpretation. But interpretation reaches no end, since life continues. Thus each interpretation is but a reflection—more or less exact, more or less brilliant—of life itself, or rather of living, of flow, of process without end. Both expressed a fear of the tendency of the verbal to become autonomous, and both took their stand as interpreters of form rather than inculcators of content. Both were adventurers in thought, experimenting with themselves in order to find a way out of the bondage fixed in ordinary, as well as philosophic language. Nietzsche saw himself as the "scratchings which an unknown power makes on paper, in order to test a new pen"; Kierkegaard as an "interjection in speaking, without influence upon the sentence," or a "letter which is printed upside down in the line." That is, a dissonance. But one which hopefully might call attention to the entombment of all us right-side-up letters in the inexorable logic of the sentence itself. Both adhered to what, for want of a more precise term, might be called a pragmatic conception of truth: truth does not lie in something already known, far less in something finally knowable, in the absolute, but rather in what arises and comes to pass, in process. There exists a human will to communicate and to act in the world which cannot be satisfied according to any single formula. This failure of ultimate systematization expresses nothing less than the multiplicity of behaviors, attachments, and events in the world. Every single truth must be shipwrecked in reality, and none can claim for itself the title of *the* truth.

Nietzsche was not sanguine over the outcome. He only knew that he could never retreat to the comfort of a stable, but for him false, cosmology. "We have left the land and have gone aboard ship," he wrote. "We have broken down the bridge behind us,—nay, more, the land behind us! Well, little ship! look out! Beside thee is the ocean; it is true it does not always roar, and sometimes it spreads out like silk and gold and a gentle reverie. But times will come when thou wilt feel that it is infinite, and that there is nothing more frightful than infinity. Oh, the poor bird that felt itself free, and now strikes against the walls of this cage! Alas, if homesickness for the land should attack thee, as if there had been more *freedom* there,—and there is no 'land' any longer!"

One final quotation. "I can deeply sympathize with anyone who objects to being tossed into such a floating cosmology. Much as I have stressed its substantiality, I can hardly expect everyone to feel it. The firm land of 'matter' or even of 'sense' or 'self' is pleasanter, if only it stands firm. To anyone whose tasks can be performed on such ground, I have not the slightest thought of bringing disturbance. But for many of us tasks are pressing, in the course of which our firmest spots of conventional departure themselves dissolve in function. When they have so dissolved, and when we are so involved, there is no hope of finding refuge in some chance island of 'fact' which may appear. The continents go, and the islands. The pang may be that felt by a confirmed landsman at his first venture on the ocean, but the ocean in time becomes familiar and secure. Or, if I may change the figure, the fledgling will vastly prefer his firm nest to falling with untried wings. But the parent sciences are pushing; the nest, even, is disintegrating; and there is air for flight, even though it is not so vividly felt and seen as the sticks and straws of the nest."

The passage opens with the same figure to be found in the previous passage from Nietzsche, the land-creature afloat on a sometimes turbulent, sometimes serene sea; and shifts to that of the little bird, concluding with the celebration of intellectual courage. The central unshakable fact is that the absolute is dead: "The continents go, and the islands." No, it is not the utterance once again of Nietzsche, nor is it Kierkegaard. It is none other than Bentley himself in a book entitled *Behavior Knowledge Fact*, twenty-seven years after *The Process of Government*. In the later work the last vestiges of an older causality go, the residual language goes, even the group goes. All that is left is sheer raw process.

II

As Gauguin and Van Gogh had attacked the academic painters, and Kierkegaard and Nietzsche the academic philosophers, so did Bentley attack the academicians of his day, and with equal gusto. In *The Process of Government*, Spencer, Jhering, Ward, Westermarck, Pearson, Morgan, Giddings, Simmel, Gumplowicz, Marx, and Dicey, to mention only the most prominent among the hosts, are vanquished and along with them their causal "spooks" from instinct to ideology. Any explanatory device which itself stands in need of explanation will not do. Bentley's campaign is masterfully laid, and executed with daring and finesse. When he is finished there is no place to turn, other than to process. Where Von Jhering, for example, insists upon a distinction between man (subjective) and society (objective), linked by *Zweck*, designed to connote "interest" in man and "purpose" in society, Bentley responds by arguing that, properly conceived—that is, from the standpoint of process analysis—"man" and "society" are merely the same phenomena seen from two different points of view. Words such as *Zweck* are introduced by social theorists for the sole purpose of satisfying "the writer's need of systematizing his work with reference to certain metaphysical problems. . . . " Bentley, no more than Nietzsche, would suffer the placement of metaphysical props which satisfy the writer, gratify his ego, or support his own or his society's prejudices. We almost hear him say in serene Laplacean tones, "I have no need of such hypotheses."

Although avowing compassion for those poor "unfortunates" who must continue to live in a dream world of religion or moralism or ideology, Bentley boldly takes up residence in a world of process where all is movement and flow, and where one must find stability as best one can by scientific means alone. Bentley is determined to dwell there without Tinker Bell, in the conviction that the most heinous scientific crime is to keep one's hallucinations alive by soliciting the applause of the intellectually impoverished.

In Bentley's scheme men, whether singly or in company, are not the starting point; only the *actions* of men are givens. The task of the investigator is to describe the relation of certain activities to certain other activities. It was Bentley's ultimate purpose to make "the best available statement" of these relations, for to do so is to assure that "scientific study will have been carried to the farthest possible point." Statement and not explanation is the scientific goal. The object of analysis is not, as in Plato, to make analogous the principles of soul and of state or to manipulate one as a "cause" of the other, but to *identify* them even while retaining the *discreteness* of the actual materials, in order that one might be in a position to state all relations in a part of them, and a part of them in all of them. It was meaning and comprehensiveness Bentley was after, and not explanation by any particular content. Content itself is at best a single manifestation of the whole. Upon the foundation of such a theory of "social life stated in terms of activity" scientists would one day be able to erect "a coherent system of measurements." "The complete description," he declared, "will mean the complete science, in the study of social phenomena, as in any other field. There will be no more room for animistic 'causes' here than there." But Bentley failed to reckon with two things which would frustrate his vision and coagulate the amazing fluidity of his thought. The first was his inability to express his concept of process in terms comprehensible to political scientists; the second, the determination on the part of his disciples to remain in the warm security of the nest until the disconcerting and even threatening flow of process had been arrested in their books and papers.

The tool which Bentley fashioned was process analysis, his examples were chosen from group activities. This choice, coupled with the difficulty of expressing his vision with any specificity, sealed the fate of his theory. Who says "Bentley" says "group." While certainly a ubiquitous term, "process" has not become a genuine concept in political science.

This may be seen in the history of the reception accorded *The Process of Government* itself. Its first reviewer obviously did not understand it. Or perhaps he did and recognized, at least implicitly, that he himself was a target of Bentley's assault. James W. Garner wrote in this REVIEW that the work was trivial. "A hasty reading of some of the chapters," he stated, "fails to impress the reviewer with their value as a contribution to the literature of political science. . . . " But the bemused or hostile reviewer was not the only one guilty of a hasty reading. One possible way to account for the triumph of "group" over "process" is by postulating a universal impatience, even among Bentley's followers, with Part I of *The Process of Government*, the exclusively theoretical part of the work. By 1950 when Bertram Gross made a fresh assessment of the contribution of the book to political science, *The Process of Government* had become a landmark and Bentley a towering figure. "If a list were made of the most important books on government to have been written in any country," Gross declared in the REVIEW, "this book would be on that list. . . . " But why? Scarcely for its expression of process. Even the title of the book failed in that particular. The reason for the high estimate of the worth of *The Process of Government* is to be found exclusively in its attention to groups. Harry Elmer Barnes had already written in 1924 that the single most important lesson to be derived from Bentley is that "the essence of all governments is the struggle of interest groups with each other." And Bentley's most influential disciple, David Truman, the very title of whose book, *The Governmental Process*, is consciously designed to suggest resonances and affinities, displays little concern over process. Fully six pages, according to the index, are devoted to definitions of "group"; none are allotted to definitions of "process," which does not even appear there as an entry. Truman acknowledges that "Bentley's 'attempt to fashion a tool'" had been "the principal benchmark" for his own thinking. Yet he does not seem to appreciate Bentley's aspirations for process as that "tool."

However valuable as a contribution to political science, and I personally judge that value to be substantial, *The Governmental Process* is not an illustration of process analysis.

A new animism, what Bentley liked to call a "thingification," enters upon the scene. What has happened since might well lead one to conclude that Bentley should be credited less with the invention of a tool, than with the introduction of still another "spook" into political science—the group. From the perspective of Bentley's vision, the splendid possibilities opened before us in *The Process of Government* have never been realized.

III

To Bentley process had meant that all is flow, all is change. Moreover, process observes no limits but comprehends both form *and* content, activity *and* position. In *Behavior Knowledge Fact*, Bentley made process expressive of "fields of influence radiating in all directions": what is content to one is process to another. Nor are institutions conceived as vessels or containers to hold activity called process, they themselves are a *part* of process. If I understand Bentley, his science foundered precisely on this extravagance: he set no boundaries whatever. One look at the title of his book is sufficient to confirm this. The words "Behavior Knowledge Fact" are simply run together; there is no punctuation to separate them. Bentley's chief problem was, characteristically, the placement of commas. In his view of the world every thing is in motion, nothing may be confined or even momentarily bracketed, all exists for change. It is no wonder that institutions and events were forever leaking through his fingers. For to think of process in Bentley's terms would mean not merely to relinquish the comfortable assumption of an unbroken continuity, nor to disavow the forces believed at work everywhere within that continuity and which provide the "cement." It would mean also the surrender of an exclusive attachment to *absolute time*, without which there might exist no continuity at all.

In the Newtonian system, whose manifestations in political science Bentley had placed under direct challenge by his rejection of determinism, time had been absolute. Newton declared in his first *Scholium:* "Absolute, true, and mathematical time, of itself, and from its own nature, flows equably without relation to anything external." But the formulas of special relativity demonstrate that while two events often appear as happening one after the other, tempting us to regard the first as having induced the second, they may actually remain causally unrelated. And Bentley had spent many an exasperating hour investigating the implications of relativity for man and his world. He even wrote a book about it. Causality, to be sure, is still useful in defining an order for the time sequence. Normally an order is constructed such that an event considered as a cause is taken as earlier than the event representing the effect. But order means just that: it is a purely theoretical arrangement, and permits two distinct directions equally admissible. Consequently, no unique direction of time may be assigned once for all by means of causality.

There are numerous accounts, usually in books on the philosophy of science, in which time is treated as a reflection of universal psychological experience, a preference which we ourselves project from our inner lives onto objects and events in the external world. Only when we are prepared to acknowledge as much, we are told, will we be ripe for alternative ways of conceiving time. There is no question that it is tremendously difficult to relinquish set ways of looking at the world. But that is precisely the point: our psychological experience is scarcely a matter of orderly occurrence through time or neat sequences of events. Acausality vies with causal modes of thought, atemporality challenges temporality, a vague impression of simultaneity invades even our fully conscious moments. Which might help account for the uncompromising order we insist upon projecting onto the world about us. We dread that dissolution into "function" about which Bentley dreamed, the terrifying disappearance of the "firm land of 'matter' or even of 'sense' or 'self' " which he welcomed as an opportunity. Perhaps rather than reflecting our psychological experience, temporality is an effort to escape his intolerable "floating cosmology." Bentley would thrust us back upon ourselves, would give neither himself nor us any rest but would have us all gaze with the merciless eye of the detached scientist straight through the barriers which we ourselves have thrown up for our own protection. There has been, to put it mildly, a certain reluctance to cooperate, which is perhaps the sign of a canny wisdom. For given a multiplicity of time-order sequences darting every which way, the problems raised are not of the sort to rest easily with a weak constitution.

For one thing, it is conceivable that there exists a certain "autonomy" of action within process, not excluding political process. If descriptions of the neural net give any indication, we might expect that following "stimulation" certain political activities will cease while others will continue. Concretely, there is no reason to believe, *on the basis strictly of process thinking*, that all or even many aspects in the political life of a new nation will reflect recent industrialization. Activation might well cease abruptly in one segment but "radiate" almost indefinitely in another. Nor is there any reason to anticipate a uniform rate of change or development. In fact, however intimately related, even causally connected they appear, it may be that within the very same system activities of a critical nature are taking place in utter freedom of one another but not without reference to still a further activity, as yet unspecified. And that is just the beginning.

Agreed that the difficulties to be confronted once a notion of absolute time is relinguished are enormous, how promising is the determination to hold to absolute time, while attempting with the other hand to alter the mode of causality it seems to demand? For the causal mode *has* been altered in much of political science, as time stands still. The result has been some rather curious causal hybrids, most of which succeed in accounting for nothing by the expedient of accounting for everything. All left unexplained by process may be squared by reaching back into time for this proximate event, that influential actor, some peculiar institution, in the manner of a Newtonian force theorist. Should probability—one of the most efficient instruments of process analysis—fail, then "probableness" is coaxed onto the stage. From a sentence which sets forth probabilities we are led to another which asserts that such-or-such *probably* occurred, even that it was *probably* the cause. For discrepancies which occur now must be eliminated now. One obvious way is to seek out some hitherto undisclosed "force." Or a discrepancy may be tolerated, even welcomed, as is frequently the practice in survey research, by resort to the authority of "the deviant case." In strict process terms this procedure is far from satisfactory. What the investigator has done is to "cut in" on flow F at point P at moment T, and discover an apparent discrepancy. But if the possibility be conceded that not all of the activities comprising the flow within the system under investigation possess an identical "velocity," or that the direction of the time-order sequence is the same for each and every one, how can the analyst be sure that the deviant is "ahead" or "behind," to one "side" or the other, in "motion" at all? Lacking a satisfactory concept of time function, he too must fall back upon social "forces," economic "forces," psychological "forces."

Not that there is any quarrel with explanation by forces. It is just that such explanation posits characteristics incompatible with those demanded by a process model. And today all political scientists are process men. The catch is that few of us possess the patience and, what is more, the tolerance of ambiguity and possibly disorder, to allow process the freedom to flow. Despite such labels as the political process, the judicial process, the legislative process, the administrative process, process itself has been denied reality.

The preoccupation of much of political science today appears instead to be with the discovery and description of the peculiar solder welding the seams of a continuous polity. A search of some of the key terms in its vocabulary will serve to confirm this. If purpose, community, sovereignty are relics of a bygone day, they stemmed nevertheless from the same theoretical impulse as consensus, socialization, or equilibrium. Axiom: the political is continuous. Hypothesis: continuity is assured by consensus. Observation: consensus does not exist, at least to the extent and in the intensity sufficient to the effect. Strategy: redefine consensus, or substitute for it coherence of leadership traits in major discrete political groupings, or conformity of socialization patterns. The point is that there exists a tenacious belief first, in the preference of nature for the continuous and second, in the purpose of political science, once having located the cement, to analyze its internal chemistry. Today it is consensus or socialization, tomorrow ideology or authority. The design is the same; only the names have been changed to protect us in our innocence.

On close examination the process about which we make such a hullabaloo turns out to be a rather homey process indeed, conveniently continuous in terms both of force and time, and miraculously free of the puzzling but significant leaps we are led to expect from a model based upon this unique way of seeing the world, whether in the arts or the sciences, or in political science.

Bentley, as well as Van Gogh or Nietzsche, hungered for meaning, yet he recognized that if meaning is to escape arbitrariness, it cannot, whatever the motive—whether anxiety, a concern for symmetry, or impatience—simply be imposed from above, but must stem from an intimate acquaintance with the political process itself. One has to stay with process a little, to learn its ways before issuing to it commands of obedience. To insist beforehand upon a definite order is tantamount to the discovery of that order, and a guarantee of safe and swift passage back to the familiar. Bentley surely possessed the genius, and the rhetorical power, to have forced his own preferred regularities upon political behavior once the continents and the islands had gone. By so doing he might have allayed our fears, but at the price of discouraging us from investigating some of the most fascinating characteristics of our political universe which, for all Bentley could tell, might even include such wonders as relativity and indeterminacy. The irony is that those, whether group theorists or systems analysts, who speak most engagingly about process and identify most readily with the intellectual style it appears to generate, should share so little of Bentley's vision, which was a vision in favor of release and against all premature foreclosures. That is what the opening, critical, section of *The Process of Government* is all about. Spencer, Jhering, Ward and the rest are criticized not just for advocating explanatory theories far too formal and remote from reality, but for hastening to shrink a rich and complex world to the dimensions suitable to molds of their own making. To state it as bluntly as possible, Bentley's maxim seems to have been this: meaning cannot be posited, it must be earned.

It has been a long time since the painters smashed their windows, the poets splintered their ladders, the writers and dramatists fractured our language, and the physicists successfully challenged an imperious determinism, and here we are. Perhaps it is time for us to return to the destructive genius of Bentley's work, to lift his powerful sling and break a few windows of our own. Who knows, the chaos out there which now looms so terrifying that we must switch it off before observing the brilliance of its colors or listening to the whir of its motion, might be less threatening than we are at present disposed to believe. Besides, fresh air is bracing to the spirit.

THE FOUR PARADOXES OF NUCLEAR STRATEGY

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The nuclear age has ushered in a novel period of history, as distinct from the age that preceded it as the modern age has been from the Middle Ages or the Middle Ages have been from antiquity. Yet while our conditions of life have drastically changed under the impact of the nuclear age, we still live in our thoughts and act through our institutions in an age that has passed. There exists, then, a gap between what we think about our social, political, and philosophic problems and the objective conditions which the nuclear age has created.

This contradiction between our modes of thought and action, belonging to an age that has passed, and the objective conditions of our existence has engendered four paradoxes in our nuclear strategy: the commitment to the use of force, nuclear or otherwise, paralyzed by the fear of having to use it; the search for a nuclear strategy which would avoid the predictable consequences of nuclear war; the pursuit of a nuclear armaments race joined with attempts to stop it; the pursuit of an alliance policy which the availability of nuclear weapons has rendered obsolete. All these paradoxes result from the contrast between traditional attitudes and the possibility of nuclear war and from the fruitless attempts to reconcile the two.

I

It is no exaggeration to state that both the United States and the Soviet Union have ruled out force in its nuclear form as an instrument of their national policies. Neither of the nuclear powers is willing to use nuclear weapons to achieve its ends. The United States has declared the unification of Germany and the liberation of the nations of Eastern Europe as objectives of its foreign policy; but it has also emphatically ruled out the use of force to achieve them. Similarly, the Soviet Union is committed to the communization of the world but has ruled out the use of force to that end.

More particularly, both nuclear powers refrain from taking steps in pursuit of their ends, which might provoke the other side to resort to force, especially in its nuclear form. Thus the United States declared at the outset of the Hungarian revolution in 1956 that it would not intervene and gave as reason that very fear of nuclear war. The Soviet Union has repeatedly—and twice in the form of ultimatums—called for a change in the status of West Berlin but has refrained from the use of violence for that purpose. In the Korean War, both sides refrained from committing, qualitatively or quantitatively, more than a fraction of their resources and from exploiting their strategic opportunities to the full, and thus granted "privileged sanctuaries" to each other, fearful as each was lest one provoke the other to resort to nuclear force. Similarly, during the Cuban crisis of October 1962, both sides went as far as they dared to go without compelling the other side to take steps which might lead to nuclear war. For this reason, United States authorities were satisfied with the success of the "quarantine" in removing the so-called "offensive" weapons from Cuba, and did not dare to press their advantage to the point of eliminating the Russian presence from Cuba altogether. And for the same reason, the Soviet Union did not attempt to break the quarantine and yielded to the American insistence on the removal of its "offensive" missiles.

However, this consistent restraint in action is belied by as consistent a verbal commitment to the use of violence, especially in its nuclear form, in certain contingencies. Thus the United States has time and again declared that it is resolved to defend its presence in Berlin by all means required, nuclear weapons included. In November 1956, on the occasion of the Franco-British invasion of Egypt, the Soviet Union threatened Great Britain and France with nuclear war, and the Soviet Union has time and again made similar threats against the United States and one or the other of its allies. Yet how seriously must these mutual threats be taken?

In view of what is known to both sides of the probable consequences of nuclear war, these threats can obviously not be taken at their face value. On the other hand, in view of the importance of some of the interests at stake, in view of the massive preparations for nuclear war on both sides and the military doctrines supporting them, and in view of the impossibility of responding to an armed attack upon some of these interests by any other but nuclear force, these threats cannot be dismissed as empty either. Thus in the successive Berlin crises, for instance, the United States and the Soviet Union tried to convince each other that they were irrational enough to incur their own destruction by supporting their respective positions with nuclear force, assuming at the same time that the other side would be rational enough not to provoke such an irrational reaction. We are here in the presence of the mechanics of mutual deterrence.

The threat of nuclear force has taken on a function which is novel at least in its exclusiveness. Traditional force is an instrument for breaking the will of the opponent either through successful defense or attack; its primary function lies in the effectiveness of its physical application. But the primary function of nuclear force lies in making its physical application superfluous by deterring the prospective opponent from using it. While traditional force operates psychologically through the intermediary of actual physical employment, nuclear force has a psychological function pure and simple. The prospective opponents are kept constantly aware of the inevitability of their own destruction should they resort to nuclear force, and this awareness prevents them from resorting to it.

In the pre-nuclear age the threat and the counterthreat of force could always be, and frequently were, put to the test of actual performance, and either the threat or the counterthreat was then proved to be empty. In the nuclear age, the very purpose of threat and counterthreat is to prevent the test of actual performance from taking place. The appearance of possessing both the ability and the resolution to make good threat and counterthreat becomes, then, of paramount importance as a condition for the success of mutual deterrence.

The nature of this condition, it will be noted, is political rather than military, for what is essential is the *appearance*, not the reality, of possessing the ability and resolution to make good threat and counterthreat. In order to make mutual deterrence work, two nations need only create the mutual belief that they are willing and able to destroy each other in nuclear war. As long as this belief exists, it is irrelevant whether or not the reality corresponds to it. In other words, the mechanics of mutual deterrence require an element of bluff, either real or suspect.

At this point, a most serious political dilemma arises. No nation can afford to yield to a threat of nuclear war that is only a bluff; nor can it afford to stand up to a threat that turns out not to be a bluff. Miscalculation is bound to be fatal either to the interests of the nation threatened if it yields to the bluff, or to its existence if it stands up to a nuclear threat that is not a bluff. Yet—and here is the dilemma—a nation cannot determine with certainty when the other side is bluffing without the test of actual performance—a test which it is the very purpose of mutual deterrence to avoid. Deterrence has thus far worked only because there has remained in the minds of both sides a doubt as to whether the other side was really bluffing. Or, to put it the other way around, both sides were able to give the threat of nuclear war at least a certain measure of plausibility.

This plausibility is bound to be affected by repetitive threats of nuclear war, and it is likely to be affected in the negative. A nation which has stopped at a certain point, far short of its goal, because it was afraid of a nuclear response that did not materialize, is likely to be just a little bit less timid when it must gauge the enemy's intentions at the next confrontation. Having stopped the first time at three paces from what it thought was the brink, it may well calculate that it can afford now to take another halfstep forward and still remain at a safe distance. If its calculation turns out to be correct, it may well be tempted at the third confrontation to take another halfstep forward, and so forth, so that either the margin of safety between the threat of nuclear war and its actuality will narrow with every confrontation or the likelihood of nuclear response will decrease with every retreat by the challenged nation.

This process of erosion is likely to result from the very dynamics of mutual deterrence. With every demonstration of its emptiness, the nuclear threat will lose a measure of its plausibility. In consequence, it will lose a measure of its restraining effect. Inherent in that dynamics is, then, a dual escalation, one feeding upon the other: the ever-diminishing plausibility of the nuclear threat and ever bolder challenges to make good on it. The effects of deterrence are likely to decrease with the frequency of its use, to the point where, as it were, the psychological capital of deterrence has been nearly expended and the policy of deterrence will be close to bankruptcy. When they reach that point, the nations concerned can choose one of three alternatives: resort to nuclear war, retreat, resort to conventional war.

The alternative of conventional war appears to be the only rational one. It seems to assure the nations concerned a chance both to survive and to pursue their national objectives. However, the paradox of the use of force in the nuclear age is not limited to nuclear war; rather it impedes the use of conventional force as well, even though—under certain conditions—to a lesser degree. For the neat distinction between conventional and nuclear force which the theoreticians of conventional war make, and its advocates imply, is valid only on the condition that the stakes of a conventional conflict are small enough to make defeat or stalemate acceptable without recourse to nuclear weapons. Korea was a case in point and so is Vietnam. Yet Berlin and Cuba are not, and it is doubtful whether Korea would be today. It is relatively safe for nuclear powers to resort to conventional force only if they bring that force to bear upon an issue which is either limited by nature, such as geography, or can be limited politically by the will of the parties to the conflict. The limitation upon the use of force, then, corresponds to the limited character of the issue; and win, lose, or draw, the parties will not commit to the conflict more than a deliberately limited force.

It is not necessary to demonstrate that few issues on behalf of which the nuclear powers might resort to violence are thus limited by nature or could be kept by the belligerents indefinitely on a sufficiently low level of priorities. Most issues are either so important from the outset or acquire such importance through accidents, miscalculations, or the dynamics of the conflict itself that neither side could reconcile itself to defeat without having used a maximum of force to stave it off. Once force has been committed to such an issue on however small a scale, the risk of escalation is ever present, first quantitatively within conventional force itself and then qualitatively from conventional to nuclear force. Thus the awareness of the irrationality of nuclear war—which, as we have seen, impedes the resort to nuclear force—also stands in the way of the use of conventional force in so far as the latter might be preparatory to resort to the former.

The immensity of the military force which the nuclear age has generated goes hand in hand with the devaluation of its practical use. The more endowed a nation is with military force, the less is it able to use that force. Non-nuclear nations have shown themselves to be much less inhibited in the use of military force than nuclear powers; for the risk of escalation presented by the intervention of one of the nuclear powers with nuclear weapons is likely to be remote. The nuclear powers are inhibited in the use of force not only in relation to each other but also in their relations to non-nuclear powers because of the ever present risk that another nuclear power may use force on behalf of the other side. Thus while the discrepancy between the strong and the weak is today much more pronounced than it has ever been in history—the United States, for instance, being much more powerful *vis-à-vis* Cuba than it has ever been—it is exactly this disproprotion which renders the powerful impotent in the fulness of their power.

II

The second paradox arising from the operation of traditional policy in the nuclear age is presented by the idea of limited nuclear war. This idea has appeared in different manifestations in different periods, such as the "clean" H-bomb, which produces no significant fallout, tactical nuclear war, graduated deterrence with "firebreaks" between the stages, counterforce strategy. All these manifestations have one quality in common: the desire to reconcile the use of nuclear weapons with the admitted irrationality of all-out nuclear war and the attempt, inspired by this desire, to discover a rational way to use them. Each of these attempts has been supported by a vast body of learned and sophisticated literature dedicated to the demonstration of its rationality and feasibility, and each has been discarded after a while to be replaced by a new one. What has remained constant is the urge to reconcile the irreconcilable and to find a way of waging nuclear war without incurring one's own destruction. Thus we have been in search of a method of waging nuclear war in the conventional manner so that nuclear war may produce conventional, that is, rational and tolerable consequences.

However, the enormous destructiveness natural to nuclear weapons upon which the dynamics of warfare is brought to bear makes the rationalization of nuclear war, however attempted, a hopeless undertaking. Hardly anything needs to be said of the "clean" bomb, now deservedly half-forgotten, which merely introduces a modification into the overall destructiveness of nuclear weapons, without affecting the destructiveness itself.[1]

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[1] *The Effects of Nuclear Weapons* (Washington, G.P.O., 1962), p. 435 f., published under the joint auspices of Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission, has written the epitaph to this piece of science fiction: "The terms 'clean' and 'dirty' are often used to describe the amount of radioactivity produced by a fusion weapon (or hydrogen bomb) relative to that from what might be described as a 'normal' weapon. The latter may be defined as one in which no special effort has been made either to increase or to decrease the amount of radioactivity produced for the given explosion yield. A 'clean' weapon would then be one which is designed to yield

Both tactical nuclear war and graduated deterrence presuppose three capabilities on the part of the belligerents: the rational ability to deduce the intentions of the enemy from his use of nuclear weapons, the rational ability to know exactly at every moment of the war what kind of nuclear weapon it is necessary and prudent to use, and the practical ability to impose the limitations so determined upon all nuclear command posts. Both tactical nuclear war and graduated deterrence require a rational and reliable interplay of the intentions and actions of the belligerents, an interplay which theoreticians may calculate in the form of "models" but which it is impossible to achieve consistently in reality. That impossibility derives from three factors: the essential ambiguity of the military act (which it of course shares with the political act), uncertainty about the enemy's intentions, and the enormous and irreparable risks, in nuclear war, of mistakes in interpretation.

When does a nuclear attack serve a tactical, and when a strategic, purpose? In the case, say, of the interruption by force of our communications with Berlin or of a civil war between East and West Germany, we probably intend to use tactical nuclear weapons at the beginning of the conflict, escalating our nuclear commitment to the point at which the enemy will desist, and we expect the Soviet Union to respond in kind. We would initially select strictly military targets, such as concentrations of troops and military equipment and missile sites, and try to interdict the enemy communications and logistics by aiming at civilian targets with a preponderant military significance, such as airports, railroad stations, bridges, and the like—intending to spare civilian targets, such as population and industrial centers. But how would the enemy react if we were to hit one of these civilian targets, either by accident or because of the close proximity of a military target? Would he hit a civilian target of ours in retaliation—and how would we react to that?—or would he continue to limit himself to the choice of military targets?

But even if he does the latter, the asymmetry of the tactical situation on both sides is bound to blur the distinction between the tactical and the strategic uses of nuclear weapons. Let us suppose, for instance, that the Soviet Union were to pursue in Central Europe tactical aims analogous to ours. Yet although in pursuit of such aims we could afford to spare population centers because of the location of our targets, the Soviet Union might need to designate the Atlantic ports of NATO as tactical military targets, destroying in the process population and industrial centers. What interpretation would we put upon such an action, and how would we react to it? We might take out a number of Soviet or satellite cities in retaliation, and how would the Soviet Union react to that?

These choices would not be made, it must be emphasized against what seems to be the prevailing academic opinion, in the detached and rational manner in which chess players make their choices. Rather they would be made against the doubly threatening background of the enemy's uncertain intentions and the ever-increasing stakes of the war. It is not too difficult to ascertain the enemy's intentions when a war is fought after the model of the Korean War in a geographically limited area for secondary stakes and with non-nuclear weapons. But even there we utterly misjudged the Chinese intentions once our conduct of the war had greatly increased the Chinese stakes; and we misjudged similarly the place the Korean War occupied in the world-wide strategy of the Soviet Union when we interpreted it as the opening move in a campaign seeking the military conquest of the world.

The assessment of enemy intentions becomes a guessing game carrying extreme risks in a war, such as the one we have stipulated for Europe, which has left narrow limits of geography, stakes, and weapons behind. We have put simultaneously and successively the most divergent interpretations upon the Soviet intentions concerning Berlin, ranging all the way from mere bluff through the consolidation of the East German regime and the testing of our intentions to gaining control of West Germany. Soviet intentions have no doubt changed in response to the Soviet interpretation of our intentions. In the course of actual hostilities, however, both sides will try, on the one hand, to impress each other with the firmness of certain of their intentions, real or feigned, in accordance with the requirements of deterrence and, on the other, to conceal other intentions

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significantly less radioactivity than an equivalent normal weapon. It should be noted, however, that a clean fusion weapon would inevitably produce some radioactive species. Even if a pure fusion weapon, with no fission, should be developed, its explosion in air would still result in the formation of carbon-14 and possibly other neutron-induced activities. If special steps were taken in the design of a fusion device, e.g., by salting (9.11), so that upon detonation it generated more radioactivity than a similar normal weapon, it would be described as 'dirty.' By its very nature, a fission weapon must be regarded as being dirty."

from each other, in accordance with the requirements of warfare. The intertwining of these two requirements will make the ascertainment of the enemy's intentions a hopelessly irrational game of chance.

This game would be played in a nuclear war for the highest stakes imaginable: the survival of the belligerents. In consequence, the assessment of enemy intentions will be driven by irresistible pressure, legitimate within the context of nuclear war, toward assuming the worst and avoiding the common mistake of underrating the enemy. This happened under relatively favorable conditions, as concerns the immediate stakes and pressures, when we evaluated the place of the Korean War in the overall Russian intentions in such sweeping—and erroneous—terms that we embarked upon a policy of massive rearmament, far in excess of what was required by the local situation in Korea. Neither side could be expected—nor would it be justified—to give the enemy the benefit of the doubt in the initial stages of limited nuclear war and thereby risk its own destruction. Both sides are likely to convince themselves that their best chance to emerge from the war without fatal damage lies in destroying the enemy's retaliatory capability, or at the least his will to continue the war, by a first strike. Thus escalation is, as it were, built into the very dynamics of nuclear war, as the maximization of violence is built into the dynamics of any war. Once a limited nuclear war has started, escalation is not a matter of choice. Short of stopping the war itself, escalation cannot be avoided. Both the logic of deterrence, in the face of the ambiguities of responses and the uncertainties of intentions, and the expanding stakes of the war require it.

These considerations apply with particular force to a specific purpose graduated deterrence is intended to serve: the provision of a "pause" between conventional or tactical nuclear war, on the one hand, and all-out nuclear war, on the other. Before the belligerents plunge into self-destruction through all-out nuclear war, it is intended that they be given a chance to reflect, to pull back, and to negotiate a settlement. Yet such a "pause," assuming its feasibility, is an ambiguous device. The more the belligerents will rely upon a "pause" between tactical and all-out nuclear war, the more readily they will make the transition from conventional to tactical nuclear war. In other words, the assumption of a "pause" between tactical and all-out nuclear war increases the likelihood of escalation from conventional to tactical nuclear war. However, even if one shares the optimistic assumption that a war for major stakes could develop in such rationally definable stages so that the progression of the war would be determined by a succession of conscious rational choices, the belligerents, once they have arrived at the brink of all-out nuclear war, would have to be absolutely certain of each other's resolution to stop there. Such resolution cannot be taken for granted in view of the very great advantages of a surprise first strike, emphasized by Russian strategic doctrine. How could such intentions be ascertained?

They can only be ascertained by facts, that is, deeds and circumstances which, as we have seen, are even more uncertain and ambiguous in war than they are in peace. The direct teletype connection, the so-called "hot-line," established in 1963 between Washington and Moscow, serves the purpose of clarifying the intentions of both sides in times of crisis. *The New York Times* of April 6, 1963 quoted Administration officials as having "expressed hope that an always ready 'hot-line' would help prevent misunderstanding and accidents at a moment of peril." Yet such a technical device used for political purposes partakes of the ambiguity of the political act. A direct communications link between the White House and the Kremlin could indeed be used for the beneficial purposes indicated by official statements. But it could also be used for purposes quite different. Imagine for a moment that there had existed such a direct communications link between the White House and the Imperial Palace in Tokyo on December 6, 1941. This would have afforded the Japanese government a splendid opportunity to conceal its intentions from the government of the United States.

The fundamental problem that the attempts at rationalizing and "conventionalizing" nuclear war pose will not be solved by a technical contrivance, such as the "hot-line." That problem simply reappears here in a new technological setting. The "hot-line" does not answer the question, which in the nature of things appears to be unanswerable: will nations, already engaged in a war for high stakes and publicly committed to certain objectives, have the moral courage, the intellectual assurance, and rational control to stop short of all-out nuclear war? The best answer one can give is that it is unlikely but not impossible that they will be able to do so. But that is not a good enough answer when the existence of great nations and the fate of civilizations is at stake.

Finally, the idea of limited nuclear war is predicated upon the ability of the supreme military authorities to hold all nuclear command posts consistently to the limits decided upon. Yet, however centralized the decision to start a nuclear war might be—a moot question into which we shall not enter here—the choice of weapons and targets in the course of the war must at least to some considerable degree lie in the hands of local commanders. Their judgment will in good measure determine the limits of the nuclear war. It is certainly utopian to expect that all, without exception and always, will assess correctly the different factors discussed above and thereby preserve the limits the central authorities have decided upon and thus prevent escalation. It is in all likelihood unduly optimistic to expect that even a considerable number will consistently make such correct assessments. It is much more probable, given the experience of previous wars and the natural tendency of the military decision toward the maximization of violence, that the decentralized choice of targets and weapons will powerfully reinforce the objective tendencies toward escalation to which we have already referred. Professor Oskar Morgenstern's proposal, rationally unexceptionable, to train local commanders in the making of correct decisions for a nuclear war[2] could at best mitigate somewhat these deficiencies; for the latter are in the last analysis the subjective manifestations of objective factors which are bound to frustrate the making of correct assessments on all levels of the political and military hierarchy.

More particularly, in view of past experience, it cannot be assumed that local commanders, even if they were intellectually equipped to make the correct assessments, will always have the will to make them. For military commanders have a natural desire to win victories by smashing the enemy rather than to maintain a stalemate by inflicting carefully measured damage. Thus the natural bias of military commanders presents still another argument against the possibility of holding the military hierarchy consistently to the limits on nuclear war decided upon by the central authorities.

The most consistent attempt thus far at conceiving a nuclear war after the model of a conventional one is the conception of counter-force strategy. As Secretary of Defense McNamara put it in his Commencement Address at the University of Michigan on June 16, 1962: "The United States has come to the conclusion that to the extent feasible, basic military strategy in a possible general nuclear war should be approached in much the same way that more conventional military operations have been regarded in the past. That is to say, principal military objectives, in the event of a nuclear war stemming from a major attack on the Alliance, should be the destruction of the enemy's military forces, not of his civilian population."

It is the distinctive characteristic of counter-force strategy that it expands the sphere of attempted rationalization from tactical into strategic nuclear war. It seeks to use nuclear bombs for pin-point attacks after the model of conventional ones and assimilate the strategic use of missiles to that of long-range artillery. An all-out nuclear war would then be fought, to quote Mr. McNamara again, "against all of the enemy's vital nuclear capabilities." The belligerents would then emerge from such a war shaken and wounded but with their societies essentially intact. If such a counter-force strategy were feasible the belligerents at the end of a nuclear war fought on such principles would be better off than Germany was at the end of World War II, subjected as she had been to conventional saturation bombing. However, four arguments militate against the feasibility of a counter-force strategy.

First of all, World War II showed that the expansion of the list of legitimate military targets under the impact of total war has made the traditional distinction between military and non-military targets tenuous in theory and untenable in practice. Railroad stations and factories, for instance, have become legitimate military targets, and they were attacked and destroyed as such during the Second World War. Yet, as a rule, large expanses of non-military targets in the surrounding areas were destroyed as well. It can of course be argued that missiles are more reliable instruments for pin-point attack than bombs dropped from airplanes by humans, who during the Second World War frequently dropped their bombs in the vicinity of, rather than on, the military target because of the hazards of the latter's antiaircraft protection. But the greater precision of the missiles is offset by the enormously increased range of the destructiveness of their warheads. For this reason alone, counter-force strategy would be feasible only on the assumption that all military targets were isolated from population centers by the number of miles sufficient to protect the latter from the destructive effects of a nuclear attack upon the former.

Yet even if one assumes for the sake of argument that all Russian military targets are of that nature, an obvious asymmetry differentiates their location from the location of our nuclear installations. Thus, supposing it were technically feasible for us to pursue a counter-force strategy against the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union would be unable to do so even if it wanted to. Many of our nuclear installations are in the vicinity of cities, and it could not attack the former without risking the destruction of the latter. It could not attack—to give only one concrete example—our missile installations in the vicinity of Cheyenne and Phoenix without for all practical purposes attacking these cities. If this should happen, we would be faced, on the level of strategic nuclear war, with the same dilemma which we discussed in connection with tactical nuclear war.

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[2] "How to Plan to Beat Hell," *Fortune*, Vol. 67 (January, 1963), no. 1.

Second, another asymmetry which renders counter-force strategy unfeasible concerns the nuclear arsenal at the disposal of the United States and the Soviet Union. Counter-force strategy is predicated upon the availability of a highly diversified nuclear arsenal, each weapon appropriate in kind and yield to its target. The United States is supposed to possess such a nuclear arsenal while the Soviet Union is not. The Soviet Union is supposed to have compensated for the lack of diversity and quantity of its nuclear arsenal by relying for intercontinental strategic purposes upon a relatively small number of high-yield weapons in the tens-of-megatons range. So although it may be possible to limit destruction from, say, a one-megaton weapon to an isolated military target—provided such a target is available—there is no American nuclear installation which could be made the target for a Russian ten-, twenty- or fifty-megaton device without increasingly large civilian centers being affected. Thus, assuming we were technically able, in view of the location of our targets and the quantity and diversification of our nuclear arsenal, to pursue a counter-force strategy, the Soviet Union, because of the location of its targets and the nature of its nuclear weapons system, would be unable to do so even if it had a mind to. Since counter-force strategy is predicated upon reciprocity—in the words of Mr. McNamara, "We are giving a possible opponent the strongest imaginable incentive to refrain from striking our own cities"—this dual asymmetry makes it impossible for the Soviet Union "to refrain from striking our own cities" and, hence, makes the conduct of a counter-force strategy unprofitable on our part.

Third, apart from the asymmetry of targets and weapons, counter-force strategy is also negated by an asymmetry in fundamental strategic position. An effective counter-force strategy is inseparable from a first-strike strategy. The nuclear installations of the two major nuclear powers are composed of two types: those that are vulnerable and, hence, lend themselves as targets for the counter-force and those that are relatively invulnerable, because of their location in hardened sites or, more particularly, their mobility, and can provide but marginal targets for counter-force. Nation A which pursues a counter-force strategy against nation B through a first strike will be able to cripple, if not destroy completely, B's vulnerable nuclear installations by using primarily its own vulnerable nuclear installations for that purpose. B, committed to a counter-force strategy against A through a second strike, would have to use its invulnerable nuclear installations. But against what targets of A could it use them? It could destroy soft launching sites without missiles, empty submarine berths, airfields, and factories. The damage it could do to A through a second strike would certainly be far inferior to the damage it suffered from A's first strike, and it could do so only at the price of committing unilaterally at least a fraction of its remaining and invulnerable nuclear reserve. Thus after the first nuclear exchange carried out within the limits of counter-force strategy, A has a great advantage by virtue of having been the first to strike.

The advantage of A results from a peculiarity of nuclear weapons. A launching installation, such as a gun, a cannon, or a missile pad, is an active element in the military equation only as long as ammunition is available for it to fire. The launching mechanism has lost its military usefulness when it runs out of ammunition, and the availability of ammunition stands in inverse ratio to its potency. At one extreme, the carrier of a pistol can fire his weapon hundreds of times with the ammunition he is able to carry. At the other extreme, a mobile missile carrier can be fired only once and must rely for each successive firing upon a fresh supply, which in case of war may at best be forthcoming only at uncertain and prolonged intervals. A Polaris submarine, after it has fired its salvo, loses its function as a weapons carrier until it has access to a fresh supply of missiles. Thus the active usefulness of a mobile nuclear weapon is enormous but limited to an instant, while the active usefulness of conventional weapons is much inferior in potency but extends over considerable spans of time. Or to put it into the language of conventional warfare: conventional infantry or artillery may temporarily run out of ammunition under exceptional circumstances and may lose for the time being its active military usefulness; but that mobile nuclear installations will run out of ammunition instantaneously or at least after a relatively few firings is inherent in the nature of nuclear weaponry.

By virtue of this peculiarity of nuclear weapons, A gains a military advantage if he can compel B to expend unilaterally a fraction of its invulnerable deterrent. Let us suppose—to take an over-simplified but illustrative example—that A and B each possess ten Polaris submarines and that after A's first strike B commits six of its submarines to counter-force retaliation. If A were to start the second nuclear exchange by committing four of its Polaris submarines to a selective counter-city strategy and if B were to retaliate in kind with its remaining polaris submarines, the quantitative relationship between A and B in terms of Polaris submarines at the end of the second round would be six to zero. In other words, the unilateral commitment of B's invulnerable deterrent would have resulted in a clear nuclear superiority for A. It would be irrelevant to this argument that B might have a nuclear stockpile quantitatively and qualitatively the equal or even superior to that of A. What is decisive is the destructive power of nuclear weapons deliverable at a particular moment. It is here that A's advantage lies, regardless of what B might be able to deliver a week or a month hence.

Since A and B must be aware of the advantage of a first strike before the war starts, both have an incentive to be the first to strike. Counter-city strategy would allow A and B to wait for the other side to make the first move, secure in their possession of an invulnerable nuclear deterrent and their knowledge of the unacceptable damage it could inflict upon the other side. Thus counter-city strategy, through the mechanics of mutual deterrence, minimizes the possibility of nuclear war. Counter-city strategy, as it were, expresses the inner logic of nuclear war. On the other hand, counter-force strategy, by presuming to superimpose upon the dynamics of nuclear war a pattern appropriate to conventional war, increases the likelihood of nuclear war. For it puts a premium upon preventive war and thus stimulates not the desire to prevent nuclear war but rather competition for starting one.

However, even if A did not have the advantage after its first strike—and this is the fourth and last argument against counter-force strategy—what would A and B do after the nuclear exchange? They have destroyed what counter-force strategy allows them to destroy and they now find themselves in a political and military blind alley. Wars are fought for the purpose of breaking the will of the opponent through victory in battle. Yet the predictable outcome of a nuclear war fought within the limits of counter-force strategy is stalemate. After the nuclear exchange the belligerents will find themselves—as to weapons— in the same relative position they occupied before the outbreak of the war, minus their vulnerable nuclear installations. They can of course make peace on the basis of the *status quo ante bellum*, and then the counter-force strategy will have revealed itself as a complete waste of human and material resources. Or they can continue the war with conventional means, supplemented by tactical nuclear weapons. But then they will be up against the insoluble problems posed by tactical nuclear war and already discussed above.

There is still another, and perhaps the most likely, alternative. Even if one assumes—quite unrealistically in view of the first two arguments presented here—that counter-force strategy will work during the initial nuclear exchange, the very fact of that exchange will conjure up the possibility of escalation into counter-city strategy. A will have an incentive to embark upon that course in order to exploit the advantage the first strike has given it. A may reason, rightly or wrongly, that B, by committing unilaterally a part of its invulnerable deterrent, has been at least temporarily weakened to such an extent as to give A a chance of victory. B, on the other hand, has an incentive to dissuade A from pursuing a counter-city strategy by demonstrating its ability and resolution to embark upon one itself.

Thus counter-force strategy turns out to be unfeasible as a conventional and rationally limited version of nuclear war, first, because of the inherent asymmetry of targets and weapons, secondly, because of the asymmetry between the likely effects of a first and second strike, and finally, because of the impossibility of following up the initial nuclear exchange with a politically and militarily satisfactory conclusion.

III

The quantitative and qualitative competition for conventional weapons is a rational instrument of international politics. The greater the quantity and quality of a nation's armory, the greater is obviously its material military power. This rationale of the conventional armaments race results from the limited capacity of conventional weapons in relation to the available users and targets. Nation A which possesses, say, ten percent more machine guns than nation B is, everything else being equal, militarily superior to nation B. If A has X machine guns and B has Y, then X minus Y equals the margin of A's superiority over B.

One can of course postulate hypothetically a situation in which A and B would be saturated with machine guns, so that further competition would become irrational. This condition would obtain if A and B were supplied with an abundance of machine guns in relation to the respective numbers of available arms-bearing men and required replacements. Since this condition of saturation is purely hypothetical, it is rational for A and B to compete for the quantitative and qualitative improvement of their respective supplies of machine guns.

What is as a rule hypothetical with regard to conventional weapons is an established fact in the nuclear field. Both nuclear powers claim the ability to destroy the other's society regardless of what the opponent might do, and the United States has been particularly emphatic in claiming that it could do so many times over. But since the destruction of the enemy's society, primarily by destroying its industrial and population centers, is the maximum damage to be inflicted by force of arms, quantitative and qualitative improvements in those arms can at best alter the modalities of the damage, but cannot enlarge the ability to inflict that damage itself. X, regardless of how much superior it is to Y, here equals Y. Once a nation possesses a delivery system capable of surviving a first strike and carrying nuclear warheads to all possible targets, it has reached the rational limits of nuclear armaments. There is no rational justification for continuing the nuclear armaments race after both sides have reached that limit.

But the nuclear armaments race continues, both quantitatively and qualitatively—and here is the first element of the paradox—as though the same rules of competition applied to conventional and nuclear weapons alike. The habits of thought and action which experience has taught us from the beginning of history to the end of the Second World War are being carried over into an age for which they are no longer relevant.[3] Their continuing application is being justified on two main grounds: counter-force strategy and the prospect of technological innovations.

The continuation of the nuclear armaments race follows indeed logically from the commitment to a counter-force strategy. The conventional conception of nuclear war presented by counter-force strategy demands a correspondingly conventional approach to competitive armaments. Under the assumptions of that strategy, a dynamic relationship exists between the number of targets presented by one side and the number and quality of weapons directed at those targets by the other. Given a static number of targets, an increase in the number and quality of counter-force weapons will improve the prospects of counter-force strategy. Given a static number of counter-force weapons, an increase in the number of targets will improve the prospects of the defender. Both sides have, then, an incentive to increase targets and counter-force weapons indefinitely, and the logic and dynamics of the conventional armaments race apply of necessity to the competition for nuclear arms seen in the perspective of "conventionalized nuclear war.

Yet while the logic of this argument in favor of a nuclear armaments race is unassailable, its practical validity depends upon the feasibility of counter-force strategy. Both stand and fall together. The arguments we have advanced against the feasibility of counter-force strategy, then, dispose of the rationality of a nuclear armaments race as well.

The argument in favor of a nuclear armaments race, based upon the prospect of technological progress, is bound to be speculative, as is its refutation. The argument operates in three main areas: anti-missile defense, improvement of weapons, and discovery of unknown weapons technologies.

It is a peculiarity of anti-nuclear missiles defense, in contrast to conventional anti-aircraft defense, that it is hardly worth having if it is not very close to one hundred percent effective. Effective nuclear defense has a meaning radically different from that of effective conventional defense. When more than one-sixth and one-fourth, respectively, of the attacking aircraft were incapacitated by active defense in the air raids on Schweinfurt on August 17 and October 14, 1943, the defense was deemed to have been successful since the losses were deemed to be out of proportion to the damage achieved. However, if, say, ninety percent of a missile force could be destroyed by active defense, the remaining ten percent, especially if their warheads were in the multi-megaton range, would nullify the defense by inflicting unacceptable damage upon the defender. Yet there is at present no prospect for the development of an anti-missile defense which would come even close to being one hundred percent effective.

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[3] It is of interest to note that these habits of thought and action had already become obsolescent in the period before the First World War. "From 1872 to 1913, this rigorous competition in the building up of armies went on, every government spending as much money as it could persuade its people to pay or the national economy would support . . . without, however, any corresponding increase in security being felt. In fact, the proportionate strength of the various armies was not greatly different in 1914 from what it had been in 1872, but the feeling of insecurity was much greater than it had been forty years earlier." (Bernadotte E. Schmitt, "The Origins of the First World War" in W. N. Medlicott, ed., *From Metternich to Hitler* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), pp. 186–87.

The search for an ever better and bigger nuclear arsenal is an obvious residue from the age of conventional warfare. For, as pointed out above, once a nation has the nuclear capability of destroying its enemy many times over, it is irrelevant whether it can do so, say, with a large number of low megaton weapons or a small number of multi-megaton ones. However, obsolete modes of thought and action persist. The production of plutonium is a case in point. It is agreed that we possess an enormous oversupply of plutonium, the explosive for nuclear weapons. While it would therefore be rational to stop production, the proposal has been seriously made, and at the moment of this writing is neither adopted nor rejected, to stockpile plutonium for further use. Yet while it might be rational to stockpile under certain conditions, say, gunpowder or dynamite, it is impossible to visualize a contingency under which, after nuclear exchanges have used up existing weapons, an opportunity could arise for the use of stored plutonium.

The search for improved nuclear weapons is from the outset rational only in so far as it is aimed at the invulnerable nuclear deterrent of the enemy. A nation which could render these installations vulnerable would have gained a decisive military advantage. It is theoretically conceivable to destroy an invulnerable deterrent by blanketing large expanses of land and sea with multi-megaton nuclear devices, and it may even be practical in so far as a distant land mass is concerned. But it is totally impractical with regard to the seaborne nuclear deterrent. For here the nuclear forces of several nations in the nature of things do not operate either from fixed locations or at least clearly defined separate territories but move and intermingle in unpredictable constellations. No improved nuclear weapons system can be expected to be able to distinguish between friendly and hostile seaborne installations. Thus the seaborne nuclear deterrent is likely to remain invulnerable in the foreseeable future.

Finally, no rational weapons policy can be based upon the expectation that another revolution in the technology of war will occur, of which the present gives no indication. The relation between pure science and weapons technology is quite different from that which obtained in the 1930s. Then the theoretical achievements of atomic physics foreshadowed at least the theoretical possibility of nuclear weapons. Achievements of contemporary pure science do not allow an analogous prognosis today. Thus while it is certainly legitimate for scientific research and technical experimentation to go on, preparing for the unexpected in nuclear weapons technology and trying to bring it about, it is as certainly futile to continue the nuclear armaments race on the basis of the scientific knowledge and technological ability both major nuclear powers have achieved.

However, our thought and action about the nuclear armaments race are not only at odds with nuclear reality, but also—and here is the other element of the paradox—with themselves. Two contradictory impulses compete for the control of our thoughts and actions. On the one hand, we embark upon a nuclear armaments race as though it were a conventional one. On the other, aware of its irrationality, we try to stop it; and sometimes an extraordinary conjunction strikingly reveals the division of our mind against itself. Thus the partial nuclear test ban treaty of 1963 has been defended simultaneously by government and private organizations alike because, on the one hand, it is supposed to be the first step toward the control of the nuclear armaments race, and on the other hand, it is supposed not to interfere in any significant manner with the nuclear armaments race we are engaged in with the Soviet Union. Public discussion centered upon the effects the treaty would have upon the ability of the United States to carry on the nuclear armaments race; the supporters of the treaty claimed that it would have no adverse effects, the opponents claimed it would. As an inducement to the Senate to ratify the treaty, the Administration had to give the most solemn assurances that ratification would not prevent it from continuing to pursue the nuclear armaments race with utmost energy.

If the analysis of the nuclear armaments race previously given is correct, then a rational policy requires the quantitative and qualitative stabilization of the present levels of nuclear armaments. This policy generally goes by the name of arms control. It is a somewhat ambiguous term in that it covers international, mutual and unilateral controls. What is essential to arms control is a yardstick, determining the level of one's own nuclear armaments, other than the level of the nuclear armaments of the prospective enemy. Arms control, then, signifies stopping one's nuclear armaments at the point where they provide an invulnerable, effective deterrent and cutting them back to that point in so far as they have exceeded it.

While it is very unlikely under present political conditions that arms control can be achieved by formal international agreement, there is good reason to believe that both the United States and the Soviet Union are practicing it. The Soviet Union, in particular, according to current estimates has produced far fewer intercontinental ballistic missiles than it was capable of producing. The "missile gap" of the late 1950s was the result of our equating productive capacity with actual production. In other words, we then thought that the Soviet Union would apply to the production of intercontinental ballistic missiles the traditional principles of the conventional armaments race rather than the principles of arms control appropriate to nuclear armaments: it would produce as many nuclear weapons as it was capable of in order to establish quantitative superiority over the United States rather than produce only as many as were necessary to establish an invulnerable, effective deterrent. The Soviet Union, having an advantage in powerful intercontinental ballistic missiles appropriate to multi-megaton warheads, could indeed achieve an invulnerable, effective deterrent with a much smaller number of delivery weapons than ours.

Similarly, the United States has foregone competition with the Soviet Union in the field of multi-megaton warheads and delivery vehicles appropriate to them, since its inferiority in this field is made good by the superior number and variety of other nuclear weapons. Thus the logic of nuclear weaponry, substituting unilateral arms control for the conventional armaments race, challenges, however haltingly and with very partial success, conventional modes of thought and action.

IV

The conflict between traditional modes of thought and action and the objective conditions of the nuclear age has nowhere had a more baffling and destructive effect than in the relations between the two major nuclear powers and their respective allies. In the pre-nuclear age, nations with certain interests in common would try to defend and promote these interests by coordinating or pooling their diplomatic and military resources. Thus nation A would go to war on behalf of the interests of nation B, or *vice versa*, when it thought the defense and promotion of the other nation's interests was in its own as well. Thereby a nation would take a double risk: it could be mistaken about the identity of the interests involved and find itself drawn into a war without its own interests being sufficiently engaged, or it could miscalculate the distribution of power on either side and allow itself to get involved in a war which it would then lose. What a nation had to guard against in its relations with its allies was a diplomatic blunder or a military miscalculation. In either of these events it would as a rule risk at worst defeat in war with the consequent loss of an army or of territory.

The availability of nuclear weapons has radically transformed these traditional relations among allies and the risks attending them. Nuclear nation A which enters into an alliance with nation B, nuclear or non-nuclear, runs a double risk different in kind from the risks facing a member of a traditional alliance. In honoring the alliance, it might have to fight a nuclear war against nuclear power C, thereby forfeiting its own existence. Or ally B may provoke a war with nuclear power C on behalf of interests other than those contemplated by the alliance and thereby force A's hand, involving it in a nuclear war on behalf of interests other than its own. That latter risk is magnified if B is also a nuclear power, of however small dimensions. If B were to threaten or attack C with nuclear weapons, C might, rightly or wrongly, consider B's military power as a mere extension of A's and anticipate and partly prevent the commitment of A through a first strike against A. Or A, anticipating C's reaction against itself or seeking to save B through nuclear deterrence, will commit its own nuclear arsenal against C. In either case, B, however weak as a nuclear power, has the ability to act as a trigger for a general nuclear war.

B, on the other hand, faces a double risk too. It may forefeit its existence in a nuclear war fought by A on behalf of its interests. Or it may find itself abandoned by A, who refuses to run the risk of its own destruction on behalf of the interests of B.

This radical difference in the risks taken by allies in the pre-nuclear age has led to a radical difference in the reliability of alliances. In the pre-nuclear age, ally A could be expected with a very high degree of certainty to come to the aid of ally B at the risk of defeat in war. In the nuclear age, ally A cannot be expected with the same degree of certainty to come to the aid of ally B at the risk of its own destruction. Here we contemplate the reverse side of the mechanics of deterrence. The very same doubt that deters C disheartens B. C cannot be certain that A will not actually forfeit its existence by resorting to nuclear war and, hence, is deterred. B, on the other hand, cannot be certain that A is willing to forfeit its existence by resorting to nuclear war and, hence, is disheartened. This three-cornered relationship offers opportunities for miscalculations more extensive and complex and, hence, more dangerous than those we encountered in the two-cornered relationship of deterrence.

The nuclear powers have endeavored to escape this dilemma of alliances carrying unacceptable risks by two diametrically opposed policies. President DeGaulle, in his press conference of January 14, 1963 and subsequent statements, has declared alliances to be for all practical purposes obsolete and has proposed to replace them with independent national nuclear deterrents. On the other hand, both the United States and the Soviet Union seek for all practical purposes to preserve the present combination of a virtual nuclear monopoly on their part with a traditional alliance system. Both these policies in different ways call into question the survival of the nuclear powers, if not of civilization itself and, hence, give no satisfactory answer to the question raised by the existence of alliances armed with nuclear weapons. They are incapable of giving such an answer because they search for it in the intellectual armory of an age which the availability of nuclear weapons has left behind.

DeGaulle proposes to assimilate nuclear weapons to conventional ones in that at least their deterrent function is to be controlled by national governments on behalf of traditional national interests. France would use its nuclear weapons, as it has used its army, navy, and air force in the past, for the purpose of exerting pressure upon a prospective enemy. The realization of such a threat raises no general problem, providing the enemy is a non-nuclear power or a nuclear one similar in rank to France. Such a problem is posed, however, if France confronts a nuclear power of the first rank, such as the United States or the Soviet Union.

Considering the industrial resources and geographic character of a nation such as France, as compared with those of the United States and the Soviet Union, an insuperable asymmetry would always exist between the nuclear threats France could address to a nuclear power of the first rank, and those the latter could address to France. France could inflict serious damage on a first-rate nuclear power without being capable, at least in the foreseeable future, of destroying it utterly; but a nuclear power of the first rank, using but a small fraction of its nuclear arsenal, could wipe France off the face of the globe. France could threaten a major nuclear power with cutting off its leg and the latter could retaliate with the threat of killing France. Yet if action were to follow these threats, France could not escape death while its enemy would have the option of minimizing damage to itself through a first strike. Thus an independent national nuclear deterrent gives a major nuclear power another incentive, in addition to those mentioned above, for a first strike, while it still further diminishes the credibility of the nuclear threat, emanating from a second-rank nuclear power.

However, deGaulle's design to use nuclear weapons as instruments of national policy increases not only the risk of local nuclear war but of general nuclear war as well. For erected into a general principle of statecraft to be followed by any number of nations, it would issue in the indiscriminate proliferation of nuclear weapons and thereby destroy the very mechanics of mutual deterrence. These mechanics repose upon the bipolarity of nuclear power. Detection systems, such as radar and sonar, are capable of identifying nuclear delivery systems in action, but they cannot identify their national identity, except in a limited way through the calculation of the projectory of land-based missiles. In consequence, retaliation requires the *a priori* determination of national identity, which bipolarity provides. Thus an anonymous explosion, caused by a seaborne delivery vehicle and destroying parts of the east coast of the United States, would automatically be attributed to the Soviet Union, calling forth nuclear retaliation. If a multiplicity of nations possessed such devices and the United States had tense relations with only two of them, such an anonymous explosion could with certainty be attributed to no one nation, however much suspicion might point to a particular one. And a new nuclear diplomacy would try its best to deflect suspicion and retaliation from the guilty to an innocent nation.

Of the three courses of action open to a nuclear power—retaliation, inaction, first strike—retaliation in the strict sense appears to be technically impossible; for in the absence of an identifiable originator of the first strike, it would have to be indiscriminate either with regard to the geographic region whence the first strike is supposed to have originated or with regard to the political entity that is supposed to have originated it. Not to retaliate in kind at all would be a rational course of action only if it were preparatory to some kind of nuclear response. Such a response would be technically a preventive first strike against a nation which, if it was not responsible for the original first strike, is deemed likely to originate one in the future.

Under such circumstances, retaliation and prevention tend to become indistinguishable, and the distinction between first and second strike becomes blurred. If A has actually originated a first strike against B, then B's nuclear response is a retaliatory second strike. But if A is only suspect, then B's action is a preventive first strike. Since all nuclear powers would have to calculate and operate in this fashion, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, implicit in deGaulle's design, would result in a political anarchy of unimaginable proportions, followed by total nuclear destruction either piecemeal or in one single catastrophe through the coincidence of a series of preventive-retaliatory blows.

Viewed against this prospect, the attempts of the United States and the Soviet Union to preserve the *status quo* of virtual nuclear bipolarity cannot but evoke sympathy. The United States and the Soviet Union have embarked upon policies which are significantly similar in that they seek to mitigate the paradox of the nuclear alliance without being able to transcend it. They risk the disintegration of their respective alliances rather than cooperate with their respective allies in nuclear proliferation. Both have strained their respective alliances to the breaking point by refusing to support France and China respectively in their attempts at acquiring nuclear weapons. Both have been instrumental in achieving a partial test-ban treaty, one of the intended and probable effects of which will be a slowing down of nuclear proliferation. The United States has in addition proposed to the members of NATO the formation of a multilateral seaborne nuclear force, which would give the participants the illusion of proliferation by leaving the decision on the use of the force in American hands.

In strictly nuclear terms, these policies move on a higher level of intellectual awareness and practical sophistication than deGaulle's design. But in strictly political terms, deGaulle has the better of the argument. Here is indeed the nub of the paradox. The use of nuclear weapons as instruments of national policies is militarily anachronistic and self-destructive. But a traditional alliance armed with nuclear weapons is politically obsolescent; for either it cannot be relied upon when the chips are down, or it gives one member power over the life and death of another member. An alliance preserving the *status quo* of virtual nuclear bipolarity cannot be accepted by the major non-nuclear nations; an alliance with more than one member armed with nuclear weapons cannot be accepted by any member thus armed; and the proliferation of nuclear weapons among isolated nations is likely to end in universal catastrophe. Thus the paradox remains unresolved, and the modes of thought and action which the nuclear powers have brought to bear upon it can at best do no more than delay its destructive effects.

The paradox of the nuclear alliance reveals perhaps more clearly than the other paradoxes of nuclear strategy the nature of the dilemma and the fatal flaw in our modes of thought and action. Any attempt, however ingenious and forward-looking, at assimilating nuclear power to the purposes and instrumentalities of the nation-state is negated by the enormity of nuclear destructiveness. We have been trying to normalize, conventionalize, and "nationalize" nuclear power. By doing so, we have tackled the wrong horn of the nuclear dilemma. Instead of trying in vain to assimilate nuclear power to the purposes and instrumentalities of the nation-state, we ought to have tried to adapt these purposes and instrumentalities to the potentialities of nuclear power. We have refrained from doing so in earnest, because to do so successfully requires a radical transformation—psychologically painful and politically risky—of traditional moral values, modes of thought, and habits of action. But short of such a transformation, there will be no escape from the paradoxes of nuclear strategy and the dangers attending them.

INTER-CONSTITUENCY MOVEMENT OF BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY CANDIDATES, 1951–1959*

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The legal or customary requirement that legislators reside in the districts they represent is one of the principal structural respects in which American legislatures differ from those of most other democracies.[1] Our legislators and party leaders commonly defend the local residence rule by claiming that it ensures that each legislator will know the special problems and desires of his constituents and thus be equipped to represent them faithfully.

Some academic commentators, on the other hand, have argued that the rule is a prime cause of the parochialism which, they say, prevents Congress and state legislatures from formulating consistent and purposive general programs.[2] These critics customarily contrast American practice unfavorably with that in Great Britain, where the last local residence rule for M.P.s was repealed in 1774.[3] In Britain, the argument runs, the absence of the rule not only minimizes localism but, even more, it enables the national party leaders to allocate their personnel resources in the most effective way. For one thing, a valued M.P.'s presence in the House of Commons is not dependent solely upon his standing with the voters in one locality. If his seat is threatened or abolished by changes in constituency boundaries, he can move to another, safer constituency. Or if he is defeated in a general election he need not wait until the next to return to the House; as soon as any safe seat anywhere is vacated by death or resignation, he can stand in the ensuing by-election. And for another thing, promising young men are not tied to the constituencies in which they happen to live; they can be given their first electoral experience fighting hopeless seats, and those who pass the test can be moved on to winnable seats.[4]

So far as the present writer has been able to discover, however, the discussion of the relative merits of American and British practices in this regard has not been unduly burdened by hard data about the incidence and circumstances of actual inter-constituency movement of British M.P.s and parliamentary candidates. Professor Philip W. Buck, to be sure, has recently informed us that between the general elections of 1918 and 1955, 42 per cent of all M.P.s and 28 per cent of all candidates "voluntarily" fought elections in more than one constituency,[5] but he is not concerned with identifying the various types of movement or the conditions in which each took place.

The present paper is intended to help fill this gap by describing candidatures mainly between the general elections of 1951, 1955 and 1959. It should be emphasized at the outset, however, that in this period most of the factors usually thought to stimulate inter-constituency movement were more quiescent than they had been for many years. In each of the three elections the Conservative party increased its share of the national popular vote and its majority in the House by small increments.[6] Only the faintest

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[1] *Cf.* the comparative summary in K. C. Wheare, *Legislatures* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 43–44.

[2] See in particular E. E. Schattschneider, *Party Government* (New York, 1942), pp. 100, 104, 143, 146–148; and George B. Galloway, *The Legislative Process in Congress* (New York, 1953), pp. 354–355.

[3] J. F. S. Ross, *Elections and Electors* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1955), p. 229.

[4] *Cf.* Henry Jones Ford, *Representative Government* (New York, 1924), pp. 165–166; Herman Finer, *Governments of Greater European Powers* (New York, 1956), p. 95; and Schattschneider, *loc. cit.*

[5] "Voluntarily" in this context means that they were not forced to change constituencies by the abolition or drastic boundary revisions of the constituencies of their first candidatures: *Amateurs and Professionals in British Politics, 1918–59* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 26.

[6] The median "swing" in the popular vote to the Conservatives from 1950 to 1951 was 1.1 per cent; from 1951 to 1955, 1.8 per cent; and from 1955 to 1959, 1.1 per cent: D. E. Butler and Richard Rose, *The British General Election of 1959* (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1960), p. 235.

TABLE I. TYPES OF CANDIDATURES, BY PARTY AND DESIRABILITY OF SEATS*

Type of Candidature	Party Candidature Percentages					
	Conservative		Labour		Liberal	
	Party winning seat in previous general election		Party winning seat in previous general election		Party winning seat in previous general election	
	Cons. (%)	Other (%)	Labour (%)	Other (%)	Liberal (%)	Other (%)
M.P. standing in constituency he already held at time of election	92	0	92	0	100	0
M.P. standing in constituency other than that he held at time of election	—†	—†	1	1	0	0
Non-incumbent standing again in constituency he had lost at preceding general election	0	20	0	21	0	24
Non-incumbent standing in constituency other than that he had lost at preceding general election	4	20	3	24	0	22
Candidate fighting his first election	4	60	4	54	0	54
	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of cases	955	862	871	987	22	413

* Data on the incumbency, previous electoral experience and other characteristics of the candidates were obtained in part from the *Times House of Commons* volumes for the three elections, and in part from the rich body of biographical data on candidates collected by David E. Butler for the Nuffield studies of the elections, and generously made available to the author.

† less than 1 per cent.

stirrings of the post-1959 Liberal revival were evident,[7] and only in Northern Ireland—a traditional home of special cases—did any other minor party candidates win seats. The boundary revision of 1954, which created 11 new constituencies, abolished 5 old ones, and made major alterations in 152 more, produced some inter-constituency movement by candidates, but far less than that caused by the far more drastic redistribution of 1948[8].

It is reasonable to suppose, accordingly, that the period studied here saw about as little inter-constituency movement as ever takes place in British politics. If this is true, we may hope that the following analysis can serve as a base-line for the study of candidate movement in other, more volatile times.

I. THE DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS AMONG TYPES OF CANDIDATES

We may assume that from the point of view of each British party the more desirable constituencies are those which it won at the preceding general election and the less desirable are those it lost. Table I shows how each of the

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In each of the three elections the Conservatives won a net gain of 23 seats.

[7] Liberals won six seats in each general election, five by incumbents being reelected each time. They lost one seat (Carmarthen) and gained one (North Devon) in 1959. The only Liberal returned by a by-election (Mark Bonham Carter at Torrington in 1958) was defeated in 1959.

[8] The redistribution of 1948 produced many more "involuntary" movements. In the general election of 1950, no less than 114 M.P.s stood in constituencies other than those they had held at the dissolution because their former seats had been abolished. Of these, 94 won and 20 lost in their new constituencies. Another 12 moved to new constituencies because boundary revisions had so drastically altered the political complections of their former seats that these no longer seemed winnable, and 11 won in their new constituencies.

three parties allocated its more and less desirable constituencies among various types of candidates in the three general elections we are considering.

Table I gives the backdrop for inter-constituency candidate movement in the 1950s. It demonstrates, first, that each of the three parties gave over 90 per cent of its candidatures in the more desirable seats to the M.P.s already holding those seats. Second, approximately one-third of all candidatures went to candidates making their first races, 40 per cent to incumbents standing again in the constituencies they held, and 12 per cent to repeaters standing again in the same constituencies they had lost in the preceding general election. So only 15 per cent of all candidatures involved any kind of inter-constituency movement, and most of them were in constituencies held by the opposition.

II. MOVEMENT BY INCUMBENT M.P.S

Table I shows that less than 1 per cent of the candidatures were by M.P.s standing in constituencies other than those they held at the dissolutions leading to the elections. Who were they and why did they want to change seats? Inspection of each of the 36 cases discloses that all but two were either forced or strongly impelled to seek new seats because the redistribution of 1955 either abolished the seats they held or so altered their boundaries that the chances of reelection seemed slim.[9] Only two M.P.s in this period moved even though the seats they held were unaltered.[10] Sir Harry Hylton-Foster, Conservative Member for York since 1950, was made Solicitor-General in 1954. For his purposes, York was both too marginal (a majority of only 1,104 in 1955) and too far from London; so in 1959 he was able to move to The Cities of London and Westminster, which was not only a geographical improvement but much safer (a Conservative majority of 18,044 in 1955). Sir Fitzroy Maclean, Conservative Member for Lancaster since 1941, wanted to represent a constituency in his native Scotland even though it would be further away from Westminster. He moved to Bute and North Ayrshire in 1959, and thereby not only returned home but exchanged a seat with a majority of 4,549 in 1955 for one with a majority of 9,155 in the same year.

III. EFFORTS BY DEFEATED M.P.S TO REENTER PARLIAMENT

Table II shows the subsequent candidatures of M.P.s defeated in the general elections of 1950, 1951, and 1955.

It appears that the Labour Party took good care of its defeated frontbenchers, for 9 of the 11 were given candidatures in new constituencies, and 7 were reelected. Since the Conservatives had only one comparable case and the Liberals none, no meaningful inter-party comparisons can be made in this respect. Each of the three parties, however, had a number of defeated backbenchers. In each party, less than half stood again, and many of those who did made second tries in the constituencies they had previously lost. Only 2 of 10 defeated Conservative backbenchers, 12 of 75 Socialists, and 2 of 16 Liberals moved to new constituencies; and, as Table II shows, even fewer actually made their way back to the House.

We have no information as to how many of those who did not stand again voluntarily withdrew from further electoral competition and how many unsucessfully sought new seats or readoption in their old constituencies. But these data, combined with those in Table I, make clear that in this period the absence of a local residence rule did just what its admirers say it should: it enabled most M.P.s of leadership rank defeated in general elections to return to the House within short periods of time—a situation that stands in sharp contrast to that in the United States, where even defeated Senate majority leaders like Scott Lucas and Ernest McFarland were unable to return to the Senate at all.

The defeated backbenchers in all three parties did not fare so well. Well over half were not again adopted as candidates in any constituency, and only 14 per cent managed to reenter Parliament. But the seven who won their way back from constituencies other than those they had formerly held were seven more than

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[9] An often-cited example of the latter was C. A. R. Crosland, who was elected Labour Member for South Gloucestershire in 1950 and reelected in 1951 with a majority of 5,338. The constituency was so revised by the 1955 redistribution that he sought another, safer seat and was adopted for the Test division of Southampton. He lost by 3,842 votes in the 1955 general election, while his Labour successor in South Gloucestershire lost by only 1,726 votes.

[10] This does not include Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, a Conservative minister who had held the marginal (majority of 1,707 in 1951) West Derby division of Liverpool since 1935, but became prospective candidate for the safe (majority of 19,749 in 1951) seat of Epsom in Surrey in 1954. He was made Lord Chancellor before the 1955 general election, however, so his move did not become final as did the two cases discussed in the text.

TABLE II. SUBSEQUENT CANDIDATURES OF DEFEATED M.P.S, 1950–1959

Subsequent Candidature	Conservative		Labour		Liberal		All parties	
	Minis-terial	Back-benchers	Minis-terial	Back-benchers	Minis-terial	Back-benchers	Minis-terial	Back-benchers
Re-won seat formerly held	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	7
Won seat in another constituency	1	2	7*	4	0	1	7	7
Lost again in constituency formerly held	0	2	0	13	0	2*	0	17
Lost in another constituency	0	0	2*	8	0	1	2	9
No subsequent candidature	1	6	2	43	0	12	3	60
Total	2	10	11	75	0	16	12	100

* These figures include E. M. King and Aiden Crawley, who were defeated as Labour M.P.s. and later stood as Conservatives; and Lady Megan Lloyd-George and E. L. Granville, who were defeated as Liberal M.P.s and later stood as Labour candidates.

would have returned under the American system.

IV. INTER-CONSTITUENCY MOVEMENT BY OTHER CANDIDATES

Table I shows that most inter-constituency movement in the 1950s involved persons who had never been M.P.s, who had lost in one or more previous elections, and who were subsequently adopted as candidates in other constituencies. In the remainder of the paper, accordingly, we shall focus upon the later electoral careers of candidates who first stood and lost in the general elections of 1951 and 1955 and therefore had at least one general election in which they could have stood again if they had sought and secured adoptions.

We summarize those careers in Table III.

Table III shows that slightly over half of the Conservative and Labour candidates had no second candidatures anywhere, while four out of five Liberal candidates dropped out after their first candidatures.[11] The largest portion of the Conservative and Labour repeaters (49 per cent and 50 per cent respectively) moved on to more promising constituencies, and most of the rest (37 per cent and 39 per cent respectively) tried again in the constituencies they had lost in their first tries. Only a small fraction (3 per cent and 4 per cent respectively) moved to constituencies less promising than those in which they had made their first try. The Liberal repeaters included fewer "stayers" (24 per cent) and fewer "upward movers" (29 per cent), and the largest group (44 per cent) moved to con-

TABLE III. SUBSEQUENT CANDIDATURES OF NEW CANDIDATES DEFEATED IN THE GENERAL ELECTIONS OF 1951 AND 1955

Second Candidature	Conservative (%)	Labour (%)	Liberal (%)
None	54	51	80
In same constituency as the first	17	19	5
In constituency more favorable than the first*	23	24	6
Other†	6	6	9
	100	100	100
Number of cases†	350	342	85

* In this and subsequent tables, assignment of a particular candidate to this category was accomplished by comparing his party's per cent of the vote in the constituency of his first candidature in his first election with his party's per cent of the vote in the constituency of his second candidature in the preceding general election.

† In this and subsequent tables, this category includes for all three parties the constituencies initially established for the 1955 general election, and constituencies less favorable than the first measured by the procedure outlined above. It also includes, for the Liberals, constituencies uncontested by Liberal candidates in the preceding general election.

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[11] It should be emphasized again that we have no information about what proportion of these candidates made no effort to secure second candidatures, and what proportion tried but failed.

TABLE IV. SECOND CANDIDATURE RELATED TO AGE AT FIRST CANDIDATURE

Second Candidature	Age at First Candidature					
	Conservative		Labour		Liberal	
	Under 40 (%)	Over 40 (%)	Under 40 (%)	Over 40 (%)	Under 40 (%)	Over 40 (%)
None	47	65	45	58	78	83
In same constituency as the first	18	16	18	20	4	5
In constituency more favorable than the first,	28	15	32	16	7	5
Other	7	4	5	6	11	7
	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of cases	196	154	180	162	45	40

stituencies which had not been contested by Liberals in the preceding general elections.

In the Conservative and Labour parties, then, most inter-constituency candidate movement was from less promising to more promising constituencies. In what follows we shall describe some of the principal respects in which the dropouts, stayers, and upward movers differed from one another.

V. SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF DROPOUTS, STAYERS, AND UPWARD MOVERS

Age at First Candidature. After a candidate has lost his first contest, his candidature is formally cancelled. He then has several courses open to him: he may seek no second candidature at all; he may seek readoption in the same constituency, and succeed or fail; or he may seek adoption in another constituency, and succeed or fail. Peter G. Richards tells us that aspirants seeking to enter Parliament "often serve an apprenticeship in a 'hopeless' constituency before moving on to a constituency that offers prospects of success."[12] If this is true, we would expect a higher proportion of these upward-moving "apprentices" to begin under the age of 40 than over 40. A man in his 20s or 30s simply has more time than one in his 40s or 50s to get a winnable constituency, establish himself in his parliamentary party, and rise to ministerial rank. This would seem both to make it more worthwhile for a younger man than an older man to seek a second candidature; and to make him more attractive to those who select the candidates in the better seats.

Accordingly, we would expect a lower proportion of dropouts and a higher proportion of upward movers among the first-time losers under 40 than among those over 40. Table IV shows the extent to which this was in fact the case with the candidates we are studying.

The evidence indicates that among both Conservative and Labour candidates there was a markedly higher proportion of dropouts in the group over 40 than among those under 40, and a similar, though weaker, tendency among Liberal first-time losers. Among the Conservative and Labour repeaters, moreover, higher proportions of those under 40 moved on to more promising constituencies.

Among Conservative and Labour candidates, these relationships between age and dropouts and between age and type of second candidature persist when other factors, such as holding office in local government, holding office in civic or party organizations, and education, are held constant.[13] Clearly, then, a candidate's age at the time of his first candidature was significantly related to whether or not he stood a second time and, if so, in what kind of constituency.

Personal Connections in Constituency of First Candidature. The author has discussed elsewhere the circumstances in which having some kind of "personal connection"[14] in a constituency has been an advantage or disadvantage in securing its candidature. For our present purposes we need note only that most locally connected candidates in the 1950s were either "flag showers" or "favorite sons." A "flag shower" was a local man who was persuaded to stand in a hopeless constituency, not with any hope of winning or of later moving to a better constituency, but because his local party was unable to attract a desirable candidate from outside and someone had to "show the flag." A "favorite son" was a local man adopted in a winnable seat over competition from outsiders.

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[12] *Honourable Members* (London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1959), p. 24.

[13] There are too few cases of Liberal repeaters to justify multivariate analysis.

[14] A "personal connection," as the term is used here, includes having been educated in the constituency, or making a living there, or holding a local government office there, or holding a trade union or trade association office there, or being the spouse or child of the current or former Member

How many locally connected candidates were there and what happened to them? Of the 350 Conservative candidates we are considering, 108 (33 per cent) had some kind of personal connection in the constituencies in which they made their first races. The comparable figure for Labour candidates was 93 of 432 (27 per cent), and for Liberal candidates 19 of 85 (22 per cent). Table V shows how they fared after their initial defeats.

Evidently, among Conservative and Labour candidates there were noticeably more dropouts among the locally connected than among those with no local connections, although among the Liberals there was no significant difference between the two groups in this regard. Among both Conservative and Labour repeaters, markedly more of the locally connected than of those with no local connections had their second candidatures in the same constituencies as their first, while a much higher proportion of those with no local connections moved on to more promising constituencies.[15]

When age is held constant, however, this relationship is considerably modified, and some noteworthy differences between Conservative and Labour candidates emerge.

Table VI shows that when age is held constant the relationship between local connections and dropouts among Conservative candidates evident in Table V persists for candidates under 40 but disappears for those over 40. This results largely from the fact that a higher proportion of locally connected over-40s than of the over-40s with no local connections stood again in the same seats they lost in their first races.

Table VI also shows that holding age constant for Labour candidates produces quite contrary effects: the general relationship between local connections and dropouts shown in Table V persists for candidates *over* 40, but disappears for candidates *under* 40.

We have too few cases to permit elaborate multivariate analysis. It is suggestive, however, that when the candidates in each party are further divided into those who first stood and lost in hopeless seats and those in winnable

TABLE V. SECOND CANDIDATURE RELATED TO PERSONAL CONNECTIONS IN CONSTITUENCY OF FIRST CANDIDATURE

Second Candidature	Percent Personal Connections in Constituency of First Candidature					
	Conservative		Labour		Liberal	
	Some (%)	None (%)	Some (%)	None (%)	Some (%)	None (%)
None	63	50	62	48	79	80
In same constituency as the first	20	16	18	18	11	3
In constituency more favorable than the first	10	28	15	28	5	6
Other	7	6	5	6	5	11
	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of cases	108	242	93	249	19	66

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for the constituency. The information about each candidate was taken from published biographical sources. Since we have no systematic information about the candidates' connections with families socially prominent in their constituencies, the figures in Table V probably understate rather than exaggerate the proportions of locally-connected candidates.

[15] This statement is based upon an analysis of the repeaters only, which reveals relationships obscured by the arrangement of the data in Table V.

TABLE VI. SECOND CANDIDATURE RELATED TO PERSONAL CONNECTIONS IN CONSTITUENCY OF FIRST CANDIDATURE, BY AGE

Second Candidature	Per Cent Local Connections by Age Groups							
	Conservative				Labour			
	Under 40		Over 40		Under 40		Over 40	
	Some (%)	None (%)	Some (%)	None (%)	Some (%)	None (%)	Some (%)	None (%)
None	57	42	64	65	43	47	79	49
In same constituency as the first	21	17	21	12	19	18	5	22
In constituency more favorable than the first	13	33	9	18	28	31	4	21
Other	9	8	6	5	10	4	2	8
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of cases	53	139	58	94	24	131	46	109

seats,[16] the relationships shown in Table VI persist for every class of candidates in both parties except the under-40s in the winnable seats. In both parties more candidates in this group with no local connections dropped out after losing the winnable seats than did those with local connections, most of whom had second candidatures in the same seats.[17]

Thus the foregoing data, while not conclusive, suggest that the Conservatives drew their local "flag showers" more heavily from persons under 40, while Labour drew theirs more from persons over 40. In both parties' winnable seats, however, more locally connected "favorite sons" under 40 than outsiders of the same age were able to get readopted for second tries in the same seats.

Education. In most western countries, reaching the higher levels of formal education is one of the principal stepping-stones for entering at least the lower echelons of political leadership. This may be because the more highly educated acquire more of the learning and intellectual skills leadership requires. Or it may be that attending a particular university or other school gives one a circle of influential friends—what the British call the "old boy net"—spread about in strategic positions ready to tip him off where candidatures are available and to press for his adoption.

Most commentators on British society agree that two sets of distinctions in educational background are particularly significant for the allocation of the society's good things: those who have attended one of the 133 "public schools" and those who have not; and those who have attended Oxford or Cambridge, and those who have not.[18] If this is true, we would expect significant differences in political upward mobility between those who had these advantages and those who had not. Table VII shows some significant inter-party differences in this regard.

Table VII documents some well-known characteristics of the Conservative and Labour parties. Although there was approximately the same proportion of non-university to university among the candidates of both major parties, 25 per cent of the Conservatives had attended Ox-

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[16] A "hopeless seat" is here defined as one won by the opposition by a margin of 10 per cent or more in the preceding general election (*i.e.*, 55 per cent to 45 per cent), and all other seats are defined as "winnable seats."

[17] The figures are as follows: among Conservative candidates under 40 in winnable seats, 71 per cent (17 of 24) with no local connections dropped out, while 55 per cent (6 of 11) of those with local connections dropped out. Among Labour candidates under 40 in winnable seats, 40 per cent (8 of 20) with no local connections dropped out, while 25 per cent (2 of 8) with local connections dropped out.

[18] For a recent discussion, see Anthony Sampson, *Anatomy of Britain* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1962), chs. 12–13.

TABLE VII. SECOND CANDIDATURE RELATED TO UNIVERSITY ATTENDANCE

Second Candidature	Per Cent University Attendance								
	Conservative			Labour			Liberal		
	Ox. or Camb. (%)	Other univ. (%)	No. univ. (%)	Ox. or Camb. (%)	Other univ. (%)	No. univ. (%)	Ox. or Camb. (%)	Other univ. (%)	No univ. (%)
None	38	63	57	56	44	54	90	70	80
In same constituency as the first	23	13	16	8	20	21	0	0	9
In constituency more favorable than the first	28	19	21	34	30	18	5	5	7
Other	11	5	6	2	6	7	5	25	4
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of cases	86	63	201	53	98	191	20	20	45

ford or Cambridge, compared with only 15 per cent of the Labour candidates. Moreover, the "Oxbridge" Conservatives had substantially fewer dropouts and more stayers and upward movers than their other-university and no-university rivals.

In the Labour party, by contrast, there were *more* dropouts among the "Oxbridge" group than among the other-university or no-university groups. Among Labour repeaters, however, the "Oxbridge" group produced a higher proportion of upward movers and a lower proportion of stayers than the other two groups.

In both parties, then, candidates with "Oxbridge" educations tended to move to better seats in higher proportions than those who had attended other universities or no university. But in the Labour party, candidates without an "Oxbridge" background tended to make second tries in the same seats more than those with such a background.

Table VIII shows the comparable information for attendance at public schools.

The inter-party differences in Table VIII are less marked than those in Table VII, but are still of some interest. The data show, not surprisingly, that a far higher proportion of Conservative than Labour candidates had attended public schools (45 to 13 per cent). Among Conservative candidates, moreover, the public-

TABLE VIII. SECOND CANDIDATURE RELATED TO ATTENDANCE AT PUBLIC SCHOOLS

Second Candidature	Per Cent Public School Attendance					
	Conservative		Labour		Liberal	
	Public school (%)	No public school (%)	Public school (%)	No public school (%)	Public school (%)	No public school (%)
None	49	58	61	50	83	78
In same constituency as the first	20	15	7	20	0	7
In constituency more favorable than the first	24	21	28	24	10	4
Other	7	6	4	6	7	11
	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of cases	159	191	43	299	30	55

TABLE IX. SECOND CANDIDATURE RELATED TO ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE* IN FIRST CANDIDATURE

Second Candidature	Electoral Performance in First Candidature							
	Conservative				Labour			
	Decrease (%)	"Normal" increase (%)	"Extra" increase (%)	Other (%)	"Extra" decrease (%)	"Normal" decrease (%)	Increase (%)	Other (%)
None	52	55	42	61	58	53	38	46
In same constituency as the first	21	14	23	18	9	17	38	24
In constituency more favorable than the first	20	25	23	19	32	22	16	23
Other	7	6	12	2	1	8	8	7
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of cases	102	138	48	62	85	161	39	57

* This was measured by comparing the candidate's per cent of the poll in his first candidature with the party's per cent of the poll in the same constituency in the preceding general election. Since in the elections of 1951 and 1955 the "swing" to the Conservatives was 1.1 per cent and 1.8 per cent respectively, a Conservative increase of between 0.1 per cent and 4.9 per cent was classified as "normal" and one of 5.0 per cent or over was classified as "extra." For the same reasons, a Labour decrease of 5.0 per cent or more was classified as "extra" while one between 0.1 per cent and 4.9 per cent was classified as "normal." The "other" category includes all the cases in which no comparison was possible because the first candidature was in a newly formed constituency or one in which the candidate's party had had no candidate in the preceding general election.

school group had a smaller proportion of dropouts and a higher proportion of stayers and upward movers than the no-public-school group. Among Labour candidates, on the other hand, there was a higher proportion of dropouts among the public-school group, a much smaller proportion of stayers, but a slightly higher proportion of upward movers.

In both parties, then, candidates with "Oxbridge" and with public school educations tended to move to second candidatures in better seats more than candidates without these backgrounds.

Electoral Performance in First Candidature. It is often said that the normal pathway to Parliament runs something like this: a young man of promise serves an "apprenticeship" (see above) in a first candidature in a hopeless seat, and if he does well in his first contest, he is moved on to a more promising seat. The better he does in his first try, the more likely he is to be moved to a winnable seat. Now we have no way of measuring our candidates' eloquence on the hustings, diligence in canvassing, cordiality of relations with the local party activists, or other subjective aspects of "doing well" in a first candidature. But we can compare each candidate's share of the poll in his first try with what his party received in the general election immediately preceding his first try, and relate it to the kind of candidature, if any, he got thereafter. This information appears in Table IX.

Table IX shows that in both parties the candidates whose individual shares of the popular vote increased more than their parties' overall national shares had the lowest proportions of dropouts. There was, however, at least one significant difference between the two parties: the Conservative repeaters' showings in their first candidatures had no apparent relationship with the *kind* of second candidatures they received, while the better the Labour repeaters had done in their first contests the more likely they were to be readopted in the same seats rather than to move on to more promising seats.

VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The data presented in this paper show that most of the British parliamentary candidates who first stood in the general elections of 1951 and 1955 stood in constituencies in which they had little or no chance of winning. Almost all the best constituencies were already preempted by their incumbent M.P.s standing for reelection. There were only two instances of incumbent M.P.s moving to different constituencies without being impelled to do so by alterations in constituency boundaries. Most M.P.s of ministerial rank who lost their seats were able to return to the House from other, safer seats, although fewer backbenchers enjoyed comparable service.

Most of the new candidates, to no one's surprise, lost, and over half had no second candidatures. Our data do not tell us what proportion of these dropouts made no effort to get second candidatures and what proportion tried but were passed over by the local candidate selectors. They do tell us, however, that in both the Conservative and Labour parties the repeaters differed from the dropouts in that they were younger, fewer had personal connections in their first constituencies, more had attended Oxford and Cambridge than other universities or no university (although the differences in this regard were slight among Labour candidates), and more had improved on electoral "par" in their first races. More Conservative repeaters than dropouts had attended public schools, but the relationship was reversed among Labour candidates.

These correlates of candidate mobility give us some clues as to what kinds of persons are likely to seek and find second candidatures and whether they are likely to remain in the same seats or move on to more promising ones. Perhaps the most significant general conclusion, however, is that even in a period of high electoral stability some 15 per cent of all candidatures were given to persons who had fought elsewhere in previous elections. And the absence of a local residence rule enabled some 40 persons to enter or reenter Parliament by a path wholly blocked in the United States. Whether this furnished the House of Commons abler members than Congress can boast is a question which, happily, falls outside the purview of this paper.

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CANADIAN PARTIES*

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Useful studies of Canadian political parties are available, and doubtless others will be soon.[1] I am not trying to add another specifically Canadian study nor even to contribute new information helpful in understanding Canada. Instead I want to use what is known about Canadian parties in order to change the comparative perspective in which we ordinarily view American parties. More particularly I am attempting to put in a new light the well-worn view of the uncohesive and nonresponsible character of American parties in contrast to British parties. The Canadian party system, itself so often described as an Anglo-American hybrid, may help explain why American parties differ from Britain's.

My analysis proceeds on the assumption that Canadian parties, like those in other Western democracies, can be profitably treated as products of social and constitutional circumstances even though it is readily granted that parties may, in turn, affect those circumstances as well as other less "basic" ones (such as voting behavior). Despite the difficulty, it is necessary to order our large-scale political phenomena in a kind of analytical framework. The one now familiar in the literature of comparative parties, although its language is drawn from more rigorously measured research, calls social and constitutional circumstances "independent variables," and parties "dependent variables," insofar as they are affected by the social and constitutional circumstances, or "intervening variables," insofar as they also affect political behavior. So simple a framework tends to ignore the way in which parties, once developed in a given way, may function to help maintain or alter some of the supposedly independent variables (especially the constitutional circumstances). But no harm is done as long as we bear in mind that what is ignored remains important for purposes other than those of our particular frame of reference. For most of this essay, at any rate, my concern is with parties as dependent variables—that is, with the manner of their development in given national circumstances. At the end, however, the effects of a party system will be considered.

I. SOCIAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES

For most of us the general Canadian setting is familiar enough so that the relevant social and constitutional circumstances can be discussed summarily. These, it should be stressed, are the ones conceived to be relevant to Anglo-American comparisons. Omitted are the common, and otherwise important, similarities in literacy rates, universal suffrage, and general aspects of advanced Western societies.

(1) Canada is plainly a *diverse nation in a large land area.* The significance of its geographic size is not drastically altered by the fact that most of that area is sparsely inhabited while the great bulk of the population lives in a corridor within a few hundred miles of the United States border. That corridor, after all, is transcontinental in length. The population is spread over the land mass in a way that approximates the pattern in the United States rather than that of any other Western nation. Moreover, the Canadian population, although in total about equal only to California's or New York's, is more sharply divided than the population of the United States. The vital division between French-speaking and English-speaking Canadians bulks larger than any division south of the border. The coincidence of geographic, linguistic, religious, cultural and even economic characteristics, which distinguish most French Canadians from English (or English-oriented) Canadians, surely makes for a durable division. And the size of the French-speaking population, almost always close to 30 per cent of the Canadian total, would alone make it a stronger force than the American Negro minority. In addition, the French-speaking Canadians differ from any 19th or 20th century American immigrant group; not only have the French Canadians had Quebèc as their own community from the start, but they have at least as good a claim as the English to be the

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* I am grateful for the bibliographical help of William Simpson and John Kingdon, graduate students at the University of Wisconsin, and for the critical suggestions by my colleagues Austin Ranney and Robert Alford of the University of Wisconsin and by Professor John H. Meisel of Queen's University.

[1] A useful collection is edited by Hugh G. Thorburn, *Party Politics in Canada* (Toronto: Prentice-Hall of Canada, 1963). Also useful, in a more general context, is the reader edited by Paul W. Fox, *Politics: Canada* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill of Canada, 1962).

original Canadians. When a Canadian government was established in 1867, the French-speaking population was already there as the preponderant majority in Quebec and as a substantial minority in the new nation. Assimilation as English Canadians is simply out of the question. Canada, unless broken as a nation by a rising separatism in Quebec, is irrevocably bi-ethnic. Therefore, apart from any other reason, it has a more basically "social federalism" than the United States.[2] Canadian bi-ethnicity now seems at least as persistent a divisive force as the once more agonizing difference between northern and southern American states. And, while Canada does not have exactly the latter kind of difference, it does have in its prairie provinces a farm-based sectionalism resembling that of the American mid-west. The Canadian variety may be even more important because the prairie provinces are a larger portion of the nation than the exclusively farm states are of the American nation.

(2) With its social federalism, especially its bi-ethnic character, Canada has developed a *structural federalism* in which the provinces, as regional units of government, have an institutional significance—in relation to the national government—probably greater than that of American states. This is true in spite of the constitutional language of the British North America Act, which seems to tip the balance in a heavily national direction by providing for the disallowance of provincial legislation even when such legislation is within the scope of enumerated powers granted to the provinces. In practice, while such disallowance has occasionally taken place, the provinces have exercised considerable autonomy in economic legislation as well as in educational policy. Provincial powers, originally designed primarily for Quebec, have become consequential elsewhere too. An index of their importance is provided by voter turnout, which, unlike that in the United States, has often been higher in provincial than in national elections.[3] There are nationalizing trends, such as are generally familiar to Americans, but these seem to have eroded provincial powers less sharply than American "states' rights." The most obvious reason for the difference lies in the fact that the Canadian federal union must remain looser than that of the United States if it is to exist at all. As a perceptive observer has said, French-speaking Canadians do not regard the Confederation as simply a federal union "in which the will of the majority should prevail." On the contrary, it is in their minds "a pact or treaty between French and English, which guarantees to each group an equal right to its own faith, language, laws, and customs."[4] The Canadian federal structure honors this treaty in many ways, although perhaps not in enough ways to satisfy the French. A striking federal practice, more meaningful politically than many formal constitutional guarantees, is to provide representation not just of Quebec but of each Canadian province in every national cabinet.[5] This is possible, without producing an unwieldy cabinet, because there are only ten provinces. In this as in other respects, the limited number of regional governmental units allows, even encourages, a greater importance for any one unit than is possible in the American union of 50 states. Incidentally, having ten rather than 50 regional governments puts Canada in the same category with most federal systems outside the Western Hemisphere.[6]

(3) Canada can be described as having an *American-style social and economic class structure.* Its development, as might be expected from its physical circumstances, resembles that of the United States more than that of Britain and Western Europe. Large-scale industrial capitalism arrived in an environment where political democracy was already established

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[2] For a general discussion of Canadian society as well as for particular attention to the French Canadians, see Bernard R. Blishen, Frank E. Jones, Kaspar D. Naegele, John Porter (eds.), *Canadian Society: Sociological Perspectives* (New York, 1961). Specifically on Quebec, among other important works, see Everett C. Hughes, *French Canada in Transition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943); Mason Wade (ed.), *Canadian Dualism* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960); Mason Wade, *The French Canadians* (New York, 1955); and Michael Oliver, "Political Problems of Poly-Ethnic Countries—Canada," mimeographed paper presented to the Fifth World Congress of the International Political Science Association (Paris, 1961).

[3] Howard Scarrow, "Pattern of Voter Turnout in Canada," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 5 (November 1961), pp. 351–64. See also his *Canada Votes* (New Orleans: Hauser Press, 1962), for a full and useful presentation of election data.

[4] Mason Wade, *The French-Canadian Outlook* (New York, 1946), p. 95.

[5] R. Macgregor Dawson, *The Government of Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957), p. 211.

[6] The ten Canadian provinces resemble in their number the six Australian states, the ten West German *laender*, and the 16 Indian states, but not the 22 Swiss cantons.

and where a residual feudal class-structure was not characteristic. The Canadian standard of living has long been in the American rather than the European range, and the industrial working-class has not been rigorously marked off from the middle-class by its economic status any more than by its general socio-historical background. Insofar as the French-speaking inhabitants of Quebec seem an exception, because of their special status in relation to English-speaking industrial owners and managers,[7] the basic factor is ethnic or linguistic rather than simply working-class consciousness. Their very distinctiveness as French-speaking workers may prevent the broad or national class-consciousness often present in a more ethnically homogeneous nation. Similarly the presence of large numbers of Central and Eastern European immigrants may, as in the United States, have introduced another cross-cleavage serving to weaken a strictly class orientation. Even without such a cross-cleavage, however, it is unlikely that the Canadian economy could provide the working-class basis for a massive labor or social democratic movement of the West European variety. Not only does Canada's industrial working-class seem to have been too affluent, but it has not been a notably large portion of the total population. This is another way of saying that farming, by owner-occupiers, has remained relatively important in Canada as in the United States (at least until very recently). Generally, then, in this social and economic class structure it is not surprising to find a slow, modest development of trade unions and a pattern of political behavior that is not markedly class-conscious. On the latter point, there is evidence indicating that Canadian voters divide less clearly along class lines than voters in the United States.[8]

(4) At least as much a *given* circumstance as the three points already listed is the *British parliamentary system.* From the beginning of Canadian self-government—and earlier for that matter—the parliamentary system has been the basic constitutional form within which Canadian parties have functioned. Both the central and the provincial governments maintain the principle of executive responsibility to a popularly elected legislative body. This system is more clearly an antecedent circumstance, relative to party developments, than is often the case with constitutional structures. Parliamentary government, while acquiring some special qualities in the Canadian environment, was not so much developed in Canada as it was transplanted from Britain. Moreover it was transplanted at a time when the British system was beginning to assume its modern form of strong cabinet leadership based on a party majority in the House of Commons. The 19th century rule remained that a government had to resign when it lost the confidence of a House majority, but the means were being found for the steady maintenance of that majority between general elections. Thus it seems important to note that it was the *British* parliamentary system, and not another variant, that the Canadians adopted and developed. Not only did they transplant the principle of executive authority emerging from the legislative authority, instead of independently and separately as in the United States, but they also transplanted the modern principle of stabilized executive authority in a parliamentary regime.

(5) Worth mentioning among basic circumstances in only the most parenthetical sense is the *single-member, simple-plurality election system* almost always used in Canada, as it is in national legislative elections in the United States and Britain. I mention it here only because the election system has been so prominently (but, I believe, mistakenly) regarded as an independent variable affecting the number and nature of political parties. Undeniably, the way elections are conducted has some effect on parties, but it is probable that the prevailing party forces secure, in the long run, the kind of election system that they want. In any event, as will be noted briefly at a later point, the election system can have no explanatory power in the present analysis.

II. THE PARTY SYSTEM

As in listing social and constitutional circumstances, there is a strong subjective element in the choice of party characteristics. Without trying to be exhaustive, it seems wise to include matters usually discussed in the field of comparative politics. Discretion is exercised chiefly in adding one or two characteristics which seem especially important to the particular comparison undertaken here. Analytical discussion of the relations between the party characteristics and the social and constitutional circumstances is mainly reserved for the next section.

(1) With respect to the most familiar of items, the number of parties, Canada has to be

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[7] John Porter, "The Economic Elite and the Social Structure in Canada," in *Canadian Society: Sociological Perspectives* (cited in note 2), p. 493.

[8] The evidence is contained in a broader comparative study by Robert Alford, *Party and Society* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), chs. 5 and 9. On class and non-class voting in Quebec, see Groupe de Recherches Sociales, *Les Électeurs Québécois* (Montreal, 1960).

described as a *two-plus party system* rather than as a two-party system in the clear-cut American national sense or in the less clear-cut British sense. "Multi-party," however, would not be the appropriate label since regularly no more than two parties have had broad enough voting support to win national power and since much—though by no means all—of the time, one of these two parties has been able to win national power on its own. In fact, a decade ago the Liberal party had won so regularly that there was a short-lived temptation to term Canada a one-party-plus system. Since then a Conservative majority in one parliament, a Conservative plurality in two others, and finally a Liberal plurality have restored the view, dating from World War I, that the Canadian system functions as a highly qualified two-party arrangement.[9] Before World War I, the two-party system was hardly qualified at all.[10]

The nature of the now well established qualification should be described. In the thirteen elections to the Canadian Commons between 1921 and 1963, third parties (that is, parties other than the Liberals and Conservatives) secured over ten per cent of the total popular vote eleven times, and over 25 per cent five times. The low point was six per cent in 1930, and the high point 32 per cent in 1945. The two current third parties, Social Credit and New Democrats (formerly Cooperative Commonwealth Federation) polled a total of 26 per cent in both 1962 and 1963. Although third parties have not been represented in the Commons in the same high proportion as they have in total votes, they have had enough M.P.s to keep either of the major parties from a legislative majority in six (including the two most recent) of the thirteen parliaments elected since 1921. These six parliaments, however, have sat for only 12 of the 43 years from 1921 to 1964, and during several of these 12 years the Liberals, as at present, have been just short of majority status.

Until 1962, when Social Credit won localized support in Quebec, third-party M.P.s were mainly from the western provinces. The New Democratic Party, like its old CCF embodiment, has sought to become national, and has begun to show strength outside of western Canada, especially in Ontario. It remains to be seen whether this represents the beginning of a large-scale change, which would probably mean displacing either the Conservatives or the Liberals as a major party, or whether it is only a temporary advance, as by the CCF in 1945. At any rate, as long as it has been a third party, the CCF-NDP appears to be only somewhat less sectional than Social Credit or the old Progressives of the early 1920s. It does have the support of certain important trade unions.

Canadian third parties, however, are by no means insignificant because of their sectional bases. On the contrary, they are significant for this very reason. Between them, the CCF-NDP and Social Credit have elected national M.P.s from the prairies, and they have also controlled the governments of the three western-most provinces over long periods. Alberta has been governed by the Social Credit party since 1935 (before which another third party had been in power since 1921), and Saskatchewan by the CCF since 1944.[11] Add to these cases the long. only recently concluded tenure of a separate National Union party in the government of Quebec, and it is plain that the national two-party system is qualified (often by a different two-party system) in provincial politics. The two major national parties have simply not contained certain large and vigorous political movements of a sectional character, and these movements, especially in the prairies, have spilled over into the national arena from their provincial bases. The durability of these bases is impressive. Notably in Alberta, the Social Credit party, once established in power, has not only maintained itself in office over a very long period, but it has done so through a virtual monopoly of provincial legislative seats. But such one-party power in a heavily rural community is not unusual in the prairie states south of the border. What is unusual, in comparison to the United States, is that the local party-in-power should not bear the label of one of the two major national parties.[12]

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[9] Writing after the Conservative victory of 1958, which reflected two-party politics more clearly than elections just before or since, Peter Regenstreif convincingly described two hard voting cores, each about 30 per cent of the electorate, for the Liberals and the Conservatives, with about 10 per cent CCF and the remainder uncommitted and moving between parties. If this description remains accurate over time, the basis for two-party politics is clear despite the large uncommitted portion of the electorate. "The Canadian General Election of 1958," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 13 (June 1960), pp. 349–73.

[10] Frank H. Underhill, *In Search of Canadian Liberalism* (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1960), pp. 21–42.

[11] C. B. Macpherson, *Democracy in Alberta* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1953); J. R. Mallory, *Social Credit and the Federal Power in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1954); and S. M. Lipset, *Agrarian Socialism* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1950).

(2) Returning mainly to the two major national parties, one finds the *principal structural elements at the provincial level.* Each party maintains its provincial association as "the effective head."[13] Under this association there are riding (constituency) level organizations and poll organizations which contest national as well as provincial elections. The provincial association has an annual meeting to elect officers, adopt resolutions, and rally the faithful. While it may be doubted that this meeting is itself an agency of great power, there can be no question about the power of the provincial association as exercised by its leaders. But the national organization has been called—though in what now seems an underestimate—"essentially no more than a federation of autonomous provincial bodies."[14] It does actively engage in national campaigns and it does have a convention called, when necessary, to select a national leader. Even aside from this obvious similarity to the main purpose of a national party convention in the United States, the Canadian party structure resembles that of Republicans and Democrats in its federative character. So far as extra-parliamentary party activity is concerned, Canadian Liberals or Conservatives are national parties for little more than the national election. And, as in the United States, the national party staff is small in relation to that of the provincial associations.

The fundamentally federal structure of Canadian parties is not surprising in a federal governmental system. It corresponds to experience in both Australia and the United States, and it is in understandable contrast to the national structure of parties in the British unitary situation. Moreover, the Canadian case, with its pronouncedly decentralized party structure, adds weight to the possibility, drawn from Australian and American practice, that parties, once established at state or provincial levels, are less readily nationalized than are governmental powers.[15]

(3) Another characteristic of the two major Canadian parties, related to their provincial structures, is that *extra-parliamentary organizations are loose and non-doctrinal* at every level. Regardless of the nature of their parliamentary wings, the external Liberal and Conservative organizations resemble their Republican and Democratic counterparts in the United States. This resemblance holds in several respects. Neither major Canadian party has a large mass-membership (dues-paying not being a standard practice), neither has a heavily class-conscious base, neither has a clear-cut ideological or even programmatic position, and neither has an apparatus (outside parliament) claiming authority to establish policy for the party's publicly elected legislators. Depending on one's viewpoint, then, Liberals and Conservatives can be described as opportunistically lacking principles, as sensibly non-doctrinaire in order effectively to compromise regional differences, or as typical middle-class cadre parties belonging (in the eyes of some critics) to an early stage of democratic political development. At any rate, each of these descriptions would be applied as appropriately to Canadian as to American major parties.[16]

A further organizational resemblance to American practice is to be found in the relation of party leadership to party following. Canadian Liberals and Conservatives, like Republicans and Democrats, have based at least their electoral unity, outside of parliament, around a national leader.[17] This has been institutionalized in Canada as in the United States by having a national convention choose the party leader, who becomes parliamentary party leader and prime minister if the party wins parliamentary control. The practice has been criticized as a curious American graft on British parliamentary practice,[18] but it is doubtful that the convention's choice of leader seriously reduces the autonomy of the parliamentary party even though a convention may not always choose the man preferred by

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[12] Historical comparison of Anglo-American prairie protest movements of the 1920s is made by Paul F. Sharp, *The Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1948).

[13] Dawson (cited in note 5), p. 529.

[14] *Ibid.*

[15] Canadian provincial parties may derive added strength from the maintenance of more patronage positions at the provincial than at the national level of government. *Ibid.*, pp. 562–63.

[16] These descriptions may be even more appropriate for Canada since the Liberals are not now distinguished from the Conservatives, in the way Democrats are from Republicans, as less of a businessmen's party. Perhaps the Liberals have become the party of modern Canadian business.

[17] H. McD. Clokie, *Canadian Government and Politics* (Toronto: Longmans, Green, 1944), pp. 90–94.

[18] John R. Williams, *The Conservative Party of Canada* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1956), p. 104.

M.P.s.[19] Certainly the purpose is not to curb the parliamentary party. Nor is that the most important consequence. Convention choice of the prime ministerial candidate is meant to provide an apparently popular symbol of unity that is not in Canada, or in the United States, provided by any programmatic aspect of party organization. The leader personifies the party's bid for executive power, as he would no matter how he was chosen, and the convention method simply gives a democratic flavor to this personification.

The absence of extra-parliamentary organizational unity, among Liberals and Conservatives, has not characterized third-party movements, particularly the CCF (now NDP). Studies of the CCF have revealed that, as a dues-paying party, it has had a significantly higher degree of mass-membership than either of the two major parties.[20] Membership and active participation by relatively large numbers in the CCF has been especially notable in Saskatchewan, but the same general pattern has been followed wherever the CCF acquired strength. Nevertheless this pattern has not so far caused either of the two major parties to maintain mass organizations on a long-term basis, as is supposed to have happened in Europe in response to social democratic organizations.[21] Canadian Liberals and Conservatives have continued, like American Republicans and Democrats, to maintain loose organizations with few active members, to raise their campaign funds from a small number of large donors rather than from many small contributors, and to strengthen only slightly their small permanent organizational staffs.

(4) *Party control of candidate selection* is clear despite the loose and small membership base in the Liberal and Conservative organizations. Whatever there is by way of a constituency-level party organization, usually no more than a cadre of leaders, bestows the Liberal or Conservative label on an aspiring parliamentary candidate. This is ordinarily done by a special nominating meeting of the local party, sometimes so loosely defined that anyone can attend, but the choice tends to be limited to names presented by the executive (of the local party). A single name may be settled ahead of the nominating meeting. Subsequent approval by a higher party agency seems to be regularly expected.[22]

This description of Candian candidate selection will appear commonplace to students of British and European politics—indeed of Western politics generally—outside of the United States. The norm is for parties to choose their candidates. Only the United States deviates by virtue of its primary laws which, with varying effectiveness, seek to transfer candidate-selection to portions of the voting public. Without the American-style primary, Canadian parties are simply choosing candidates in the manner of parties virtually everywhere else. And, as in Britain, they are not limited by a rigid residential requirement.

What may seem distinctive—especially compared with Britain—is that the two major Canadian parties do their selecting without mass-memberships to give the process a democratic flavor. It is doubtful, however, that this distinction is crucial since, in practice, British candidate selection is in the hands of a small active local leadership group. Nor does Canadian practice substantially differ from the British in the degree of control by higher party authority over local selection. The nearly automatic party agency approval, reported for Canada, is the counterpart of British central party headquarters' approval. In neither case is centralization achieved by central dictation of candidate selection. This, however, does not mean in Canada any more than in Britain that central party leaders fail to suggest useful candidates, or that local party leaders selecting the candidates will choose those unwanted by their provincial or national leadership. On the contrary, it is a fair assumption that local leaders, recruited more definitely to a party's political cause than are American party primary voters, want to choose on the basis of what is good for the party. Certainly their conception of what's good for the party need not always be that of the national leadership or even of the provincial leadership. Such a divergence would seem more likely in Canada than in Britain because the heterogeneity of the nation introduces local as well as provincial differences within parties. For such differences to be bridged, so that local party leaders do exercise their power over candidate-selection compatibly with central party purposes, there must be a definite political incentive. That some such incentive exists in Canada seems most probable since the local parties do consider loyalty to national party leadership when candidates are selected and when incumbent M.P.s are re-selected as candidates.[23] The incentive may be found in the Canadian party response to the parliamentary system, as discussed below.

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[19] John Meisel, *The Canadian General Election of 1957* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), ch. 2.

[20] Peter Regenstrief, "Some Aspects of National Party Support in Canada," *Canadian Journal of Economic and Political Science*, Vol. 29 (February 1963), pp. 59–74, esp. at p. 66. See also Lipset (cited in note 11), p. 199; Dean E. McHenry, *The Third Force in Canada* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1950), ch. 2; and Leo Zakuta, "The C.C.F.-N.D.P.: Membership in a Becalmed Protest Movement," reprinted in Thorburn (cited in note 1), pp. 96–108.

[21] According to the well-known thesis of Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties* (New York, 1954).

[22] The selection procedure is described by Meisel (cited in note 19), pp. 120–24. "No case is known, in the 1957 election, of a provincial executive vetoing the candidature of a person selected by a recognized constituency association" (p. 121).

(5) The *cohesive legislative party* is the most significant feature of the Canadian system when approached from an American-based comparative viewpoint. That the major Canadian parties are (and have long been) cohesive in both provincial[24] and national parliaments is not disputed although there have been, to my knowledge, no definitive roll-call studies to establish the degree of parliamentary party cohesion in relation to American or British legislative behavior.[25] Generally, it is simply taken for granted that M.P.s, particularly of the governing party but also of the major opposition party, will vote according to a previously arranged caucus, influenced strongly by its leadership.[26] While it would be comforting to have a quantitative study confirming this assumption, it may be less important to know the exact percentage of divisions in which parliamentary parties are completely or almost completely cohesive than to appreciate the evident point that almost all important public policy business is government business on which M.P.s of the governing party fulfill the British-style expectation by voting their approval and so their renewed confidence in the government. In other words, Canadian M.P.s, like British M.P.s, function in effect as members of an electoral college that is in more or less continuous session between general elections. Certainly this electoral college debates governmental policy, as does the British parliament; but it does not make policy in the manner of an American congress. M.P.s may play a policy-making role in their parliamentary party caucus, if not in the cabinet, but any independence in this role ordinarily comes to an end with the caucus decision.

Party cohesion in Canadian parliamentary life is long-established. As early as 1922, MacGregor Dawson, who was to become the best known authority on Canadian government, wrote that "few Canadian members of parliament have shown their independence of party . . . "[27] and that a prime minister was able to secure full parliamentary party support, on a question of confidence, despite known intra-party differences. Two decades later, another Canadian political scientist, Clokie, in an especially perceptive textbook, wrote confidently of the "universal testimony of foreign as well as Canadian observers that Canadian parties display a notable coherence and subservience to their leaders."[28] He added a shrewd analysis of the factors making for this unity. And in a slightly later essay, expanding on the theme, Clokie explicitly noted that Canadian parties, while resembling American parties in other ways, were much closer to the unity of British parties in their parliamentary functions. This unity, he remarked, was not merely commended by party leaders; it was expected by the public as "the very condition of party government of the Cabinet variety."[29] American congressional practices have in no vital respect modified the parliamentary system in Canada. Indeed, American influence, otherwise so pervasive in Canadian affairs, political and non-political, seems limited in the

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[23] Dawson (cited in note 5), pp. 243–44.

[24] Two provincial governments are discussed in detail by Hugh G. Thorburn, *Politics in New Brunswick* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), and by Frank MacKinnon, *The Government of Prince Edward Island* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1951).

[25] The one tabulation of roll-calls that I have been able to find is by Williams (cited in note 18), pp. 200–04, but it involves only one division in each of 28 years. It shows no consistently perfect cohesion for either party, but the governing party seems highly cohesive most of the time.

[26] An inside account of the Liberal party caucus under Prime Minister Mackenzie King stresses King's use of the caucus as the place "where he explained the whys and wherefores of Government action and policy and suggested the lines on which the Government could be supported most effectively." J. W. Pickersgill, *The Mackenzie King Record* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960), p. 9.

[27] R. Macgregor Dawson, *The Principle of Official Independence* (London: P. S. King, 1922), p. 229.

[28] Clokie (cited in note 17), p. 135.

[29] Clokie, "The Machinery of Government," *Canada*, ed. by George W. Brown (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1950), p. 307.

Canadian House of Commons to the introduction of desks and page-boys.[30] The parliamentary system, as operated by cohesive legislative parties, is a rock of British political culture that Americanization has not washed away.

Canadian party cohesion, especially when accompanying a majority for one party in the Commons, has produced the same kind of cabinet stability known in Britain. Short-lived governments have occurred only in the absence of a majority party, when the cohesion of a single governing party was insufficient to ensure stability. The record testifies to the stability: since 1867 there have been only 19 "prime ministerships,"[31] of which no more than three can be said to have ended because of parliamentary defeats. In each of the three instances, the governing party was a minority of the House and was forced either to resign or to dissolve because of the loss of third-party support. There is no case, putting aside the pre-modern politics of 1873, of a governing party being forced from office because its own followers defected in a parliamentary division.

The crucial degree of governing party solidarity has remained, it should be emphasized, even in the rare circumstances of an open intra-party disagreement over policy. Such circumstances did occur for the Conservatives in 1896 on the Manitoba school issue and in 1963 on American nuclear warheads, and for the Liberals in 1942 and 1944 on overseas conscription (which had also split the Liberals in 1917 when they were a minority within a coalition government).

The more recent of these cases are instructive, and especially the 1942–44 experience because it included numerous voting deviations from the large Liberal parliamentary majority. These deviations were by Quebec Liberals, who objected in 1942 when the Mackenzie King government secured the repeal of the ban on overseas conscription, and who objected again in 1944 when the government finally moved to use its power to conscript for overseas service. Knowing that these objections, grounded as they were on constituency commitments by Quebec Liberals, would have to be carried beyond the usual caucus disagreement, Mackenzie King had delayed both his 1942 and 1944 moves so long that he angered the English-speaking population both in and out of his own party. A possible result, when his moves were actually made, was to blunt the force of Quebec objections to the government itself since Mackenzie King had been so obviously reluctant to adopt the overseas conscription which, as in 1917, was anathema to Quebec. In the event, at any rate, the French-speaking M.P.s from Quebec, while mainly refusing to vote with the rest of their party on the conscription issue itself, nevertheless made it clear that they continued to support the Mackenzie King government on everything else. This they did in 1942 by returning to support King on a vote of confidence five days after their defection on conscription,[32] and in 1944 by giving King assurances of their subsequent support even before voting against him on conscription.[33] Probably more notable, however, was that the French Canadian defections on the conscription votes were not only insufficient in number to overthrow the government, but also insufficient to deprive King of a majority still composed exclusively of his own fellow-Liberals (all the English-speaking Liberals plus some of the French-speaking Liberals). The cardinal rule of party government in the British-Canadian parliamentary system did not have to be broken for Mackenzie King to stay in office despite the unusual open split in his party. Many, or even a few more, open splits of this kind would probably break the cardinal rule or else produce cabinet instability. But the fact is that the open split, in parliamentary voting, is genuinely exceptional.

Less exceptional and clearly within the bounds of customary parliamentary party cohesion was the internal Conservative party difficulty in the winter of 1963. Here there was a public disagreement over nuclear arms policy between the Conservative prime minister, John Diefenbaker, and his minister of defence, and this disagreement plainly reflected differences between Diefenbaker and other important members of his parliamentary party. The defence minister, on resigning, claimed that most Conservative M.P.s agreed with him rather than with the prime minister. Yet in the subsequent parliamentary division, when the Diefenbaker government did lose a motion of confidence, the prime minister's own party voted almost unanimously in his favor.

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[30] W. F. Dawson, *Procedure in the Canadian House of Commons* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), p. 14.

[31] But there have been only 14 different Canadian prime ministers. Five of the 19 prime ministerships involved men who came back for another turn as head of the government.

[32] Pickersgill (cited in note 26), pp. 351–403.

[33] R. Macgregor Dawson, *The Conscription Crisis of 1944* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), pp. 101–23.

He was defeated only by the fact that most of the third-party M.P.s voted with the opposition Liberals instead of supporting the minority Conservative government as they had been doing.[34] The continued Conservative party support for Diefenbaker, despite at least substantial disagreement with his policy and his handling of the defence dispute, represents the strongest possible evidence, from a single case, of the establishment of parliamentary party cohesion in Canada.

III. ANALYSIS

What remains is the most important purpose of this essay. Having listed certain social and constitutional circumstances and having briefly described the main features of the party system, my aim is to examine the relations between these items, both between the two sets and between the several features of the party system, and to do so within a deliberately Anglo-American comparative frame of reference. For convenience, the analysis is divided into three parts. The first centers about an explanation of the existence of cohesive legislative parties. The second tries to account for the qualified two-party system. And the third raises questions about the relation of the Canadian party system to policy-outputs of a national government.

(1) Explaining the existence of cohesive legislative parties in Canada, within the scope of the factors outlined here, leads straight to the British parliamentary system as the apparent determining factor. Among the four circumstances postulated as basic at the beginning of the essay, it is only this parliamentary system, as opposed to the separation of powers, that Canada has in common with Britain rather than with the United States. If a nation's size and diversity, social and structural federalism, or socio-economic class structure were to have anything to do with the achievement of cohesive legislative parties,[35] as is often argued, then the Canadian result should resemble the American. The fact that, instead, Canadian legislative parties resemble the British in their crucial cohesion can only, in the present analysis, be attributed to the presence in Canada of the British parliamentary system.

Two qualifications must, however, be made immediately. The first is implicit in the parenthetical phrase, "in the present analysis," since the scope of this analysis is limited to the factors listed. Conceivably, there might be one or more other circumstances (an "x" factor or a series of "x" factors) which alone or in conjunction with the British parliamentary system are really determining with respect to the cohesion of legislative parties. No one can legitimately rule out this possibility. A political scientist can never be sure that he knows all possible independent variables. The best that can be done is to indicate some of the likely ones, and that has been done here. Thereby the qualification may be weakened, but not eliminated.

The second qualification is simpler. It is that the apparently determining circumstance is the *British* parliamentary system, and not just the parliamentary system in a generic sense. The reason for stressing this point, even though it reduces the sweep of the argument, is that we know from French experience in the Third and Fourth Republics that a parliamentary system does not necessarily lead to cohesive legislative parties. The absence of cohesion, especially among parties of the center and the right-center, contributed almost as much to the instability of French governments as the presence of many rather than just two parties.

Perhaps, in being thus influenced by the French case, I am over-cautiously emphasizing "British" in the phrase "British parliamentary system." France, after all, does seem exceptional among Western nations with extensive parliamentary experience in that elsewhere, even in a multi-party environment like that of the Netherlands, the parliamentary system produces or at least coincides with cohesive legislative parties. It is not just where there is overwhelming British influence, as in Australia and New Zealand as well as in Canada, that party cohesion accompanies the parliamentary system. Yet French experience is important enough, even if fairly exceptional, to warrant caution. The consequence of such caution, it has to be admitted, is a qualification which is substantial although relatively simple. It means that a nation which wants cohesive legislative parties must import more than a parliamentary system as such; it must also import the British, or British-type, rules of the game. One of these rules is that a governing party, in particular, should support its leadership. And this comes very close to saying that a nation really imports the cohesive legislative party as an element of the British parliamentary system. But we cannot go that far on the basis of Canadian evidence. Another nation might at least try to operate the British system without the apparently crucial cohesion.

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[34] Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, First Sess., Twenty-fifth Parliament, Vol. III 1962, pp. 3461–63 (5 February 1963).

[35] These factors, along with the parliamentary system, are noted in my "Cohesion of British Parliamentary Parties," this Review, Vol. 50 (June 1956), pp. 360–77.

The argument for the crucial nature of the British parliamentary system in regard to legislative party cohesiveness is strengthened by looking at some other aspects of the Canadian party system. Both the provincial structure and the loose, non-doctrinal extra-parliamentary organization, listed earlier as second and third among features of the party system, so evidently resemble American rather than British parties that such factors can surely be ruled out as possible causes for legislative party cohesion. If ever regarded as causal, the non-national and loose extra-parliamentary organizations would be said to contribute to the absence of cohesion in the national legislative body. Indeed this is the way American party organizations are regarded by those critics from the responsible party school who want to reform external American party organizations, in a more-or-less British pattern, as the supposed first step toward the achievement of cohesive congressional parties.

What the Canadian case establishes, however, is that legislative party cohesion can be achieved without British-type external organizations. And what is at least strongly suggested by the Canadian case is that reform of American external organizations is irrelevant to the problem of congressional party cohesion. This conclusion, in turn, seems to justify the procedure adopted in this essay of treating external party organizations, along with legislative parties, as results rather than as circumstances contributing materially to the nature of legislative parties. (This treatment, it can be added, was dictated, before the Canadian analysis, by internal studies of the British system. The Canadian analysis confirms the original judgment.)

One feature, however, of what may be regarded as external organization cannot be readily dismissed as unrelated to legislative party cohesion. This is the control of candidate selection by the party organization (listed as number four under Section II above). It is noteworthy that this control is exercised in Canada despite the absence of the other organizational features of British and European extra-parliamentary parties, but that nevertheless it seems effective in selecting candidates who, when elected, are loyal to the national party cause as defined by their parliamentary leadership and caucus. Whether they would be equally loyal if selected by an American-style primary system is at least possible, given the pressure of the British parliamentary system, but the question cannot be decided either from Canadian experience or from the experience of another nation.

The truth is that we have for this purpose no experimental laboratory. No nation has sought to combine American primaries with a parliamentary system. Perhaps no nation would ever want to try since it appears illogical to combine primaries, intended to make legislators independent of party, with a parliamentary system that requires cohesive legislative parties in order to provide stable government. More significantly, this reasoning can be turned in the other direction so that the American party reformers are told that if they want to try to achieve legislative party cohesiveness, without adopting a parliamentary system, they could at least try to abolish direct primaries in the United States and subsitute organizational control of nominations. Admittedly, however, this advice is not persuasive since the method of candidate selection, especially in comparison with the presence or absence of a parliamentary system, does not loom large as a possible determinant of legislative behavior. Direct primaries have not generally prevented, so much as obscured, organizational control of the selection process in the United States, and in any case the primaries have not prevented fairly high cohesion in certain state legislatures.

It is hard, I find, to escape the conclusion, qualified though it must be, that the British parliamentary system is the factor really determining the difference between Canadian and American legislative parties. In a way, this conclusion seems so obvious, given the need for a cohesive party if the British system is to work, as hardly to be worth so much emphasis. Yet there has been a recent reluctance among American political scientists to accept it. Some, in the responsible party school, may have misunderstood the British system and ignored the Canadian. Others, in their zeal to reform, may have concentrated on party organizations simply because it seemed easier to change them than to persuade the American people to revise the Constitution in the form of a parliamentary system. But still other political scientists, not always of the responsible party persuasion, may have been reluctant to attribute, in our sociological age, so much causation to a structural or constitutional circumstance (although it, in turn, might be explained by a variety of historical factors of a social and economic character). Perhaps David Truman illustrates the point. In one of the few efforts by a political scientist to use Canadian experience to help understand American politics, Truman comes close to explaining the admittedly greater centralization and cohesion of Canadian parties as a product of the differences in constitutional systems. After granting that Canadian federalism resembles American in its effects on party organziations, he says it is tempting to seize on the absence of the separation of powers as crucial, "but as a simple constitutional fact it is not convincing."[36] One suspects that Truman, in rejecting the temptation, speaks for a large part of our profession.

Yet why should this "simple constitutional fact" be unconvincing? Its consequence for legislative party behavior is understandably great. The individual legislators of a governing (or potentially governing) party have an entirely rational motivation for cohesion in a parliamentary system that they do not have under the separation of powers. Each parliamentary vote on an important policy involves the question of whether the M.P. wants a cabinet of his party or of the opposition. Thus each vote becomes a party vote in a sense politically meaningful to the individual M.P. Not only may he share the obvious benefits of executive power for his party, but he knows that his own electoral fortunes would likely suffer with his party's if the party shows itself so uncohesive as to fail to maintain its leadership in office. Thus he has as dominant a motivation to support his party on each such vote as an American congressman has to support his party on a strictly organizational issue (such as the election of a speaker), or, one might say, as a member of the American electoral college has to cast his presidential ballot on party lines. In Canada, as in Britain, the parliamentary system provides this motivation regularly rather than only occasionally, as in the United States. It is a motivation that, except in the most extraordinary instance, transcends the disagreements which are bound to exist among M.P.s of a given party, especially in a nation as diverse as Canada. The process by which it transcends may well include caucus compromise rather than crude leadership or majority imposition of a policy on dissenting M.P.s, but in one way or another the members of a parliamentary party act on their recognizable political incentive to present a united front.

No such incentive operates with sufficient force to impel American congressmen, under the separation of powers, to be so cohesive (although congressional party voting is by no means entirely uncohesive in degree or frequency). A congressman, Republican or Democrat, is able to vote differently from his party leadership, and, whether his vote is in behalf of his own or his constituents' preferences, he does not hurt his party in any way that is politically meaningful to him. He can be just as rational in his political calculation as a Canadian or British M.P., but his basis for calculation is different. Legislative party cohesion is just not as important a value in the American scheme.

Here it is worth mention that what is emphasized is the value of party cohesion, not the value of programmatic or policy cohesion. Canadian parties, possibly unlike British parties, are no more programmatic in their doctrines or election commitments than American parties. Canadian M.P.s, therefore, are united in their parliamentary parties primarily because of calculated *party* advantages. These advantages may even require the submergence of strong policy views in order to achieve the coherence of caucus-compromise, and thus the Canadian M.P. may not vote his policy convictions as often as the American congressman. The demands of the parliamentary system do not necessarily make parties programmatic, but only cohesive. Their cohesion may or may not represent a clear-cut policy position.

(2) The highly qualified character of the Canadian two-party system usually commands more attention than it will have here. This is because most political studies of Canada are concerned to explain why Canada differs from the more nearly straight two-party system of the United States and, to a lesser extent, of Britain. The question is admittedly interesting since, with reference to the United States, the difference cannot be explained solely in terms of the first three basic circumstances—the large national diversity, federalism, and socio-economic class structure. In these respects Canada resembles the United States. We are left again, given the limits of the present analysis, with the British parliamentary system as a possibly determining circumstance. Here, however, it is evident, even with the Anglo-American-Canadian framework, that the parliamentary system could not be determining on its own. What blocks that possibility is that Britain itself has a two-party system usually

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[36] David Truman, "Federalism and the Party System," *Federalism Mature and Emergent*, ed. by Arthur Macmahon (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), pp. 115–36, reprinted by Nelson Polsby, Robert Dentler, and Paul Smith, *Politics and Social Life* (Boston, 1963), pp. 513–27, with quotation at p. 522.

(and, I think, rightly) regarded as not substantially qualified in anything like the Canadian manner. Therefore, it is necessary to couple the parliamentary system with Canada's diversity and federalism in order to explain why Canada differs from both the United States and Britain in having substantial third parties in national as well as provincial politics. This is what S. M. Lipset has done by arguing that Canada's social structure and bases for political division are comparable to those of the United States or France—presumably requiring either loose American-style parties or the French multi-party pattern—while the form of government requires disciplined parliamentary parties without cross-party alignments in the Commons, sharp inter-provincial differences in national party programs, or anything like American primaries to select candidates.[37] The result, in this perspective, is that protest movements, of which the prairie farmers were clearly representative, become third parties rather than sectional factions contending for influence within one of the two major parties—as the Non-Partisan League has done in North Dakota primaries.[38]

This pushes still farther the primacy of the parliamentary system as a determining factor, but it is interesting to note that this heavily institutional interpretation is made by a sociologist rather than a political scientist. However, in his behalf as well as in behalf of the interpretation itself, it must be emphasized that the circumstances of Canadian diversity provide almost as much of the explanation as does the British parliamentary system. It is in those circumstances that the parliamentary system, with its necessarily disciplined parties, produces the third and fourth parties.

If the explanation still seems too old-fashioned in its institutional flavor, it is at least persuasive by comparison with most of the alternative explanations. Social or structural federalism alone, for instance, is not sufficient to account for the Canadian qualification of the two-party system. Leslie Lipson has discovered a correlation (which he is careful not to call causal) between federalism and the party system, but only by staying within the Commonwealth. He ranks New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the Union of South Africa (then still in the Commonwealth), Canada, and Australia in order from the most unitary to the most federal, and finds that the two-party system is most firmly established in the first two while Canada and Australia (less clearly) have third or fourth parties.[39] But this analysis is deliberately limited to the effect of federalism in nations which have adopted the British parliamentary system. Here federalism, if conceived as social as well as structural, may be seen to be determining. Yet as soon as the United States is brought into the picture the emphasis has to be shifted to the effect of the parliamentary system, in conjunction with federal circumstances. The United States, despite its federal character, has a firm two-party system in national elections. There may be virtually three parties in Congress, but the presidential election—a prime feature of our non-parliamentary system—produces a two-party division of the electorate.

More clearly incomplete as an explanatory device is the election system. The case that has often been made, from European data,[40] against the election system as cause for the number of parties is strengthened by the Canadian experience. Having usually the Anglo-American single-member, simple-plurality system, instead of proportional representation, has not prevented the development and the maintenance of third parties in Canada even though they have usually been under-represented in national parliaments. Their sectional and provincial bases may, it is granted, account for their persistence. But this is the trouble with the election system explanation: there is always something to cause exceptions to what is supposed to be the discouragement of third parties by the mathematics of single-member, simple-plurality elections.

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[37] S. M. Lipset, "Democracy in Alberta," *The Canadian Forum*, Vol. 34 (November 1954), pp. 175–77, and (December 1954) pp. 196–98, at p. 197. For a criticism of Lipset's view, see Dennis H. Wrong, "Parties and Voting in Canada," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 73 (September 1958), pp. 397–412. Lipset's own two-part article was in the form of a review of Macpherson's *Democracy in Alberta* (cited in note 11). Macpherson responded to the view in the same journal, Vol. 34 (January 1955), pp. 223–25.

[38] Attempts to explain the third-party turn in Canada are made by W. L. Morton, *The Progressive Party in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950), pp. 8–9, and by Macpherson (cited in note 11).

[39] Leslie Lipson, "Party Systems in the United Kingdom and the Older Commonwealth: Causes, Resemblances, and Variations," *Political Studies*, Vol. 7 (February 1959), pp. 12–31, at p. 20.

[40] John G. Grumm, "Theories of Electoral Systems," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 2 (November 1958), pp. 357–76.

There are, however, some exclusively Canadian explanations of the nation's third parties which deserve notice. These explanations may complement or substitute for the effect of the parliamentary system in federal circumstances. One possible view is that certain Canadian provinces, namely Quebec, Alberta, or Saskatchewan, are much more different from the rest of the nation than any American states are from the rest of the United States. Accordingly, separate protest parties are required. Related to this is that there are only ten Canadian provinces so that control of even one gives a third party a relatively greater national importance than any third party could achieve in one American state. Then, once having achieved a provincial base, a third party's leverage is also greater because the nature of cabinet government may, if there is no majority party in the Commons, give a third party a share of power in an actual or tacit coalition.[41]

Interesting though it is to follow each of these explanatory lines, enough has already been said about a subject that is not the main focus of the present analysis. It remains only to say why it is not the main focus. This stems from doubts about the general importance, in policy results, of the difference that exists between the number of parties in one country and another. These doubts are especially strong when the difference is only that between a two-party-plus system and a less qualified two-party system. More specifically, it is hard to believe that the Canadian policy-making process differs from the American because of the difference in the number of parties.

(3) For this reason, the discussion and analysis have concentrated more heavily on the nature of the legislative party. Here there is not only a strong *prima facie* case that the cohesiveness of a party makes for a different policy output, but there is a respectable school of political scientists who believe that the output of a cohesive party is better as well as different. On the basis of the Canadian experience, I have already argued that this responsible-party school would have to turn to the parliamentary system, rather than to highly organized national extra-parliamentary parties, to achieve their purpose. I should like now, more speculatively, to suggest that the Canadian experience may make their very proposals, even if feasible, of uncertain value. And I mean uncertain "value" in their own terms of effective, successful, and coherent policy-making. We really have little evidence or reason to believe that the Canadian achievement of cohesive legislative parties has led to the preferred policy-making results. Perhaps in Britain the similar achievement has led to these results. Even this may be doubted by the true sceptic who wants empirical evidence for every piece of conventional wisdom in political science, but for the present I am not prepared to challenge the assumptions about the favorable working of the British system.[42] It is simpler to question the assumptions concerning Canada since they are not so firmly rooted. Besides, some political scientists must suspect that it would be a more difficult matter to achieve a coherent legislative program in a large and diverse nation like Canada than in Britain. It might be as difficult to achieve as it is in the United States.

Why should it be assumed that Canadian parties, no matter how cohesive in parliament, have achieved the programmatic results claimed for such parties in Britain? Some descriptions of Canadian practice may even lead one, speculatively, to a contrary viewpoint. Not only are the major Canadian parties usually thought to be undoctrinal and opportunistic in their campaign appeals, but they are also said to be so in their parliamentary performances. Caucus and cabinet decision-making is assumed to involve bargaining between sectional groups, from which inaction has often resulted.[43] Successful Canadian government—that is, government which remains in office supported by its parliamentary party majority—may sometimes have to be inactive in many areas unless it is to risk the break-up of its sectionally based party. By this standard, the Mackenzie King government was Canada's most successful. It survived over many years, but surely without being as notable for its policy output as for its papering-over of internal party disagreements. As an official biographer of King has said, his conception of a party was such as to make more important the function of bringing together diverse and even conflicting groups than the function of carrying out ideas and policies. Party principles might have to be "temporarily shelved or substantially modified in order to secure the necessary consent among the rival forces within the party—the highest common factor on which all could unite."[44]

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[41] J. R. Mallory, "The Structure of Canadian Politics," in *Party Politics in Canada* (cited in note 1), p. 26. Quebec's third-party movements have intervened less in the national arena than have those of the prairie provinces. This may well be the consequence of Quebec's relative size—large enough to be an effective bargainer within a major national party.

[42] One conventional assumption, that the British system makes for less effective minority pressure on legislative policy output, has been most convincingly challenged by J. Roland Pennock, "Agricultural Subsidies in England and the United States," this REVIEW, Vol. 56 (September 1962), pp. 621–33.

[43] E. M. Reid, "The Rise of National Parties in Canada," in *Party Politics in Canada* (cited in note 1), p. 20; and Herbert F. Quinn, "The Role of the Liberal Party in Recent Canadian Politics," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 68 (September 1953), pp. 396–416.

One can agree that Mackenzie King thus performed, as in his long delay of overseas conscription during World War II, as a useful statesman in the divided Canadian nation, but the consequent maintenance of a cohesive parliamentary party did not necessarily mean the carrying out of clear-cut positive policies. Despite impressive achievements in some domestic fields, there may be no way for Canada regularly to have British-style policy results at the national level. Many policies may have to become the business of a provincial government, as they often are for other reasons, or perhaps be ignored altogether. A Canadian national government, because it observes the British parliamentary rule of remaining in office only with the support of its own party, must keep that majority virtually intact on every policy decision. It cannot, like an American president, secure an occasional cross-party majority instead of a straight party majority. This non-parliamentary American practice permits the president to have his policies enacted by majorities that are differently composed for different occasions. It seems possible—admittedly only possible—that this practice is more conducive to policy-outputs, in American or Canadian circumstances, than the more rigid parliamentary system the Canadians have adopted from Britain.

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[44] R. MacGregor Dawson, *William Lyon Mackenzie King* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1958), p. 319.

PARTY RESPONSIBILITY IN THE STATES: SOME CAUSAL FACTORS

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Pleas and programs for party responsibility are not new. It is remarkable, however, how little the discussion has advanced. I do not mean that I am surprised that the path of reform has been hard but that knowledge of the subject has not grown in proportion to the length of the discussion. Proponents believe party responsibility introduces desired qualities into the policy process and makes possible rational organization of the electorate in terms of policy. Not much has been done to provide adequate support for either of these propositions. In fact, it is hard to discover a serious effort to put these propositions in some form which would permit a partial but rigorous test. Opponents on the other hand conjure up visions of polarized parties, downtrodden minorities, and multipartyism as the fruits of party responsibility. They are able to make these improbable inferences by working with an exceedingly simple model, by ignoring the functions of party competition and the complex of factors which seem to shape party systems. Some observers less involved in the argument allow that the debate may have some value since it leads to notice of important realities. But, for them, proposed reforms are not to be taken seriously because they are utopian in two senses: (1) sweeping and incalculable; and (2) out of reach. This view seems to overlook the fact that party responsibility is a matter of degree and that incremental reform is, at least, possible in principle. Finally, very little attention has been paid to factors which may promote or inhibit party responsibility.

Party responsibility in some degree is a normal incident of politics in a competitive party system; in other words it is a function of party competition. Arguments might be offered to support this opinion, but let it suffice here to call it a useful theory. Given this much, then the fate of party responsibility relates to the maintenance and spread of partisan conflict at the polls. As the margins of one-party or nonparty areas retreat, party responsibility will grow. In the case of Congress, one would expect party to grow in importance as two-party competition becomes more general, and structural revision in the direction of increased concentration of power in the hands of partisan groups to grow apace. However, there is probably no one-to-one relation between party competition and party responsibility; intervening variables may encourage or inhibit the development of party responsibility. These are the factors to be explored in the present study by reference to practice in the states and by an occasional reference to Congress.[1]

But first some additional preliminary comments are necessary.

(1) Advocates of party responsibility seem to envisage a system with these identifying characteristics: (a) intra-party cohesion and interparty conflict in legislative situations; (b) communication of the facts of legislative combat; and (c) an attentive public. At least, (a) must be present for without it the whole system falls. If only (a) is present the minimum condition is satisfied, but the values attributed to the system may well not be entirely realized. Given this understanding of party responsibility, then it is the behavior of legislative parties which must be considered and which will be considered here to the exclusion of other matters.

(2) It is taken as established that elements of party responsibility are present in many state legislative bodies[2] although a much larger collection of evidence would certainly be welcome.

(3) The conditions for theoretical advance are present in the study of state legislative parties, and this should make the subject an attractive one whether or not it is considered intrinsically interesting or important. These state parties differ from one another from time to time and from place to place, and members of one and the same state party stand in different relations to the majority of their own party. Explanation of the differences may be very difficult due to the large number of vari-

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[1] This study is a revision of a paper delivered at the APSA annual meeting of 1963. I was assisted in preparation by a grant from the Ford Foundation to Oberlin College for the study of public affairs. The assistance of Robert Murphy and Virginia Woodcock is also acknowledged with deep appreciation.

[2] Malcolm E. Jewell, "Party Voting in American State Legislatures," this Review, Vol. 49 (Sept., 1955), pp. 773–791, and studies cited by Jewell, *The State Legislature* (New York, 1962), ch. 3.

ables in the systems, but the requisite differences are present. Furthermore, they are measurable, although providing useful measures is not the least of many problems.

(4) Finally, roll call analysis is the tool to be used, and it is a good one although it has its limitations like any other technique.[3] Critics who would condemn or relegate the technique to the margins of serious inquiry are mistaken even though it must be conceded that the technique is much more difficult to apply than some practitioners seem to have realized.

I. THE PARTY ORGANIZATION

Duane Lockard in a study of Connecticut legislative politics described the leadership "on both sides of the aisle in both houses . . . [as] highly unified and cohesive . . . [consisting usually] of the state chairman of the party, the governor, a few chosen but powerful outside party leaders . . . and intra-legislative leaders such as the speaker of the House, the president pro tempore of the Senate, the majority and minority leaders, and the chairmen of the most important committees."[4] He then reports that "the final and almost invariably binding decisions are made by the party leaders themselves. . . . "[5] Four factors contributing to the result are cited: party organizational strength; party competition; ideological agreement within each party; and potential control of legislative nominations by the party organization.[6] Considerable emphasis is placed on the impact of the external organizations; that is, party responsibility is to some extent explained by pressure from the outside party organization which is what might be called the organization pressure theory. E. E. Schattschneider[7] and Stephen K. Bailey[8] are also impressed by the importance of the outside organization in producing cohesion in legislative parties, as may be inferred by the prescriptions they have offered for increasing party responsibility.

The importance of organization pressure in generating cohesion in legislative parties in Connecticut is conceded, but it seems unimportant in other situations where high levels of party cohesion nonetheless occur. In Congress northern Democrats and Republicans are each able to close ranks on many key issues in every session. Cohesion is not perfect, but it is high. No one would suggest the result is produced by the organized pressure of the parties in the country.

The two state legislatures with which I am most familiar, Minnesota and Ohio, frequently show high levels of party cohesion;[9] but it is not due to organization pressure. In Minnesota direct action by outside party leaders to enforce party policy in the legislature would probably produce negative results.[10] In Ohio the Democratic state organization is notoriously weak, and it is split. A few sessions ago Democratic members were reported to be dissatisfied with the state party headquarters, because it showed so little interest in them.[11] The Republicans are more effectively organized at the state level, and the relation of the state chairman to the legislature is closer. However, interviews with Republican county officials in some 20 geographically scattered counties convince me that the county parties rarely make any attempt to communicate to legislators their views on policy questions. To be sure, the evidence is limited, but it does seem fair to conclude that while organization pressure may produce party responsibility, it is not a necessary condition for cohesion in legislative parties.

II. CONSTITUENCIES

It is argued sometimes that legislators from similar constituencies will vote together and in opposition to legislators from constituencies with contrasting characteristics. To the extent that parties find their support in contrasting constituencies, party responsibility is the consequence. Aside from the fact that this statement is not operational in form, numerous objections to it arise almost at once.

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[3] A good discussion is David Truman's, *The Congressional Party* (New York, 1959), pp. 10–14.

[4] W. Duane Lockard, "Legislative Politics in Connecticut," this Review, Vol. 48 (March 1954), pp. 166–173, especially p. 167.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 171.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 172–173.

[7] Committee on Political Parties, APSA (E. E. Schattschneider, Chm.), "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System," this Review, Vol. 44 (September, 1950), Supplement.

[8] Stephen K. Bailey, *The Condition of Our National Political Parties* (Santa Barbara, Calif.: The Fund for the Republic, 1959).

[9] Data on Ohio may be found in my study, "The Outline of Ohio Politics," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 13 (September, 1960), pp. 702–721.

[10] Some supporting evidence for this observation may be found in my case study, *Governor Freeman and the Minnesota Budget*, ICP Study 60 (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1961).

[11] Wahlke, et al., *The Legislative System* (New York, 1962), p. 349.

TABLE I. FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF INDICES OF LIKENESS INVOLVING DESIGNATED GROUPS, 1949 SESSION OHIO HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Interval	Urban Dems Urban Reps		Rural Dems Rural Reps		Urban Dems Rural Dems		Urban Reps Rural Reps	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
0– 19	27	12	32	15	1	0	0	0
20– 39	31	14	26	12	6	3	5	2
40– 59	28	13	33	15	11	5	12	6
60– 79	40	18	56	26	40	18	46	21
80–100	90	42	69	32	158	73	153	71
Total	216	99	216	100	216	99	216	100

On some issues constituency interests are weak and on other issues only a part of all the constituencies represented have or think they have anything at stake. In addition, legislators' perceptions of their districts may be unclear or they may vary with the personality of the legislator.[12] It has been shown also that legislative roles vary, with the result that members do not respond equally to constituency interests.[13] The urban-rural factionalism thesis on state legislatures is a special version of the more general theory. Derge in particular has presented persuasive evidence which discredits the thesis.[14] His study used data from Illinois and Missouri. Studies of legislative behavior in Alabama[15] and Ohio[16] have the same effect.

Since the constituency pressure theory seems to be a tough weed, some additional evidence based on data from two sessions of the Ohio legislature are offered above. The first of the two sessions is that of 1949. Attention was restricted to the House which was organized by the Democrats. The governor was also Democratic. A roll call analysis was undertaken. Every roll call on which the minority was equal to 10 per cent or more of the majority was selected for consideration: 216 roll calls in all. The legislators were divided into four groups: urban Democrats (51); urban Republicans (12); rural Democrats (18); and rural Republicans (54). Urban members were defined as those representing counties classified by the 1950 Census as standard metropolitan areas or parts thereof. The behavior of the groups relative to each other was described by use of Rice's index of likeness.[17]

The theory requires, at least, that members from similar districts vote together more often than members from dissimilar districts. In terms of the data above, this would mean that urban members regardless of party and also rural members regardless of party would vote together more often than members of the same party representing dissimilar districts. However, inspection of Table I shows clearly that the predicted relationships do not occur. The data disconfirm the theory.

The second of the two meetings of the Ohio General Assembly selected for further testing of the constituency-pressure theory is that of 1959. Once again attention is restricted to the House. It was organized by the Democrats, and the governor was again Democratic. The recorded votes of the members on all roll calls between and including May 13 and July 24, 1959, were considered; and those on which the minority was equal to or greater than 10 per cent of the majority were selected for analysis.[18] The period was chosen for the reason that it was a period of sustained activity on a variety of relatively important matters but not including the first or last weeks of the session. The length of the period was determined by the need on the one hand to collect a fairly large body of data and on the other hand to limit the data to what was convenient for processing. There are 183 roll calls in the group selected for analysis, and on 113 of these a majority of the Democrats opposed a majority of the Republicans. Members were given scores which measure the percentage of their votes which were cast in support of the position taken by the majority of the Democrats on party opposition votes, with the exception that 3 Democrats and 1 Republican were dropped from the analysis altogether for failure to vote on more than 100 of the 183 selected roll calls. Then members were grouped by party and constituency characteristics, and mean scores were computed for each group. Results are shown below.

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[12] Lewis Dexter, "The Representative and His District," *Human Organization*, Vol. 16 (Spring, 1957), pp. 2–13.

[13] Particularly Eulau, et al., "The Role of the Representative: Some Empirical Observations on the Theory of Edmund Burke," this REVIEW, Vol. 53 (September, 1959), pp. 742–756, and Charles O. Jones, "Representation in Congress: The Case of the House Agriculture Committee," this REVIEW, Vol. 55 (June, 1961), pp. 358–368.

[14] David R. Derge, "Metropolitan and Outstate Alignments in Illinois and Missouri Legislative Delegations," this REVIEW, Vol. 52 (December, 1958), pp. 1051–1065.

[15] Murray Clark Havens, *City Versus Farm?* (University, Alabama: Bureau of Public Administration, University of Alabama, 1957).

[16] Flinn, "The Outline of Ohio Politics," *op. cit.*

[17] Stuart Rice, "The Behavior of Legislative Groups: A Method of Measurement," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 40 (March, 1925), pp. 60–72.

TABLE II. MEAN SUPPORT FOR POSITIONS TAKEN BY A MAJORITY OF DEMOCRATS BY PARTY AND CONSTITUENCY, SELECTED PARTY OPPOSITION VOTES, 1959 OHIO HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Constituency % Urban*	Dems		Reps	
	Mean Score	(N)	Mean Score	(N)
0– 29	83	(9)	12	(16)
30– 59	78	(18)	13	(25)
60–100	84	(48)	18	(19)

* 1950 Census.

It is abundantly clear that members from similar constituencies do not vote in the same way and that differences between the parties are not due to differences in the composition of the legislative parties in terms of constituencies represented. Once again the constituency-pressure theory is disconfirmed.[19]

However, use has been made of the theory in modified form; and this should be distinguished from the full-blown theory discussed above. MacRae[20] and Dye[21] have argued that variance in the degree of party loyalty shown by members of partisan legislative groups relate to differences in constituency. They maintain, in MacRae's words, that "representatives who come from districts that are most typical of their parties tend to show highest 'party loyalty' on roll calls; those who come from districts atypical of their party tend to cross party lines more often."[22] Note that the state-

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[18] This is in effect a time sample, and it is taken to be a random sample of party opposition votes in the 1959 session. Findings are spoken of as applying to the entire session, and probabilities are given. Another time sample taken from the 1963 session is treated in the same way. If the data analyzed do not constitute random samples, then the probabilities add nothing, of course; and certain statements must be taken to apply only to the data analyzed and not to the entire legislative sessions from which they were drawn.

[19] But see Lewis A. Froman, Jr., "Inter-Party Constituency Differences and Congressional Voting Behavior," this REVIEW, Vol. 57 (March, 1963), pp. 57–62. As I understand him, he seems to argue that intra-party differences relate to differences in constituency and that Democrats and Republicans tend to represent different kinds of constituencies. Therefore, differences between the parties *are* due to constituency influences. This is not necessarily true since intra-party differences may have little or nothing to do with inter-party differences, as Table II in this study shows. Furthermore, Froman's phi coefficients which he uses to measure the relations of constituency to intra-party differences are so weak as to suggest negative rather than positive findings.

[20] Duncan MacRae, Jr., "The Relations Between Roll Call Votes and Constituencies in the Massachusetts House of Representatives," this REVIEW, Vol. 46 (December, 1952), pp. 1046–1055, reprinted in Eulau, Eldersveld, and Janowitz (eds.), *Political Behavior* (Glencoe, Ill., 1956), pp. 317–324.

[21] Thomas R. Dye, "A Comparison of Constituency Influences in the Upper and Lower Chambers of a State Legislature," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 14 (June, 1961), pp. 473–481.

[22] MacRae, *op. cit.*, p. 323 in Eulau et al., *Political Behavior*. In order to understand clearly what MacRae is reporting, it should be recognized that his use of the term "typical" is somewhat unusual although convenient for lack of anything better. "Typical" may refer to central tendency, but here it means, in a sense, representative of the extreme. The finding actually summarized by reference to typical and atypical districts is that members who come from districts which have most of that characteristic which distinguishes districts represented by their party from districts represented by the opposing

TABLE III. "A COMPARISON OF CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CONSTITUENCY CHARACTERISTICS AND PARTY COHESION FOR HOUSE AND SENATE MEMBERS, 1957 SESSION, PENNSYLVANIA GENERAL ASSEMBLY"[25]

Relationship	Correlation Coefficient			
	House		Senate	
	Democrats	Republicans	Democrats	Republicans
Income and Deviation Total Urban Legislators	.45	−.07	.08	−.29
Ruralism and Deviation Total Legislators	.56	−.37	.09	.00
Electoral Margin and Deviation Total Legislators	−.46	−.44	−.15	.12

ment says *variance* in party loyalty relates to constituencies, but does not offer any reason for the relatively high degree of party unity from which the analysis starts. It is not contended that members from similar districts vote together regardless of party.

Actually the constituency-pressure theory in even its severely modified form is open to question. MacRae based his Massachusetts study on a very small number of roll calls in each of three legislative sessions, and members were included in the analysis even though they may have missed as many as 50 per cent of the roll calls selected from a given session. Furthermore, MacRae offers no measure of the strength of the apparent relationship between constituency and party loyalty. It seems that his intention and accomplishment were to advance an hypothesis with enough data to make it credible.[23]

Dye on the other hand took MacRae's hypothesis, and gave it a much more rigorous test. He considered every vote in the 1957 session of the Pennsylvania legislature on which the majorities of the two parties were opposed, and computed correlation coefficients to express the relation between constituency and party loyalty. Dye's measure of roll call voting behavior is what he calls a deviation index, which is "the per cent of the votes on which party majorities were in opposition that the legislator voted with the opposition party's majority and against his own party's majority."[24] He summarized his finding in the table which is reproduced above.

Leaving aside electoral margin, which will be considered later, it can be seen that income and ruralism have some relationship to party loyalty in the House. As a matter of fact coefficients above .4 are remarkably good in a system as complex as the legislative system. Insofar as the Senate is concerned, constituency characteristics have virtually nothing to do with a member's behavior with reference to the majorities of the respective parties. Dye offers an interesting explanation for the contrast between House and Senate: "It appears from empirical analysis that the function of the upper chamber in Pennsylvania is to inject into legislative decision-making the influence of a body relatively more free from narrower constituency pressures than the lower chamber. Larger and more heterogeneous constituencies compel senators to align themselves with a wider variety of interests. . . . One may conjecture that the moderating of constituency influence via longer terms and larger districts actually clears the way for party affiliation to

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party are more loyal to their own party than are members who come from districts which have least of the characteristic which distinguishes districts represented by their party. Hence, use of the term "typical" in this context may be unconventional; but it is certainly convenient.

[23] Pesonen in a recent study [Pertti Pesonen, "Close and Safe State Elections in Massachusetts," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 7 (February, 1963), pp. 54–70] replicates MacRae's study using a more recent session of the same legislature. He uses an improved measure of party loyalty, and reaches the same conclusion as MacRae concerning the relation of constituency and party voting. However, he works with only seven roll calls; and does not measure the strength of the observed relation.

[24] Dye, *op. cit.*, pp. 476–477.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 477.

exert a greater influence on voting patterns."[26] The last statement suggests an elaboration of what has been identified as the modified constituency-pressure theory; however, replication is undoubtedly required before the theory can be well accepted in any form.

An attempt to do that was made with the 1959 Ohio data already described. The procedure differed slightly from Dye's. Only 113 party opposition votes were considered, and the measure was support for the position of the Democratic majority.[27] Results are shown in Table IV.

TABLE IV. PRODUCT MOMENT COEFFICIENTS EXPRESSING THE RELATION BETWEEN CONSTITUENCY CHARACTERISTICS AND SUPPORT FOR POSITIONS TAKEN BY A MAJORITY OF DEMOCRATS, 113 PARTY OPPOSITION VOTES, 1959 OHIO HOUSE

Constituency Characteristic (1950 Census)	Dems (N=75)	Reps (N=60)
% Mining & manufacturing empl.	+.246*	+.123
% Urban	+.170	+.257*
% Rural farm	−.170	−.272*
Median family income	+.234*	+.145

* p=.05.

It may be seen that support for the position taken by a majority of Democrats increases as the per cent of the labor force in mining and manufacturing increases and as urbanism and family income increase. Support for the majority Democratic position decreases as the per cent of the population classified as rural farm increases. However, the relationships are weak; and in half of the cases the coefficients are statistically insignificant.

Before accepting a negative conclusion and before counting the contrast between Ohio and Pennsylvania as a paradox it should be noted that single demographic variables are being used to order constituencies in a way which is thought to be relevant to legislative behavior. Actually they may not be able to do that. In Ohio there are some high urban areas where industry is not particularly important and also some relatively rural counties which have a large part of their population engaged in mining and manufacturing. Thus, it may be that differences in constituencies do relate significantly to legislative behavior in Ohio but that they are not properly described by any single variable. This problem may not be so acute in Pennsylvania and that might explain the contrasting findings.

To see whether there is a relation closer than yet perceived between constituency and party loyalty in Ohio, Democratic and Republican districts were each grouped on the basis of several demographic characteristics. An appropriate variance analysis procedure was employed to determine whether these classes related to variance in party loyalty.[28] Application of the procedure yields a series of equations which are forms of the equation

$$S = b_1C_1 + b_2C_2 + b_3C_3 \cdots$$

where S is the *actual* line of regression, b the class mean, and C_1, C_2, etc. are the classes. R-values, F-values, and probabilities are shown for each equation.

Democratic districts were divided into four classes as follows: C_1—districts 30–55 per cent urban; C_2—districts less than 22 per cent urban; C_3—districts 87 per cent or more urban; and C_4—districts more than 40 per cent industrial, *i.e.*, more than 40 per cent of the working force engaged in mining and manufacturing. Where a district could be classified in more than one way, it was placed in the highest class. The result of the analysis of variance is shown below:

$$S = 75C_1 + 82C_2 + 85C_3 + 86C_4$$
$$R = .414 \quad F = 3.68 \quad p = .01$$

The coefficient is substantially better than that produced by the zero-order correlation (.246) between mining and manufacturing employment and party loyalty. Also, Democrats from mid-urban districts are less loyal to the party

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[26] *Ibid.*, pp. 479–480.

[27] Members were also scored on 60 party agreement votes. (10 of the original 183 roll calls were dropped since one party or the other was evenly divided making it impossible to characterize the vote as a party agreement or a party opposition vote.) The scores of Democratic and Republican members on party opposition votes were each correlated with their scores on party agreement votes. The product moment coefficients were less than .1 in each case, indicating that a party opposition vote and a party agreement vote are distinctly different events in the life of the legislature.

[28] See A. M. Mood, *Introduction to the Theory of Statistics* (New York, 1950), pp. 318–326. The procedure is designed to permit comparison of variance around the over-all mean with the sum of the variance around class means. It is specially useful in the present situation since it allows flexibility in the creation of classes.

TABLE V. PRODUCT MOMENT COEFFICIENTS EXPRESSING THE RELATION BETWEEN CONSTITUENCY CHARACTERISTICS AND SUPPORT FOR POSITIONS TAKEN BY A MAJORITY OF DEMOCRATS, 50 PARTY OPPOSITION VOTES, 1963 OHIO HOUSE

Constituency Characteristic	Dems (N=46)	Reps (N=85)
% Mining & manufacturing empl. (1950 Census)	+.350†	+.335*
% Urban (1960 Census)	+.321†	+.271†

* $p=.01$.
† $p=.05$.

majority than Democrats from very rural counties.

Republican districts were divided into four classes as were Democratic districts, and in the following manner: C_1—districts 25 per cent or less urban; C_2—districts 26–68 per cent urban; C_3—districts 71 per cent or more urban; C_4—districts more than 40 per cent industrial. Analysis produced the following equation:

$$S = 11C_1 + 14C_2 + 15C_3 + 21C_4$$
$$R = .353 \quad F = 1.99 \quad p = .250$$

A more significant result is obtained, with only a small decrease in the value of *R*, if classes 1 and 2 are combined.

$$S = 13C_{1-2} + 15C_3 + 21C_4$$
$$R = .327 \quad F = 2.28 \quad p = .1$$

Note that, once again, use of a combination of constituency characteristics produced a better result than that produced by the best zero-order correlation (.272) between a demographic variable and party loyalty although the improvement here is not so great as in the case of the Democrats.

Additional data[29] were collected from the Republican-controlled 1963 meeting of the Ohio House to see whether similar results could be obtained. Zero-order coefficients relating demographic variables and party loyalty are shown in Table V.

Districts represented by Democrats were divided into four classes similar to but not identical with those used in analysis of the 1959 data: C_1—districts 30–52 per cent urban; C_2—districts less than 20 per cent urban; C_3—districts more than 92 per cent urban; and C_4—districts 44 per cent or more industrial. Districts qualifying for membership in more than one class were placed in the highest class. Application of the variance analysis used before produced remarkably good results.

$$S = 68C_1 + 78C_2 + 85C_3 + 72C_4$$
$$R = .687 \quad F = 9.39 \quad p = .001$$

The coefficient is dramatically better than any zero-order coefficient, which is due in part to the unexpected non-linear relationship which appears above.

Districts represented by Republicans were divided also into four classes similar to but not identical with those used in analysis of the 1959 data: C_1—35 per cent or less urban; C_2—37–67 per cent urban; C_3—districts 72 per cent or more urban; C_4—44 per cent or more industrial. Classification procedures were the same as those used before. Analysis produced the following result:

$$S = 15C_1 + 19C_2 + 18C_3 + 25C_4$$
$$R = .420 \quad F = 4.34 \quad p = .01$$

Once again a more sophisticated analysis reveals a stronger relation between constituency and party loyalty. It is fair to conclude that the modified constituency-pressure theory has substantial merit and that failures to discover the expected relations may well be due to the variables and procedures employed.

III. ELECTORAL MARGIN

A number of writers have observed that electoral margin seems to correlate positively with loyalty to party. MacRae in his previously mentioned Massachusetts study found this relationship although his findings were somewhat inconclusive.[30] Pesonen found that Democrats from safe districts were more loyal to party than Democrats from close districts but that the opposite relation seemed to exist in the Republican Party.[31] Dye in his study of roll call voting in Pennsylvania computed coefficients expressing the relation between electoral margin and party loyalty. In the House they were .46 and .44 for the Democrats and Republicans respectively, but in the Senate the comparable coefficients were only .15 and .12.[32] Patterson in a study of the Wisconsin State Assembly delineates certain legislative roles, and remarks in passing that maverick members of the Republican Party were much more likely to be from marginal districts than were the regulars. His exact finding is that 88 per cent of the Republican mavericks were from close districts while only 42 per cent of the regulars were from districts so classified.[33] Democratic mavericks were either missing or rare in the session which provided the data. Becker et al., in a study of the Michigan legislature conclude that electoral competition has no relation to legislative behavior.[34]

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[29] Fifty party opposition roll calls were selected. They are every such vote which occurred between May 15 and the July 11 recess. Members who voted on less than 35 of the 50 selected votes were dropped: 3 Republicans and 3 Democrats. Others were given scores expressing the percentage of their votes cast in support of positions taken by a majority of Democrats.

[30] MacRae, *op. cit.*, reprinted in Eulau et al., pp. 321–322.

[31] Pesonen, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

[32] Dye, *op. cit.*, p. 477.

I made a further test of the relation between plurality and party loyalty, by using the 1959 and 1963 Ohio data already discussed above. In making the analysis plurality was defined as the difference between the winner's vote and the vote of the most popular losing candidate expressed as a percentage of the winner's vote; hence, the higher the percentage the safer the election. This somewhat complex definition was made necessary by the existence of a number of multi-member districts.

From Table VI it appears that high plurality members support their own party majority more often than low plurality members, but the relation is weak to vanishing. However, further analysis leads to a much more positive conclusion.

Each of the four groups shown in Table VI was divided into classes depending on plurality. Nothing was gained insofar as the 1959 Republicans and 1961 Democrats were concerned. On the other hand, the effect of plurality on the behavior of the 1959 Democrats is seen to be non-linear as shown by the following equation:

$$S = 81P_1 + 80P_2 + 85P_3 + 86P_4$$

where P_1 are members with less than 12 per cent plurality, P_2 members with 13–20 per cent plurality, P_3 members with 21–29 per cent plurality, and P_4 members with more than 29 per cent plurality. Reduction to two classes and application of the variance analysis procedure used before produces this result:

TABLE VI. PRODUCT MOMENT COEFFICIENTS EXPRESSING THE RELATION BETWEEN PLURALITY AND SUPPORT FOR POSITIONS TAKEN BY A MAJORITY OF DEMOCRATS, SELECTED PARTY OPPOSITION VOTES IN TWO SESSIONS OF THE OHIO HOUSE

Session	Dems	Reps
1959	.228†	−.106
1961	.012	−.147

† $p = .05$.

$$S = 80P_{1-2} + 85P_{3-4}$$
$$R = .272 \quad F = 2.91 \quad p = .1$$

Elimination of one member in class P_3 with a very low party support score improves the outcome significantly:

$$S = 80P_{1-2} + 86P_{3-4}$$
$$R = .369 \quad F = 4.90 \quad p = .025$$

The relation of plurality to the behavior of 1963 Republicans is also non-linear as is shown below:

$$S = 22P_1 + 18P_2 + 16P_3 + 18P_4$$

where P_1 is a class whose members have less than 11 per cent plurality, P_2 a class with members having 11–25 per cent plurality, P_3 a class with members having 26–40 per cent plurality, and P_4 a class with members having more than 40 per cent plurality. Reduction to two classes and further analysis yields the following:

$$S = 22P_1 + 18P_{2-3-4}$$
$$R = .208 \quad F = 1.88 \quad p = .250$$

Thus it may be concluded with appropriate caution that in 1959 low plurality Democrats were less loyal to party positions than high plurality Democrats and that in 1963 low plurality Republicans were more likely to support Democratic party positions than were high plurality Republicans. Further, it is important to insist that plurality does not operate continuously, that there is a threshold: when it is once passed, plurality operates no longer as a factor affecting loyalty to party. Generally, it appears that the least secure members of winning parties, *i.e.*, the least secure members of the legislature, are less loyal to party than other members. Within these limits plurality does relate significantly to legislative behavior.

Plurality has been combined with constituency in relation to party voting in another theory which runs along these lines: a comfortable plurality frees a member from constituency pressures; a close race makes him unusually sensitive to any position with constituency support. If the member with only a tenuous hold on his office comes from a district not typical of his party, he will be most likely to be deviant. On the other hand, if he represents a district typical of his party, he will be unexcelled in fidelity to party. A schematic presentation of this view is given below:

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[33] Samuel C. Patterson, "The Role of the Deviant in the State Legislative System: The Wisconsin Assembly," *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 14 (June, 1961), pp. 460–472, 467.

[34] R. W. Becker et al., "Correlates of Legislative Voting: Michigan House of Representatives, 1954–1961," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 6 (Nov., 1962), pp. 384–396. Actually,the number of members from districts classified by the authors as close is so small as to make the finding doubtful. What the data do show clearly, however, is that so few members of the Michigan House come from close districts that electoral insecurity could not influence the behavior of many members.



To test the theory it is necessary to hold constituency constant and to vary plurality, and this was done by use of the 1959 and 1963 Ohio data. The classification of constituencies is the same as that described earlier, and the variance analysis procedure is also the same as that employed before. In 1959 plurality related significantly to party loyalty in Democratic ranks in only the most typical Democratic districts, *i.e.*, more than 40 per cent industrial; and the relation was contrary to the hypothesis. Democrats in this class with high pluralities supported the party more than Democrats with lower pluralities as is shown by the equation for constituency class 4 Democrats:

$$S = 84P_1 + 87P_2$$
$$R = .473 \quad F = 2.55 \quad p = .1$$

where P_1 is a class composed of members with pluralities of 20 per cent or less and P_2 is a class with members having pluralities of more than 20 per cent.

Also, in 1959, plurality related significantly to party loyalty in Republican ranks in only the most typical Republican districts, *i.e.*, districts 25 per cent or less urban; and the relation is consistent with the hypothesis. Low plurality Republicans give less support to Democratic positions than do high plurality Republicans as is shown by the following equation for constituency class 1 Republicans:

$$S = 10P_1 + 13P_2$$
$$R = .558 \quad F = 2.94 \quad p = .1$$

where P_1 is a class whose members have pluralities of 10 per cent or less and P_2 is a class whose members have pluralities of more than 10 per cent. (The 10 per cent cutting point was chosen as the point most likely to yield positive results on the basis of previous analysis.)

In 1963 plurality related significantly to party loyalty among Democrats, once again in only the most industrial districts, and the relation was contrary to the hypothesis.

$$S = 62P_1 + 76P_2$$
$$R = .592 \quad F = 3.78 \quad p = .05$$

where P_1 is a class with members having less than 10.4 per cent pluralities and P_2 is a class with members having pluralities of 10.4 per cent or more. (The cutting point is at the median.)

In the same session of the Ohio House plurality had no significant relation to party loyalty in any Republican constituency group, with 10 per cent plurality used as the cutting point. These findings from two sessions of the Ohio legislature are somewhat contradictory but generally point to disconfirmation of the hypothesis being tested; however, this negative conclusion must be accepted cautiously since an effort to relate plurality to legislative behavior in relatively small groups is almost doomed from the start when plurality itself has only a weak relation to the behavior to be explained.

IV. EXPERIENCE AND LEADERSHIP

A tendency can be seen toward a positive relation between experience in a group and conformity to its norms, a condition comforting to both the member and the group. Since loyalty to party is rather obviously the accepted thing in many state legislatures, experience should contribute to party loyalty.

This theory has, however, received little attention. One study considers somewhat tangentially the effect of experience on roll call voting. The relevant observation is that members over age 35 are more likely to vote their own social status rather than the party position if their legislative experience is limited rather than extensive.[35] The relation does not appear to be strong. A more direct test was made by use of the 1959 Ohio data. Experience measured in number of terms served was related to support for the positions of a majority of Democrats. In the case of the Democrats the coefficient is +.194, and in the case of the Republicans +.116. Neither is significant, and the finding is negative. In the absence of contradictory evidence the theory appears to be disconfirmed.

The relation of leadership to roll call behavior has received a little more attention. Analysis of voting patterns in the 1955 session of the Michigan House yielded the observation that the average House leader supported his party 89 per cent of the time he voted on partisan roll calls (party opposition votes) while the average non-leader supported his party 83 per cent of the time.[36] Leadership was defined by a panel of experts and not merely by reference to formal positions within the legislature.

Analysis of voting patterns in the 1951–1952 Massachusetts legislature produced the finding that Democratic leaders were somewhat more loyal to the party position than non-leaders, when organizational loyalty was at stake. Republicans, however, showed no such differentiation between leaders and non-leaders. With reference to votes that could be designated as liberal or conservative, it was found that an "overall association between legislative status and liberalism (for the Democrats) or conservatism (for the Republicans) would probably not be statistically significant."[37]

The 1959 Ohio data were used for a further test with leadership defined with reference to positions of formal authority. Democrats classified as leaders were the speaker, majority leader, committee and sub-committee chairmen. Republicans classified as leaders were the minority leader, his assistant, and the legislators who had been committee or sub-committee chairmen in the Republican-controlled legislature of 1957. Twenty-seven Democrats and 18 Republicans qualified as leaders. Leaders in both parties did appear to be slightly more devoted to party positions, but chi-square tests showed the relation to be very insignificant indeed. It seems fair to conclude that in the absense of clearcut evidence to the contrary the holding or not holding of positions of leadership has little to do with voting support of party.

V. IDEOLOGY

As a guess, it is likely that voting behavior in a legislature will be influenced by the ideology of the members. The problem is to discover and measure attitude structures and to relate them to legislative behavior. For that purpose a questionnaire was sent to the members of the 1963 Ohio House of Representatives. Replies were received from 65 per cent of the Republicans and 61 of the Democrats, and insofar as it was possible to judge, respondents appeared to be a representative sample of the whole.[38] Re-

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[35] Duncan MacRae, Jr. and Edith K. MacRae, "Legislators' Social Status and Their Votes," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 66 (May, 1961), pp. 599–603.

[36] Margaret G. Fuller, *Leadership in the Michigan Legislature* (Master's thesis, Michigan State University: published by the author, 1957), pp. 27–28.

[37] Duncan MacRae, Jr., "Roll Call Votes and Leadership," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 20 (Fall, 1956), pp. 543–558, at p. 552.

[38] Respondents did not differ significantly from from non-respondents in terms of constituency characteristics or in terms of party support

TABLE VII. DISTRIBUTION OF LIBERALISM SCORES BY PARTY, 1963 OHIO HOUSE MEMBERS

Interval	Dems	Interval	Reps
100–90	3	79–70	1
89–80	2	69–60	1
79–70	3	59–50	5
69–60	9	49–40	6
59–50	6	39–30	20
49–40	2	29–20	17
39–30	3	19–10	5
29–25	2	9– 5	2
N	30	N	57
Mean	60	Mean	31
s	18	s	13

publican responses to 10 questions concerning public policy issues constituted a Guttman scale with an index of reproducibility of 92 as did Democratic responses also. Members were given a liberalism score on a scale of 100, the high positions being assigned to members more in favor of government action. The distribution of those scores is shown in the above table.

It may be noted in passing that the partisan groups of legislators differ considerably one from the other. They appear to be distinct bands of co-believers, a finding which accords with McClosky's finding concerning national party leaders.[39] This is, of course, a qualitative judgment based on quantitative data. It is made cautiously, and some may disagree.

The relation of liberalism scores to constituency characteristics is shown below, in Table VIII.

TABLE VIII. PRODUCT MOMENT COEFFICIENTS EXPRESSING THE RELATION BETWEEN DESIGNATED CONSTITUENCY CHARACTERISTICS AND LIBERALISM SCORES, 1963 OHIO HOUSE MEMBERS

Constituency	Dems	Reps
% Industrial	+.114	−.370*
% Urban	+.259	−.285†

* $p=.01$.
† $p=.05$.

Insofar as the Democrats are concerned, the relations are in what is probably the expected direction, but they are very weak. The outcome in the case of the Republicans is totally unexpected. Republicans representing more rural and less industrial districts tend to be more liberal than other Republicans. This is even more surprising when it is recalled that the Republicans from more rural and less industrial districts gave less support than other Republicans to positions taken by the Democrats who are clearly the more liberal of the two partisan groups.

The coefficient expressing the relation between liberalism and loyalty to Democratic positions is only −.034 in the case of the Democrats, which is of no significance at all, and −.298 in the case of the Republicans ($p=.05$). Partial correlation analysis for the Republican group, using industrialization and liberalism as the independent variables and party support scores as the dependent variable, reduces the relation between liberalism and support for Democratic stands to −.199 ($p=.25$). The negative relation between liberalism and support for the Democrats remains; but the relationship itself is now so weak that it is fair to conclude that ideology has little explanatory value when the behavior to be explained is position relative to party position.

VI. CONCLUSION

Inter-party conflict and intra-party cohesion describe essentially but with varying degrees of imprecision many roll calls in state legislative bodies. Party organizations capable of imposing sanctions and discipline may raise party responsibility to very high levels, but this seems not to be a necessary condition. The view that what really happens on party opposition votes is that members vote their constituencies and that different parties represent different constituencies, is wrong. Differences in constituency do, however, relate to intra-party differences with members from districts typical of the party supporting the party position more often than other members. Constituency characteristics will not account for all the variance or even most of it, but given the complexity of the legislative system impressive results can be obtained. This is one generalization which seems now to be firmly established.

Electoral margin seems to have little to do with loyalty to party, except that the least secure members of the legislature, *i.e.*, the

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scores; in fact, they were remarkably similar. Respondents were, therefore, treated as a proper sample from which inferences could be drawn. If there is objection, then it is only necessary to consider what follows as applying to about two-thirds of the members of the 1963 Ohio House and not to the whole House.

[39] Herbert McClosky, et al., "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers," this REVIEW, Vol. 53 (June, 1960), pp. 406–427.

members of the winning party with lowest pluralities, are less loyal to party than are other members. This judgment is based on rather limited evidence, and must be taken cautiously. Experience in the legislature and the holding of positions of leadership have little or nothing to do with party loyalty. This judgment too must be taken with caution; further inquiry could lead to a revision of it, although the evidence is sufficient to indicate that is unlikely. Surprisingly, ideology seems not to have a significant relation to party voting. This observation is based only on Ohio data which show also that the Democrats and Republicans differ distinctly from one another. Within the Ohio Democratic Party attitudes do not vary with constituency but within the Ohio Republican Party the rural members are more liberal than the urban. A shift in the base of the Democratic legislative group would not produce a change in the attitude of the group, but if a more rural Republican group were to face a necessarily more urban Democratic group, there would be a closing of the gap between the legislative parties in terms of basic attitude.

To put the foregoing into the context of the theory which was outlined in the beginning: party responsibility is a consequence of party competition (an unconfirmed but a plausible and useful proposition). Various factors may intervene to inhibit or promote party responsibility, but the only important one located with substantial confidence by this inquiry is constituency. Prospects for increased party responsibility depend, therefore, on the spread of party competition and upon a sorting out of legislative constituencies so that the districts represented by the respective parties are more homogeneous. There are those who think these processes are occurring, although the application of some measures is certainly needed; and there are those who would regret the process if it is occurring, on the ground that legislative life would be much more difficult if two parties were placed on the scene representing constituencies which overlapped in characteristics very little if at all. However, this fear may be unfounded, given the distribution of attitudes within and between the parties which was noted in Ohio. Hence, it might be argued that increased party responsibility in the states is on the way and that it is desirable; but establishment of these points is a problem for further inquiry.

Assuming the theories advanced in this study are nearly correct, then it seems that there is very little chance of getting or increasing party responsibility by deliberate action. On the other hand, it is entirely possible that there are trends running which will encourage party responsibility whether it is desired or not.

THE EXPATRIATION DECISIONS: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL IMPROVISATION AND THE USES OF HISTORY*

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On February 18, 1963, in the cases of *Francisco Mendoza-Martinez* and *Joseph Henry Cort*,[1] the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional a provision of the nationality code which said that "departing from or remaining outside of the jurisdiction of the United States" during wartime or a period of national emergency "for the purpose of evading or avoiding training and service in the land or naval forces of the United States"[2] created in effect an irrebuttable presumption of a voluntary decision to expatriate, *i.e.*, to extinguish one's American nationality. The reader who winces at this convoluted formulation should brace himself: worse is yet to come. Indeed, it would be hard to discover an area of American public law in which the premises and logic of action have been so absurdly attenuated, or in which the historical record has been so flagrantly distorted. (Unless it is in the similar area of denaturalization, which is excluded from discussion here.)[3]

The crucial difficulty has arisen from the fact that a set of improvisations, formulated on an *ad hoc* basis over a century and a half, was in 1940 promoted into an ideology. Since all good ideologies must have historical foundations, there was a hasty movement to the archives and, with appropriate selectivity, a History was concocted. Opponents of the expatriation formula, of course, needed a history of their own, or, let us call it, an Anti-History. These two versions of the development of expatriation in the United States have appeared like Siamese twins in all subsequent litigation: the United States maintaining that deprivation of citizenship is not a "penalty" but merely a formalization of voluntary individual action; opponents claiming that deprivation of nationality except on a clearly voluntary basis is an unconstitutional innovation, a break with all the traditions of the past.

We are suffering, in short, from an acute case of hardening of the categories; perhaps the time has come to explore the history and logic of expatriation from a wholly dispassionate standpoint. This does not imply that I have no opinions on the validity or wisdom of the expatriation statutes, but rather that they will be, to the best of my ability, stated as such rather than guised as "historic truths." The historian, unlike the brief-writer, can never proceed on the assumption that history unfolds backwards in neat legal categories; his task, whatever his opinions on the merits of contemporary policies, is to analyze the past on its own terms. I have elsewhere chronicled the problems of loss of citizenship,[4] and will confine myself here to a summary of historical developments which provide the background for current chaos.

I

There is an ancient Talmudic caveat that the existence of a question does not necessarily require the existence of an answer. Yet when the Supreme Court comes to grips with the constitutionality of a statute written in 1940 or 1952, it commonly assumes that there is an answer concealed in the corpus of American constitutional history, that there is a "logic of constitutionality" which makes it possible for events in 1963 to be squared with the intentions of 1787. There is, in short, an assumption of equivalence which serves as the rationale of judicial review, and this juridical fiction in turn activates the brief-writers in their desperate quest for History, or Anti-History. It would hardly do for the Supreme Court, asked how the Framers would feel about expatriation, property rights in space, or the obligation of commitments to the United Nations, to pass—

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* This article is adapted for a non-legal audience from my study, "The Expatriation Cases: Breathes There the Man with Soul So Dead . . . ?," in Kurland, ed., *1963 Supreme Court Review* (1963). The adaptation has been made with the permission of Professor Philip Kurland.

[1] 83 S. Ct. 554 (1963).

[2] 58 *Stat.* 746 (1944) as amended by 66 *Stat.* 163 (1952).

[3] For the similar development of legal improvisation in this field see Roche, "Pre-Statutory Denaturalization," *Cornell L. Q.*, Vol. 25 (1949), p. 120 and "Statutory Denaturalization," *Pittsburgh L.R.*, Vol. 13 (1952), p. 276.

[4] Roche, "Loss of American Nationality: The Years of Confusion," *Western Pol. Q.*, Vol. 4 (1951), p. 268; "Loss of American Nationality: The Development of Statutory Expatriation," *U. of Pa. L.R.*, Vol. 99 (1950), p. 25; and the studies of denaturalization cited *supra* note 3.

though it might be the course recommended by sophisticated intelligence. Instead, an elaborate *gestalt* is promulgated with the key question: how would the Framers have reacted to the issues of 1963 if they had been given the opportunity? In practice, the views of the Framers thus construed often bear a striking resemblance to those of the justices writing the opinions.

The apparent outcome of this role-playing is, I suspect, that Justice Black knows a good deal more about what James Madison had in mind when he introduced the First Amendment into the House of Representatives than James Madison did at the time. And all legal practitioners are surely aware of the esoteric divination that frequently goes into the construction of statutes—a technique which, by the way, achieved something of a high point in the recent Cort case when the Supreme Court gave the McCarran-Walter Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 a *liberal* construction.[5] What must be emphasized is that the history of expatriation in the United States does not fall into anybody's *post hoc* categories. On this subject our ancestors were neither "liberal" nor "conservative" by contemporary standards; confronted by issues of citizenship, they dealt with them extemporaneously in terms of their value systems. In fact, before the Civil War there was a conspiracy among the political leadership to *avoid* a clear definition of United States citizenship. This was not perversity, but was founded on a recognition that the status of the Negro, notably of the free Negro, was a great source of conflict between North and South and, in the interests of political harmony, had best be left "unclarified."[6]

If citizenship itself was juridically obscure, what can one expect with respect to loss of citizenship? The United States was a nation of immigrants and it is in this context that one must understand the significance of the "natural right of expatriation": it was American policy to deny the doctrine of indefeasible allegiance *in the international forum*. When our spokesmen talked of the right of expatriation, they were not concerned with loss of *American* citizenship; they were combating in specific situations—*e.g.*, the British impressment of British-born, naturalized Americans from our ships[7]—the traditional doctrine that a citizen could not shift his allegiance without the consent of his sovereign. Yet ironically *in the municipal forum* the United States, like the British, endorsed the doctrine of indefeasible allegiance. In other words, we claimed the right to naturalize immigrants but denied Americans the right to give up their American nationality—a classic nationalist posture.[8]

In *Shanks* v. *Dupont* (1830), the Supreme Court gave its conclusions on the subject; said Justice Story, "The general doctrine [governing American law] is that no persons can by any act of their own, without the consent of the government, put off their allegiance and become aliens."[9] And Chancellor James Kent in his *Commentaries* concluded a discussion of expatriation by stating:[10]

> From this historical review . . . the better opinion would seem to be that a citizen cannot renounce his allegiance to the United States without permission of the government, to be declared by law; and that, as there is no existing legislative regulation on the case, the [perpetual allegiance] rule of the English common law remains unaltered.

Only Congress (or the state legislatures?) could validate expatriation for Americans, but after several abortive efforts, the last of which was in 1818, the legislature dropped the topic.[11] Living as we do in the shadow of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is difficult for us to appreciate the disruptive force of states'-rights in the *ante-bellum* period. A legislative examination of the problem of citizenship, and its loss, automatically opened up into a bitter debate on the nature of sovereignty. Thus those who argued that citizenship in the nation was derived from state citizenship would insist that provision for expatriation also lay within state jurisdiction; the Abolitionists, who were urging the primacy of national citizenship,[12] assigned the expatriation authority to Congress; and those interested in peace and quiet simply kept the dilemma off the floor. This may seem quaintly abstract, but it should be recalled that the heart of the *Dred Scott* decision,[13] which touched off a furor North and South, was the theoretical question of Scott's citizenship in Missouri, *i.e.*, his standing to bring action for trespass in the federal forum under the diversity clause of Article III of the Constitution.

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[5] Rusk v. Cort, 369 U. S. 367 (1962).

[6] See Roche, *The Early Development of United States Citizenship* (1949).

[7] See Anthony Steel, "Impressment in the Monroe-Pinckney Negotiation, 1806–1807," *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, Vol. 57 (1952), p. 352 and "Anthony Merry and the Anglo-American Dispute about Impressment," *Cambridge Hist. J.*, Vol. 9 (1948), p. 331.

[8] Steel, *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, Vol. 57 at p. 357 note 20; Tsiang, *The Question of Expatriation in America Prior to 1907* (1942); Morrow, "Early American Attitudes towards the Doctrine of Expatriation," *Amer. Jour. Int. Law*, Vol. 26 (1932), p. 552.

[9] 3 Peters 242, 246 (1830). As his correspondence reveals, John Marshall was a supporter of indefeasible allegiance: "it is a question upon which I never entertained a scintilla of doubt; and have never yet heard an argument which ought to excite a doubt in any sound and reflecting mind." Marshall to Pickering, April 11, 1814, cited by Beveridge, *Life of Marshall* (1916–19), Vol. 4, p. 54.

[10] Kent, *Commentaries* (1827), Vol. 2, pp. 49–50.

[11] See Roche, "Loss of American Nationality: The Years of Confusion," *op. cit.*, *supra* note 4 at pp. 274–277.

According to the standard mythology,[14] the right of expatriation *for Americans* was finally established in 1868 when Congress passed an "expatriation act." True, this statute began strongly enough by asserting that:[15]

> Whereas the right of expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all people, indispensable to the enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. . . .

But a persistent reader, who continued beyond this rhetorical flourish, could get a different sense of legislative intent (one consonant with the title of the bill, an "Act concerning the Rights of American Citizens in Foreign States"); it stated:[16]

> and whereas in the recognition of this principle this Government has freely received emigrants from all nations, and invested them with the rights of citizenship; and whereas it is claimed that such American citizens, with their descendants, are subjects of foreign states, owing allegiance to the governments thereof; and whereas it is necessary to the maintenance of public peace that this claim of foreign allegiance should be promptly and finally disavowed: Therefore any declaration, instruction, opinion, order or decision, of any officers of this Government which denies, restricts, impairs, or questions the right of expatriation is hereby declared inconsistent with the fundamental principles of this Government, and therefore null and void.

In other words, the "expatriation act" of 1868 was merely another affirmation of the rights of foreign nationals to expatriate, *i.e.*, to become naturalized *American* citizens, and an announcement to the world at large that the United States considered these adopted citizens fully within its protection.

Naturally there was a certain amount of feed-back from this luminous pronouncement; for the rest of the nineteenth century, the President, the Secretary of State, and the courts engaged in desultory excursions on whether Congress had intended the right of expatriation to extend to Americans.[17] The preponderant opinion was that Congress had so intended, but nobody got particularly wrought up on the subject because of its marginal character.[18] Many problems arose in connection with the marriage of American women to aliens, and here an ingenious improvisation, too illogically delightful to pass over, was employed to dispose of the question: the citizenship of an American woman married to an alien went into a specially designed limbo. Thus while living abroad her American citizenship was "in abeyance" or "inactive" for the duration of her foreign residence and coverture, but she could regain it by "returning to and dwelling in the country of her maiden allegiance."[19] This was a neat half-way station between two contending and inconvenient legal traditions: the first asserting the rule of perpetual allegiance, and the second maintaining the primacy of the husband's status.

In 1906 and 1907, Congress finally took official notice of the legal problems created by non-statutory denaturalization and expatriation and passed two statutes which for the first time systematized immigration and nationality procedures. The Expatriation Act of 1907, which alone concerns us here, essentially gave statutory validity to the administrative law of expatriation which had been developed in the years preceding.[20] An American who became a naturalized citizen of a foreign state, or who took an oath of allegiance to another sovereign;

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[12] See tenBroek, *Anti-Slavery Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment* (1951).

[13] *Scott* v. *San [d] ford*, 19 Howard 393 (1857).

[14] As incorporated, for example, in Justice McKenna's opinion of the Court in MacKenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915), or Justice Jackson's in Mandoli v. Acheson, 344 U.S. 135 (1952).

[15] *Stat.* 223 (1868). It is perhaps worth recalling that preambles have no legal force, Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S. 11 (1905).

[16] *Ibid.;* see Roche, *op. cit., supra* note 11 at pp. 282–285 for a discussion of the legislative history of this enactment.

[17] See *ibid.* at pp. 286–294 for an analysis of the interpretations of the 1868 statute.

[18] *Ibid.* There was no authoritative judicial determination.

[19] *Ibid.* at p. 289.

[20] 34 *Stat.* 1228 (1907). The companion legislation dealt with naturalization, 34 *Stat.* 596 (1906).

a naturalized American who returned to his native land or took up permanent residence in another foreign state; an American woman who married an alien; were all held to have voluntarily given up their American citizenship. This is an oversimplification[21]—naturalization abroad, for example, established an irrebuttable presumption of expatriation, whereas foreign residence by a naturalized citizen created a rebuttable presumption (and the citizenship of women was put into the limbo described earlier). But the important point for our purposes is that Congress adopted the basic syllogism that has underpinned expatriation legislation ever since: (1) expatriation must be "voluntary"; and (2) the United States can establish the outward and visible standards of such volition and force an individual to accept the consequences of the freely willed decision thereby imputed to him.

At the same time, it should be carefully noted that the expatriation categories of the 1907 statute were all related to a putative *transfer* of allegiance. They established criteria, that is, for determining when an American had taken up a new nationality (or reverted to his original status); the proviso on women had, indeed, a quaintly arrogant ring: "any American woman who marries a foreigner shall take the nationality of her husband." In other words, the 1907 enactment was not designed to penalize Americans for their sins; it may have had that impact in marginal cases, but its main purpose was to regularize the arrangements by which the United States took notice that an American national had *sua sponte* abandoned his citizenship for another. The Supreme Court viewed the matter in this light: after stipulating that "it may be conceded that a change of citizenship cannot be arbitrarily imposed, that is, imposed without the concurrence of the citizen," the Court held the statute to be part of the "inherent power of sovereignty":

> As a government, the United States is invested with all the attributes of sovereignty. As it has the character of nationality it has the powers of nationality, especially those which concern its relations and intercourse with other countries.[22]

We can stop our summary of this aspect of expatriation here. We have a firm category: those who have by their actions indicated that they have voluntarily abandoned American nationality in favor of citizenship in, or at least allegiance to, a foreign sovereign. In 1940 this category was expanded to include one who took service in a foreign army if "he has or acquires the nationality of such foreign state," one who accepted or performed "the duties of, any office, post, or employment under the government of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof for which only nationals of such state are eligible," and one who voted in a political election in a foreign state.[23] The 1952 statute retained these provisions with slight modifications.[24]

II

With this background, we can now turn to another set of criteria for expatriation, those involved in *Trop* v. *Dulles*[25] and in the 1963 cases. Beginning in 1940 the Congress added several new provisions to the section setting forth the standards of voluntary expatriation, and they were qualitatively distinct from those described above. They were not recognitions of a transfer of allegiance except in the most abstract ideological sense; they were punishments for sins against the sovereign. An American was held to have expatriated himself by committing treason;[26] by deserting from the armed forces in wartime;[27] by leaving the country or remaining outside of the country to avoid military service (1944 amendment);[28] and by attempting, conspiring, etc. to teach and advocate the overthrow of the United States government by force or violence (1954 amendment).[29] Conviction for treason, desertion or sedition thus carried with it automatic denationalization; the proviso on draft-dodging, involved in the *Cort* and *Mendoza-Mar-*

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[21] For detail see Roche, "The Loss of American Nationality: The Development of Statutory Expatriation," *op. cit., supra* note 4.

[22] MacKenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311 (1915).

[23] 54 *Stat.* 1169 (1940). There was also a special provision for renunciation of American nationality, designed for use by dual nationals living abroad.

[24] 66 *Stat.* 163 (1952). There were some additions and changes. Service in the armed forces of a foreign state was held to expatriate without regard to the stipulation of the 1940 act quoted in the text. Accepting service for a foreign government cost one his nationality if (a) he had or acquired the nationality of such state, or (b) if he were required to declare allegiance to such foreign power as a prerequisite for employment. Sec. 349, Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. 1481.

[25] 356 U.S. 86 (1958).

[26] 54 *Stat.* 1169 (1940).

[27] *Ibid.*

[28] 58 *Stat.* 746 (1944).

[29] 68 *Stat.* 1146 (1954).

tinez cases, was not triggered in this fashion: it was not feasible to convict absentees in criminal actions. Indeed, only when an individual, like Mendoza-Martinez, returned to the United States and was apprehended for draft evasion could a trial take place. In Cort's instance, for example, an indictment had been turned in against him in federal court and a warrant was out for his arrest for draft dodging, but until he returned to the jurisdiction no further action was possible. The decision that an individual had departed from, or remained outside of the United States to avoid military service was thus left in the hands of the administrative authorities: the Immigration and Naturalization Service, which could exclude an individual from the United States on the ground that he had expatriated himself by evading military service, and the Department of State, which could withdraw an individual's passport and inform him of his loss of nationality under this clause. It was not an easy provision to administer, but Congress in 1952 stepped in with a helpful presumption: "failure to comply with any provision of any compulsory service laws . . . shall [in the instance of an American abroad] raise the presumption that the departure from or absence from the United States was for the purpose of evading or avoiding training. . . . "[30]

I have so far taken for granted the very issue which was *sub judice* in *Trop* v. *Dulles*,[31] *Rusk* v. *Cort*,[32] and *Kennedy* v. *Mendoza-Martinez* (and was evaded on technical grounds in *Perez v. Brownell*),[33] namely, that deprivation of nationality under these rubrics was in fact a punishment, a criminal sanction, rather than a mere recognition of transfer of allegiance, an official *imprimatur* on a private, voluntary act of expatriation. The Solicitor General labored mightily[34] in *Cort* and *Mendoza-Martinez* to demonstrate that "punishment" was not involved, but this was obviously an effort to distinguish the current cases from *Trop*, where the Court had invalidated the desertion provision, and to fit them into the mold of *Perez*, where the Court sustained the voting-in-a-foreign-election category. The historian, fortunately, is not bound by the deductive requirements of pleading, and can confidently call a spade a spade.

Had it not been for the eccentricities of precedent, one and all would surely have admitted what is patent on the face of the legislation: that it is essentially penal in character. Indeed, both historically and contemporaneously denationalization has been widely employed as a punishment for "bad" behavior.[35] At this moment one may be deprived of his Nicaraguan citizenship for "expounding political doctrine running counter to the ideal of the Fatherland, affecting its national sovereignty or tending to destroy the republican system of government."[36] In Albania and Yugoslavia it is sufficient to refuse "to do one's duty";[37] in Brazil, to engage in activities "against the public interest";[38] and in a number of states one is thus penalized for indications of disloyalty, disaffection, or a mentality contrary to the national spirit.

The United States, happily isolated and isolationist, had no statutes of this kind on its books in the nineteenth century. Having no external politics of any consequence, no peacetime conscription, and little competitive nationalism, we had no need for such sanctions. But one early effort in this direction suggests that it was the lack of motivation rather than virtuous principles which prevented denationalization from being used punitively: the proposed and never-ratified Thirteenth Amendment. Introduced in 1810, this measure provided that:[39]

> If any citizen of the United States shall accept claim, receive or retain any title of nobility, or honor, or shall, without the consent of Congress, accept or retain any present, pension, office or emolument, of any kind whatsoever, from any Emperor, King, Prince, or foreign power, such person shall cease to be a citizen of the United States, and shall be incapable of holding any office of trust or profit under them or either of them.

As originally introduced, the amendment also penalized intermarriage with a person of royal blood![40] (It may seem strange that this was cast in the form of a constitutional amendment, but the dominant Jeffersonian view held that citizenship was within the jurisdiction of the states—a statute would thus have been a federal usurpation of states'-rights.) The proposal received the necessary two-thirds vote in the House of Representatives without debate, and with only slight changes in the Senate, and fell but one state short of the three-quarters necessary for adoption.[41]

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[30] Sec. 349 (a) (10), Act of 1952.

[31] 356 U.S. 86 (1958).

[32] 83 S. Ct. 554 (1963).

[33] 356 U.S. 44 (1958).

[34] Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 83 S. Ct. 554 (1963), Brief for Appellant, pp. 53-64. The Solicitor general did not reargue this issue in his brief in the Cort case.

[35] See summary of various provisions for denationalization in U.N. General Assembly Doc. No. A/CN.4/66, 6 April 1953, Section 9.

[36] *Ibid.*

[37] *Ibid.*

[38] *Ibid.* See also *Laws Concerning Nationality*, U.N. Doc. No. ST/LEG/SER. B/4 (1954).

[39] Ames, "Proposed Amendments to the Constitution," *Annual Report of the American Historical Assoc. 1896*, Vol. 2 (1896), pp. 186–187.

In 1864 Congress did pass a measure—the Wade-Davis bill—which *inter alia* provided (§14) that "every person who shall hereafter hold or exercise any office, civil or military, except offices merely ministerial, and military offices below the rank of colonel, in the rebel service, . . . is hereby declared not to be a citizen of the United States."[42] Lincoln pocket-vetoed the enactment, but it still seems to spoil Justice Black's case that the Fourteenth Amendment made citizenship an "absolute", *i.e.*, that the authors of the Amendment would never have dreamed of employing denationalization as a penalty. It also supplies evidence that Civil War legislators were aware of the distinction between "citizenship" and "rights of citizenship"—the issue to which we now turn our attention.

The statutory ancestor of the punitive provisions of the Nationality Act of 1940 was not this obscure enterprise, but a Civil War measure aimed at draft-dodgers and deserters. In 1865, an amendment was added to the Enrollment Act which stipulated that draft-dodgers and deserters who did not return to military service within sixty days of the passage of the act were "deemed and taken to have voluntarily relinquished and forfeited their rights of citizenship."[43] There has been a great deal of argument in recent years over whether this statute deprived deserters of their citizenship or merely of their civil rights (right to vote, hold office, etc.).[44] No one can read the minds of the dead with certainty, but in the context of the measure it seems that when Congress said "rights of citizenship", it meant precisely that; the Chairman of the House Military Affairs Committee, who guided the bill through that chamber, presented this section as a disfranchisement.[45] But even if, improbably, Congress meant to deprive deserters of their nationality, there is no escaping the conclusion that this was a punitive sanction. It was so treated after the close of World War I when President Calvin Coolidge, on March 5, 1924, issued a "Proclamation of Amnesty" in which he granted "amnesty and pardon to all persons who have heretofore [been convicted of desertion in wartime] to the extent that there shall be . . . fully remitted as to such persons any relinquishment or forefeiture of their rights of citizenship."[46]

In 1940 the desertion proviso served as a model for the section of the Nationality Act which "expatriated" (to convert an intransitive verb into the active mood) traitors, and later those who left or stayed out of the United States to evade military service, and later still those convicted under the Smith Act. The "rights of citizenship" employed in the old law were quietly converted to "citizenship"; when queried on this change during the Hearings on the 1940 Act, State Department Counselor Richard Flournoy stated that the Department had always construed the Act of 1865 as depriving Americans of their nationality, and that seemed to settle the question.[47]

Thus in the present nationality code we find, in addition to the category examined earlier which provided for the loss of American citizenship for those who concretely evidenced a shift of allegiance to a foreign sovereign, a second category based on the proposition that "Bad Americans" should be deprived of their nationality. The first category had a rational foundation in international law; the second operates purely in the municipal forum to create stateless persons—it provides a mode of punishment superadded on to those provided by the criminal law for certain heinous offenses against sovereignty. Admittedly one can conjure up abstract arguments that a traitor has opted for another allegiance, but in the context of *nationality law* this is essentially absurd: he is merely a technically stateless inmate of a federal penitentiary. Again one can claim that Communists convicted under the Smith Act have indicated by their own free will their superior loyalty to the Soviet Union, but then what does one do with convicted Trotskyites who can at best be described as would-be nationals of a nonexistent foreign power? And most deserters from the armed forces, far from demonstrating a superior loyalty to the enemy, are simply interested in a quiet life away from gunfire and the rigors of military existence. Perhaps, as in the case of Mendoza-Martinez,[48] special provisions could be formulated to deal with the problems created by dual nationals who evade military service by moving to the state of their alternative citizenship, but generally speaking—as in Cort's instance—draft-evaders have violated the national service laws, without any concomitant indication of allegiance to another sovereign. Let us now examine the constitutional problems that these two major categories have created over the last decade.

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[40] 11 *Annals of Congress* 549 (1810).

[41] Ames, *op. cit., supra* note 39, at p. 187.

[42] See Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents* (1899), Vol. 6, p. 223.

[43] 13 *Stat.* 490 (1865).

[44] As already noted, the distinction between citizenship and rights of citizenship was not lost on Civil War legislators. In 1865 Congressman Ashley of Ohio introduced a measure to deprive high Confederate officials of their *citizenship*, *Cong. Globe*, 38th Cong., 2d sess., p. 280. This was immediately forestalled when Congressman Eliot of Massachusetts noted that "A person cannot commit treason if he is not a citizen." *Ibid.* at p. 299.

[45] *Cong. Globe,* 38 Cong., 2d sess., p. 643 (Schenck of Ohio).

[46] 43 *Stat.* 1940 (1924). For whatever it may be worth, Coolidge referred to those in this category as "fellow, citizens." See generally Gathings, "Loss of Citizenship and Civil Rights for Conviction of Crime," this REVIEW, Vol. 43 (1949), p. 1228.

[47] 2 *Hearings before Committee on Immigration and Naturalization on H.R. 6127*, 76 Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 2, p. 38 (1940). But see *In the Matter of P———*, 1 I. & N. Dec. 127, 132 (Board of Immigration Appeals, 1941).

When the Supreme Court was confronted with the constitutionality of these two expatriation categories, it had singularly few guidelines to follow. History provided no answer—or, perhaps, too many, conflicting answers. The founders of the nation were no help because they were preoccupied with a different question: was admission to the community a state or a national prerogative? The burden of evidence indicates to me that national citizenship was originally viewed as derivative from state citizenship, and all early discussions of loss of nationality came to grief on the reef of states'-rights.[49] The Fourteenth Amendment settled this issue, and presumably thereby vested any jurisdiction over expatriation in the national government, but still there was no authoritative doctrine on the reach of the expatriation power. The states in the revolutionary period had deprived Tories of their state citizenship (and everything else in their possession)[50]—and the working definition of "Tory" was often pretty loose—but aside from the abortive "Thirteenth Amendment" of 1810 and the Wade-Davis bill there were no later examples of efforts to employ expatriation in a punitive fashion. The 1865 desertion statute left a shambles of conflicting interpretations in its wake. In short, to reiterate, there was no "theory" of expatriation because the problem simply was not important enough to warrant serious jurisprudential effort.

In the twentieth century, after the passage of the 1907 statute, the federal courts had been confronted with a number of problems, but all of these arose from litigation in the first category, *i.e.*, they were concerned with issues of transfer of allegiance. The provisions of the 1907 law on loss by marriage to an alien husband, for example, were, as already noted, sustained as a legitimate exercise of congressional authority over international relations.[51] In *Perkins* v. *Elg*,[52] the leading modern case, the Supreme Court overruled the administrative authorities by holding that the American-born child, of naturalized American parents who subsequently reverted to their former nationality and took her with them to Sweden, had not lost her citizenship. In the course of the opinion, Chief Justice Hughes provided the widely cited rationale:[53]

> Expatriation is the voluntary renunciation or abandonment of nationality and allegiance. It has no application to the removal from this country of a native citizen during minority. In such a case the voluntary action which is the essence of the right is lacking.

Hughes, however, did not invoke constitutional grounds; indeed, he was careful to state the basis of the decision narrowly:[54]

> As at birth she became a citizen of the United States, that citizenship must be deemed to continue unless she has been deprived of it through the operation of a treaty or congressional enactment or by her voluntary action in conformity with applicable legal principles.

This still left the judiciary with no constitutional bearings on loss of nationality imposed by law or by treaty—and it might be added that a number of treaties dating from the Bancroft Treaty of 1868 with the North German Confederation[55] did, in effect, impose loss of American citizenship upon naturalized citizens who returned to North Germany or other former sovereignties for two years or more.

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[48] Who was by birth a dual national of the United States (*jure soli*) and Mexico (*jure sanguinis*).

[49] Roche, *op. cit., supra* note 6.

[50] See Van Tyne, *The Loyalists in the American Revolution* (1929); Hurst, "Treason in the United States," *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 58 (1945), pp. 226, 268–272.

[51] MacKenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915).

[52] 307 U.S. 325 (1939).

[53] *Ibid.* at 334.

[54] *Ibid.* at 329.

Thus the Supreme Court, when it turned to the problem of loss of nationality by desertion, voting in foreign political elections, or leaving the nation to evade military service, was really writing on a blank constitutional slate. All previous decisions tended to support the proposition that the United States could "expatriate" its nationals as an inherent coefficient of sovereignty, but in no previous holding had a punitive proviso (in the sense described above) been under litigation. History was useless, and the existing body of patchwork administrative and judicial improvisations provided no baseline, no logical line of development. (Indeed, it was not unknown for the Department of State to take one position, and the Department of Labor—which then had jurisdiction over the Immigration and Naturalization Service—to take the opposite).[56] There was a loose tradition that expatriation had to be "voluntary," but this word had been given a peculiar, disembodied gloss: an individual did not have the option of deciding whether he wanted to lose his citizenship; one merely had the freedom to decide whether or not to undertake a commitment which carried with it denationalization, *e.g.*, marriage to an alien husband. Consequently voluntary marriage could, and did, lead to involuntary expatriation, *i.e.*, to a loss of citizenship which was in subjective terms unwanted. Curiously this technique had been anticipated by Representative Lowndes of South Carolina in 1818; opposing a bill to enounce the "right of expatriation," Lowndes told the House, "If you pass this bill, you have only one step further to go, and say that such acts shall be considered as presumption of intention of the citizen to expatriate, and thus take from him the privileges of a citizen."[57]

Elsewhere I have examined in greater detail the chaos which has emerged from recent Court encounters with problems of expatriation.[58] Suffice it here to say that it is perhaps too easy to be critical of the Supreme Court's handling of expatriation issues; as Justice Jackson, with his usual insight, remarked, "it would be unrewarding to point out conflict in precept and confusion in practice on this side of the Atlantic, where ideas of nationality and expatriation were in ferment during the whole Nineteenth Century."[59] Practice simply outran theory and because the whole problem of loss of nationality was so trivial, so marginal to the main concerns of public policy, a legal tradition developed on the basis of pragmatic accretion. A special problem was met by an *ad hoc* remedy, and the *ad hoc* remedies, in aggregate, constituted the law on the subject. Nobody worried about the constitutionality of the Bancroft Treaties, any more than the congressmen who passed the Wade-Davis Bill tossed in their beds wondering what constitutional power to hang Section 14 on. If there had to be a constitutional justification, the Attorney General could doubtless conjure one up, or find a professor of constitutional law to do the job for him.

However, in the past half-century nationality matters have moved from the littoral to the center of public policy. There has been continuing dispute over immigration issues, a tightening up of standards for naturalization, and finally in the last twenty-five years two major campaigns for codification and rationalization of nationality practices—the first resulting in the Nationality Act of 1940 and the second in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. In the specific context of this paper, a mass of earlier statutes and administrative regulations were codified into the section regulating loss of nationality, Section 401, of the Nationality Act of 1940. And a few new provisions were added, with no furor, that were allegedly patterned on existing provisos. Let us take, for example, the desertion case: here the old Civil War statute was assimilated, but where the 1865 enactment deprived deserters (and draft-evaders: in the Civil War, an individual was automatically in the service as of the date he was ordered to enroll) of their "rights of citizenship," the 1940 revision forfeited "citizenship." Then, on the model of the desertion provision, a similar provision denationalized traitors, and was extended in 1954 to include those convicted under the Smith Act. Had someone proposed that Americans convicted of gambling or traffic violations be denationalized, there would undoubtedly have been a heated controversy, but no congressman could get very interested in the problems of traitors, deserters, draft-dodgers, or sedition-mongers. These provisions had to be constitutional; the precedent, after all, was an act of 1865. Moreover, it was not *really* a punishment; like denaturalization,[60] deportation,[61] or (later) depriving those deported on security grounds of their Social Security benefits,[62] it was merely a civil action which small-minded litigants persisted in branding as punitive.

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[55] 15 *Stat.* 615 (1868). See Roche, *op. cit.*, *supra* note 11 at pp. 285–286.

[56] Such dissension was part of the background of the Elg case, see Roche, *op. cit.*, *supra* note 21 at pp. 30–31.

[57] 15 *Annals of Congress* 1050 (1818).

[58] See Roche," The Expatriation Cases: Breathes There the Man with Soul So Dead . . . ?," in Kurland, ed., *1963 Supreme Court Review* (1963).

[59] Mandoli v. Acheson, 344 U.S. 133, 135 (1952)

The federal courts had the perplexing burden of making constitutional sense out of this corpus of improvisation. And it was not a simple task. To borrow a classic instance from the area of naturalization law, when the Supreme Court was confronted with the problem of *res judicata* involved in a denaturalization suit under the 1906 statute, it sustained the reopening of an earlier naturalization judgment on the ground that before 1906 naturalization had been an *ex parte* matter which though "conducted in a court of record . . . [was] not in any sense an adversary proceeding . . . [but] was closely analogous to a public grant of land. . . . "[63] Or, to put the matter differently, Justice Pitney declared that a naturalization judgment had, for a century or more, not been a "case or controversy"! This remarkable announcement raised a few judicial eyebrows,[64] but Justice Brandeis explained in a later case that the commotion on the subject was unfounded: "If the proceedings were not a case or controversy within the meaning of Article III, Section 2," he said, "this delegation of power upon the courts would have been invalid."[65] This masterly injection of circular logic put an end to the argument.

When the courts came to grips with expatriation legislation, they found themselves dealing with a mixed bag. As already elaborated above, they discovered two fundamentally different types of expatriation provisions, the first relating to transfers of loyalty, the second concerned with betrayals of allegiance. Yet the two were interwoven in one statute and alleged to be rested on the same constitutional foundation: the right of an American citizen voluntarily to abandon his nationality. Moreover, the Constitution and early precedents are totally useless on the subject. What then is perhaps surprising is that the Court has, in its own fashion, so closely approximated the objectives of what I would take to be a rational expatriation policy, one which treats denationalization as a dimension of foreign relations rather than of the penal code, one which minimizes the creation of stateless persons, one which recognizes that depriving an American of his citizenship is not a casual legal undertaking which can be left, without review, in the hands of virtually invisible administrative bodies or justified by the illogical whimsy of over-zealous congressional committees.

And finally, to revert to the question raised at the outset, the political scientist must inquire as we move into 1964 how much longer American public law will labor under the burden of historicism? How much longer must we engage in the farce of ransacking the historical garret of rural America for the "intentions of the Framers" to validate contemporary policy? Or to invalidate it? In short, can we not emulate the *spirit* of our ancestors, close the history books, and turn with experimental creativity to the tasks of constitutional democracy?

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[60] Luria v. U.S., 231 U.S. 9 (1913).

[61] Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924); Fong Yue Ting v. U.S., 149 U.S. 698 (1893).

[62] Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).

[63] Johannessen v. U.S., 225 U.S. 227, 236–38 (1912).

[64] See *e.g.*, Judge Geiger's comment in U.S. v. Kamm 247 Fed. 968, 974 (E.D. Wis. 1918).

[65] Tatun v. U.S., 270 U.S. 568, 577 (1926).

THE SELECTION OF FEDERAL POLITICAL EXECUTIVES*

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Central to the problem of obtaining intelligent and effective management and policy direction in the federal government are the sources and procedures used in the selection of federal political executives. These executives, occupying positions usually subject to presidential appointment and senatorial confirmation, constitute the "key group in making representative government work within the executive branch."[1] Through them the President directs and controls his administration, creates political support, and establishes lines of defense for his political program. Increasing attention has been paid to the selection process in recent years because of frequent reports of extreme difficulty in recruiting able people, inability to retain their services, and allegations that those who have served have proven less than adequate. The problem as broadly stated by the (Jackson) subcommittee on National Policy Machinery of the Senate Committee on Government Operations is: "how to make the quality of appointments of private citizens to national services keep pace with the spiraling complexity and difficulty of foreign policy and defense problems."[2]

The information available on the backgrounds of men who have served as political executives, the duration of their terms, the procedures used in their selection and their reactions to the prospect of government service—in short, the information to substantiate these charges—has hitherto been highly impressionistic, based on inadequate data, out of date, or tinged with ideological preferences. To cite but a few examples, C. Wright Mills characterized the second team of the political directorate in his *Power Elite*[3] on the basis of a relatively brief period at the beginning of the Eisenhower administration, alleging that they were the product of big businessmen fathers, Ivy League colleges, large corporations or big law firms, and country clubs, all of which made them "representative of the corporate rich." In their landmark study of *Federal Administrators*,[4] now 25 years old, Macmahon and Millett said that "appointments to assistant secretaryships have been political in most connotations of that word, with little regard for qualifications or the needs of the posts. Few of the occupants of these positions have been conspicuous individuals." One imaginative commentator asserted that the difference between a Roosevelt New Dealer and a Truman Fair Dealer was about 30 pounds; the difference between an Eisenhower and a Kennedy executive was about 30 years and a shift from "gentlemen 'C' boys" to Phi Beta Kappas.[5]

For the present study, several approaches were taken in obtaining information on the process of selecting political executives. First, we secured biographical information on all political executives who had served in the federal government between 1933 and 1961.[6] Using standard biographical sources and information supplied by the federal agencies, we assembled profiles of these executives, including information on place of birth, education, occupation, residence, party affiliation, age at the time of appointment, and length and kind of previous public service. Second, using a modified random sampling procedure we chose 108 cases of appointments during the Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy Administrations for an intensive investigation to learn the procedures followed in the recruitment and selection of political executives. Interviews were conducted with the appointees, with the officials chiefly responsible for their appointment—usually the agency heads—and with any others who may have played a role in the selection process. We asked not only about the procedures but also the perspectives and values of each of the participants in the recruitment process, including the appointees themselves. Third, partially as a means of validating the information secured through the case studies, but also to learn more about attitudes toward the recruitment process, interviews were conducted with a wide range of actual and potential participants in the recruitment process. These included White House officers, party officials, members of Congress, interest group officials, career civil servants, and departmental aides. We collected information also on the roles the political executives played in the executive branch and their careers after government service. Finally, we tried to evaluate their performance and to relate these evaluations to objective factors in their occupational and personal backgrounds. This paper, however, will be devoted to the procedures followed in their selection and an analysis of their backgrounds.

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[1] Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, Task Force Report on *Personnel and Civil Service*, February 1955, p. 39.

[2] "The Private Citizen and the National Service," *Organizing for National Security*, Hearings, vol. 3, 1961, p. 63.

[3] New York, Oxford University Press, 1956, p. 233.

[4] New York, Columbia University Press, 1939, p. 302.

[5] William V. Shannon, "The Kennedy Administration: The Early Months," *The American Scholar*, fall 1961, pp. 484–85.

[6] As defined in this study political executives are limited to under secretaries and assistant secretaries in major departments and deputies in several other agencies: Bureau of the Budget, Veterans Administration, General Services Administration, Housing and Home Finance Agency, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, United States Information Agency, International Cooperation Administration and predecessors.

I. PATTERNS OF RECRUITMENT AND SELECTION

The selection of federal political executives is a matter of interest to virtually every major participant in the political struggle, not only to the aspirant himself. The President is interested in staffing his administration with people personally and politically loyal to him, who will at the same time bring competence and support to the programs he espouses. The Secretary often looks for individuals who will similarly serve him, with perhaps greater emphasis on administration and program execution. Party interests tend to center on rewards for support or hopes for future political effort. The goals of senators and congressmen are varied, but often relate to personal interests in particular candidates or to policy commitments. Interest group stakes in administration are almost exclusively programmatic. Each has his own perspective from which to view the process and each uses his influence as he can; but the contest is hardly one of equals.

In general, the agency head is the central figure in the selection process, although his precise role varies from case to case. (See Table I.) In most instances he, or someone he appoints, is directly involved in unearthing eligible candidates and examining their qualifications. In fewer instances, the Secretary may play a more passive role, recognizing a legitimate claim on a particular position by a member of Congress, or the President, or a member of the President's staff. Very frequently, the Secretary plays a vital role in negotiating with interested parties, both inside and outside the government, agreement being arrived at by mutual consent. At the beginning of an administration particularly, the President may fill one or more of the subordinate positions before choosing the agency head, making acceptance of his action a condition under which the agency head accepts his position. Sometimes an individual opens the campaign in his own behalf. Included in the sample of 108 cases covered in Table I are 17 who actively sought appointments and thus exerted their own pressures on the selecting officers. The self-initiated cases divided nearly equally among the three administrations—seven oc-

TABLE I. PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS IN SELECTION OF POLITICAL EXECUTIVES*

	Truman		Eisenhower		Kennedy		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
1. Secretary—Friends and associates	26	70	27	57	7	30	60	56
2. Secretary—White House Staff	5	14	9	19	10	42	24	22
3. Secretary—Congress	0	0	5	11	3	13	8	7
4. Secretary—Interested Group	2	5	1	2	1	4	4	4
5. President—White House Staff	3	8	2	4	3	13	8	7
6. Secretary—Party Officials	1	3	3	6	—	—	4	4
Total	37	100	47	99	24	102	108	100

* The important criterion in the assignment of these cases to one or another category was the individual's influence in making the decision on an appointment rather than his being the source of the candidate. Clearly the source of a candidate is less significant than the pressures that develop for the appointment of specific candidates.

TABLE II. AGENCY HEADS' SCOPE OF SEARCH FOR CANDIDATES FOR POLITICAL EXECUTIVE POSITIONS*

	Beginning of Administration				Later in Administration				Total	
	Eisenhower		Kennedy		Truman		Eisenhower			
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Personal search; usually among close friends and associates	7	37	4	19	21	75	10	42	42	46
Extended search; effort to broaden range beyond personal acquaintances	7	37	5	24	3	11	8	33	23	25
Reliance on others to provide candidates	5	26	12	57	4	14	6	25	27	29
	19	100	21	100	28	100	24	100	92	100

* Each agency head was counted once in each time period unless the scope of his search changed with different selections, as it occasionally did. This table does not cover the cases in line 5, Table I.

curring in the Kennedy administration, five in the Truman and five in the Eisenhower.

Scope of Search. The agency head has the most direct interest in the selection of his subordinates, although his active role may be slight in some cases. It is useful to examine, therefore, the methods he uses in recruiting candidates for a particular position. These range all the way from the consideration only of personal friends and close associates to extended searches among many groups and among individuals whom he does not know personally. And in some instances he allows or is forced to permit others to control every aspect of the recruitment process.

In general there is a tendency for the recruiter to rely most heavily on personally conducted searches among his friends and associates, although some differences were found in the scope of search in the three administrations (Table II). The most notable departure from this pattern was at the beginning of the Kennedy administration when agency heads relied in many instances on candidates supplied by the "Talent Hunt," or when the President directly intervened to place men in whom he had personal confidence or to whom he was politically in debt. Heavy reliance on personal contacts in selecting political executives in the Truman administration is related to a strong tendency to promote men already serving in the federal government to higher positions. With willing men already available within an agency or in another agency, extensive recruiting outside the government appeared to be unnecessary or futile, especially in view of the great resistance to government service in the postwar period.

Over two-thirds of the agency heads whose recruiting methods were examined took primary responsibility for finding suitable candidates, either through personal contacts or by a broader search. The remainder allowed or were expected to accept leadership from some other source, although usually reserving the right to object and even veto individuals who were not acceptable to them.

The type of search conducted did not necessarily dictate the type of candidate finally selected, although there was clearly some relationship. The instances where the agency head relinquished control of the process were usually those in which party and interest considerations became paramount in the selection. The criteria for selection tended to be related to geographical representation, party service, or access to some other power-holder in the political system. When the agency head retained control, there was often—although not always—an emphasis on past administrative experience, policy objectives, or substantive knowledge of operations for which an appointee would be responsible on the job. Furthermore, the agency head operated under certain restraints in many departments. Where the clientele groups were powerful, his scope of search tended to be narrow and he tended to lose discretion in choosing among candidates. Where the clientele groups were more numerous, disunited, or had interests which did not entirely parallel agency activities, the discretion of the agency head increased.

To a certain extent, the character of the agency head and his perspective on the process predetermined what process would be followed in recruiting. Those with long experience in electoral politics were often inclined to recognize broader needs of the political system, rather than strictly administrative needs within an agency. They could see wisdom in accepting candidates who wore the *imprimatur* of a particular congressman or an interested group.

Finally, the character of the times was occasionally determinative. A crisis situation, or periods when the attractions of private life are paramount, may lead to reliance on career

TABLE III. CRITERIA FOR SELECTION OF POLITICAL EXECUTIVES

	Beginning of Administration		Later in Administration		Total	
	Eisenhower (Number)	Kennedy (Number)	Truman (Number)	Eisenhower (Number)	No.	%
Expertise in a specific area of responsibility	7	8	3	5	23	21
Expertise plus political factors	1	1	2	3	7	6
General experience in the area of responsibility	3	4	20	12	39	36
General experience plus political factors	8	9	9	3	29	27
Service to the party	2	2	3	3	10	9
Total	21	24	37	26	108	99

government employees who are promoted into the ranks of political executives. On the other hand, at the beginning of an administration there may be a tendency to consolidate party gains by granting favors, including high position, to party members and interest group functionaries.

Regardless of the process followed, the specific candidate selected may sometimes be the result of coincidence or desperation. There is no assurance that an extended search for *the* most qualified man necessarily results in finding him or finding him available; and failure to find or get him may lead to the appointment of a man who has little more to commend him than his own enthusiasm.

Criteria of Selection. For the various kinds of political executive posts that must be filled, and for the various kinds of functions which circumstances and agency head expectations may require, quite varying standards must be used in measuring the qualifications of those being considered for appointment. Some recruiters have clear ideas of what they consider are the qualities necessary for successful performance in a job. These may relate to personal skills, to substantive backgrounds, or in some instances only to symbolic values. In other cases, the agency head has only an indefinite notion of "getting the best man" for the job. He looks for successful experience of some sort and tends to attribute success in any line of endeavor to some innate capacity to perform well in all positions, including those in the executive branch. It is not exceptional to find, moreover, that an agency head will begin recruiting with one idea in mind and will end up selecting a person with characteristics quite different from those he originally looked for.

The case studies reveal a much greater concern for administrative skill and substantive experience than might be expected. (See Table III.) Membership in the administration party is an almost invariable requirement, but within that context more professional standards are applied. There is usually an implicit assumption that only those who have an orientation on policy similar to that of the President or his agency heads will be seriously considered for an appointment. But for some recruiting officials, policy considerations are of less concern than administrative capacity, substantive acquaintance with specific problem areas, and the political significance of an appointment. The self-promoters and the individuals who appeared on the lists of the Talent Hunt were almost automatically qualified on policy grounds since they were usually sympathetic with the new administration. Obviously, however, general sympathy with the new administration did not necessarily mean conformity in policy views on specific issues arising in any particular agency.

The classification of certain appointments as based on "political factors" requires some explanation since all political executive appointments are predicated on some calculation of political advantage, depending on who does the calculating. "Political" criteria were those related primarily to prior political party service or to some party advantage in the future. Seldom were appointments "purely" political, although there were instances of this. Usually, appointments which could be based on compensation for past services could also be justified in some measure on experience and talents which the men brought to the job. Thus, about one-third of all appointments were based on mixed criteria, while less than ten per cent were based solely on political considerations.

The analysis of cases further emphasizes the tendency of agency heads and other recruiters to stress general experience and capacity rather than narrower criteria related to specific activities of an agency. Very often agency heads expressed this preference by saying they were looking for "the best possible man" or a man with "administrative experience" or a man with all of the best personal virtues. This was particularly true of former businessmen agency heads who seldom appeared to compare the specialized private experience of their candidates with the requirements of specific jobs in the government. General business ability and success were accepted as evidence of capacity to perform all sorts of duties in all agencies. It is significant, however, that political considerations tended to play a more active part in appointments based on general administrative ability than in those based on expertise. Presumably, general administrative ability was so common that additional qualifying experience, that is, political experience, was required.

The cases suggest that political and general administrative experience are given the greatest weight in filling the positions of under secretary and deputy. Whether the agency head is looking for an *alter ego* or for an internal administrator, he is generally looking for someone with a broader gauge or perspective than he might look for as the head of one or a group of operating agencies. If he hires a specialist as a deputy, he is liable to lose the deputy to his specialty. Recruiting for the assistant secretary level appears to up-grade technical factors and down-grade political factors in the selection process.

Recruitment at the Beginning of an Administration. At the beginning of an administration the President-elect faces a formidable array of tasks which must be carried out with both dispatch and care. One of the most important of these is to fill the high-level positions with men who are responsible, loyal, and experienced, who will give the proper "image" to his administration and also give him the assistance he needs in policy development and management. The pressures of time are severe and the anticipations of both participants and observers are high. With innumerable candidates to choose from, he must carefully sort out the wheat from the straw.

To assist in this operation, the President gathers about him a corps of trusted aides and personal friends to give him guidance and extend his reach into the many institutions of society with which he may be only dimly acquainted. Thus, at the beginning of his administration President-elect Eisenhower relied on two of his most intimate advisers, Herbert Brownell, who had served as his principal strategist in the 1952 campaign, and General Lucius Clay, a lifelong military associate and personal friend. At a somewhat greater distance, but nevertheless working closely with the President and his chief advisers, were Sherman Adams, who later became the President's principal assistant in the White House, and businessmen such as Sidney Weinberg and Harold Boeschenstein who had long been active in recruitment for government positions. In addition an informal group of Eisenhower supporters had hired McKinsey & Company, a management consulting firm, to study the executive recruitment problem. McKinsey had identified 131 high policy positions which should be filled as quickly as possible, and also prepared a list of thousands of potential candidates for these positions.

At the outset, Brownell and Clay and their assistants were primarily concerned with helping the President select his cabinet officers. President-elect Eisenhower was remarkably quick in making these decisions; his entire Cabinet was selected in less than four weeks. Inevitably in the process of looking for cabinet officers, the searchers were led to consider the qualifications of a great many others whom they eliminated for the top positions but kept in mind for subordinate posts. Little was done about appointments at the sub-cabinet level, however, until the chief positions were filled.

The Eisenhower recruiters looked for individuals who had been active in the 1952 campaign and who were from the liberal wing of the Republican Party. But they recognized the necessity of weighing the competing demands of the Citizens for Eisenhower and the regular party organization. Campaign activity and political persuasion therefore became important factors. At the same time they undertook an extensive search for men qualified for high executive posts on the basis of their experience and competence in particular lines of endeavor. They made use of their numerous contacts in the business world, the professions, universities, and politics to locate likely candidates.[7]

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[7] The people whom Laurin Henry identifies as being important figures in the "Commodore" operation after the election suggest the types and range of contacts which could be made from this central source. *Presidential Transitions* (Washington, D. C., Brookings Institution, 1960), pp. 464–65.

Through business and professional associations, through boards of directors, and an infinite number of personal ties, these men could drop a net over a large segment of the successful men in America. It was clear that the net was designed to bring in successful businessmen more than any other type. Added to these names were the names of candidates from political sources—members of Congress, national committeemen, state officials, etc.—and the aforementioned McKinsey lists.

Once a cabinet officer or agency head had been selected, Sherman Adams reports, "Eisenhower gave [him] complete responsibility for his department and almost never intervened in the selection of their assistants and other key personnel."[8] Each cabinet member could establish his own criteria for selection, search out his own candidates, and present his preferred choice to the White House for the President's approval. This degree of independence in selecting subordinates was consistent with President Eisenhower's unusual propensity for delegating authority to the point of even accepting views and actions which deviated from his own preferences. He was unwilling to exercise his prerogatives in order to blunt the criticism from congressional sources that they were being short-circuited in the appointment process. Undoubtedly the presidential assistants in the Commodore Hotel pressed such considerations on the new agency heads; but lacking the influential support of the President, there was little they could do to enforce their views.

The beginning of the Kennedy administration offers an unusual opportunity for comparing the characteristics of the recruitment process under conditions of some similarity: pressures of time, use of centralized machinery, and marked interest in the character of the appointments by the public, members of Congress, and other parties with something at stake. But other factors in the situation were different: a president with an entirely different background, a party that had been out of power only eight years but which had to weld together perhaps even more disparate elements than those which composed the Republican Party in 1953.

As soon as victory was assured, while President-elect Kennedy vacationed in Palm Beach and in Georgetown, he and his chief advisers spent the major part of their time talking with prospective candidates and evaluating the qualifications of those who had been recommended or who were recommending themselves. The President-elect took an active role in the early consideration of candidates—consulting with the elders of the Democratic Party, with his chief political aides, and with likely candidates for cabinet positions.

Kennedy and his advisers had two important criteria in mind in settling high-level presidential appointments: recognition of those who deserved appointments on the basis of service to the party; and recognition of the need to obtain the "best talent" to serve in these demanding positions. To make these criteria operative in fact as well as in theory, it was decided to divide the recruitment task between two groups of Kennedy aides, with each group focusing primarily upon one of these two criteria. In the words of one member of the staff, one of these groups sought "deserving people" and "hoped they were bright enough," while the other group reversed this order of priority. Together, these two groups became known popularly as the "Talent Hunt."

Heading up these two operations were the President-elect's brother, Robert, and his brother-in-law, Sargent Shriver. Robert Kennedy worked mainly through the nation-wide network of contacts he had developed during the 1960 campaign, while Shriver drew upon his contacts in the business, professional, and university world. The operation under brother Robert was staffed by the President-elect's campaign and senatorial aides: Lawrence O'Brien, Richard Donohue, and Ralph Dungan. The Shriver operation was primarily in the hands of young lawyers who had also been active in the campaign, such as Adam Yarmolinsky and Harris Wofford. In spite of this informal division of labor, the allocation of responsibilities was hardly distinct. In time, in fact, "everyone got into everyone else's business," as one staff member expressed it.

Of particular interest were the criteria the recruiters tried to use in assessing the candidates' qualifications. Persons suggesting candidates and other respondents were asked to assess the qualifications of the candidates in terms of "judgment," "toughness," "integrity," "ability to work with others," "industry," and "devotion to the principles of the President-elect." The evaluator was also asked to say whether the candidate had a wide or limited acquaintanceship with qualified people in his field of specialty or "only local contacts"; and to estimate whether the candidate's appointment to a high-level government position would enhance the administration's standing "nationally," "in his professional group," "in his state," or "in his community."[9] Under pressure of time, however, the staff members found it increasingly difficult to get careful ratings on candidates on each of these discriminating criteria. Instead, the interviewer was more likely to ask a respondent, "What do you know about this guy?" When all of the evaluated material was gathered together, the staff member added a summary evaluation that included general ratings that ranged from "highly qualified," "qualified," and "some qualifications" on the competence side; and "good Democrat," "politically neutral," "Republican," or "politically disqualified" on the political side.

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[8] *First-Hand Report* (New York, 1961), p. 59. Our findings essentially confirm this view.

President-elect Kennedy was relatively slow to announce his first appointments. His first selection, that of G. Mennen Williams as Assistant Secretary of State, indicated both a desire and a will to participate actively in sub-cabinet appointments. It also became known that the President had offered the post of Ambassador to the United Nations to Adlai Stevenson long before Dean Rusk and Chester Bowles were selected as Secretary and Under Secretary. These actions suggested that in cases where he had a direct and compelling interest Kennedy would be willing to make his selections independently of his Secretaries, and expected them to acquiesce in his selections.

In some instances where the President-elect and his chief aides felt themselves inadequately grounded to form a sound judgment both politically and professionally in making selections, they were willing to give a much freer hand to the agency head. But where the appointments required a sensitive balancing, as in the agencies attempting to promote a bipartisan approach, and where the President had a strong commitment to particular policies or political values, he was unwilling to delegate the responsibility. It is clear, for example, that the President-elect and his aides took a much greater interest in the Department of State and the Department of Defense than they did in appointments in the Departments of Labor, Agriculture and Interior.

Within a few days after the appointment of each agency head the Talent Hunt recruiter assigned to that agency met with him and reviewed the list of names in the recruiter's file. At this point the role of the Talent Hunter could follow any of several patterns but almost always along the line of diminished responsibility. In the case of two or three agencies the recruiter was given no further responsibility, the cabinet member preferring to conduct his search by other channels. This was particularly true in agencies whose heads were themselves acutely aware of political considerations and could be relied upon to make selections which would reflect them. In other agencies the Talent Hunt members continued to assist by screening the available candidates and conducting further searches.

In both the Eisenhower and Kennedy pre-inaugural periods members of Congress were active in suggesting the names and promoting the causes of candidates, often men from their own states. They displayed a wide range of attitudes, however, from those who aggressively sought out the Commodore or Talent Hunt recruiters and the newly appointed agency heads to those who did nothing more than transmit the names of men who had been suggested to them. Their vigor varied also with the qualifications of the individuals in question. Republican senators, in particular, were dissatisfied with the early reception that their candidates received at Republican headquarters, since few of the appointees up to the Eisenhower inauguration appeared to come from the more conservative congressional wing of the party. Congressional leaders met with President-elect Eisenhower and received assurances that their recommendations would be given consideration, although he continued to reserve the right of final choice for himself and his agency heads. Democratic members of Congress voiced little open criticism of the procedures and appointments in the Kennedy administration, although there was occasional private grumbling that clearances had been ignored or wrong choices made. The Kennedy recruiters were more conscious of congressional interests and sensitivities than the Republican recruiters, and generally observed clearance procedures before announcing appointments.

In both administrations the special recruiting groups discontinued their operations after inauguration. Some of the participants themselves received appointments and were distracted by their new duties. Top recruitment responsibilities then shifted to the White House—to Sherman Adams and his assistant Charles Willis in the Eisenhower administration, and to the group of aides President Kennedy brought with him from the Senate. But a large part of the function had already devolved on the departments and agencies, with the White House constituting an important clearance point for anyone who recommended a candidate.

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[9] See Adam Yarmolinsky, "The Kennedy Talent Hunt," *The Reporter*, June 8, 1961, pp. 22–25.

Recruitment During an Administration. The intense concern with appointments that characterizes a new administration fades rapidly a few weeks after Inauguration Day. By summer of the first year practically all of the political executive positions are filled. But with the beginning of the second year of a new administration, the problems of political executive recruitment again begin to assert themselves. Some appointees have committed themselves only for a limited period of time and therefore prepare for departure. A few unfortunate choices are nudged into early resignation. Others, finding new, attractive, and what may appear to be once-in-a-lifetime opportunities resulting from their new visibility, feel compelled to move on. Still others achieve immediate success in public life and are shifted into other positions in the national government or are encouraged to run for elective office. As the departures begin, the agency heads again must devote a fair amount of their valuable time to canvassing potential appointees.

But by now the recruiting environment has changed markedly from the early days of the administration. The central staff operation that produced long lists of eligible candidates for the President-elect's consideration is largely dismantled, although a few vestiges may remain, usually located in the White House office. In any event, the sense of urgency and determination to obtain the best qualified men have diminished. The President is heavily involved in the other responsibilities of his office and usually can concern himself only with the selection of the highest level officers directly responsible to him. Consequently the decentralization of personnel decisions which is apparent at the beginning of an administration becomes even more pronounced as an administration ages.

At the beginning of an administration, the fervor engendered by the political campaign creates an attitude in both political activists and passive supporters which is favorable toward government service. The large majority may not actively promote themselves for political executive positions, but their commitment to the success of the new administration predisposes them to consider favorably the prospect of an appointment. But as time passes those who have not been selected—whether approached or not, whether disappointed or not—turn to their private concerns and give a smaller share of their time and attention to public affairs, particularly those in Washington. They may continue to participate in party councils, contribute money, and cast their votes for the administration, but everyday activities tend to crowd out public issues which seem less pressing and less immediate. Fewer and fewer are actively seeking positions or are "available" when contacted.

Many of those who supported the victorious presidential candidate may have had strong programmatic commitments and looked to the new administration to bring radical changes in existing policies. But as an administration matures it often becomes disappointingly evident that radical changes either are not possible or can be accomplished only with persistent, strenuous efforts. Potential candidates now may make a more realistic assessment of the constraints of the situation, leading to disillusionment about the possibility of major changes. This reduces the receptivity of some potential recruits for the administration.

Finally, as the second year's congressional elections come and go, uncertainty over the future of the administration is apt to mount. The possibility that the President will not be re-elected and his appointees will have to seek other employment tends to reduce ardor for public office. The prospect of coming to Washington for what may turn out to be only a few months or at the most a year or two, when accompanied with heavy financial losses as a consequence of moving, operates to dissuade men from seriously considering political executive service.

These circumstances lead agency heads and other recruiters increasingly to seek their candidates inside the government rather than in private activities. Having encountered difficulty in getting replacements from private life, they become wary of having their offers rejected or their veiled approaches rebuffed. Moreover, with less time to devote to recruitment than they had at the beginning of the administration they have a stronger tendency to take the easier way in filling vacancies. The easiest solution is usually to select replacements from among those who are already in or closely associated with the government. This also makes sense because the agency heads by this are able to make more accurate evaluations of men already serving in the agency than of "unknowns" from outside. They are less dependent on the evaluation of others. With experienced and proven executives on the scene there is a strong tendency to give them preference.

Turnover in the highest echelons of the major agencies also leads to expectations and hopes on the part of subordinates that they will be advanced to the more prestigious and influential positions. Those who have strong public commitments are often ambitious for promotion to positions where they can have a greater impact on policy decisions, where they can share in the emoluments of high office, and where they can gain recognition for their accomplishments. An expectation naturally develops among subordinate officials that successful performance will be rewarded by advancement to higher office when vacancies occur. Failure to be recognized or seriously considered for promotion has been a critical factor in the decisions of some executives to leave the government.

The case studies reveal clearly this pattern of more reliance on government men in recruitment for positions during an administration. In a total of 62 case studies of appointments after the first year of an administration (including all of the Truman administration), 37, or 60 per cent, of the appointees were already in positions in the federal government. For the Truman administration the insider-outsider ratio was 65 to 35 per cent; for the Eisenhower administration it was 52 to 48.

The Truman preference for men already in the government partly reflects the continuity between his administration and the Roosevelt administration. Since the two administrations shared the same party allegiance and avowed generally similar policy orientations, the Truman recruiters felt no strong urgency to seek men outside the government who might introduce new policy viewpoints. Moreover, many Truman executives had had long experience in the government previously and were acquainted with men in their agencies who were considered capable of assuming high level responsibilities. Younger men who had served their apprenticeship during the New Deal and World War II had strong hopes that they might be considered for leading political positions as rewards for their faithful service. Finally, the Truman administration was faced with widespread public antipathy toward governmental service and a desire by most men to return to or continue in essentially private pursuits. The years subsequent to World War II were probably the most difficult years for recruiting men to public service.

Major differences between administrations show up in the extent to which men with varying kinds of backgrounds rose into the higher ranks of the political executive service during an administration. (See Table IV.) The case studies tend to confirm the view that the Truman administration had a strong inclination to advance men with *careers* in the public service to political executive positions. Often these men had already moved into politically sensitive positions as confidential assistants or personal aides and it was no major step to go on to a presidential appointment. The Eisenhower administration was much more inclined to bring newcomers into the federal government, and subsequently to promote them to still higher political positions.

TABLE IV. SOURCE OF POLITICAL EXECUTIVE APPOINTEES DURING AN ADMINISTRATION

	No.	Per Cent of Total	Per Cent under Truman	Per Cent under Eisenhower
Promotion of political appointees	16	26	22	32
Promotion of career officials	15	24	35	8
Transfer of political appointees	6	10	8	12
Appointment of former federal appointees	5	8	11	4
Other appointments	20	32	24	44
	62	100	100	100

The Truman administration was particularly notable for its tendency to rely upon men already in the government for its subordinate aides. As indicated above, only nine of the thirty-nine Truman appointees studied were not in the government or had not recently had experience there when appointed. Appointments from outside appeared to be the exception rather than the rule. Many agencies developed what amounted to a tradition of promoting individuals from subpolitical executive positions and from career positions into the political ranks. In such instances the agency head had usually had direct personal contact with the appointee and was able to assess his qualifications for the position to be filled. Many times, the agency head made little effort to consider other possibilities since he was relatively satisfied with those already in the agency. Even with an improved climate for recruitment, Eisenhower executives tended also, after the first year, to recruit from within. Half of the Eisenhower case studies were of men already serving. Often the agency head had been responsible for appointing the individual to his lesser position and had observed closely his performance on the job. There was a much stronger tendency to promote political appointees than career officials, and it was not exceptional to find the promotion principle applying even to appointments at the agency head level. While the failure of some to advance may not necessarily have indicated inadequate performance, it is relatively certain that advancement of others under these conditions did constitute recognition for superior performance.

Variations among Agencies. Both the biographical information and the case studies reveal important differences among agencies in the sources of executives, the style of recruitment, and the criteria used in selection. Although the following generalizations require considerable refinement and qualification, they highlight the variable context of political executive recruitment.

State and Defense: Professionals and Professional Amateurs. In the Departments of State and Defense, the emphasis on previous service and relevant experience is more pronounced than in other agencies. Political executives are chosen for their expertise and sympathy with presidential programs, but previous governmental service—either at the political executive level or below—in these agencies or the military services is the factor that conspicuously distinguishes recruitment in these agencies from the others. The predominance of this kind of appointment suggests that the men who serve in these agencies may be characterized as "professional amateurs," in that they spend a considerable portion of their mature lives within the government or, if in private life, operate in the environment of that policy area. While not professionals in the sense of being committed and dependent on government service as a career, they are nevertheless remarkably well prepared to assume the duties of office.

In our case studies some agency heads and others responsible for recruitment in the Departments of State and Defense showed a measure of deference to party in making appointments, but the strongest opposition to party influence, particularly by the national committees, but also by the White House, was found in these two agencies. Agency officials often tried to suppress knowledge of a probable vacancy, hoping to find a suitable candidate to present to the President before the national committee or the White House staff could propose alternatives. White House and national committee officials testified that they received less cooperation from these two departments than from any other agencies in the government.

The Department of State has developed a practice of balancing appointments between foreign service officers and non-career appointees. Most frequently, foreign service officers are found heading the bureaus with responsibility for policy development and coordination in particular regional areas, and also in some important administrative positions at the secretarial level. Over one-third of all political executive appointees during the Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations were foreign service officers, the largest percentage appointed during the Eisenhower administration.

Treasury: The Technicians. Recruitment for the Department of the Treasury has been predominantly a search for bankers and lawyers who appear to have specific experiences and skills required for particular functions within the Department. The Treasury political executives included the second highest percentage of businessmen (chiefly bankers) of all domestic agencies and was second only to the Department of Justice in the percentage of lawyers serving in domestic agencies. These two occupations accounted for 78 per cent of all appointments in the Treasury. Furthermore, Treasury had the lowest percentage of political executives whose primary occupation was in the public service.

The appointments at the beginning of both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations indicate this emphasis on technical competence. Both Marion Folsom and Stanley Surrey were experts in taxation, Randolph Burgess and Robert Roosa had had long experience in debt management; and Andrew Overby and John Leddy were both intimately acquainted from practical experience in international finance.

These appointments show a marked departure from the pattern of earlier periods. Macmahon and Millett found that three-quarters of the Treasury appointments were accounted for by political considerations, and that few of these were prominent either before or after serving in the Treasury. Nor was there the striking emphasis on technical qualifications in making these earlier appointments.

In recent administrations, Treasury recruitment has been largely conducted by the Secretary himself with the assistance of his chief aides who obtained useful material in evaluating candidates. The secretaries in the Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations—Snyder, Humphrey, Anderson, and Dillon—all had extensive experience in the business, banking and financial world and could rely on a wide range of contacts to provide them with a supply of candidates. In most instances, it appears that the secretary went directly to individual acquaintances to obtain their services. On occasion, a departing political executive was able to recommend another candidate in his own special area and even assist in getting him to accept.

Justice: Politics and the Law. By the nature of its function as the chief legal agency of the federal government, the chief officers of the Department of Justice are required to be lawyers. It has seldom been enough, however, for an appointee to have only the technical qualification of a legal background or experience in the practice of law. Far more than the State Department, the Defense establishment, or the Treasury, political executives in Justice have had active experience in public affairs, often in elective office. From 1859 through 1938, some 125 men served as assistant attorneys general; nine-tenths of them had held some political office prior to their appointment.[10] In the Roosevelt, Truman and Eisenhower administrations, over 50 per cent of the assistant and deputy attorneys general were serving in the federal government at the time of their appointment. Three out of four in the Truman administration were in that category.

Appointments in the Truman administration were characteristically advancements from lower non-career positions, often on the basis of merit, but it must be recognized that the procedures which brought the appointees into the department initially were usually highly political. Moreover, the political background of the attorneys general made party considerations of more than routine consequence. Partly as a reaction to the low state into which the Department had fallen as a result of scandals at the end of the Truman administration, Eisenhower officials had a greater tendency to recruit outside of governmental and even outside of active political circles, although political considerations still ranked comparatively high.

Post Office: Politicians and Businessmen. No agency has experienced such sharp reversals in the character of the men appointed to political executive positions as the Post Office Department. Traditionally, this Department has been the harbor for deserving party officials. The Postmaster General usually has held a high level post in the party and his appointments, according to Macmahon and Millett, have been "prevailingly political."[11]

In general, Post Office appointees during the Truman administration were Democrats who had performed some service for the party, or who could be expected to do so while in the government and subsequently. The Kennedy administration resumed this pattern of appointment.

In sharp contrast with Democratic practice in recruiting for the Post Office stands the record of the Republicans during the eight-year period of the Eisenhower administration. Although Postmaster General Summerfield followed the traditional route from the chairmanship of the national committee to the Cabinet, at President Eisenhower's insistence he resigned from the national committee upon taking office. Summerfield selected only Republicans as his aides, but he defied tradition in not filling the subordinate posts in the Post Office with individuals whose primary claims were based on partisan political service. Some of the initial appointees, such as Charles Hook, had taken part in the campaign but in no sense could be considered professional politicians. With two exceptions—one a career official in the Department and another a former Civil Service Commissioner with extensive service in the federal government—all of the Summerfield appointees were businessmen. In most instances, they were selected because of some specialty they had developed in their business careers which was considered applicable to Post Office operations.

Interior and Agriculture: Politics, Pressure Groups, and Policy. Of all the major domestic departments or agencies in the national government, Interior and Agriculture are probably the most deeply involved in controversy over public policy. The impact of these policy controversies bears directly on the recruitment of high level executives in these two departments. The department heads are guided by the policy views of the individuals they are considering and the organizations they represent. The recruiters tend to rely on the recommendations of those who have policy viewpoints corresponding with their own. Groups with opposing viewpoints are deliberately avoided in the recruitment effort and seldom given opportunities to pass judgment on the merits of individuals who are under consideration.

The search for executives with acceptable views for policy positions in the Department of Agriculture seems to lead to the interest groups and the party organizations. For a reason not clear, the same problem tends to lead executives in the Department of the Interior either to the bureaucracy or to members of Congress. In no other agency of the federal government did the members of Congress play a more significant role than here. Because the department represents interests located promarily in the West, the western senators and congressmen expecially were involved in the selection process.

At least part of the explanation for their role lies in the conflict among the western states over policy and the western sense of proprietorship toward the Interior Department. Representation of a particular area has both a symbolic and a practical value in assuring consideration of its interests in the councils of the department.

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[10] Macmahon and Millett, *op. cit.*, p. 288.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 36.

Commerce and Labor: Clientele Politics. In recruiting for the Department of Commerce, secretaries since the beginning of the Eisenhower administration have relied almost exclusively on businessmen, with the occasional addition of a lawyer. Of the fifteen men appointed to under secretary and assistant secretary of Commerce in the Eisenhower administration, thirteen were businessmen in private life, one was a lawyer, and another a former member of Congress who had been a lawyer before running for elective office. Similarly, at the beginning of the Kennedy administration all initial selections were of businessmen, although the creation of a new assistant secretary post for science and technology will undoubtedly bring into the Department men with primary backgrounds in the natural sciences who may not have been associated formerly with business. However, the Eisenhower administration placed a heavy reliance on men without previous experience in any level of government. This is understandable, considering that the Republican administration entering in 1953 was the first in 20 years. Nevertheless, the relative lack of public service stands in sharp contrast with many other agencies during the Republican administration whose political executives had had rather extensive service during World War II, the Korean War, in state government, or in federal career positions.

The relationship between the governmental recruiters and the trade unions in the selection of political executives for the Department of Labor was carefully structured, particularly during Democratic administrations. During the Truman administration the chief clientele groups for the Department, the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations, tended to receive equal representation in the Department as a kind of gesture toward their equality in the union movement—or else as a measure of prudent neutrality.

The initial selections in the Kennedy administration clearly followed the typical Democratic practice, with one appointee coming from the AFL background, and another from the CIO.

The appointment process during the Eisenhower administration was of a different nature because of the relatively distant relationships between labor and the Republican party. At first, the new Republican administration tried to woo labor through appointments from the labor movement such as Martin Durkin and Lloyd Mashburn. The impasse over one union candidate, however, resulted in a tacit agreement that there would be no attempt to provide direct union representation in the high ranks of the Labor Department. As a result, from 1954 on, the appointees in that Department were men with professional or business backgrounds; some of them had strong political connections. Several had been appointed on a political basis to subordinate positions within the Department, later moving up into secretarial posts.

II. THE BACKGROUND OF POLITICAL EXECUTIVES

In this paper it will be possible only to suggest some of the major outlines of the backgrounds of political executives since 1933. In certain respects they represent a broad cross section of American life, far removed from Mills's characterization, but in other respects they constitute a select group, reflecting important special sources from which they have been drawn.

Geographical Background. Political executives were drawn from all sections of the nation, reflecting the population distribution among census regions, although there are natural differences in each administration which are related to voting strength. Both parties drew heavily on the Middle Atlantic states, particularly New York, and then relied on areas of special political advantage—the South for the Democrats and the Midwest for the Republicans. Expected regional emphases in certain departments, notably Interior and Agriculture on the West and Midwest, were very apparent. A strong tendency, however, appears to favor candidates whose primary occupations—distinguished from their legal residence—are in the Washington, D. C. area. This suggests the importance of experience in the federal government and involvement in national affairs as a controlling factor in selection.

Perhaps of even greater long-run consequence is the tendency to prefer men whose backgrounds are urban or metropolitan. While only 59 per cent of the population lived in standard metropolitan statistical areas in 1950, some 90 per cent of the political executives were employed in those areas when appointed. Moreover, when compared with the population residing in such urban places in 1900—the year nearest to the median year of birth of the subjects in this study—political executives tend to have a much stronger urban background. This background provides a marked contrast with that of senators and perhaps explains some of the conflict between the executive and legislative viewpoints. Don Matthews found that a majority of the senators serving during the years 1947–1957 were born in rural areas.

Education. Political executives far surpass the general population in level of education. Overall, 74 per cent were college graduates and a majority—57 per cent—had graduate degrees. Less than five per cent had only high school educations. Not unexpectedly, the level of education was higher in each successive administration. In this respect political executives are not markedly different from earlier predecessors in high executive office, or from high-level federal administrators[12] but are well above most other occupational groups in the United States and far above the general population in which only 6 per cent were college graduates in 1950. Differences between Democratic and Republican administrations were very slight and reflected primarily the tendency of Republicans to recruit businessmen who were less likely to have graduate education than men in other professions. Those expecting a greater tendency toward intellectual brilliance in Democratic political executives can find little support here since an equal percentage of executives having Phi Beta Kappa or Sigma Xi memberships were found in the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations.

According to Mills, attendance at certain "exclusive" schools and colleges marks one as a member of an "elite." Although the evidence lacks complete reliability, apparently at least 9 per cent of political executives attended one of an arbitrarily defined group of 18 well-known Eastern preparatory schools. In the general population of comparable ages, only 9 per cent attended private secondary schools of any sort including parochial schools. In this respect they were similar to successful business executives and again in contrast with senators who are less likely to attend such schools. Attendance at such schools was much more marked among executives in the foreign affairs and national security agencies than in the domestic agencies.

A similar pattern marks the undergraduate education of political executives. Those who served in the Departments of State and Defense and in the military departments were much more likely to have attended Ivy League colleges such as Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Dartmouth and Cornell than executives who served in the domestic agencies. Of those who served in the security agencies 41 per cent attended these colleges while only 24 per cent in the domestic departments did so and only 19 per cent in the independent agencies. Combined with evidence that will be presented below these patterns of education indicate a common path which executives in these agencies tend to follow, which leads to high government office.

Nevertheless, no university provided undergraduate education for more than 10 per cent of the entire number of executives. The highest was Yale, followed by Harvard, Princeton, Dartmouth, Wisconsin, California at Berkeley, Michigan, Minnesota, North Carolina and Stanford. Twenty-two schools provided undergraduate education for a majority of executives. These same schools figured very prominently in the education of high-level career executives in the federal government and also business executives.[13] Although more political executives come from private universities and colleges than business executives and senators, large percentages of public institutions are represented in the training of political executives.

Religious Preference. The interest in maintaining a balance of religious affiliations among Cabinet officers appears to have little application at the subordinate political executive level, at least in part because of relatively diminished public attention. The expected domination of these positions by members of the Protestant churches was confirmed; 78 per cent of all political executives reported Protestant faiths.[14] Catholics were far better represented in Democratic administrations, as might be expected. Of greater interest is the fact that Catholics were readily able to achieve leadership positions in the executive branch of the government although they are apparently restricted in access to professional ranks in other fields. Twenty per cent of all political executives but only 9 per cent of business executives, and only slightly more of the members of Congress and the uniformed military services, were Catholics. Catholics were best represented in the Departments of Justice, Labor and Post Office, those departments in which political preferment or trade union in-

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[12] See W. Lloyd Warner, "The Careers of American Business and Government Executives: A Comparative Analysis," in George B. Strother, ed., *Social Science Approaches to Business Behavior* (The Dorsey Press and Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1962), pp. 116–118.

[13] See Warner, *op. cit.*, p. 120.

[14] A significant percentage—over 40 per cent—failed to give information on religious preference, particularly among those who probably were Catholics or Jews.

TABLE V. PARTY AFFILIATION OF POLITICAL EXECUTIVES, BY ADMINISTRATION

	Number	Democrat (%)	Republican (%)	No Party (%)	Total (%)
Roosevelt	138	88	12	1	101
Truman	166	83	14	4	101
Eisenhower	258	5	73	23	101
Kennedy	103	79	10	12	101

fluence was greatest. In the Post Office in Democratic administrations, of those reporting church membership, 63 per cent were Catholic.

Some significant differences appeared in the representation of the various Protestant churches. Episcopalians were particularly prominent, accounting for 25 per cent of all appointees, although the membership in that Church accounts for only 3 per cent of the total population. Presbyterians were also favored, while Baptists, accounting for 20 per cent of the total population, provided only 6 per cent of the political executives. Episcopalians were particularly prominent in the Treasury Department, the military establishment, and the Department of State, reinforcing the impression of high social status associated with these three departments.

Party Affiliation and Activity. It is hardly surprising to discover that each administration strongly prefers its own partisans in the recruitment of political executives. For ideological reasons, for purposes of rewarding the party faithful, and for welding together the divergent wings of the party, emphasis on party membership is an important factor in the selection process. As Table V shows, each party appointed its own partisans in an overwhelming percentage of the cases. Democratic administrations were more willing to appoint Republicans than the Eisenhower administration was to appoint Democrats, although the latter administration did appoint a large number of independents. As one might expect, the greatest showing of bipartisanship occurred in the departments concerned with national security and considerably less in the domestic departments. Partisanship might have been expected to be highest at the beginning of an administration, but no significant difference appears in the degree of partisanship from one period of an administration to another.

More intense forms of party activity such as attendance at the national conventions, or large contributions to the campaign war chest did not appear to be important indicators of likely candidates for political executive positions as defined here. Only 14 per cent of the political executives in the four administrations had been delegates at one or both of the national party conventions preceding their appointment. Cabinet officers were most likely to have been delegates; 44 per cent of them had so served during one or both of the two previous conventions. Subordinate executives were considerably less frequent attenders. Not surprisingly, nearly one out of four appointees in the Post Office Department had been delegates while fewer than 10 per cent in the security agencies had attended. Only 13 per cent of all appointees had made reported contributions of over $500 during either of the two campaigns prior to a new President's inauguration. Department heads were the most notable contributors while hardly 10 per cent of subordinate political executives contributed. Departments such as Commerce, Treasury, Defense, and Air Force, that relied primarily on businessmen for their political executives, were most likely to have had executives who made these major contributions.

Occupational Background. Table VI shows the distribution of political executives by their principal occupations. Over the past four administrations the largest source of political executives was among men who had established careers in public service.[15] For the most part, those who became political executives had had careers in nonelective positions and had usually served as subordinate federal officials before their advancement to political executive positions. Often this involved considerable shifting about from position to position or from agency to agency. A good example was Elmer Bennett, under secretary of the Interior in the Eisenhower administration. Beginning his public career as an employee of the War Department in 1942, he served successively as a trial attorney for the Federal Trade Commission, as an assistant to Senator Eugene Milliken of Colorado, legislative counsel, assistant to the secretary and solicitor in the Department of the Interior, before his appointment as under secretary. Although trained as a lawyer, his background in fact was that of a public servant.

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[15] Principal occupation was determined on the basis of the length of time spent in the occupation and the proximity of that work to the appointment as a political executive. The common practice of identifying principal occupation with professional training (*e.g.*, classing all law graduates as lawyers), when in fact an individual may have spent a large part of his life in public service, was rejected.

TABLE VI. PRINCIPAL OCCUPATION OF POLITICAL EXECUTIVES, BY ADMINISTRATION AND MAJOR OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS

	Number	Business (%)	Law (%)	Other Professions[a] (%)	Government*			Other[b] (%)
					Elective (%)	Non-elective (%)	Total (%)	
Persons	789	29	25	11	3	29	32	5
Roosevelt	210	23	26	16	3	30	33	2
Truman	265	23	24	5	2	43	45	4
Eisenhower	293	39	24	9	3	22	25	3
Kennedy	124	20	24	18	4	25	29	10

* All levels of government, including international agencies.

[a] Chiefly education, journalism, engineering and science.

[b] Trade union officials, party officials, farmers and foundation officers.

Among the men with private careers, lawyers showed the most constancy in supplying approximately 25 per cent of the political executives in each of the four administrations. Business supplied a significant number, but the percentage varied widely from administration to administration, the Republicans relying much more heavily on business.

One of the most striking facts about political executives is their mobility. Few entered an occupation at an early age and remained in that occupation without other experiences. Table VII shows the distribution of secondary occupations. Over 50 per cent of the political executives had spent sufficient time in other occupations to be classified as having had a secondary occupation. This secondary occupation was most likely to be in the government in Democratic administrations.

The tendency to recruit men from certain occupational backgrounds persists through most of the political executive positions from the Cabinet down to the deputy administrator in any one administration. Thus, businessmen predominated in all positions in the Eisenhower administration. Similarly, men in all political executive positions in the Truman administration tended to have primary careers in the federal government. Nevertheless, the tendency is greater to rely on businessmen as Cabinet officers, while making the subordinate political executive positions available to men whose primary careers are in public service. The emphasis on mobility is most clearly seen in the careers of Cabinet officers, considerably more of whom had had a secondary occupation than of those who served at subordinate levels. Nevertheless, a combination of careers is characteristic of political executives in all positions.

Sharp contrasts show up in the representation of various occupations in each of the major departments and agencies. Domestic establishments, such as Interior and Agriculture, Bureau of the Budget, and the Veterans Adminis-

TABLE VII. SECONDARY OCCUPATION OF POLITICAL EXECUTIVES, BY ADMINISTRATION AND MAJOR OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS*

	Number	Business (%)	Law (%)	Other Professions (%)	Government (%)	Other (%)	No Secondary Occupation (%)
Persons	789	14	13	8	22	3	43
Roosevelt	201	11	13	4	25	4	46
Truman	265	13	20	8	25	3	34
Eisenhower	293	17	9	8	16	2	49
Kennedy	124	10	11	11	27	2	40

* Totals over 100% are the result of adding rounded figures and also of multiple appointments of men whose secondary careers changed.

TABLE VIII. POSITIONS HELD BY POLITICAL EXECUTIVES IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO APPOINTMENT, BY ADMINISTRATION

	Number	Business (%)	Law (%)	Other Professions (%)	Government				Other (%)
					Elective (%)	Nonelective		Total (%)	
						Federal (%)	Other (%)		
Appointments	787	20	15	7	4	32	17	54	4
Roosevelt	200	12	17	6	4	42	17	63	3
Truman	211	16	10	2	3	44	20	67	5
Eisenhower	271	30	17	7	5	26	14	44	2
Kennedy	105	21	17	16	7	8	21	35	11

tration, emphasized strongly recruitment of men with careers in the public service. The military services and the Department of Defense, however, included fewer men with such backgrounds in their highest ranking positions. Businessmen predominated in the military departments with lawyers running second. This contrasts sharply with recruitment in the Department of State where even among those who were not members of the foreign service, 42 per cent had had primary occupations in the public service.

In recruiting for specific political executive positions the agency heads or other recruiters must find their candidates where they *are*, not where they *generally* are. And in a majority of cases the appointees were already serving in government. As indicated in Table VIII nearly two-thirds of the appointees in the Roosevelt and Truman administrations were already serving in public office, most often in federal executive positions but frequently in state or local government and occasionally in elective office. Fewer were serving in government when appointed during the Eisenhower Administration, but the figure is still not inconsiderable. In every occupational category—business, law or other professions—there was a significant reduction in the per cent who had had primary careers in those occupations from the per cent who were actually engaged in those pursuits at the time they were appointed.

The most common route of advancement was from a subordinate executive position outside the career service to a presidentially appointive position. Frequently this meant the promotion of an assistant to the Secretary to an assistant secretaryship or the promotion of a politically appointed bureau chief to a position at the secretarial level. In not a few instances these promotions were within the political executive ranks—an assistant secretary to under secretary or an under secretary to secretary. In virtually every type of political executive position internal promotion is the most significant route to the top.

Again, great variations were found from agency to agency. In the State Department nearly three-fourths of all political executives who were non-career appointees were already serving in government. Nearly as many were recruited from government in Agriculture and Interior. At the other extreme were Health, Education and Welfare, Post Office, Commerce and Labor, where less than half were in public positions. But in *every* department and agency the public service showed a marked increase when compared with the numbers whose primary careers were in the private economy. In the Commerce Department, for example, only 5 per cent of the political executives had principal occupations in the public service but over 40 per cent were in the government when they became political executives.

The commonly held view that political executives are relatively inexperienced in public affairs is mistaken. Over 80 per cent of all political executives had had some previous federal governmental experience. (See Table IX.) Even in the Eisenhower administration, when the view was most often expressed about businessmen, 75 per cent had had such experience. Moreover, in more than 75 per cent of the cases, this experience was full-time work, not just service in an advisory or part-time capacity. In many instances, furthermore, this public experience was of an extremely varied kind, involving more than one agency and a wide variety of types of positions. Over 40 per cent of executives in the Roosevelt and Truman administrations had seen service in more than one agency. The most common level of previous experience was at the non-career executive level, nearly two-thirds having served

TABLE IX. TYPES OF POSITIONS HELD BY POLITICAL EXECUTIVES PRIOR TO APPOINTMENT, BY ADMINISTRATION*

	Appointments	Roosevelt	Truman	Eisenhower	Kennedy
Number	(1040)	(239)	(322)	(353)	(126)
Federal					
Political Executive:					
Same Agency	12%	12%	13%	12%	8%
Other Agency	7	6	11	5	3
Other					
Noncareer:					
Same Agency	30	28	36	30	22
Other Agency	36	40	44	22	47
Career:					
Same Agency	13	9	15	13	16
Other Agency	9	7	13	5	9
Congress	4	5	3	6	5
Judicial	1	2	2	—	2
Part Time	17	13	16	18	21
Party	8	7	5	8	14
No Service	18	19	11	25	15

* Columns do not add to 100 per cent because many executives held more than one type of position.

in such positions. Nineteen per cent had had previous experience as political executives and 23 per cent had had experience in the career service.

In many departments and agencies there was considerable movement *into* the ranks of political executives from subordinate positions but little promotion *within* the ranks. This was typically the case in the domestic departments and agencies. In the security agencies—State and Defense—there was movement of both kinds. One quarter of all political executives in the security agencies had previously served in some other political executive position, usually within the same agency, and had been rewarded for their efforts by advancement. One need only recall the careers of such men as James Douglas, Thomas Gates, Donald Quarles, William Foster and Robert Lovett, all of whom served as Deputy Secretary of Defense, to recognize the extent of transfers in the military establishment. Such transfers make the figures for tenure in individual positions appear extremely short but presumably these were promotions in recognition of proven merit.[16]

In addition to previous service at the federal level, nearly 40 per cent of the appointees had had some state or local experience. The most prominent form of activity was service in some non-elective state position, usually as the head of a state agency. A small number had been members of state legislatures or had served in some local elective office. Experience in state and local government was somewhat more prominent in domestic agencies than in security agencies, 47 per cent in the former agencies having such experience and only 26 per cent in the latter.

Lending emphasis to the picture of broad public service backgrounds of political executives are the statistics on the length of previous service (Table X). In every administration but Eisenhower's a majority of the appointees had had more than three years' previous experience in appointive positions, with a median for all administrations of 3.3 years. Clearly, political executives have had far more administrative experience than is usually attributed to them, experience which provides them with a basis for approaching their demanding tasks. Few, however, have had much experience in elective politics, as suggested earlier. Only 14 per cent had had elective experience during the four administrations, the fewest appointed during the Truman administration.

Cabinet officers, except in the Truman ad-

TABLE X. YEARS OF PRIOR ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE OF POLITICAL EXECUTIVES, BY ADMINISTRATION

	Number	Number of Years						Median (years)
		None (%)	0–2 (%)	3–5 (%)	6–10 (%)	11–15 (%)	16+ (%)	
Persons	790	27	20	21	17	8	13	3.3
Roosevelt	202	22	25	20	20	5	12	3.3
Truman	265	17	16	21	22	14	13	5.2
Eisenhower	293	37	19	19	12	4	12	2.0
Kennedy	124	27	15	19	14	8	18	3.8

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[16] The Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery of the Senate held up the Deputy Secretary of Defense position as an example of excessive turnover, failing to give any weight to the fact that the occupants of this position had had an average of four years and nine months of service prior to service in that particular position.

ministration, tended to have less administrative experience and more elective experience while the reverse was true for subordinate political executives. Approximately 64 per cent of the cabinet officers had held appointive office and had served for a median of 2.7 years, while 74 per cent of the under and assistant secretaries and deputy administrators had held administrative posts for medians of 3.2 and 4.7 years, respectively. On the other hand, 37 per cent of the cabinet officers had had elective experience while only approximately 10 per cent of the assistant secretaries and deputy administrators had served in elective positions.

Not unexpectedly, there were marked variations among the agencies in the length of previous service. The domestic agencies relied much more heavily than the military agencies on men with extensive and prolonged service. The appointees in Agriculture, Interior and Justice were most likely to have had prior experience and they served the longest, with medians of 6.9, 4.1, and 3.7 years, respectively. In contrast, the median length of prior administrative service for military executives was slightly less than one year. The independent agencies recruited the executives with the most extensive administrative experience, however. More than 80 per cent had had administrative experience and the median length was 4.8 years.

The information on backgrounds of federal political executives invites hypotheses about the nature of the appointment process and the sources from which political executives are drawn and their status in the whole political system. Lacking detailed information on their social origins, it is difficult to make any firm conclusions about their class orientation. Information about their educational and religious backgrounds suggests, however, that there are important differences in class orientations among the various agencies. Political executives in most of the major domestic departments appear to come from a broad spectrum of American politics, with their numbers well distributed geographically throughout the nation. They have had a great deal of political, especially administrative, experience and there is a strong tendency to choose them from the President's party. In contrast, the political executives who have served in the military departments, in the Department of State, and the Treasury Department have tended to come from considerably more restricted backgrounds. Their backgrounds tend to be Northeastern, Ivy League, and high church; and, if career foreign service officers are excluded, they had usually had relatively little experience in politics or government administration.

In part, the explanation for these divergencies may be found in the characteristic American penchant for specialization. Recruiting executives for the Department of the Interior and the Department of Agriculture naturally leads agency heads to agricultural institutions of the midwest, south, and west—to the colleges of agriculture, to state resource agencies, to interest groups, and to private businesses and companies operating in the resource field. Moreover, with their strong tendency to promote subordinates—whether in the career or non-career service—to political executive positions, the agency heads were taking advantage of the training which men who may have come from many sections of the country have received while actually on the job. In contrast, recruitment for the Departments of State, Treasury and the Defense establishment has emphasized the business and professional world of the eastern seaboard. In Treasury this appears to reflect the demand for men with certain technical skills and experience, dealing with such matters as taxation, debt management, and international finance. In the State Department, the recruitment has tended to rely strongly on a community of men, both in and out of the government—in universities, foreign policy associations, law firms, and banking institutions—who have had a broad interest in international affairs. In somewhat similar fashion, but to a lesser extent, a community has developed around defense policy and management which has relied more heavily on the business world than is the case in the Department of State.

Equally significant is the strong tendency for political executives to come from urban and executive backgrounds. To an extent far greater than the population of the United States, political executives were born, lived, and worked in large metropolitan centers. They tended to be highly mobile, moving from firm to firm and even from occupation to occupation. Large numbers of them spent significant periods of their lives in the public service. A considerable number had primary occupations in the public service. They tended strongly, therefore, to have an orientation toward the presidential wing of their political party as well as a sympathetic understanding of the social and political problems of urban life. Few had had experience in legislative bodies or were acquainted with the institutional values of the legislature. With such backgrounds, it is not difficult to understand why they were chosen by the President or his advisers for their positions, and why they tended to be less appreciative of the values of legislators who are predominantly rural and conservative.

III. CONCLUSIONS

Significant changes have occurred both in the character of the process by which political executives are recruited and in the sources relied upon. Far from depending merely on "haphazard political reasons," their selection is increasingly related to some experience factor which qualifies them for office above and beyond the qualifications achieved through party membership or service. Selection appears to depend on the personal confidence of the cabinet officer or the White House aide in the capacity of candidates to perform adequately in dealing with substantive problems of an agency, as well as the significance of the appointment in the total political context. The precise specifications for availability vary markedly with time and agency and even position. Party factors rank high at the beginning of an administration but the numerous instances where they are disregarded even at that period make even such a generalization suspect. Clearly some appointments are "political" in the traditional sense—to placate a wing of the party, to satisfy a group interest, etc.—but these tend to be restricted to positions which are—rightly or wrongly—considered less consequential.

The point of view that political executives are part of a "political directorate" is hardly justified. While tendencies exist in certain departments to recruit from an eastern industrial, financial class, they appear chiefly to reflect the interest such groups have taken in the issues of national security. Thus special qualifications of experience and interest again play important roles in selection decisions. When the appointees to domestic departments are considered it is obvious that the ranks of political executives are representative of a wide range of interests, experience, localities and talents from the more mobile elements of the American population.

COMMUNICATION

HAMILTON ON "THE PEOPLE"

TO THE EDITOR:

Until recently, I was under the impression that the famous quotation, "Your people, sir—your people is a great beast!," attributed to Hamilton, could be found in Hamilton's own works. I was unable to find it there. The Hamilton Papers Office referred me to the *Memoir of Theophilus Parsons* (Boston: Ticknor and Fields, 1859). There on pages 109–110 is the following account:

> That was a day of violent language, and, I suppose, of violent feeling; but, with it all, there was some wisdom left. Then, as always, extremes produced extremes; and, in the excitement and exasperation of political antagonism, words were sometimes used which were more extreme than the speaker's thought. At a dinner party in New York, soon after the adoption of the Federal Constitution, the conversation turned upon the prospects of the country. One gentleman, whose name I never heard, was an earnest "friend of the people," and descanted with much enthusiasm upon the glorious future then opening upon this new-born nation, and predicted the perpetuity of our institutions, from the purity and intelligence of the people, their freedom from interest or prejudice, their enlightened love of liberty, etc. etc.
>
> Alexander Hamilton was among the guests; and, his patience being somewhat exhausted, he replied with much emphasis, striking his hand upon the table, "Your people, sir,—your people is a great beast!" *I have this anecdote from a friend, to whom it was related by one who was a guest at the table. After-dinner utterances have little value, unless, perhaps, their very levity makes them good indicators of the wind. We do not know the qualifying words which may have followed, or the tone and manner of that which was, perhaps, in part or in the whole, a jest.* And it is fair to suppose that the remark, if it had any serious meaning, meant only that the people might be corrupted by prosperity and adulation, until they would lose all wisdom, and all principles of right, and all the guidance of reason. But after every possible allowance is made, the remark was a mistake; for the people is not a beast, but a MAN. [Italics supplied.]

In view of Parsons' care in pointing out the hearsay nature of this account as well as the lack of knowledge as to the context in which Hamilton was reported to have said the words of the famous quotation, it is amusing to see how positive some historians have been in attributing them to Hamilton. Henry Adams wrote:

> The Philadelphia grand jury indicted Dennie for this paragraph [a paragraph in which he denounced democracy] as a seditious libel, but it was no more expressive than the single word uttered by Alexander Hamilton, who owed no small part of his supremacy to the faculty of expressing the prejudices of his followers more tersely than they themselves could do. Compressing the idea into one syllable, Hamilton, at a New York dinner, replied to some democratic sentiment by striking his hand sharply on the table and saying, "Your people, sir—your people is a great *beast!*" [Henry Adams, *The Formative Years*, ed. Herbert Agar (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947), vol. I, p. 45].

Vernon L. Parrington wrote: "His [Hamilton's] notorious comment—which the American democrat has never forgiven him, 'The people!—the people is a great beast!'—was characteristically frank." [Vernon L. Parrington, *Main Currents in American Thought* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1958), vol. I, p. 300]. Neither Adams nor Parrington provides a source for the quotation. Can any of your readers supply a more positive attribution of the quotation to Hamilton than the Parsons *Memoir*? Of course, Hamilton's disdain for "the people" can be found in other expressions which can be safely attributed to him. But though the melody remains the same, perhaps a small change in the lyrics is in order.

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REPORT OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON *FOREIGN RELATIONS*, 1963

The Advisory Committee on *Foreign Relations* held its seventh annual meeting at the State Department in Washington, on November 1–2, 1963. Since its last meeting three members of the Committee (Leland M. Goodrich, Dexter Perkins, and Philip W. Thayer) have retired. The present composition of the Committee is as follows: *representing the American Historical Association:* Fred H. Harrington (Professor of History and President, University of Wisconsin), Richard W. Leopold (Professor of History, Northwestern University), Robert H. Ferrell (Professor of History, Indiana University); *representing the American Political Science Association:* Clarence A. Berdahl (Professor of Political Science, emeritus, University of Illinois, and Visiting Professor of Government, Southern Illinois University), Robert E. Osgood (Professor of American Foreign Policy, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington); *representing the American Society of International Law:* Robert R. Wilson (Professor of International Law, Duke University), William W. Bishop, Jr. (Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School, and Editor-in-Chief, *American Journal of International Law*).

All the members were present at this meeting except Mr. Harrington, who was detained because of his duties as President of the University of Wisconsin. Clarence A. Berdahl was elected Chairman to succeed Dexter Perkins, who had served as Chairman since the Committee was established in 1957. Others present at various sessions of the Committee were Raymond E. Lisle, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs; William M. Franklin, Director of the Historical Office, the administrative personnel of that office, and the entire "Foreign Relations" staff; Arthur Marmor, Assistant Chief of the Division of Publishing Services; and the Public Affairs Officers of three of the five geographical Bureaus (Leonard R. Greenup of ARA, John A. Billings of NEA, and Milan W. Jerabek of EUR). At a luncheon given by Under Secretary George W. Ball, there were also present, in addition to Mr. Ball and the Committee, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., White House Assistant to the President; Robert J. Manning, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs; and Mr. Franklin. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who last year provided a similar hospitality, was present for a short time before the luncheon.

At these various sessions the Committee reviewed the problems of the Historical Office in respect to the compilation, editing, and publication of "Foreign Relations." Its report is submitted herewith:

Status of the Series. During the year since the last meeting of the Committee, five volumes have been released (1941.VII. The American Republics; 1942.IV. The Near East, Africa; 1942.VI. The American Republics; 1943.I. General; 1943.III. British Commonwealth, Eastern Europe, Far East). This represents some progress, although not enough to keep the series from slipping further behind currency. However, another volume (1941.VI. The American Republics) was released in late December, and its publication completed the series through 1942. In addition, the Historical Office has now a carefully worked out program for several years ahead which, if it can be carried out, will produce approximately ten volumes per year and go far towards preventing any further increase in the gap between diplomatic events and their recording for the public.

The historical development of the series, together with some attention to publication problems, is exceptionally well reviewed by a member of this Committee, Professor Richard W. Leopold, in a paper prepared as a recognition of the series' centennial, read before the American Historical Association in 1961, and published in the *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* for March, 1963. That paper may well be considered a part of this report.

The Twenty-Year Lag. For almost fifty years after the "Foreign Relations" series began, publication was substantially current, that is, only a year elapsed between the date of the documents and their publication. Gradually, however, as documentation proliferated and other difficulties were encountered, the time lag increased until it became fifteen years in 1919 and is now twenty years. The Advisory Committee at first felt strongly that this time lag ought to be reduced, and President Kennedy two years ago indicated his desire for a more rapid unfolding of the historical record.

After thorough consideration, however, the Committee has reluctantly concluded that a reduction in the time lag is virtually impossible, that a twenty-year lag is defensible, but that every effort must be made to hold the line at twenty years. The Committee discussed this problem at a luncheon session with Secretary Rusk last year, and was gratified to receive his formal approval of such a program, subject only to the reservation that an occasional case might arise when an exception might have to be made. The Historical Office has accordingly prepared a schedule of publication to maintain that twenty-year lag over the next several years; and it has also, in cooperation with the Division of Publishing Services, developed new procedures in respect to the mechanics of publication (checking references, proof-reading, and the like) that should serve to speed up production and thus assist in maintaining the twenty-year lag. The Committee warmly approved these plans and procedures, but feels strongly that they can hardly be carried out without substantial increase in budget and staff. This matter was discussed again this year with Under Secretary Ball, and the Committee received from him not only a sympathetic response but also some intimation of future support if funds could be found.

Quantity and Complexity of Material. A major problem confronting the Historical Office is the enormous increase in documentation in view of the two World Wars, the resulting range and complexity of our international relationships, the large number of international conferences, and the establishment of permament international organizations such as the United Nations and related agencies. Until these developments the conduct of our foreign relations was largely in the hands of the State Department, and State Department documents made up almost the entire record of our diplomacy. Even these increased many times over the years; but now other departments and agencies of the government, the Treasury Department, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Defense, the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, and others, exercise functions so important in respect to foreign policy that their transactions cannot be ignored if the record is to be accurate and reasonably complete. This Committee is convinced that the "Foreign Relations" series must increasingly include documentation from these other agencies, and it commends the Historical Office for recognizing this necessity, even though the task of compilation and editing is thereby made much more difficult.

The increase in documentary materials during recent years has been such as to require, in the view of the Committee, fifteen to twenty annual volumes if the papers are to be published as fully as in the past. To produce so vast a record would require a staff and budget that it is quite unrealistic to expect; nor does it seem to us necessary to have so complete a record in order to maintain historical accuracy. It has become essential to be much more selective of the documents to be published, and for this purpose the Historical Office has worked out a system of priorities which has the general approval of this Committee, which cannot, of course, be applied inflexibly, but which can be used as a guide in compilation and should make the problem of selection somewhat easier.

Something can also be done to reduce the number of volumes and yet maintain historical integrity by appropriate citation of documents not published, by cross-reference to documents or pertinent accounts published elsewhere, and by editorial notes summarizing documents or events relevant to the record but for good reason hardly deserving publication *in extenso*. There has already been experimentation with these procedures in recent volumes, and the Committee approves the results and urges their larger use. It should also be noted that the publication of *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents*, begun by the Historical Office for the years 1950–1955 (as a continuation of a previous volume prepared by the staff of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations) and continued annually since, and the publication of other documentary collections relating to special problems, serve the two-fold purpose of filling in somewhat the twenty-year lag and of reducing the amount of documentation that need be textually reproduced later in the "Foreign Relations" series. These new methods, somewhat rigidly applied, may make possible the present goal of approximately ten volumes per year instead of twenty.

Clearance. The clearance problem continues to be one of the principal obstacles to speedy publication. The Committee has noticed this difficulty in each of its previous reports, and again records emphatically its view that there is little merit in most cases of objection and delay on the part of those officers who review the materials after compilation and editing by the "Foreign Relations" staff. There is no discernible evidence that the inclusion or exclusion of particular documents has any material effect on the conduct of foreign policy or on the relations with other governments. It was President Kennedy's view that "any official should have a clear and precise case involving the national interest before seeking to withhold from publication documents or papers fifteen or more years old"; and the twenty-year lag should make that view even more compelling.

During the past year some new procedures and pressures for more rapid clearance have been developed. Assistant Secretary Manning has brought to the attention of the geographical Bureaus Secretary Rusk's endorsement of this Committee's recommendation to hold the line at twenty years, and has proposed to these Bureau officers a maximum period of three months for consideration of the materials prepared by the "Foreign Relations" staff; he also appealed, in view of the twenty-year lag, for a more liberal clearance policy. "Only a very clear and compelling danger of real importance," he wrote, "could justify leaving a gap in a documentary series with a high reputation for completeness and reliability." The response to this procedure seems to have been good, with perceptible improvement in clearance.

The Committee discussed this clearance problem with representatives of three of the geographical Bureaus, and feels that further progress was made in understanding the problem and in promoting better cooperation of all concerned. The clearance problem was also discussed with Under Secretary Ball, who suggested that certain cases be sent to him for review. It is hoped that out of this may come increased pressure for more rapid consideration and a more liberal policy in respect to clearance. The Historical Office, on its part, is preparing a memorandum for the reviewing officers that should further clarify the situation and bring about better cooperation.

Access to State Department Files. The rules governing access by scholars to the records of the State Department have recently been revised. Although this matter is not strictly within the jurisdiction of the Advisory Committee, it is something that concerns scholars everywhere and especially those represented by this Committee and is of particular interest in view of the greater selectivity of the documentation to be published in "Foreign Relations." For many years the records of the Department, for the purpose of access by scholars, were divided into three periods: an open period, through 1929; a restricted period, 1930–1941; a closed period, 1942 to the present. These fixed dates have now been changed to periods progressively geared to the publication of "Foreigh Relations," and access to the records thus automatically moved up as the volumes are published. It is also understood that access to documents in the restricted period will be granted as liberally as possible to serious scholars.

Personnel and Budget. The Committee desires to emphasize again its view that the crux of the problem in respect to "Foreign Relations" is the size and quality of the staff. In spite of the overwhelming increase in the materials to be scrutinized, compiled, and edited, the "Foreign Relations" staff has actually been reduced over the years, from 15–18 in 1947 to 12–14 in 1963. Indeed, the entire Historical Office staff has been reduced from 62 in 1952 to 39 in 1963 (this figure including two unfilled vacancies). The Committee has complete confidence in the competence and industry of the present staff, but it is obvious that this niggardly policy imposes an impossible burden and prevents effective recruitment. The Committee understands that there has been a good increase in the budget for printing and binding, which is to be warmly commended, but the provision of a budget for additional personnel has not been granted. In the view of the Committee, 8–10 additional positions are needed if the staff is to keep up with its task and maintain the twenty-year line. This matter was also discussed with Under Secretary Ball, who indicated his readiness to review the budgetary situation and see what could be done.

In the meantime the Committee would note with approval the suggestion by Secretary Rusk that internships for service in the Historical Office might be useful. If arrangements could be made for the necessary funds (which the Committee assumes must be found outside the State Department) and if mature scholars could be interested, so that no long period of training is necessary, such internships would be helpful, not only in providing some staff assistance but also in promoting a better understanding by professional scholars of the problems involved in the production of "Foreign Relations" as well as a better appreciation of the substantive importance of the series.

Finally, the Committee warmly commends the Director, Dr. Franklin, and his staff, who have produced more volumes than we have a right to expect under the difficult circumstances confronting them, volumes whose compilation and production reflect industry, integrity, and historical scholarship of the highest order. Dr. E. Ralph Perkins is about to retire after more than thirty years on the staff and approximately thirty years as Editor of "Foreign Relations." He has during all these years maintained the most rigorous standards of historical accuracy, objectivity, and completeness, and his services are warmly appreciated. The Historical Office is fortunate in having obtained the services of Dr. S. Everett Gleason, well known historical scholar for some years with the National Security Council; he was brought in first as a Special Assistant and will now replace Dr. Perkins as Editor of "Foreign Relations." In spite of the numerous and often discouraging problems noted in these annual reports, the Committee is well pleased with the operations of the Historical Office and feels that the solution of some of the most persistent problems may be in sight.

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BOOK REVIEWS

The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics. By Heinz Eulau. (New York: Random House, 1963). Pp. x, 141. $1.95.)

In the modified quiet of his study, the political scholar today can hear many voices telling him what he should be doing. The current argument begins with David Easton's *The Political System* (1954); after a little while David Butler's *The Study of Political Behavior* (1958), Hyneman's *The Study of Politics* (1959), and Van Dyke's *Political Science* (1960), came close upon each others' inky heels. The right has also been heard from: first Voegelin in *The New Science of Politics* (1959), then Bernard Crick in *The American Science of Politics* (1959), and Storing's collected authors in *Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics* (1962) volleyed and thundered. The *Annals* tried to achieve a balance in "The Limits of Behavioralism in Political Science" (1962), and Dahl tried to consolidate the position of behavioralism and to stop the war in his article in this REVIEW on "The Behavioral Approach" (1961).

With a modest flourish, Heinz Eulau now appears upon this scarred terrain with an extended essay on *The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics.* He brings to his task some manifest qualifications. He is well known for his original research in electoral and legislative behavior, and his editorial skill revealed in two major books of readings, the forthcoming revision of *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, and the excellent Bobbs-Merrill reprint series. He knows what he is talking about; he writes with grace and fluidity and, in spite of his (and all our) wounds, he is sweetly good humored as he surveys the situation.

After a running start on the importance of focusing on *man,* "his acts, goals, drives, feelings, beliefs, commitments, and values," Eulau develops some thoughts on the units of analysis: his preference is for analyzing the individual in various situations, and particularly for role analysis. It is one of the better sections. He then discusses some of the conceptual problems involved in the analysis of politics in "the social matrix," "the cultural context," and in connection with "the personal basis." Each of these discussions deals (somewhat loosely) with the search for ways of organizing and deriving meaning from behavioral data. Finally, there are some observations on special problems involved in the point chosen for observation, the relationship between macro-politics and micro-politics, and the problems of change.

The book is not merely a repetition of previous argument, for it is much less focussed on method than Hyneman's work, much less on the problems of the logic of science than Van Dyke; it does not spend much time attacking the old order as does Easton, and of course, does not defend it, either, as do Crick, and Strauss's piece in the Storing collection. Nor does it deal with individual authors—as the Storing collection and Easton have done. Its contribution lies in the effort to state the way the behavioral approach conceptualizes the field. In this sense, it aims to be a contribution to modern political theory.

But, somehow, *The Behavioral Persuasion* does not wholly succeed, does not quite persuade. Puzzling over this, I believe there are three causes of this shortcoming. First, it seems to me, that the way to advance the argument over the fruitfulness of one way of looking at the field, compared to another, is to come to grips directly with what others have said about it. An argument with a vague generalized other is not really an argument at all. There are no footnotes in Eulau's book and almost no references to individual authors or books treating many of the same problems. This gives the essay a kind of disembodied quality; it is hard to locate it in the current on-going discussion. Second, I have always thought that one of the virtues of the behavioral approach is the intimate relations between theory and data; each helps the other. This is a theoretical book, but there are no references to the studies which inform it, or which illuminate and illustrate the points made. Eulau has chosen to argue his case without showing what the behavioral approach can do. At the other extreme, and in some ways more persuasive, are Likert and Hayes, *Some Applications of Behavioral Research* (1957), and the recent *Essays on the Behavioral Study of Politics*, edited by Ranney (1962). They do not do the same thing that Eulau has attempted, but some similar reporting of actual results would have given Eulau's work a greater impact.

Third, one has the feeling that the diffuse essay style, with its easy literary flow, has subverted the author himself. The thought tends to be associative, rather than logical, the mixture of ideas within the paragraphs tends to confuse the reader on the point he is supposed to carry away; the argument loses cogency, the very texture of the thought suffers.

Yet even with these defects, the piece reveals and induces an imaginative inquiry into the nature of political affairs.

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The Small Group: An Analysis of Research Concepts and Operations. BY ROBERT T. GOLEMBIEWSKI. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962. Pp. xii, 303. $6.00.)

The author by personal confession has chosen in this summary and critique of small-group research to discuss how empty is its cup, rather than how full. The book is an updating of a doctoral thesis presented in political science at Yale in 1958, and smacks to some degree of the standard "Suggestions for Future Research" run wild. After scanning hundreds of small-group studies, the author concludes with a summary labelled "a Prologue to Research." This posture will undoubtedly irk the older laborers in these vineyards. On the other hand, the book is a boon to students overly intimidated by the bulk of the extant small-group literature, who may be discouraged from the search for new gifts for the man who has everything. The man, it is argued, is currently wearing little more than a tie and a belt.

A full-length book in this vein could readily be either niggling or tedious. To my view, this book is neither. The author uses his own points of view in a highly skilled way to jell an account of the recent (post-war, largely) small-group literature which is highly comprehensive yet which avoids the sense of dreary catalogue which mars most summaries of the literature. The atmosphere may be rather steadily critical, yet a good deal of talent is given over to being constructive about the matter: the critical leverage is gained from the author's vision of what small-group knowledge might hopefully look like some decades hence. And while different people have different visions, Golembiewski's seems as defensible as anyone else's.

The political scientist should be forewarned that the book is not at all tailored to specialized political science interests in the small group. In his introduction the author locates these interests in the realm of "applications" of small-group theory, and refers such readers elsewhere (as to Verba's *Small Groups and Political Behavior,* or to his own recent *Behavior and Organization*). The stress here is upon "pure" small-group analysis, after the manner of the social psychologist.

The research strategies urged by the author in the course of his review are intensely empirical ones. He bills his central assessment tool as "analysis-by-juxtaposition," a term which conveys little meaning in itself but gains some as it is paired off against premature "synthesis," "integration," or "system-building." He wishes to juxtapose concepts and operations that have actually been used to refer to much the same phenomena across numerous studies, with an eye to determining whether or not there is sufficient convergence of empirical approaches and findings to permit broader conceptual integration. With occasional exceptions, the verdict is negative.

More specifically, the heart of the book involves a discussion of three "panels" of small-group variables. The *structural* panel includes dimensions of communication structure, power structure, functional roles, sociometric structure and the like. The *style* panel treats dimensions of small-group goals, process phases, task dimensions, norms, morale and group "atmosphere." The *population* panel refers to the distribution of individual characteristics (intelligence, authoritarianism, etc.). The author finds work within each of these panels to be in a very crude state, which is to say that there is little agreement either on concepts or operations that would delimit a basic set of working dimensions. Efforts have been even thinner in the experimental crossing of variables from one panel to the other, although a few studies are cited to support the central contention that simple relationships between single variables of a given panel tend to be muddy or varied from study to study, whereas results are greatly illuminated when multiple dimensions from the several panels are taken into account at once.

Hence Golembiewski's plea is for a collective assault to establish a consensual battery of measurable dimensions covering the three panels; and for the more massive, multidimensional research designs necessary to profit from such consensus.

This strategy for research may presume a degree of regimentation and standardization which is at least implausible, if not downright undesirable. Furthermore, what seems to be the preferred tactic toward dimensional salvation—factor analysis—gets somewhat overemphasized. The text shifts from dour to bright on the rare instances when studies can be mentioned that have tried to winnow down to a limited number of dimensions data relevant to small-group work. The author does prudently suggest a number of criteria to distinguish the ideal factor analysis from any which have been achieved in small-group research. However this may be, and with all due respect to the utilities of the method, getting small-group data onto the couch to be factor-analyzed probably does not enjoy quite the unique therapeutic value for what ails the field that the author attributes to it.

To challenge some of the horses ridden by way of criticism does not, however, do justice to the value of the book as a whole. The criticism eschews the petty and hews to the true potentials of an exciting field. For many readers, it may illuminate these potentials in a way which goes beyond other discussions. Furthermore, as a summary both of research and critiques of research, it is remarkably well organized and lucidly written. To do such a job with the large and diverse literature now surrounding small groups is in itself no mean trick. Source books of this genre above the level of the most elementary texts have been all too infrequent, and this effort is of a calibre to rank well with its few predecessors.

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Party and Representation: Legislative Politics in Pennsylvania. By FRANK J. SORAUF. (New York: Atherton Press, 1963. Pp. xii, 178. $6.50.)

This mis-named book is a welcome addition to our growing literature on the political recruitment processes in the several American states. The fresh empirical data in Mr. Sorauf's study are restricted to the 154 districts and 210 representatives elected to the Pennsylvania House of Representatives in 1958, but he is quite aware of the importance of generalization-through-comparison across state lines, and wherever possible he has checked his findings for Pennsylvania with the studies of Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Mexico, Oregon and the four-state project of Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan and Ferguson. For analytical purposes, the volume goes far beyond the descriptive series of state electoral arrangements sponsored by several Citizenship Clearing House affiliates, and its conceptual and methodological sophistication reveal the distinct, if laborious progress in the discipline since the pioneering "tenure-and-turnover" inquiries projected by Charles Hyneman thirty years ago.

Following an introductory chapter presenting the demographic milieu of Pennsylvania politics, the author incorporates his data on Pennsylvania's legislators in five chapters: "Constituencies," "Parties," "Candidates," "Recruitment and Selection," and "Legislative Roles and Votes." A concluding chapter elaborates his over-all conclusion that the vigorous two-party system in Pennsylvania primarily operates to reflect and represent the interests of the district or constituency parties within the state. Party discipline in the legislature serves to support the common interests and purposes of the generally similar districts from which the two parties respectively draw their most loyal partisans (pp. 151–52). The strength of party officials and organizations is rooted in the "political culture" of their districts, that is to say, the needs and expectations of the social groups in the districts for which the parties act as agents, and it is the differences (primarily along the urban-rural dimension) in political culture that determine the acceptable limits of party organization and activity (pp. 61–62, 148–150). The organizational autonomy and policy initiatives of the district party leaders rest upon the ability of the system to serve the social and material interests of several districts (not the ideological or policy interests of the statewide party), and it is upon the satisfaction of those expectations that the parties' effective control of candidate selection and informal organization in the legislature depends (pp. 152–154).

Several of Sorauf's specific findings for Pennsylvania are of great interest to students of party processes elsewhere. For example, although Pennsylvania has been a "competitive, two-party state" since 1950, in 1958 there was genuine electoral competition between the two parties in less than one-third of the state's legislative districts, *i.e.*, those in which the two-party division of the vote fell within a 55–45 range in the general election (p. 117). In 60 per cent of the Democratic primaries and 70 per cent of the Republican, or two-thirds of both party primary elections, there were no contests (p. 111). As other studies have discovered, there is more competition, defined by number of contestants, in the majority party in Pennsylvania, except in areas of greatest party strength (the safest districts). With respect to *candidates*, Pennsylvania is like other states in that there are no substantial differences in sex, age or racial characteristics between the party nominees; the differences appear in educational, religious, occupational, and social status attributes. Pennsylvania legislators exhibit a low turnover (less than 20%) and seem to regard their position either as a reward for long party service or as something of a career in itself; this is something of a contrast to other states, where service in the state legislature is usually either ancillary to another career or an intermediate step on the political ladder. With respect to *party organization*, there is almost no legislative party organization separate from the regular county and ward structure, and the existence of strong party organization is more highly correlated with urban and densely-populated districts than with safeness of the district for the party (pp. 47–51). Deviations from party discipline in legislative voting are associated with competitiveness rather than safety of the legislator's district (pp. 140–42).

The shortcomings of the study are inherent in the design and are quickly disposed of. It is restricted to a single legislative election (1958). Emphasis is placed on description of the Pennsylvania pattern of legislative recruitment, selection and responsibility rather than systematic comparison of Pennsylvania legislators with those of other states. Almost no attention is given to the interplay of city-county, gubernatorial and national politics upon state party organization. At several points in the text, the reader experiences some irritation when the quoted statistical evidence varies from the figures used in the adjacent tables, but these discrepancies usually can be tracked down or explained.

When everything is said, however, *Party and Representation* contains undoubtedly the most comprehensive analysis available of state legislative districts in Pennsylvania, the demographic and behavioral characteristics of the lower-house legislators, and the distinctive role of the parties in the state with respect to legislative recruitment, selection and responsibility. One must applaud the judgment of the A.P.S.A. Committee which selected it as the co-winner of the 1962 Atherton Political Science prize.

Avery Leiserson

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Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society. By Leonard Binder. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962. Pp. xii, 362. $7.50.)

Aerodynamically, so some experts tell us, the bumblebee is unequipped to fly. Politically, so it often seems from afar, the present Iranian system is too cumbersome to operate. The populace gives simultaneous allegiance to half a dozen different ideologies. A traditional monarch whose dynasty dates back but one generation governs with the shifting aid of the military, a disgruntled aristocracy and a partially modern bureaucracy. Antique, institutionalized religion remains a factor of formal authority in the state while corruption sometimes seems to occupy more of men's efforts than development planning. The ordinary Persian is commonly said to regard Iran as a culture rather than as a nation. Yet, all this has amazingly endured in the face of severe external pressures from Cold War combatants and oil-interested capitalists.

The merit of Professor Binder's book is that, more than any other work, it unravels some of the contradictions and complexities of the Shahvian political system. It is a book which, despite an opaque first chapter, deserves wide reading, both in Iran (where it has lamentably been banned) and in the West. It is the first intensive, broad, analytical treatment of the contemporary Iranian polity. As such it is of significance to all those interested in comparative politics.

Like previous observers, Binder emphasizes the inconsistencies of Persian politics. He points to the ancient conflicts that still fester unresolved ("Iran has let nothing pass"). He stresses the fatal incompleteness of her two main impulses toward reform, the Reza Shah and Mussadiq movements. Scrambling like Charles II not to go on his "travels" again, the present Shah is basically portrayed as playing off army, landowners, *ulama*, bureaucrats, tribes and—one now supposes—peasants in delicate balance. Those of his subjects not dominated by "self-seeking" display an extensive rejection of the present system along with an even stronger unwillingness to modify their personal behaviors which constitute that system. Group alignments and leadership are so indeterminate that positive political calculation is nearly impossible. The most obvious underlying trend is toward what Binder calls a "rational-hierarchical" system; others would probably categorize it as "collective authoritarian."

Though the picture Binder draws is often impressionistic and sometimes tendentious ("The government of Iran is a living fossil." "Constitutionalism, as presently maintained in Iran, is a farce."), it is clearly accurate in many dimensions, always honest and generally penetrating. He gives us the first informed treatment of the history and *modus operandi* of the Iranian cabinet. He offers interesting insights on Iranian political culture as manifested in the peasant, the technocrat, the university student, and other distinctive Persian figures. Strategic classes and groups in Iranian society—such as guilds, organized labor, professionals—are described in perceptive sketches which frequently yield more politically relevant material than is to be found anywhere else. Much valuable information, though now perhaps dated, is furnished about the characteristics of Iran's *soi-disant* "political parties." And, the position of the Majlis in the political scheme of things is well illumined. All in all, the great value of Binder's work seems to this reviewer to consist in its wealth of shrewdly observed comments on the particular characteristics of Persian politics, past and present.

Unfortunately, the books written by those of us who analyze developing societies tend to be as bifurcated as the societies we study. If the researcher is area-competent (as Binder unquestionably is), he offers many probing detailed comments on the behavior of his chosen people. If he is also discipline-competent (as Binder also is), he feels the urge to cast his particular observations into more general form so as to make clear their relevance for the theoretical development of his discipline. When dealing with a limited problem, such as voting behavior, the social backgrounds of politicians, or formal party organization, he is frequently able to draw upon a rather well established body of concepts, techniques and hypotheses. But, when he laudably sets out on the more ambitious quest of analyzing "whole political systems" (in Binder's words), he quickly runs afoul of the very feeble development of macro-analysis in political science. He is compelled to elaborate, usually in one chapter, the grand theoretical underpinnings of the discipline. The product is almost always a hastily prepared, generally borrowed, ill-digested and unsatisfactory "theory" or "analytic scheme."

Binder is avowedly (and justifiably) disenchanted with the two most popular grand theoretical departures currently used by comparative analysts—the structural-functional and the group theoretic approaches. Nevertheless, throughout the more substantive portions of his book he frequently falls back on that functional analysis he earlier berates. Though telling criticisms of the functional approach have been made by Hempel, Dore, Nagel and others, comment on some of its inadequacies as reflected in the present work seems required.

Binder variously describes a number of administrative practices, institutional activities, customs and behaviors as "functional," "eufunctional," or "dysfunctional." It is difficult to appreciate the significance of these judgments for several reasons. Foremost among these is that the political system which is assertedly being "maintained" or "challenged" is so vaguely and loosely described. It is almost impossible to determine the systemic effects of the activity under discussion because 1) the basic structuring of the elements in the system, and 2) the notion of *how much* change in that structuring constitutes fundamental systemic alteration, are very far from being clear.

Secondly, even if one could agree that a specific activity did tend to maintain or alter a well defined political system, that assertion alone is usually too crude to be very informative. A given behavior may well have both eufunctional and dysfunctional aspects. How are these taken into account in the summary description of that behavior as eufunctional or dysfunctional for the "whole political system?" More particularly, we are most interested in the question, "Eufunctional or dysfunctional for what?"—what specific elements of the system are affected by the instant practice and how? All too often the functionalist thinks he has done his job when the mere functional label is attached.

Much more could be said about the theoretical side of Binder's valuable effort. Unfortunately, the quality of his theoretical prose does not match that of his descriptive passages, and a number of minor grammatical confusions and proof-reading errors mar the more abstract portions of his work. Though perhaps few will share his particular theoretical predilections, few also will disagree with his uneasiness in using existing macro-analytic approaches. His book contributes more to our store of information on Iran than it does to our analytical uplift. Nonetheless, exposure to his struggles at conceptual improvement will prove useful to many, and exposure to his observations on Iranian politics should prove interesting to all.

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Old Societies and New States: A Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa. Edited by Clifford Geertz. (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963, Pp. viii, 310. $6.95.)

The essays in this book represent attempts at social science in the grand manner. The subject is probably the most important facing contemporary social scientists: the revolution of change and modernization in the new states. The empirical materials do not come from any particular area but are drawn in a broad comparative manner from the experiences of all the new states as well as from the relevant experiences of the older states. The mode of analysis is largely in the macro-sociological tradition of Max Weber. And, most important of all, though there is inevitable variation among the essays, almost all carry off this task of grand analysis with success.

Though the essays differ in their specific topics, all deal with the problem of nation-building. And within this broad problem the main focus is on the integration of the new nations, particularly from the cultural point of view. Geertz's essay is directly on this subject. It treats the conflict between, on the one hand, the primordial ties to family, kingroup, and tribe, with which people are born and, on the other, the demands of civil commitment to the state. A multiple loyalty solution in which commitment to the new nation state is added to but does not destroy these primordial ties is difficult, because the competing loyalties are on the same general level—that is, the nation state and the more parochial units compete for the position of the maximal political unit to which loyalty is owed. Most of the other essays deal with aspects of this particular problem. Apter's essay suggests that the development of a "political religion" is one way to break down primordial ties and to mobilize commitment to the tasks of nation-building. This solution involves the forcible suppression of parochial ties and the elevation of the new state to the level of a sacred object. LeVine's excellent essay on political socialization is relevant here. And Marriott's essay on the cultural policy of the new states indicates the great extent to which the creation of a culture around which political commitment can be mobilized is a matter of conscious policy choice for the leaders of these states.

This raises the second important theme that runs through most of these essays—the theme of the tremendous load that is placed upon the policy-making structures of the new states. Almost all of the problems they face require *political* solutions, in the sense that they must be dealt with by the conscious coordinating activity of political elites. This is best reflected in the cultural sphere. Earlier writings on the relationship between cultural patterns and political systems suggested that the culture of a nation is a given condition that has effects upon the politics of that nation. In the present volume—and particularly in Marriott's essay—it becomes clear that the culture of a nation has become the subject of conscious policy-making in most of the new states. The leaders of these nations are engaged in selecting symbols for their political movements and even in devising or selecting appropriate histories for their nations.

A third important theme running through the book is what one might call the "participation explosion." As Fallers points out, one of the major characteristics of the evolution of modernization is a movement toward a more equalitarian and populistic set of values. Older states went through periods of economic and cultural change at a time when the political elites could ignore a large part of the population, but the new states are being formed in an era when an elitist solution is no longer feasible. This does not imply a democratic solution. The mobilization systems that Apter discusses, organized around a political religion, are hardly democratic; but they are designed to deal with the participation of all in politics.

This book illustrates the value to political science in general of the focus on the new nations. When one looks at these emerging nations, one is forced to deal with the most basic questions of politics—the entire set of questions involved in the creation and maintenance of political societies. The new nations are a laboratory for nation building, and much of what the authors discuss is relevant to the historical problem of nation-building, and to the current problem of nation maintenance in the older, more established states. One of the values of the work on the new nations is that it may send political scientists back to the study of the history of the older nations with a more sophisticated sense of the universality of the problems with which nation-builders must deal.

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Modern Islam: The Search for Cultural Identity. BY G. E. VON GRUNEBAUM. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962. Pp. 288. $7.50.)

Professor von Grunebaum is a leading scholar in the field of Islamic studies, and his works are indispensable to anyone wishing to gain an understanding of recent developments in the Middle East. The work under review is particularly interesting to social scientists because the author does attempt in certain places to explain his own particular way of relating the product of "orientalist" scholarship to the concerns of political scientists and anthropologists. Because this book is a collection of essays, however, its methodological sections are broken up into a number of pieces. As a consequence, this reviewer does not feel able to present a coherent restatement of the author's method. It is possible, nevertheless, to alert those concerned with problems of comparative method and with problems of cultural change and modernization to the fact that several of Professor von Grunebaum's chapters contain matters of relevance to them.

The key to this book is the author's view that self—understanding is only possible in conjunction with the ability to understand others. Objectivity is further essential to this kind of understanding. The author also believes that historical objectivity is possible in general but may be distorted within the context of given cultural configurations. Western culture demands self-understanding, hence it pursues the study of alien cultures in order to better know itself. Islam does not seek to understand itself. Even more significant is the fact that, despite "modernization," Muslims do not really try to understand the west. If they fail to gain an understanding of the west they will not resolve the problem of their own cultural identity and never adapt to the modern world. The cause of this cultural difficulty is not the consequence of the objective character of Islam, but rather of the self-image that Muslims have of themselves.

This capsule interpretation of the author's intention doubtless does great injustice to the subtlety of his expression and the richness of his description. If, however, I have got the point, that point depends upon our ability to distinguish between the objective character of Islamic culture and the self-image which Muslims have of themselves. In attributing this view to the author, I rely heavily on the following illustrative passage from page 101:

> In this sense historical objectivity, that is, object-orientedness, if placed in the widest possible judgmental perspective, tends to liberate, or to purge, the self-image from aspirations that are not *richtigkeitsrational;* it assists in a rational adjustment of purposes where otherwise only a purposive rational adjustment of means to non-rationally apprehended ends would have been possible. If this is true, one may well postulate that distortions of a period's historiographic seizure of reality . . . are functions of the peculiarities of the society's self-image, . . .

The author cites Stark, Weber, Scheler, and Husserl in connection with various passages which reveal something about his method and approach. The conclusion which suggests itself is that the author's approach contains elements of both historical relativism and historicism (or, if alternative terms are preferred, of both historicism and historicalism), a position perhaps best explicated in Stark's *Sociology of Knowledge*.

The major portion of the book is taken up with detailed presentations of diverse aspects of the Muslim self-image as revealed in an extremely wide array of contemporary and recent Middle Eastern literature. Regardless of one's methodological preferences, this material will be acknowledged as clearly necessary in any analysis of recent Middle Eastern thought.

The vast quantity of cited materials and the variety of sources from which these were drawn, render it difficult to sum up the author's position on the substantive question of where the Muslims stand. This reviewer's understanding is as follows: the central objective historical fact with which the Muslims must come to grips, and with which they have thus far failed to come to grips, is the political, technical, cultural, and scientific emergence of the west. They cannot see the west objectively because of the effect of their self-image. Unless they alter their self-image the Muslims will not be able to cope with the modern world. The only way to alter a self-image is by really coming to understand another culture. But the Islamic self-image precludes this method; thus the goal is taken as the prerequisite of effective application of the means and a severely pessimistic conclusion results.

The sensible reader will know that capsule summaries are grossly distorting, but should also recognize that this is a stimulating, even an exciting book. Its interest goes far beyond Middle East area studies. In a very real sense its major theme is of concern to all social scientists, but it is of particular interest to those who would encourage contacts between Political Science and Philosophy and between the study of cultural history and the study of political development.

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Elezioni e comportamento politico in Italia. EDITED BY ALBERTO SPREAFICO AND JOSEPH LA PALOMBARA. (Cremona: Edizioni di Comunità, 1963. Pp. xlvi, 1,000. L. 8,000.)

This gargantuan compilation will disappoint those who expect it to be a systematic treatment of "elections and political behavior in Italy." Strung out along its thousand pages are essays and monographs by twenty-one authors; the only connecting thread between the various pieces is a common concern with the Italian elections of 1958 and 1960, and this bond proves too light to give the work more than an outward semblance of unity. This chaotic state of affairs is defended by the editors in the name of a happy eclecticism; a diversity of "approaches" is supposed to enhance our understanding of recent Italian politics more than a single methodological orientation possibly could. This view, as debatable as it is fashionable, could be accepted for the purposes at hand if the various contributions were of a reasonable intellectual parity and did in fact represent clearly conceived "approaches." As it stands, it can only be wished that more discrimination had been employed in the acceptance of articles and a firmer editorial hand been exercised in reducing the bulk of those which deserved to be accepted.

Many of the articles add little to our knowledge of Italian politics that could not be gained from an intelligent reading of electoral propaganda and the press. Others, although quite limited and in some instances narrowly technical in nature, do make a contribution to political science. In the latter category are included the pieces by Giovanni Schepis, Federico Mohrhoff, Stefano Passigli, Joseph La Palombara, Achille Ardigò, Alberto Spreafico, and Paolo Ammassari. Schepis presents a detailed statistical analysis of the electoral returns of 1958 and 1960; embedded in the exposition is a particularly useful discussion of the workings of the Italian system of proportional representation and preferential voting. Mohrhoff deals in a rigidly limited fashion with the circulation of elites within parliament. Passigli contributes a useful and judiciously written bibliographical essay on Italian "electoral sociology." La Palombara has included his brief study (previously published in English) of the political orientation of Italian youth.

Ardigò, Spreafico, and Ammassari reflect, in different ways, the influence of a more rigorously "behavorial" approach to voting studies; they are familiar with the extensive American literature that has accumulated, particularly in recent years. Ardigò's monograph is an exercise in "micro-analysis"; employing the "ecological method," he devises an electoral map for the city of Bologna. Spreafico and Ammassari, in separate studies, analyze the implications of a survey conducted by the political science faculty at the University of Florence which attempts to relate attitudes of apathy and political alienation to such variables as age, sex, educational level, and party identification.

The most significant contribution to the volume is the monograph by Mattei Dogan on "The Social Stratification of the Vote" (pp. 407–474). Dogan combines an intelligent use of available statistics with shrewd hunches derived from his own acute observation of Italian politics to produce a fascinating study of the degree of support obtained by the major political formations from the various social strata. He displays a becoming modesty about the fallibility of his statistical information, indicating a refreshing willingness to heed Aristotle's injunction that it is not the mark of an educated man to seek greater precision than the subject-matter inherently affords. Dogan documents such important political facts as the gradual de-proletarianization of the Communist party, the inter-class composition of Christian Democracy and its significantly disproportionate strength among land-owning peasants, the predominantly lower middle-class support of the extreme right, and the comparatively high educational and professional level of Liberal party adherents.

The general impression which one retains after reading this massive tome is that the crucial substantive problems facing the Italian polity remain either outside its scope or are analyzed in an inadequate manner. There is a stark contrast between the solemn declaration of Giuseppe Maranini in the preface that "Italian democracy is dangerously ill" and the relatively trivial preoccupations of the majority of the essays that follow. The irrelevance of much that today passes for political or social science is scarcely a distinctively Italian problem, however. Indeed, as Messrs. Storing, Berns, Strauss, *et al.* have informed us quite recently, this gap between science and significance is also a problem for American political studies.

Where, one is led to ask, are the successors of Gaetano Mosca and Guido Dorso in Italian political science today? We have need to hear from them, especially while so many others whose business it might be to articulate the principles and structures of right order in politics, are, to revert again to Leo Strauss, fiddling while Rome burns.

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Africa in the United Nations. BY THOMAS HOVET, JR. (Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1963. Pp. xii, 336. $8.50.)

The United Nations Reconsidered. EDITED BY RAYMOND A. MOORE, JR. (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1963. Pp. xii, 158. $3.00, cloth. $1.00, paper.)

When in the fall of 1960 the U. N. General Assembly passed the Declaration on Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the worst fears of many Europeans and some Americans were confirmed: with the bit in their teeth, the Afro-Asian states had surely taken over. The bitter controversy over the Congo signalled to many that their comfortable picture of the 55 or 60 member United Nations of predominantly white European influence, indeed the whole image of the European diplomatic tradition created and confirmed in the 19th century, was finally made obsolete.

This conclusion is, to say the least, premature. But revised assessments of the United

Nations are timely, and new data to check the more extravagant hypotheses more than welcome. Professor Hovet's new work and, in more limited ways, the collection of readings edited by Professor Moore, should contribute to this end.

Thomas Hovet has innovated in the international organization field in his analysis of the formation and operation of U. N. blocs. His *Bloc Politics in the United Nations* developed a unique and useful methodology of analysis, and this he carries over here with a focus on Africa.

The centerpiece of his approach is what he calls the eleven "caucusing groups" plus the only real "caucusing bloc"—the Soviet group (some of the African consultative patterns may already be changing in the aftermath of 1963's Addis Ababa Conference). He traces the spectacular rise of the African role in the United Nations from the days of the League when "Africa had no identity, no purpose, no hope," through the creation of the U. N. in which Liberia and Ethiopia were the only original Black African members, the turning point of the Bandung Conference which gave the Asian and African countries a vision of their political future, and the 1958 Accra Conference which, in the author's words, "not only marked the emergence of an African voice and personality in international diplomacy, but established a role for Africa in the United Nations." Between those two conferences six African States were admitted, in the next two years sixteen, and since then a dozen—all since 1955.

The Accra Conference set up a permanent body in New York consisting of the permanent U. N. representatives to carry out the agreed collaboration. This is an important illustration of a growing use of permanent representatives to the U. N. for non-U. N. business; as Hovet points out, many new African states would find it financially burdensome to maintain embassies in all the other African capitals.

Some of the data are highly provocative. After the African caucusing group was formed in the 13th General Assembly, for example, the percentage of identical votes among the African states in the U. N. decreased from 52% to 37% while the percentage of divided votes increased from 16 to 41%. Even more interesting is the decline of support within the larger group for the Casablanca states. Since 1958 a majority of African members have voted identically with the United States on 36.8% of Hovet's adjusted number of roll call votes, and divided with us on 37.9%. *Both* of these figures are rising. The majority have voted identically with the Soviet Union during the same period on 66.4% of those issues and have differed on 16.3%. Of course a flexible Soviet Union, not particularly concerned with consistency or commitment, has associated itself freely with the issues in which Africans consider their vital interests to be at stake. But where the Africans were opposed to the United States, in most instances the United States opposed the African position rather than vice-versa.

The other side of the coin is the domination of the United Nations agenda by African concerns. The protagonists are not always well informed; they are often inconsistent; and they are sometimes unreasonable by Western lights. In their lights, however, there are many sins of omission and commission for which the white Western European community must atone. South Africa could combine those elements into an apocalyptic stew, and one wishes that Professor Hovet had allowed his mind to stretch out over those possibilities.

It is also legitimate to pick some nits where literary barbarisms flaw the interesting material. The book could have profited from a deeper analysis from African sources of the situation both there and in New York. However, the book which Mr. Hovet *has* written is both useful and timely, and it will be widely drawn upon.

Mr. Moore's compilation can be more briefly dealt with. It is a selection of published "reassessments" of the United Nations by those who, he says, regard themselves as U. N. supporters (one wonders about this description of General DeGaulle), but who have aired critical views in recent times. Everyone is entitled to make his own compilation, and this reviewer admits that he might have done it differently. It is surprising that Mr. Moore considers the needful background to be supplied only by one piece by Hamilton Fish Armstrong and one by two U. S. senators. One would have thought that John Foster Dulles and Dean Rusk would have been more meaningful and relevant sources. In his section on foreign views he quotes from only the U. K. and France. Such a man as Paul Henri Spaak in many ways would have been more interesting, if only on Congreve's principle of "love to hatred turned." If critical views were not to be limited to Americans, the Soviets are the only ones to have been in a real minority over the years, and the Afro-Asians surely are, in their fevered impatience, more frustrated than anyone else with the organization.

More serious is the editor's own view of things. He lumps what he calls the Congo "imbroglio" with Goa and Hungary as cautionary examples of U. N. failures. He is, of course, characterizing a body of criticism that tends to lump conveniently together all displeasure into a single grand pejorative. Nonetheless, his role as our guide through this miscellaneous collection of criticism might have been better served if he had pointed out that these examples are hardly comparable. Goa was an act of aggression which the Soviets abetted by their veto and the Afro-Asians closed their eyes to, and Hungary was a bloody re-establishment of imperial controls to which the U. N. made no effective riposte because the United States would make none. It is difficult to see any resemblance, political or moral, to the constitutionally appropriate U. N. decision to intervene at the request of the Congolese Government. The only common denominator is that they are episodes which singly or collectively annoy some critics of the U. N., often for very good reasons.

Professor Moore correctly focuses on the crucial points of shifting power from the Security Council, the "escalating membership," "fuzzy and irresponsible resolutions" and—somewhat more controversially—violations of domestic jurisdiction. But not all of his critics share his balance or learning. Senator Dodd, in complaining that the United Nations cannot save any country from Communist subversion, not only places an unwarranted burden on the other side of the argument but is incorrect in his facts. The U. N. did have a hand in so saving Greece; and both Senator Dodd and Professor Moore could profitably look into the high significance in the Cold War of the action of the U. N. in closing down the Congolese air fields when Soviet planes began arriving with agents from Moscow.

The real issue is whether the West is ever to settle on a view of the United Nations reflecting neither sentimental utopianism of its uncritical worshippers nor the often destructive and generally ill-informed invective of its detractors. Westerners are often no different from Easterners or Southerners in wishing to use the United Nations as a pointed instrument of national policy but objecting to the same use by others. It is difficult if not impossible to have it both ways, and the U. N. turns out to be not very usable for such things as it *can* helpfully perform if it is seen chiefly as an instrument of political warfare. We are left with the policy question of what values there *are* in it for the United States, and how can they be maximized.

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BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY

Jurimetrics. Edited by Hans W. Baade. (Durham, North Carolina: 1963. Pp. 270. *Law and Contemporary Problems*, Vol. 28, no. 1. $2.50.)

"Jurimetrics" is a term coined by law professor Lee Loevinger some years ago to distinguish scientific inquiry into legal problems from studies in jurisprudence concerned with normative theory. Whatever the merits of Loevinger's neologism, one is hard pressed to see how some of the ten articles in this symposium can be seriously said to deal with scientific inquiry—unless any treatment of computers or of symbolic logic is *ipso facto* entitled to be so regarded.

Two of the articles, one by Loevinger and the other by William B. Eldridge of the American Bar Foundation and Sally F. Dennis, an IBM systems engineer, are largely concerned with various systems for the storage and retrieval of legal documents and their contents. A third article by Professor Layman Allen and Miss Mary Ellen Caldwell, both of the Yale Law School and the periodical *M.U.L.L.*, presents neat illustrations of how symbolic logic can be used to analyze possible interpretations of ambiguous legal language. They take great pains, one should add, to demonstrate their awareness that the interpretation of legal language is only one aspect of judicial decision-making.

Even a quick perusal of the sole essay by a foreign author, Dr. Djangir A. Kerimov of Leningrad University, will reveal that just beneath the superstructure of his ideological verbiage are interests in computer applications highly similar to those of the American jurimetricians.

If one is prepared to hypothesize that the decisions of courts in given areas such as constitutional right to counsel are based solely upon various combinations of relevant facts, then one may use symbolic logic, as patent attorney Reed Lawlor has done, to predict how these courts will decide cases containing combinations of those relevant facts. Political scientist Fred Kort describes Lawlor's method and compares it with the factor analytic model he has developed for handling similar problems. As Kort quite rightly points out in answer to some of his critics, the models he and Lawlor have been using do not commit them to the position that judicial behavior is always consistent and predictable. The extent to which the models are useful for predicting the behavior of any court in any given area is a matter for inquiry.

Duke economist Joseph J. Spengler is concerned about a possible development which goes far beyond anything envisioned by Allen, Kerimov, or Kort. In a highly theoretical piece, Spengler contends that if computers are utilized by adjudicators for defining and administering justice, undesirable consequences may well result. The complex problems of justice, he argues, are not well suited for computer simulation or solution because the programs would have to be written in accordance with conceptual structures that are too simple and rigid.

Contributions by Professors Glendon Schubert and S. Sidney Ulmer shift the emphasis from legal decisions to the persons who make them. After a perceptive introduction in which he contrasts the uses of prediction in scientific inquiry with those of prediction based upon intuition, inside knowledge, and experience, Schubert describes the by now well-known psychometric model he has been using, and applies it to the 1961 term of the United States Supreme Court. He concludes his long essay with what this reviewer considers a largely premature and ill-advised series of predictions about the 1962 term of the Court (which was just getting under way at the time Schubert's essay was written).

Professor Ulmer sets himself two rather diverse tasks. First, he seeks to show that enough stability in judicial behavior has already been demonstrated to justify continued exploration with a variety of quantitative techniques for predictive purposes. In the second place, Ulmer considers the relationship between the correctness of collegial decisions and the number of adjudicators involved.

One of the more exceptional articles in the symposium is law professor Reed Dickerson's penetrating analysis of the fear, anger, and hostility many lawyers show toward computers, modern logic, and other contemporary tools. Professor Walter Berns, in a sometimes impassioned essay directed to his fellow political scientists, displays elements of the hostility that Dickerson so well dissects. This is not to suggest that Berns does not score some telling points when he raises questions about the technical adequacy, replicability, and substantive merit of particular studies. But basically his argument seems to be that the only questions worth asking concern the good, the noble, and the just. Since behavioral science is ill-equipped to deal with these matters, it has, Berns feels, very little to offer to the study of law and the judicial process.—Joseph Tanenhaus, *New York University*.

A Strategy of Decision: Policy Evaluation as a Social Process. By David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom. (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963. Pp. ix, 268. $5.95.)

Many political scientists (as well as others) are still plodding along with the idea that to be "rational" in choice-making means to specify in advance the goal or goals to be achieved, consider all of the possible alternative means of achieving those goals, consider all of the possible consequences of pursuing each alternative, calculate the likelihood that each alternative will in fact get you to the goal or goals, and then, with an as yet unspecified calculus, choose one alternative (or policy) among all those considered. In extremely simplified form, this strategy urges the policy-maker to choose the most "efficient" means to get to a goal.

Some people have evidenced a suspicion about this process of rationality (e.g., Cyert, March, Simon) as being not only difficult, but impossible, and several refinements have been offered to make the ideal more realistic, such as "satisficing" rather than "maximizing" in choosing among alternatives. Lindblom, consistent with many of his earlier fine writings, takes us two steps further. Not only is the above "rational strategy" impossible and hence not a description of the policy-making process, it is also a *worthless ideal*. This decision-making method does not adapt itself to: "1. man's limited intellectual capacities, 2. his limited knowledge, 3. the costliness of analysis, 4. the analyst's inevitable failure to construct a complete rational-deductive system or welfare function, 5. interdependencies between fact and value, 6. the openness of the systems to be analyzed, 7. the analyst's need for strategic sequences to guide analysis and evaluation, and 8. the diversity of forms in which policy problems actually arise" (p. 113).

Lindblom, however, does not rest content to demonstrate the validity of each of these points. He constructs an alternative decision-making ideal, called "disjointed incrementalism," which he then demonstrates does adapt to the eight points previously mentioned. The upshot of the first six chapters of the book is to present us with a way of making policy choices which does not presume that we must know everything before we can make a choice. In fact, thinking that we have to follow the "rational strategy" will get us into more problems than it really solves. Rather, disjointed incrementalism as a strategy for decision offers an alternative which provides for "incremental, restricted (both with respect to variety of alternatives and to variety of consequences for each alternative), means-oriented (in a number of complex senses), reconstructive, serial, remedial, and fragmented" decision-making (pp. 112–113). It is offered, not only as a more practical guide to the actual making of decisions, but as a more ideal set of prescriptions of how to make decisions.

In very simplified form, Lindblom's ideal suggests that most changes in policy are prompted by something that goes wrong with a particular part of a previous imperfect policy and that decision-makers attempt to adjust to the new situation by making small changes in which only a limited number of values and alternatives are considered. The means to be employed are just as important as the goals in determining alternative policies. Finally, this process of incremental changes in policy is a continuous one as new problems arise in adapting policy to constantly changing circumstances. In one fell swoop, then, Lindblom has given us a new definition of what it means to be rational, a set of directives consistent with the definition, and a justification for this process of decision-making.

Braybrooke takes over where Lindblom left off and in the next four chapters we learn how the strategy of disjointed incrementalism may be used to solve some ethical problems. More particularly, we learn how disjointed incrementalism helps solve the Utilitarian dilemma of developing a calculus to measure "pleasure-pain" so that Utilitarianism as an ethical theory might also have some relevance to real people in real situations. Braybrooke suggests that the strategy of disjointed incrementalism may be used for just such a purpose and that in fact it provides a method by which Utilitarianism may be rehabilitated. If there are any Utilitarians left (and certainly most supporters of democratic theory are at least in part Utilitarians), or if there are any who are dissatisfied with alternative ethical systems (which probably includes most of us), this argument will certainly prove of considerable interest.

What is perhaps just as intriguing as what Braybrooke and Lindblom did do is what others might do using the strategy of disjointed incrementalism they describe. One of the problems which runs through the book, for example, is whether disjointed incrementalism is a set of prescriptive statements of how we should make decisions, a set of descriptive statements of how some people in fact do make decisions, or both. As Lindblom, the empirical theorist, and Braybrooke, the philosopher, try to suggest, it is really both.

Several jobs, then, remain to be done. Do decision-makers actually behave in a disjointed-incremental fashion? What are the conditions under which they do or don't? In other words, is this a theory which explains the decision-making process, or part of it, or some decision-making processes rather than others? Braybrooke and Lindblom attempt, in an introductory fashion, to solve this problem by limiting the conditions under which the strategy of disjointed incrementalism is applicable. This, in fact, is one of the attractions, and at the same time one of the weaknesses, of the book. There is no pretense, here, that this is a general theory applicable to all decision-making situations. In fact, in their scheme of things it is only applicable in one of four possible situations. Disjointed incrementalism is not applicable, for example, to revolutionary and utopian decisions, some administrative and technical decisions, and wars, revolutions, and grand opportunities. What is needed, of course, is a much more rigorous specification of the conditions under which decisions will be made in one way rather than another.

Another interesting tack would be to link up the strategy of disjointed incrementalism with other recent theories of decision-making, such as March and Simon's, Cyert and March's, Dahl's, and the group theorists'. Cyert, March, and Simon, for example, have been pursuing a similar kind of theory in the area of organization theory and they, too, conclude that much of decision-making is incremental and serial, and that means and ends are interrelated. Dahl, a previous collaborator with Lindblom, has advanced democratic theory several steps in a direction away from the rational, majority-rule model and towards a more complicated and rich minorities-rule system which fits in very nicely with Braybrooke and Lindblom.

The relevance of Braybrooke and Lindblom's disjointed incrementalism is immediately apparent in a number of governmental contexts, including congressional decision-making, organizational decision-making, and several others. There is really so much more to be done using the nicely articulated guidelines set out by Braybrooke and Lindblom that as good as the book is, it is a perfect illustration of how good books often raise as many interesting questions for research as they answer.—LEWIS A. FROMAN, JR. *University of Wisconsin.*

Explanation in Social Science. BY ROBERT BROWN. (Chicago: Aldine, 1963. Pp. viii, 198. $5.00.)

This book is a most effective defense of the notion of a social science for it considers with sympathy and in detail most of the conventional denunciations of the social scientific enterprise and yet concludes that there is a hope (as yet mostly unrealized except in economics) for a social science not fundamentally different from physical science.

The argument of the author depends on an initial distinction between description and explanation, a distinction which is elaborately developed in the first forty pages. Since the author identifies description with history and explanation with science, the distinction permits him to ask whether or not social science is more than descriptive, whether or not it explains. His survey of description and observation (which are not very successfully distinguished) concludes that, while so-called social scientists do much work that is totally descriptive (e.g., "the natural history of society"), still this rubric is insufficient to encompass all social science.

Brown then distinguishes the following types of explanation: (1) genetic explanations, or the outline of a temporal sequence of events, which (as history) are excluded from lawlike explanations but which in the very end are given a minor role in relating theoretical explanations to reality; (2) explanations by intentions or stated goals; (3) explanations by dispositions to follow rules (i.e. institutions); (4) explanations by reasons; (5) explanations by functions; (6) empirical generalizations; and (7) theories.

According to Brown, the second, third, and fourth types are seldom used by any kind of scientist (social or physical); the fifth, while used, is primitive; the sixth, while commonly identified as scientific, is in fact no more than wisdom; and only the seventh kind of explanation (i.e., theory) is true science. The question of whether or not social science exists therefore reduces, for Brown, to the question of whether or not there is theory in the social sciences.

Undoubtedly, as he points out, there is empirical generalization, i.e. laws obtained as verified empirical hypotheses from observation and experiment (what Mill called induction and what Russell called guessing). But are there, Brown inquires, social scientific laws obtained by deduction from theories or "by deduction combined with transliteration into the vocabulary of experimental works?"

To answer this question, one must first define the essential qualities of a theory. On this point Brown offers several interesting suggestions (which are, unfortunately, crammed into a long last chapter): (1) Negatively, it is clear, he argues, that bulky systems of classification (e.g. that of Talcott Parsons) do not constitute theory for they do not admit the deduction of law-like explanations. (2) While a calculus is, he argues, probably fundamental to any theory, still a calculus which is no more than a formalization of an existing empirical generalization does not by the mere fact of formalization achieve the status of a theory. (Here Brown instances Simon's formalization of Homans' scheme of interaction.) (3) Must a theory, Brown asks, lead to the assertion of the existence of ultimate unobservable entities (like the particles of physics) in order to terminate a series of 'why' questions? This question in turn partially resolves into the question of whether or not idealizations are present in social science theory. Brown's answer is that some genuine and some spurious idealizations are present. Spurious idealizations are "extreme types," such as those Max Weber and numerous sociologists and anthropologists (e.g. Robert Redfield) used to build what are clearly systems of classification. But Brown finds that genuine idealizations (such as "economic man") do in fact exist in social science. He then concludes that, given the existence of theoretical hypotheses, formality, and idealization, unobservable entities are not absolutely necessary for the formulation of theory and that therefore a social science can and does exist, though without conspicuous success.

Political scientists, who are scholars in search of a discipline, have in recent years been desperate for theory. Most of us have had relatively little instruction in the philosophy of the scientific method and hence we have often been naive in looking for guidance. This book, by a philosopher originally trained in anthropology, can offer us some help. At least we can learn the following things from it: (1) It is useless to imitate sociology or anthropology or social psychology for they are as undisciplined, as lacking in theory, as we are. (2) The crucial feature of idealization is whether or not it leads to ideal types that can be imagined to interact in the ideal world. If one can infer non-obvious and law-like generalizations from the imagined interactions, then one has achieved a theoretical explanation. What is wrong with the models of sociology and allied fields is that their descriptive idealizations admit only of classification, not of inference. (3) Economics is the one social science in which extensive and successful use has been made of idealizations. Hence, the most obvious strategy for political scientists in their discipline-building is to imitate and draw on economics. (4) Aside from economics, political scientists may find inspiration in the following fields: servo-mechanism theory, learning theory, communications theory, game theory, and, I would add, linguistic theory.—WILLIAM H. RIKER, *University of Rochester*.

Human Nature in Politics: The Dynamics of Political Behavior. BY JAMES C. DAVIES. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1963. Pp. ix, 403. $7.50.)

Some book reviews are plain dull, usually regurgitating an author's own summary or conclusions; others are unduly enthusiastic, usually reading more into a book than is there; still others are condescending, usually telling the audience what the reviewer would have done if he had written the book himself. I have sent in my share of any of these, and I shall probably continue to do so. But sometimes a book comes along that defies categorical treatment. It's the kind of book that is, above all, a very personal book—a book in which the author seeks to communicate a point of view that makes his book, in a very real sense, a "personal document." We readily recognize this when the book is a novel, or perhaps when it is an essay. But when it is a "scientific" book, we refuse to deal with it as a personal document. Yet, a seminal book is invariably personal. I think a letter to the author will capture more appropriately than any other form what I may have to say about *Human Nature in Politics*.

"Dear Jim:

You know how very much I have been looking forward to your book. I remember—it must have been about twelve years ago—when you first told me about what you were trying to do. And we have talked about it since. I didn't quite believe that you would ever pull it off. But here it is—you have finished a job which, it always seemed to me, was too stupendous to contemplate. And now, that I have read the book, I wish it had come out sooner. If it had, it would have been even more of a bombshell than it is now. After all, you present an argument that, at least some years ago, seemed to have become rather obsolete. Today this is no longer the case. So much has happened in the last dozen years, in our own field and in the behavioral sciences generally! I don't think that anyone will disagree with your position that political behavior, like all human behavior, is rooted in man's organic needs as these interact with situation and environment. Perhaps most of our immediate colleagues do not as yet know it, but there is an enormous interest again in all primates and their behavior and in the relevance of primate behavior to the study of 'human nature.'

Only those who are ignorant would controvert, therefore, your central point that, in studying political behavior, we should return to human nature as the point of departure. And, if nothing else, I think your book will do much good in sensitizing us to what should be pretty fundamental concerns. It has always seemed to me, and your book confirms it, that what I would call the 'great deviation' in the study of politics occurred when human nature was left out of its equations. Graham Wallas was the first to call our attention to what had been lost in the decades after John Stuart Mill, but his call for the study of human nature in politics was largely ignored for more decades to follow.

Why did it happen? Why was it that the human component, so clearly discernible in Hobbes and Hume, in Rousseau and Marx, in Locke and Mill, was lost in the study of man and his works? The reasons are manifold and complex. Historicism and positivism in nineteenth century thought are obviously involved. But while I would certainly not single out any one factor, it seems to me that, paradoxically, it was the emergence and development of psychology itself that made social science increasingly move away from 'human nature,' as the classical theorists understood it, as Wallas understood it, and as you yourself understand it.

What happened strikes me as paradoxical because, the more psychology became an independent discipline separate from both physiology and ethics, the more tentative and ambiguous did our vision of human nature become. The more we seemed to penetrate the depths of man's psychic constitution, the less we seemed to know about human nature. By way of contrast, the view of human nature, whether 'true' or 'false' does not matter, held by the great political theorists was singularly innocent; and because it was innocent, it could serve as a basis for political speculation and analysis. The writers on politics, from Machiavelli on, could write with such 'authority' precisely because they were unencumbered by the feelings of scientific doubt which, as Max Weber suggested, have so much contributed to our own disenchantment. As you know, psychology itself, after a period of tortured efforts, from Wundt through James and Freud to McDougall, gave up trying to build its constructions on primal intincts or organic needs. And in the other social sciences, including our own discipline, it was much safer to leave human nature out of our conceptions of man in society.

All this is relevant to your own effort. Those of us who followed Charles Merriam's summons for a renaissance in the study of politics, only rarely dared to descend into the jungle of human needs and drives that, we all knew, was there, but that seemed to defy our ingenuity. That you ventured into the jungle, and that you seem to come out of it as well as you do, testifies to your intellectual courage. What will come out of it over the long haul only time can tell, perhaps depending less on what you yourself will be doing in the future and more on the work of others who may follow along the path you have charted.

For, I think you will admit, your book charts a path that is not always straight, not always cleared of the underbrush, and not always lighted by the open sky. To follow this path requires not only much knowledge—of biology and psychology, of anthropology and sociology, of politics as experience and politics as science—but also much vision. But all this, I daresay, is beside the point. The point is that, in redirecting our political vision once more to human nature as you see it rooted in man's organic needs, you have challenged our imagination. There really is no reason for saying more, in this limited space, about your book's rich and stimulating content. Critical commentaries, I am sure, will come in due time.

Yet, I cannot resist saying at least something about your basic position—not because I necessarily disagree with it, but rather because it makes me uncomfortable. I grant you that organic needs are basic to human behavior, in politics as in any other human pursuit. I grant you that the nexus between man's deepest needs and his social behavior constitutes an important area of inquiry. But I feel that I should make two comments. First, it seems to me that one can study a great many facets of social behavior and explain them satisfactorily without having to take recourse to their rootedness in man's basic organic needs, drives or causes. If the linkage can be effected, all the better. But it is surely not an absolute requisite of social science that it seek its explanations in the biological realm. We can explain much that is psychic, social or cultural in man's behavior on the levels of the psychic, social or cultural alone. I doubt that you would deny me this point.

There is a second comment where, I fear, our disagreement would perhaps be more difficult to resolve. In your search for a system of basic needs you review Henry Murray's and settle for Abraham Maslow's. Surely there are other systems—some of them more or less overlapping, others more or less at odds with each other. The very multiplicity of these schemes introduces an element of arbitrariness into the choice of any one of them that has always bothered me. Your own exclusion from Maslow's system of 'safety' or 'security' as needs of not the 'same order' as physical, social or equality needs seems to illustrate this arbitrariness—with strange results. Those needs which you accept from Maslow as basic—physical needs (water, food, sex, etc.), social needs (love, affection, belongingness, etc.), self-esteem needs (which you call the 'need for equality'), and the need for self-actualization—inevitably lead you to an ideological stance that one can vaguely call 'liberal.' But has not the 'need for security' been considered basic by all those who have invoked it to justify more conservative forms of political organization, such as paternalism, authoritarianism or even totalitarianism of one color or another? Is security not a crying need in our own age of personal and communal instability and dislocation?

Human needs, it seems to me, change with changes in environmental conditions and requirements. This, of course, is your position also. But it is for just this reason that I am wondering what thinking in terms of 'basic' needs contributes to our understanding of social behavior. 'Basic,' it seems to me, is a concept one can only use with the greatest caution. It threatens to lead us to a possible rigidity in our thinking that an empirical science of political behavior can ill afford. Needs, I believe, are more in the nature of behavioral postulates than of proofs. If they are only postulates, insisting on one set of needs as more basic than another does not get us very far, for it leads to a debate over what is basic and what is not that strikes me as rather futile. It seems to me, therefore, that what we may wish to designate as a need should always be a function of the particular problem to which we address ourselves in research. A universal claim for one system of needs as against another is not likely to advance empirical knowledge. At most, then, the needs we postulate are working assumptions or heuristic devices, and no more. I assume that you view your own work in this limited sense of needs as postulates rather than universals. If you do not, our disagreement is 'basic' indeed.

With best wishes for the success of your book."
—Heinz Eulau, *Stanford University.*

The Pure Theory of Politics. By Bertrand de Jouvenel. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963. Pp. xiii, 221. $6.00.)

The title of Bertrand de Jouvenel's book, *The Pure Theory of Politics,* is misleading. It is neither a quantitative study nor based on quantitative studies, nor is it a piece of "theory-construction" such as one would get in the natural sciences whereby artificial terms are coined and systematically related so as to explain the greatest number of empirical facts with the fewest number of assumptions. It does not, therefore, belong to the behavioralist faction of political science.

On the other hand, the book does not fit snugly in the rival traditionalist camp either. It champions no particular point of view, be it liberal, socialist, or conservative. It belongs to no particular school, be it psychological, sociological, or historical.

What Jouvenel has given us is a rich, stimulating, and penetrating study which is drawn from the many fields in which he is at home and written in a beautiful and polished literary style. By the term "political" Jouvenel means decisions involving conflicts about problems which admit of settlement but not of solution. To keep the study "pure" he excludes elements which do not fit with his use of the term. Thus, he distinguishes judicial decisions which look to the past from political decisions which look to the future. He also excludes principles except insofar as they influence the people who are making the decisions.

Can the realm of the political conceived in this manner be reduced to a science? Jouvenel thinks that it can, though he admits that little progress has been made. The reason for this lack of progress is not that "the masters of the past were incapable" of developing a truly scientific theory of politics but that "they must have been unwilling." In astronomy or chemistry and even in economics, "ethical neutrality" is made possible by "teleological optimism." In politics, however, we have good reason not to be optimistic either about our discoveries about ourselves or about the uses to which our discoveries will probably be put. It is thus that Jouvenel accounts for the unwillingness of the masters of the past.

Nevertheless, Jouvenel undertakes this task from which the old masters shrank and offers new or re-vamped concepts, usually in pairs, such as instigation and response, configuration and consequence, ego and otherdom, Authorities and authorities, attention and intention. It seems doubtful that a natural science of politics can be constructed with the assistance of the tools which Jouvenel offers us, but he has given us a wealth of ideas and insights as well as tools which will be helpful in analyzing any political situation.—Rene de Visme Williamson, *Louisiana State University.*

Philosophy, Politics, and Society: Second Series. Peter Laslett and W. G. Runciman, editors. (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1962 Pp. x, 229. $5.00.)

Political science, perhaps because it is largely organized around a subject matter rather than a method of inquiry, tends somewhat more than other disciplines to borrow and adapt modes of approach from related areas of intellectual inquiry. Very often, it seems fair to say, this borrowing and adapting occurs a decade or two after the breakthrough is made in the related discipline. Sometimes this lag may result in a more sophisticated use of the new method, but it may very well result in attention to outmoded ideas. Nowhere is the latter more true than in the impact of recent analytic philosophy on American political science.

Logical positivism, vintage of 1936, is considered the very definition of analytic philosophy by a good many teachers of political theory (who, of course, tend very much to disapprove) and, as well, by empirically oriented political scientists (who seek arcane support for their own dispositions). But analytic philosophy has changed a great deal since 1936 and no one, save a few refugees from the Vienna circle, is a logical positivist anymore. The second series of *Philosophy, Politics, and Society* edited by Peter Laslett of Trinity College, Cambridge together this time with W. G. Runciman, also of Trinity, helps to remedy this situation.

Laslett and Runciman seek quite explicitly to point up what they call the change in philosophical mood which has occurred in recent years. Analytic philosophy has since the war turned its attention successively to ethics, law, and now the beginnings of a turn toward politics can be discerned. The present collection includes a number of articles which illustrate this point—"Does Political Theory still Exist?" by Isaiah Berlin, "A Paradox in the Theory of Democracy" by Richard Wollheim, "The Idea of Equality" by Bernard Williams, and "Justice as Fairness", by John Rawls all are suggestive of a new and significant relationship between philosophy and politics.

The editors try also to illustrate the relevance of contemporary sociology to the traditional problems of political theory, particularly in articles by Runciman, Ralf Dahrendorf, and Reinhard Bendix. Dahrendorf's "On the Origin of Inequality" in conjunction with Williams on equality illustrate very nicely the way in which sociology and philosophy can complement each other and have a good deal to say about this central political question as well. Also included in the volume are "Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment" by H. L. A. Hart and "The History of Political Thought: A Methodological Enquiry" by J. G. A. Pocock.

Any collection of essays, of course, provides ample opportunity for quarrels and quibbles. I, for example, have reasons for thinking that Wollheim's paradox in the theory of democracy is a pseudo-paradox, but the collection is, on the whole, quite a good one and deserves the attention of all interested in political theory. We can hope, moreover, for a third volume of *Philosophy, Politics, and Society* which can illustrate the advance in political theory which Laslett and Runciman predict.—T. L. THORSON, *University of Wisconsin.*

The Future of Political Science. BY HAROLD D. LASSWELL. (New York: Atherton Press, Pp. 256. 1963.)

This book has been published under the auspices of the American Political Science Association. Its length is 256 pages, which include footnotes and an index. It is divided into eleven chapters. It mentions gibbons, dolphins, astronomy, Zen, chemistry and astro-politics, among other things. While doing so, it introduces the field of Political Science into the tasks of the 20th Century.

The book is a blueprint for political science by a knowledgeable and distinguished social scientist. In it, political scientists are asked to provide enlightenment in the area of decision-making within the political process. Such enlightenment must be based on precise data, of which the type, methods of gathering and interpretation are outlined. In it are planned strategies and manipulative techniques to test and integrate the body of contemporary knowledge in order to further the understanding of politics. But the author's concerns go further than data and reliability of inferences. He wants creativity from political scientists. To him they are not merely recorders of human events, but also map-makers of the unexplored and testers of the unknown in the quest for causal relationships. It is this kind of political scientist who, with creativity of mind and competent training, may be useful in maintaining the freedom and dignity of man in the approaching time of astro-politics.

There are some very penetrating, if not embarrassing, questions asked. For example: "How does a graduate department sustain the creativity of professors and students?" "Does the department provide scientific bases for inferences or not?" "What is being done about partial obsolescence of each department?" There is an implied call here for the necessity of a frank, possibly brutal, recognition and, above all, acknowledgment of faculty propensities for self-deception.

Professor Lasswell does not seem to imply that there is a correlation between obsolescence and age. (Parenthetically, on many occasions I have seen young Ph.D.'s who, because of their personality dynamics and limitations of training given to them, were "obsolete" even before they entered the profession.)

While on the subject of creativity the author takes a critical look at the norms and standards of behavior in the political science fraternity. Also, among the problems discussed are "teaching versus research," code of professional conduct and socialization within the profession. In this connection I quote directly Professor Lasswell's diagnostic description of a very common picture of a political science department.

"In many institutions, the department of political science seems highly pedestrian when evaluated in intellectual terms. It is populated by professors who enjoy courses full of descriptive details, semirigorous legalisms, and semidefined affirmations of preference on questions of public policy."

If for nothing else, Professor Lasswell should get an award from the profession for this generous understatement.

What permeates the book is a plea for creativity. . . . It will be, perhaps, a great surprise to many of us that the author does not think universities are the institutions best adapted for the promotion of creativity in studying political phenomena. He is in favor of the establishment of special "Centers for the Advancement of Political Science." The basic reasons for the rejection of universities are these: Modern universities are no longer centers of an intellectual community. The sheer size, physical dispersion, number of faculty and the segmentation into specializations are against existence of such a body.

The purpose of the Centers would be to provide the type of intellectual community with a unity of purpose conducive to study, research and consultation. A prescription in detail follows, including goals, functions and requirements for membership. The stress is on integrative experience and close cooperation with allied fields.

Professor Lasswell suggests very specifically what a political scientist should study. He provides sets of precise operational indexes for such studies. Calling for sensitivity of perceptions to social change, he also asks for concentration on decision-making, particularly on the discernment of goals, trends, conditions, alternatives and at setting up empirically validated projections.

Why such a specific concentration on decision-making? Because the value of "political science" and political scientists to society will be measured in the future by the effectiveness with which they will be able to help society to make rational decisions to solve its problems. Among these problems the author considers the most important to be (1) man-machine relations and, (2) expectancy of violence.

Because "the decision-process" is the primary focus, Professor Lasswell provides a comprehensive and highly structured scheme for the analysis of "an act of decision." He divides such an act into seven specific phases (p. 15). Each of these phases is further refined into six additional subcategories, (p. 47), cutting into "an act of decision" with the incisiveness of a surgical scalpel. What is provided is a comprehensive system of operational indexes for studying the decision-making process. Of particular importance to the profession is the fact that this analytical scheme may be applied with appropriate modifications on three levels of interaction: national, subnational and international.

After delineating areas of inquiry and providing the scheme for their analysis, Professor Lasswell proceeds further. He expects from the profession the output and availability of a specific kind of data; he also expects a specific kind of professional training of personnel.

It is necessary to provide the political scientist with reliable data for inferences. The author calls for establishment of a procedure for systematically storing Basic Data Surveys; he also suggests that the American Political Science Association serve as promoter and coordinator in organizing the storage of the data.

Lasswell does not rest with suggestions as to the availability of data. He proceeds to describe specific techniques for controlled investigation of factor combinations and to appraise the merits and pitfalls of these techniques and possible areas of their application. Among others, these techniques are experimentation, prototyping, intervention and micromodeling.

The author has a set of values and preoccupations which affect his intellectual expectations for himself and the profession. He states them. They are human dignity, social responsibility and "policy and goals of man in the large community context."

These are the fundamental references and conscious concerns when Professor Lasswell designs a role for "political scientists," "politics" and "the future of Political Science."

The role of the political scientist is to provide enlightenment regarding " . . . the prospective role of government in the social process . . . " This is indispensable to the "guarding of freedom." He defines politics as " . . . the largest arena of interaction in which goals are clarified, degrees of achievement are described, conditioning factors are analyzed, future developments are projected, and policy alternatives are invented and evaluated."

"The Future of Political Science" is a powerful beacon thrust into what is literally a foggy field without boundaries.—J. K. Zawodny, *Washington University* (*St. Louis*).

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8. Michigan State University
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10. Emory University
11. University of Saskatchewan
12. Carnegie Institute of Technology
13. University of California at Los Angeles
15. University of Illinois
16. University of Massachusetts
17. General Electric Company, Grotonville, New York
18. University of North Carolina
19. School of Social Sciences, Tampere, Finland
20. University of Buffalo
21. Serendipity Associates, Los Angeles, California
22. Mc Gill University
23. University of Washington
24. University of Delaware
25. University of Michigan
26. Ohio State University
27. Western Behavioral Sciences Institute, La Jolla, California
28. American University of Beirut
29. University of Natal
30. University of Miami
31. Yale University
32. State University of New York at Albany
33. Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
34. Victoria University of Wellington
35. The Merrill-Palmer Institute of Human Development and Family Life, Detroit
36. Harvard University
37. Indiana University
38. University of Pittsburgh
39. University of Wisconsin
41. Columbia University
42. Johns Hopkins University
43. Miami University (Ohio)
44. City College of New York
45. Leeds University, England
46. University of Southern California
47. Università di Roma
49. University of Cambridge, England
50. Connecticut College
51. Louisiana State University
52. University of North Carolina at Greensboro
53. Northwestern University
54. Stanford University
55. Boston University
56. State University of Iowa

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Communities in Action: Pattern and Process. BY SEVERYN T. BRUYN. (New Haven: College and University Press Services, Inc., 1963. Pp. 205, $5.00.)

This is a study of applied social science undertaken in four Illinois communities where sizable portions of the local citizenries were aroused to take action on community problems. In this "field" of community action, two competing models guide programming. One model is that of "community organization" through the creation of a community council, while the second is that of "community development" in which people organize for action through a self-survey (but which apparently may also lead to the creation of a council of organizations in the community). Two communities were chosen representing each basic approach and, within each pair, the communities were also selected to represent both relative success and relative failure.

If this book has an unequivocal and academic purpose, I failed to find it. I am not sure, therefore, that I can be fair in criticizing the book. But let us assume—what the author clearly denies at one point—that the function of research on action programs is to evaluate the effectiveness of such alternative models and programs. If this is the case, and it seems to me the major function of action-oriented research, then the canons of behavioral research approaches ought to govern. The meaning of policy effectiveness ought to be operationalized so that the comparative degree of program-accomplishment may in fact be observed. The probably significant independent variables ought to be spelled out beforehand so that their relative influence on policy effectiveness can be measured and compared. If, for example, size of the social unit is deemed an important determinant of effectiveness (and the author at several points reverts to size of place as an explanatory variable concerning differences in what I interpret as effectiveness), then control of this factor ought to be built deliberately into the research design; it ought not to emerge in a post hoc fashion. Finally, if the all too obvious limits of single case studies—including single case studies haphazardly lumped together into groups of four—are to be avoided, then either ideal-type models or a deliberate sample of communities ought to be employed for comparative yardstick purposes.

All of these elements are lacking here. Consequently, about all that this book establishes—and this quite unintentionally—is the great gap between social activists and political behaviorists today. The activists can claim certain mitigating circumstances on their side: men of good will must indeed act; the quality of life in many American communities is depressed and depressing; and so on. But these are not enough. If universities are to maintain departments of community development for other than public relations purposes, then such programs and research on them ought not to be conducted as if the social sciences did not even exist.—HARRY M. SCOBLE, *University of California, Los Angeles.*

Politics and Conservation: The Decline of the Alaska Salmon. BY RICHARD A. COOLEY. (New York: Harper & Row, 1963. Pp. xxi, 230. $5.00.)

Cooley's doctoral dissertation makes a useful addition to our meager stock of systematic studies of the politics of conservation. His chief contribution is to political science, for he centers attention upon the pressure politics of salmon conservation. His tools of analysis, however, are principally economic and historical.

In his economic analysis, he presents strong evidence that the Alaskan salmon runs are in ruinous decline. He implies that overfishing is the principal cause, but recognizes that the existing evidence is inadequate for firm conclusions. He points to the economic waste inherent in the exploitation of a resource which was managed principally by controls upon the efficiency of the fishing gear rather than by regulation of the numbers and location of fishermen. Most significantly of all, he demonstrates that the steady rise of the market value of the total salmon catch spurred on the canners and fishermen despite a two-thirds decline in the total pack and an even greater decline in the catch per fisherman.

His political analysis is a case study of the formal record of the conflict which led to the enactment of the White Act in 1924 and of the continuing struggle over its administration. Little attention is given to the informal political party and legislative politics related to the struggle or to political and economic movements, such as the unionization of the fishermen, which greatly affected the issue.

Presented chronologically, largely without historical setting or interpretation, the story constitutes a familiar tale of conflicting pressure groups and their relationships with Congress and the executive. Large private interests battle to retain their advantages by keeping the federal administrative agency friendly or impotent. Lack of authority, lack of funds, and occasionally lack of attention from top executive leadership combine to convince the operating bureau that cooperation with the industry is the better part of valor. Disadvantaged groups struggle to change the system by legislation and by administrative innovation, but find that they have decisive influence only in the local areas where they are dominant.

Cooley frequently lets his own sentiments creep into his tale. Essentially he sides with the Alaskan leaders who believe that the benefits of the salmon resource should flow principally to the fishermen of Alaska. The large packers and the "absentee" fishermen from other Pacific coast states become "the canned salmon lobby." (See especially pp. 181–183.) The leaders of the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries and its predecessors are pictured variously as timid bureaucrats, as champions of the canning industry, as graspers for political power, and as the captives of Pacific coast congressmen who serve their own "absentee" constituents. The little fishermen of Alaska and Alaskan leaders, especially Senator Ernest Gruening, are his heroes for they serve Alaskan economic, social, and conservation objectives by fighting to outlaw fish traps and to alter the pattern of commercial development. Alaskan statehood becomes his savior by delivering the resource to the Alaskan people.

Despite his use of values, direct and implied, and his failure to dig behind the formal statements and official positions of the contending parties, Cooley's research is well done and the book is well written. It merits the serious attention of the profession's specialists in the politics and administration of conservation.—DANIEL M. OGDEN, JR. *Resources Program Staff, Office of the Secretary, U. S. Department of the Interior.*

Politics in a Pluralist Democracy: Studies of Voting in the 1960 Election. BY LUCY S. DAWIDOWICZ AND LEON J. GOLDSTEIN. (New York: Institute of Human Relations Press, 1963. Pp. xii, 100. $1.75.)

Is the America of the 1960's more of a "melting pot" for inherited loyalties or a "beef stew" (preserving in recognizable form religious, ethnic, and racial traditions and values)? To what extent can the result of the 1960 presidential election be regarded as turning on the religion of the Democratic candidate? This short study of some aspects of pluralistic politics in the 1960 election offers tentative answers to these questions. It is one in a series of original reports by the American Jewish Committee on intergroup attitudes, problems of prejudice and discrimination, and the status of human rights here and abroad.

The three sections of the book examine voting trends in five multiethnic cities (Boston, Buffalo, Cincinnati, Providence, and Los Angeles), the religious issue in five rural areas (Tennessee, Illinois, Ohio, Louisiana, and Minnesota), and the voting behavior of Jews.

Perhaps more interesting than its conclusion that religion was an important factor in the 1960 vote is the book's analysis of the interplay of religion with economic or class interest, party loyalty, ethnic background and local political conditions. The authors demonstrate that general pronouncements about the behavior of a religious or ethnic group in an election must frequently be qualified. Protestants in Minnesota reacted differently to the religious issue in the 1960 campaign than Protestants in Tennessee. The voting habits of Boston Italians differed noticeably from those of Providence Italians. Negroes in Boston and in rural Tennessee did not respond to Kennedy and the Democratic party in the way that Negroes did elsewhere.

Dawidowicz and Goldstein noted instances where New England Protestants behaved the way ethnic minorities are often thought to do—supporting candidates of their own "Yankee" group.

There is some difficulty in ascribing Kennedy strength in Catholic urban areas. The categories of union membership, Catholicism, and adherence of lower income group to the Democratic party overlap, so that economic and religious factors cannot be readily separated.

Their examination of Jewish voting patterns clarified seemingly aberrant conduct. At the start of the 1950's most Jews were in business, white-collar occupations and the professions—groups which tend to vote Republican; yet no other group in the population—not even trade unionists, Negroes or young people—supported the Democratic party so solidly and consistently.

Another phenomenon which deserves further study is the effect of a third group on two rival groups. The presence or absence of Negroes in considerable numbers affected the way Louisiana white Protestants voted. The presence of a Jewish third group in a suburban Detroit community affected the Catholic and Protestant groups' perception of the 1960 political situation.—MARTIN GRUBERG, *Wisconsin State College (Oshkosh).*

State Sales Tax Administration. BY JOHN F. DUE. (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1963. Pp. xiv, 259. $8.00.)

No illusion concerning taxes is more prevalent than the one that the retail sales tax is simple and easy to administer. Those who think so should read John Due's book—the first authoritative examination of the subject based on extensive field work in 33 states. The book also contains an impressive amount of detailed information concerning the laws and practices in this area and should serve as a manual for draftsman of new sales tax laws or amendments to old ones.

Selecting a few conspicuous notes from a vast array we observe first as to organization and personnel that better than half the states have no (or only partial) merit systems of appointment with widely different degrees of political influence in recruitment and turnover. Salaries are often pitifully inadequate ranging down in several cases to some $200–$300 per month for a starting auditor. Inadequacy of staff in terms of numbers is general, states ranging from 1 auditor in Wyoming to a very large staff in California. The latter state has concluded that an addition of 10 percent in personnel would enable it to reach "the optimum"—a term which is open to several interpretations. In a typical state a moderately small vendor will see an auditor once in thirty years. After surveying recovery statistics the author concludes that "in general the states are losing significant sums of revenue annually in excess of the costs of additional audit personnel." Encouraging fact is the wide and growing use of mechanical equipment.

Delinquent accounts and reporting are a considerable problem. California revokes 10,000 licenses per year and has a 20-percent annual turnover in its accounts.

Most difficult to administer is the use tax, companion piece of the sales tax in most states. Attempts to collect this tax directly from the consumer are fruitless but voluntary acceptance of responsibility by many out-of-state vendors and reciprocal enforcement agreements among states have mitigated the problem.

Laws of states from the standpoint of administrability are reviewed: they encounter such items as deduction of bad debts, trade-ins, repairs, exemption of last-sale production equipment, treatment of services. Both exemptions and inclusions that might be recommended on other grounds may not pass muster in terms of administration. Private accounting typically follows total sales and affords no clue as to the volume of taxable and non-taxable items.

Administrative costs range in the area of 1.5 percent of revenues which is not excessive but compliance costs apparently run much higher. Some scanty (and hardly credible) information places the latter figure at 4 percent of collections (10 percent in the case of grocery stores!). Compensatory allowances ranging from 1 to 5 percent are provided in over half of the states but they represent a poor fit for a wide range of costs.

The author estimates perhaps optimistically that evasion ranges from 1 to 5 percent in the various States depending on the quality of administration. Favorable factors here are the large proportion of business done by large vendors and the fact that that evasion constitutes a clear case of misappropriation of "other people's" money. Nevertheless, says the author, there is substantial room for improvement.—HAROLD M. GROVES, *The University of Wisconsin.*

Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, and Irish of New York City. BY NATHAN GLAZER AND DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN. (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press and Harvard University Press, 1963. Pp. 360. $5.95.)

The major contribution of *Beyond the Melting Pot* is the proposition that if one is to understand the politics of the great metropolis, he had better explore the ethnic composition of its social fabric. Professors Glazer and Moynihan contend that "*the ethnic group in American society became not a survival from the age of mass immigration but a new social form*" (authors' italics). The authors, both having ethnic backgrounds, accomplish with amazing facility the feat of moving in and out of one sub-culture after another, while at the same time making interesting and useful comparisons between and among them. They demonstrate descriptively how social structure influences politics, a fact political scientists choose to ignore at their peril. The ethnic brings to New York politics a divergent set of concepts, values, and styles of life which present special public policy problems and therefore turn the political dialogue to take them into account. In fact, politicians persist in exploiting this ethnicity at the expense of giving serious attention to the public policy issues that are so in need of solution.

The authors examine the significant substantive public problems of housing, education, and employment which confront, trouble, and challenge the local administrators and politicians. They relate these problems to the family, neighborhood, ethnic organizations, and sense of community which are treated as another set of interest groups that must be calculated in the political formulas of the multi-party system. At the same time the authors hint at and stress the development of manifest social class distinctions, especially in the case of the Negro and Puerto Rican who constitute a "submerged, exploited and very possibly permanent proletariat" in Manhattan, which has been characterized as a place of the "haves and have-nots."

Studies of New York City are always subject to discussion of their relevance to what occurs in other parts of the American polity. It is not enough to say, as do these authors, that it is the most important single part of the United States. If the ethnic is a new social form, then New York City may very well be a model for what will happen to most of our other large urban centers, or it may also serve as a useful microcosm of the nation. On this last point the authors should have made more of their material and referred to the controversy engaged in by the "pluralists," Robert Dahl and his colleagues, and those like Floyd Hunter who view American communities as governed by a "power elite." The heterogeneous society based on ethnicity produces a democratic order for the pluralists. However, as urban politics takes on a highly manipulative character, this thesis needs to be reexamined.

This study raised a number of important questions that require the systematic attention of social analysts. Granted New York City has been no melting pot, then to what degree and at what rate of speed has assimilation taken place? What ethnic factors are most durable and least subject to smelting? What are the key variables that account for the entrance, successful arrival, and assimilation of ethnic leadership and political power? Under what conditions can assimilation be accelerated or slowed down? Are the conditions of political anomie, apathy, and alienation more prevalent among the ethnics and what are their causes? What real effect do ethnic groups have on the democratic character of decision-making in the metropolis when they compete for green or purple lines down Fifth Avenue for their ethnic parades? What are the socio-political cost-benefits produced by ethnic diversity?

It is hoped that the two authors, from their present vantage point in the federal agencies (Glazer in housing, Moynihan in employment), will continue to add to our knowledge on ethnicity and its political consequences.—BERT E. SWANSON, *Sarah Lawrence College.*

A Nation of States. Essays on the American Federal System. EDITED BY ROBERT A. GOLDWIN. (Chicago, Rand McNally & Company. 1963. Paperback. Pp. 148.)

For this volume of readings, obviously intended for political science students, the editor has put together five essays by political scientists, one by a newspaper editor, and one by an author-lecturer-columnist. No attempt has been made to harmonize the statements made, or to bring about a consensus.

Professor Morton Grodzins of the University of Chicago leads off with an impressive analysis of the key problem of the book: "Centralization and Decentralization in the American Governmental System." His studies have taken him not only into national, state, and local intergovernmental relations, but also into the influence and activities of political parties and pressure groups in this complicated field. He finds that the picture presented by some states'-rights politicians and visionary decentralists of the national government as a power-hungry, all-devouring monster bent on destroying the state and local governments is a complete caricature of the facts. His analysis of the process of centralization-decentralization in the United States is "must" reading for every student of American government.

The other four articles by political scientists add historical and constitutional dimensions to the Grodzins demonstration. Professor Martin Diamond of Claremont Men's College summarizes "What the Framers Meant by Federalism," and shows clearly that the successful leaders in the Federal Convention of 1787, while drafting the Constitution so as to provide for an effective national government, carefully avoided using any of the misleading "fighting words" like national, federal, or confederate in its text; but later participants in the debate over the nature of the union have not failed to supply them.

Professor Herbert Storing of the University of Chicago writes on "The Problem of Big Government." He evidently has in mind Mr. Russell Kirk's paper, to be mentioned below, and he also goes back to the founding fathers, the Convention Debates, and the Federalist Papers, in order to set the record straight.

"The Case for a Stronger National Government" is presented by Professor Harry V. Jaffa of the Ohio State University from the viewpoint of national security in an insecure world. His argument shows clearly how a government desiring to be strong in defense against potential foreign enemies needs to be strong and active on the home front as well. He quotes with some skepticism from a potential presidential candidate who seems to think that the nation's government should and can be super-strong and hyper-active against all possible foreign enemies, but at the same time be weak and inactive at home.

Professor Walter Berns of Cornell University contributes a paper on "The Meaning of the Tenth Amendment." He makes clear what many states-righters seem to deny that this amendment is only a rule of constitutional construction, and not a denial to the United States government of any power conferred on it, by express words or necessary implication, in any other part of the Constitution.

These five papers do not by any means cover all the issues involved in national-state relations, or in centralization-decentralization under the United States Constitution, but together they provide an excellent, balanced and scholarly introduction to these fields.

As to the other two papers, I think it is well that students should read materials of this nature provided the instructor devotes a little time to a critical discussion of them. Under careful analysis they will be found to be pretty thin and threadbare appeals to old prejudices. Mr. Russell Kirk, the conservative writer, lecturer, and columnist, expatiates on something he calls "The Prospects for Territorial Democracy in America." The phrase "territorial democracy" is borrowed from a writing of Orestes Brownson of about a century ago. Brownson gave the term a fairly clear meaning, but this reviewer is unable to determine what it means to Mr. Kirk, except that he thinks government should be carried on in units smaller than the United States. He evidently assumes that such units will be "democratic." Is it to be a township, village, city, county, or state? And if any thing as large as a state, is it to be a Rhode Island or Texas? A Delaware or California? There is something vague and mystical about the entire approach.

Mr. James Kilpatrick, who contributes "The Case for 'States' Rights",' is editor of the Richmond, Virginia, *News Leader.* He makes it clear that he has no love for political scientists, an ilk that he classifies with "uneducated editors, witless politicians, and other ignorami," although he confesses that he sometimes reads "the learned quarterlies and other leaf-rakings from the academic grove." Typical of his statements is this gem on Congress, which, he says, "offers only a milling gaggle of chiropractors, foot doctors, country clowns, elevated plumbers, and second-rate lawyers."

I will not attempt to summarize his article; it must be read to be appreciated. And after all, he admits at the end that he doesn't mean half of what he says. Indeed, he concludes by saying that "He is urging simply that we cherish a reasoned veneration for established institutions" and pay due respect to "the wisest men the Republic will ever know,"—who are presumably the Founding Fathers, but he doesn't say.—WILLIAM ANDERSON, *University of Minnesota.*

The Historian and the City. EDITED BY OSCAR HANDLIN AND JOHN BURCHARD. (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press and Harvard University Press, 1963, Pp xii, 299. $7.50.)

There was a time, surely not too long ago, when the intellectual product of an academic conference would appear as a group of mimeographed papers, bound or stapled together in primitive fashion, and distributed free of charge or for a nominal $1.00. One might casually leaf through the pages of such a volume and if one or two articles caught one's eye and indeed proved worthy of perusal, the reader was left with a feeling of delight and unanticipated reward. Nowadays things have changed. The product of the same academic conference is a "book," often published by a distinguished University Press, with slick pages, attractive type, and imaginative cover, a sexy title, and a selling price of $7.50. When one still finds only a few really rewarding articles in such a volume he is likely to be left with a feeling of outrage.

In 1961 the Joint Center for Urban Studies and the Harvard University Summer Session convened a conference "that would consider the city in History." This volume is a product of some of the papers delivered at that conference with some additional commentary by some of the participants. The title is a complete misnomer. Of the 22 contributors only nine are historians. The remainder are economists, city planners, and students of architecture and philosophy. Since the conference sought "to bring together historians who had examined some aspect of [the city in history] and men who had dealt with the contemporary city," (p.vi.) the absence of political scientists or urban sociologists seems inexplicable. Even less reasonable is absence of almost any reference to contemporary work by urban sociologists or political scientists. But the ultimate in incomprehensibility is the failure by all but one writer to seriously consider the efforts of the only group of historians today who are attempting to make meaningful generalizations about the city, the Urban History Group.

The volume is divided into eight parts. Part I is an Introduction by Handlin. Part II deals with the City in Technological Innovation and Economic Development. There is a good article here by Shigeto Tsuru. However, his discussion of social cost accounting and the nature of external economies and diseconomies of cities would lend greater cogency to his plea for increasing the economist's role in confronting modern city problems if he had indicated that economists can in fact measure external economies and diseconomies as challenged to do by Richard Meier. Part III is The City in the History of Ideas. This whole section does not seem to make any point although Sylvia Thrupp presents an interesting notion of the city as the idea of social order. For the fourth time in roughly a year I read Morton White telling me that intellectuals don't like the city. Part V is the City as an Artifact. Perhaps the book is, after all, worth its price to read Sir John Summerson say, "'villa' was a catch-penny phrase in the forties," (p. 175) meaning the 1840's, or "the psychological reaction of the English middle classes to pointed arches is a subject altogether too large even for the most summary treatment . . . " (pp. 175–176). Part VI, planners and Interpreters of the City, includes a fine article by Eric Lampard examining underlying movements in community structure and particularly demographic change which is more basic "than the epiphenomenal patterns of politics or the ferment of ideas" (p. 236). I think Lampard is too enamored of what historians can learn from human ecologists although there is surely much useful material there. A more careful reading of contemporary sociological and political literature may save the historians from a number of false starts. The volume concludes with Part VII, which contains some afterthoughts and a Selection of Works Relating to the History of Cities.

This book is a poor addition to the otherwise distinguished series of publications of the Joint Center for Urban Studies.—CHARLES S. LIEBMAN, *Yeshiva University.*

The Social Basis of the Support of a Depression Era Extremist: Father Coughlin. BY GARY TRADE MARX. (Berkeley, California: Survey Research Center, University of California, 1962. Pp. ix, 131. $2.50.)

This study is concerned with political extremism and its possible relation to anti-Semitism particularly as exemplified by Father Coughlin. He was but one of a succession of national demagogues since the Civil War, often spurred by agrarian populist reform, intolerance, parochial jealousy, intellectual inferiority, urban and anti-alien prejudices and "paranoid fear of subversion."

Here is an analysis of the social basis of Coughlin's "extremist right movement." The data are derived from pertinent Gallup Polls involving 5000 respondents and done in April and December, 1938. Coughlin was then the leading fascist, anti-Semite, and Nazi propagandist in the United States. The wildest super-patriots then had nothing over Coughlin. Some Jews and half the Negroes supported Coughlin, the latter as virtually the disinherited.

Considered ethnically Irish-Americans supported Coughlin as one of their own and consequently he was strong among New England urban population. His most intense support came from the poor such as the W.P.A. workers and the unemployed and the poorer the respondent the more intense his loyalty to Coughlin. However, the small farmers' support was no stronger than that of the large-scale farmers.

Fundamentalist Protestants, largely anti-Catholic, were usually indifferent to the movement. But not far behind the Catholics with 42% pro-Coughlin were the Lutherans 29% pro, but this latter adherence was due to the Father's pro-Germanism. Catholics and Lutherans were the only church groups more pro- than anti-Coughlin and the unchurched were just as pro-Coughlin as the churched.

Father Coughlin "was allowed to rant and rave through 3½ years of anti-Semitic, racist, seditious tirades before his church silenced him in 1942." Until then he expressed only personal opinions. His church disavowed him when he became the spokesman of an organized group. When he launched the New Union Party he called President Roosevelt a "liar," and cast his clerical collar to the ground. As his frustrations multiplied he grew more free swinging, attacking "communism," "imported radicals," international Jews and bankers and was praising isolationism, Americanism, Hitler, Mussolini and Franco and his program increasingly resembled the later "McCarthyism."

Sixty tables based on the Gallup Polls are presented to support conclusions and scholars are indebted to the author for the results of his prodigious labor. However, this reviewer felt that the subject was sometimes belabored and repetitious with respect to the data used and conclusions even a bit speculative in spots.—Wilfred E. Binkley, *Ohio Northern University.*

Jurisprudence and Statecraft: The Wisconsin Development Authority and Its Implications. By Samuel Mermin. (Madison: Wisconsin University Press, 1963, Pp. 252, $6.00.)

Because Wisconsin constitutional law prohibited state ownership of public utilities (although not municipal ownership) and required that state funds be spent for state purposes (money must be spent at the level at which it is raised), it was constitutionally impossible for the legislature to create a *state* corporation to promote directly the construction and development of locally owned and operated utilities. In 1937 the Wisconsin legislature undertook to achieve the same result indirectly. A *private* corporation was created to promote rural electrification through utilities owned by municipalities and cooperatives. To this private corporation the legislature appropriated a small sum to be used for research and information. None of the money was to be used for construction, engineering services, or other direct help in the organization of local utilities. The Wisconsin supreme court passed upon the constitutionality of this scheme twice within a period of six months in 1938. A unanimous court first held the statute to be unconstitutional; and then a split court repudiated the ground of the first decision.

In the first decision, the court held that the statute invalidly used a private corporation as an instrumentality for the exercise of governmental functions. Upon re-hearing, however, a majority of the justices decided that the ground of the first decision they had made was wrong, and that there had been no delegation of any governmental function at all. The act of 1937 was a simple appropriation measure—it delegated no power, except to spend the money for the purposes set out in the act. But the majority also held that none of the money appropriated could be spent to promote the acquisition, construction, or other development of particular plants by particular municipalities or cooperatives. It could only be spent for general educational purposes. This limitation vitiated the principal purpose of the scheme.

This book is a discussion of the second case and its implications, and although jurisprudence and statecraft are given equal billing in the title, there is much more on the first than the second of these subjects of speculation. In the manner of much legal writing, there is an approximately even division of space between text and apparatus—one hundred twenty-nine pages of text and one hundred twenty-three pages of appendix material, notes, and index.

The case supplies the occasion for some observations by the author on the judicial process, of which the best part is a knowing discussion of techniques used by judges to achieve freedom from the restraints of precedent. It is no longer an open question in the literature as to whether the judges make policy—they do, and the only issue is whether they should make a little or a lot. The new sweetness, which is in such contrast with the critical credenda of the thirties supports "wise policy making" as the central element of the ideal judicial decision. Learned Hand and Herbert Wechsler have shown some skepticism about the range of free decision that should be allowed judges. Charles Black and Eugene Rostow would seem to be more cheerfully permissive, and so is Samuel Mermin.

Although there was almost complete failure "to anticipate the grounds of decision" in the Wisconsin case, the free decision exercised by judges is not thought to be arbitrary—the judges do think about what they are doing and group influences affect the judgments of individual judges. Unlike Erwin Griswold who does not believe that judges should make "result-oriented" decisions, Professor Mermin says that they should, although no particular result is prescribed. Judges will be guided in their decisions by their conceptions of justice and of wise policy. Readers may recall the dictum of Alexander Pope: "Tis with our judgments as our watches, none go just alike, yet each believes his own." Professor Mermin is willing to tolerate "the diversity of reasonable views that judges may hold" about the general concepts that apply to different sets of facts.

Since no norm of absolute justice can form the forecast of judicial decisions, prediction must depend upon the inspection of other signs. The author suggests that appellate court predictability is a function of three variables: the kind of case, the kind of court, and the kind of lawyers on each side. This is chancy and unreliable, of course, but the merit of more quantitative methods has yet to be established, and the promise is scant.—Earl Latham, *Amherst College.*

The New Frontier NLRB. By Kenneth C. McGuiness. (Washington, D. C.: Labor Policy Association, Inc., 1963. Pp. 268, $6.00.)

This book is in no sense an objective analysis of the work of the National Labor Relations Board during the Kennedy Administration. Perhaps objectivity was not to be expected because of the knowledge that McGuiness, a leading labor attorney representing management, was an important member of the NLRB legal staff under the Eisenhower Administration; that a highly laudatory foreword for the book was written by Congressmen Landrum and Griffin; and that the volume was published by the Labor Policy Association, Inc., an employer group concerned with labor policy. Nevertheless, one is hardly prepared for such a thorough indictment of almost all aspects of the Kennedy Board's operations. It is difficult to find one thing which the majority of the Board has done since 1961 which McGuiness even grudgingly approves. Indeed, it seems equally clear that he didn't approve of much which the Roosevelt and Truman Boards did either, and that it was only in the Eisenhower years that the Board acted in ways which McGuiness finds reasonably satisfactory.

McGuiness discusses many of the controversial areas in which the NLRB is called upon to rule: free speech; employer resistance to union activity; violence; employer refusal to bargain; determination of bargaining units; contracting out and plant removal; organization and recognition picketing; secondary boycotts; "hot cargo" contracts; and jurisdictional disputes. In none of these is he pleased with what the Kennedy Board has done.

Some of the major criticisms which McGuiness levels at the Board are that the members are seriously lacking in background and understanding of the day-to-day conduct of labor-management relations; that the Board is dedicated to a "case-by-case" approach which emphasizes the circumstances of each case with little respect for prior decisions; that the Board is overly concerned about encouraging the practice of collective bargaining and not concerned enough about safeguarding the rights of individual workers; that the Board has gone much too far in making policy itself while ignoring the purposes of Congress as set forth in the National Labor Relations Act, the Taft-Hartley Law, and the Landrum-Griffin Act; that the Board's decisions have aimed at encouraging the growth of unions while adversely restricting the rights of employers; and that the Board's penchant for overruling decisions of the previous Board has created an atmosphere of uncertainty in which management and labor do not know what to expect. Understandably, McGuiness fails to emphasize that the Eisenhower Board also overruled actions of previous Boards in many of its decisions; that almost without exception these decisions were beneficial to employer interests and restrictive of union activities; and that the present Board majority has been trying to return to at least some of the precedents enunciated by earlier Boards.

This book was apparently prepared with attorneys in the labor-management field and students of labor law primarily in mind. The style is decidedly legalistic with many case citations incorporated in the text. In readability, however, this is offset by the welcome absence of the usual academic impedimenta of footnotes.

For the political scientist, the book probably has most significance in providing additional evidence that legislative acts really become meaningful only after they are applied and interpreted by administrative agencies and the courts. Whether one agrees with McGuiness's judgments or not, and this reviewer disagrees with most, his work illustrates that in the application of national labor legislation it *does* make a great deal of difference who gets elected to the Presidency and what individuals the President sees fit to appoint to the NLRB.

Despite its highly polemic nature, this book should be of interest to all those interested in governmental regulation of labor relations and in the interrelationships of legislation and administration.—A. J. WANN, *University of Illinois.*

The Wall between Church and State. ED. BY DALLIN H. OAKS. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1963. Pp. 179. $6.75, cloth; $1.95, paper.)

For a century and a half following the adoption of the Bill of Rights the Supreme Court of the United States had no occasion to rule on the First Amendment provisions pertaining to religion. In earlier cases, such as *Reynolds* v. *U. S.* (1878) and *Pierce* v. *Society of Sisters* (1925), religious questions were involved but not the meaning of the provision: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Since the Everson (1947) and McCollum (1948) cases (dealing with bus transportation for students at parochial schools and "released time" for religious instruction, respectively) the Court as well as the public have been agitated by controversy over "the wall separating church and state" (a non-constitutional metaphor attributed to Thomas Jefferson who borrowed it from Roger Williams). In the years since, the Supreme Court has handed down a number of major decisions concerning the religious provisions of the First Amendment, the most recent pertaining to prayer reading in the public schools (*Engel* v. *Vitale*, 1962; *School District* v. *Schempp*, 1963).

The confusion brought by judicial opinions and public contentions about the constitutional issue of church and state the contributors to this little volume attempt to clarify. The book is an outgrowth of a recent Conference on Church and State sponsored by the University of Chicago Law School. The contributors include Robert M. Hutchins, President of the Fund for the Republic; Rev. Harold E. Fey, Editor of the *Christian Century;* Dean Robert F. Drinan, S.J., Paul G. Kauper, Philip B. Kurland, and Monrad G. Paulsen, law professors; Murray A. Gordon of the New York Bar; and William Gorman of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions. The editor, Dallin H. Oaks, is a University of Chicago law professor. Represented are Catholic and Protestant, legal and lay, spokesmen. The agenda for discussion includes church-state separation, religious freedom, public aid to parochial schools, tax exemptions for religious activities, religion in adoption of children, and prayer in public schools.

Do the contributors succeed in their attempt to clarify the issue? From them we learn that about the meaning of the provisions widespread disagreement exists and nowhere more striking than among the Supreme Court Justices, that by any interpretation of the First Amendment many traditional and prevailing practices in this country are of dubious "constitutionality," that discussion of the issue even by learned specialists is plagued by remarkable ambiguity and imprecision, and that the constitutional questions are in practice inextricably scrambled with questions of public policy which are logically separable.

Rather than clarify the confusion, the contributors compound it. As a survey of unsettled American opinion on questions of church and state this work has some value, though it appears that after another term or so of the Court that value will mainly be historical. Professor Kurland concludes the volume with an optimistic observation that "the Court is at least searching for an appropriate rationale for the religion clauses" (p. 179). With this assurance we can perhaps look forward to the day when the Court has worked out a rationale of sufficient clarity that it will be in a position to reverse itself.—CURRIN V. SHIELDS, *University of Arizona.*

Nominating the President; the Politics of Convention Choice. BY GERALD POMPER. (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1963. Pp. 292, $6.50.)

Presidential politics is almost invariably a topic of interest in presidential election years. Dr. Pomper's short volume seems to be a response to that interest.

The book provides a brief history of the presidential nominating process from the first elections in which presidential electors exercised independent choice, through the congressional caucus period, up to the development of the national convention system. Some of the major rules of the game—apportionment of representation among the state parties, the various voting rules, the procedures for selecting delegates, etc.—are briefly surveyed. The major decision-making activities of the conventions, with respect to nominees, platforms, party rally, and self-government, are reviewed. The countless sources of influence upon the nominee—interest groups, primaries, preference polls, existing national leadership factions—are listed and typical strategies of candidates described. The sources of presidential and vice-presidential candidates are given, with particular attention to the familiar notion of "availability" and a newer one, "prominence." Patterns and trends in nominating decisions by the conventions are analyzed in Chapter 8. Chapters 9 and 10 are devoted to evaluations of the system, directions in which it seems to be moving, and proposals for reform.

Dr. Pomper has apparently set for himself the task of making a comprehensive survey and summarization of existing knowledge regarding the presidential nominating process. He covers the ground fairly well and succinctly.

The new information that the Pomper volume provides bears mainly upon his treatment of the "availability" concept (pages 127–128) and his attempt to classify presidential nominations according to the degree of discretion available to and employed by the party delegates at the conventions (Chapter 8). The "availability" analysis uses nine criteria—governmental experience, incumbency in a governorship, large-state residence, etc.—developed by Sydney Hyman. The test is applied to "the convention nominees and their leading opponents," although it is not made clear who the "leading opponents" were. The nine-point scale is found to have been valid in the past but much less so in modern times. Dr. Pomper suggests that a new test of "prominence" will probably replace that of "availability," but the new term is not defined.

The survey of patterns of nomination according to "degree of discretion" is a somewhat different approach to the analysis of these patterns made in the Brookings studies. As in the earlier studies, Dr. Pomper finds an apparent decline in degree of discretion on the part of the delegates. "If this trend were to continue, the importance of the convention as a decision-making body might soon be at an end." This reviewer acknowledges the evidence regarding the validity of the trend findings, but disagrees with the author's evaluation. Even if the convention itself were to become as formal a ritual as the Electoral College, the importance of the national convention—as the Electoral College—would remain, and perhaps even increase, not as a distinct decision-making body but as a terminal situation in a decision-making process. After all, the Electoral College has been a ritual for many decades, but one could hardly conclude therefrom that the political dynamics antecedent to and associated with the Electoral College ritual have declined in vigor or significance. The convention itself may become a ritual, but the entire presidential nominating process continues to evolve in complexity and pervasive consequence.—Ralph M. Goldman, *San Francisco State College.*

Aliens and Dissenters: Federal Suppression of Radicals, 1903–1933. By William Preston, Jr. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963. Pp. viii, 352. $6.75.)

The study of civil liberties by political scientists in the United States has been primarily the study of Supreme Court decisions. Although the activity of the justices constitutes a portion of the relevant behavior for analysis in that area, it is only a small portion and perhaps not the most important. The activity of congressmen, administrators, lower-court judges, prosecutors, defense lawyers, and leaders and members of interest groups—in short, those whose activity is law in action—comprises the major portion of the civil liberties universe. That is the universe depicted by William Preston, Jr., a historian, in *Aliens and Dissenters.*

Tapping the rich sources of data in the records of various departments and agencies of the federal government, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the private papers of cabinet officers and others, Preston tells of the plight of the alien radical in the United States during the early part of this century. Although nativism was a growing phenomenon since the 1880's, it reached a high point when the mad fanatic Czolgosz—who, by the way, was a native-born American—assassinated President McKinley in 1901. The event symbolized the alien radical as the devil incarnate, a wild-eyed, bearded character with a bomb in his hand and a dagger between his teeth. Immigration officials, a number of persons in the Justice Department, some federal judges, and others strongly felt that he had to be eliminated from American society. Federal officials regarded alien radicals as dangerous not simply because of their behavior but also because of their expressed beliefs and associations. Hence, at times, they were punished for exercising rights supposedly protected by the First Amendment. Punishment occurred under sedition statutes, but more often it took the form of deportation. And in such proceedings short shrift often took the place of due process. To those charged with the administration of federal laws, the alien radical, it seemed, was not entitled to the protection of the Bill of Rights. That sentiment was echoed even in Congress. In 1920, Congressman Albert Johnson, Chairman of the Immigration Committee, was applauded in the House when, referring to alien radicals, he said: "Free press is ours, not theirs; free speech is ours, not theirs, and they have gone just as far as we can let them go toward running over our most precious rights" (quoted, p. 207).

Pressures for more restrictive legislation, more repressive administrative policy, and fewer procedural safeguards for alien radicals came from the grass roots of the federal bureaucracy. What resistance there was to such pressures came, for the most part, at the cabinet level. Some of the most important civil liberties battles were fought within the bureaucracy itself. Important, too, in the defense of liberty during this era was the activity of lawyers like George F. Vanderveer, who represented scores of I.W.W. defendants; for such activity affected administrative policy concerning alien radicals, and, more important, it also saved many a man from prison or deportation for no more than his beliefs or associations.

In an epilogue, Preston indicates that the federal suppression he described was no worse than suppression of the alien radical in our time. He points to the Smith Act, the Alien Registration Act of 1940, the Internal Security Act of 1950, and the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 and states that those laws make "the radical-catching laws of the first two decades seem simple and harmless" (p. 274). Fear rather than faith in the people, he says, underlies the policies of our present alien and immigration laws. "Not only are we afraid of our shadow," he adds, "but we also would like to deport it" (p. 275).

Aliens and Dissenters is a valuable contribution to the study of civil liberties in the United States. In terms of scope, it points the way for the political scientist to examine the whole range of activity in the civil liberties universe and not just Supreme Court decisions. The political scientist in this area is equipped to do more than Preston did. Armed with hypotheses such as Murray Edelman's concerning the symbolic aspects of politics and Samuel Stouffer's concerning attitudes toward civil liberties, the political scientist can go beyond depiction and attempt to explain in depth the phenomena Preston described. That, however, is not to take anything away from Preston's work, but it is to indicate one opinion concerning the task of the political scientist who undertakes research in the civil liberties field.—DAVID J. DANELSKI, *University of Washington (Seattle)*.

State Government in Transition: Reforms of the Leader Administration 1955–1959. BY REED M. SMITH. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963, Pp. 263. $6.00.)

What are the proper criteria with which to evaluate the administration of a governor in an American State? Professor Reed Smith has attempted an evaluation of the regime of George M. Leader, governor of Pennsylvania, 1955–1959. Professor Smith has confined himself to assessing the administrative aspects of Leader's incumbency with the result that one senses a tremendous amount of energy being expended by the Commonwealth's chief executive in what might be termed the "tooling up" of his administration.

As the reader pores over the detail of administrative reform introduced by Governor Leader, he becomes conscious of a great deal of hustle and bustle in re-arranging budgetary, accounting, and personnel practices. The author spends almost half of his time in examining the work of the Bureau of Program Evaluation, a division of the reorganized "Governor's Office." Careful analysis of the job done by the Bureau gives the impression that Leader meant this agency to be *the* general staff arm of his administration. Yet, as one plows through the account of its myriad operations, he gains the distinct feeling that much of what it was doing was administering for the sake of administering.

Little light is placed by Smith upon the salient political problems confronting Leader. Yet it was these problems that, in final analysis, would test the real efficiency and value of the administrative reorganization with which the governor seemed to be continually concerned.

Largely because he has introduced so little flesh and bones of politics into the treatment of administrative organization, Professor Smith never gives the impression he is dealing with a political operation. Yet he says in his opening chapter that the office of the Pennsylvania governor has long been affected by politics. While it is quite evident that the author is conscious of the connection between politics and administration (he states that it is important to observe "what political changes were needed before organizational changes or reforms could be made"), this reviewer had difficulty in finding the connection in the Leader governorship.

It would be a bit too severe to accuse Professor Smith of writing in the vein of A. E. Buck, *et al.*, but there seems to be an over-stressing of the role of administration in the operation of political office to the point that some of the more potent reasons for administrative reform are lost. One looks in vain for answers to the question: What did Leader's administrative reorganization do for the furthering of his substantive program?

If by "Government," we mean the established form of *political* administration, Professor Smith has tended to neglect the importance of the adjective. Perhaps a better title would have been "State Administration in Transition."

The book is thorough in its exegesis of the administrative changes effected under the Leader regime. Professor Smith is a careful scholar.—PAUL DOLAN, *University of Delaware*.

Justice and the Supreme Court. BY ROCCO J. TRESOLINI. (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1963. Pp. 205, $3.50.)

In this book Professor Tresolini examines eight

Supreme Court Justices and their decisions in major civil liberties cases. Included are Taney and *Merryman*, Waite in *Reynolds* v. *United States*, Harlan and *Plessy* v. *Ferguson*, Holmes in *Schwimmer*, Hughes and *Macintosh*, Black in *Chambers* v. *Florida*, Murphy and *Korematsu*, and Rutledge in *Yamashita*. In each chapter, the author presents a biographical sketch, subtitled "The Man," followed by a discussion of the case as seen by his subject, under the heading "The Case." He finally traces the effect each decision has had. The thesis of the book is that "precious liberties can easily be lost in an age of expediency and flexible administration; of confusion and fear of military disaster." (p. 5) The Supreme Court is seen as the agency protecting these liberties.

The marriage of biography and civil liberties, short of full scale treatment, is a difficult task. A series of biographical sketches is that and nothing more. A discussion of eight cases selected at random from the whole field of civil liberties rather than one aspect of that vast area is just eight essays. When the two are combined, the result can be just the same; neither biography nor the broad sweep of civil liberties provides a sufficiently specific unifying theme. To present brief discussions of suspension of habeas corpus, polygamy, racial discrimination, naturalization, coerced confessions, and military trial is to take an overview that confuses. The connection between these very dissimilar cases is not readily apparent. The author attempts in his "Epilogue" to pull the diverse strands together by discussing *United States* v. *Shipp* and its aftermath as proof of Learned Hand's observation that "liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can save it." (p. 153) The reader, however, might well assume that the author has been arguing the reverse of this proposition in the preceding chapters.

The chapter on Taney is far and away the best one in the book. Taney's development is quickly but carefully depicted and the transition from 'The Man" to "The Case" is smooth and effortless—the case seems to be a logical extension of the biographical material. This, unfortunately, cannot be said for some of the other chapters. The transitions in the essays on Waite, Holmes, Murphy, and Rutledge are particularly forced and abrupt. In these chapters, the reader feels unprepared for the case and might even wonder about the relevance of "The Man" for the following material.

In the realm of specifics, this reviewer would seriously question the inclusion of the material on Waite. This is the only sketch presented in which the central figure votes against individual liberties. The others are eloquent statements of protection for these rights. Further the problems of polygamy are outdated and no attempt is made to tie Waite's discussion of the difference between belief and action to contemporary versions of that problem. The chapter on *Plessy* has as much Earl Warren as John Marshall Harlan in it and strikes the reader as too diffused. The inclusion of two naturalization cases (*Schwimmer* and *Macintosh*) ties these chapters together and makes the issue clearer, though Professor Tresolini has to resort to *Abrams* v. *United States* to make Holmes understandable.

In the author's words, "this book is designed to focus on the civil liberties aspects of the Court's work that are not found in textbooks ordinarily used. . . . Moreover, every effort has been made to present the material in a clear, interesting, and readable manner so that able secondary school students can use the book." (p. 2) He has succeeded in the latter objective.—ROBERT H. BIRKBY, *Vanderbilt University*.

Studies in Judicial Politics. BY KENNETH N. VINES AND HERBERT JACOB. (New Orleans: Tulane University, Tulane Studies in Political Science, Vol. VIII, 1962. Pp. 119. $2.00.)

The dual purposes of this research monograph are to advance and to exemplify the thesis that the judicial branch of state government plays a vital role in the political process at the level of state and local government. The authors believe that political scientists have done a much better job in investigating and describing the politics of the legislative and executive branches of state and local governments, while neglecting to allocate equivalent resources and attention to the study of state judiciaries. Their intent is to contribute to the closing of this gap in political research, and thus to help to create an equilibrium in our systematic descriptive knowledge of state and local political systems. The instrumental value of such knowledge will be to permit political scientists better to perform their professional function of educating the citizenry; and an enlightened electorate, in turn, will insist upon long overdue reforms in the structure and functioning of the judicial process (p. 50).

There are four chapters, authored individually, and alternatively, by Jacob and Vines. The first chapter is an essay which surveys the political history of changes in the structure and functioning of American judicial institutions, from the colonial period through the contemporary era. Students will find this essay useful as a summary of the standard but diversified literature by law professors, political scientists, and historians.

Each of the three remaining chapters reports the findings of the authors' original research in selected aspects of the politics of courts, prosecutors, and judges in Louisiana. The second chapter analyzes the decision-making of the state supreme court, in a sample of about two hundred cases drawn from three periods of Louisiana history: the regime of Huey Long (1928–36), the first anti-Long regime (1940–44), and a later anti-Long regime (1952–56). The cases deal with disputes relating to elections, conflict between units of government, and the appointment and removal of public officers (separated into those who were, and those who were not, under civil service). The third chapter focuses upon the records of official action taken in the names of two successive district attorneys for (New) Orleans Parish. A relatively large sample of eleven thousand cases was drawn from the first and third years of the terms of each of the two public prosecutors: 1954, 1956, 1958, and 1960. In this study, unlike the preceding one (p. 73), the factional orientation of the two purported decision-makers was known; I say "purported" because, in sharp contradistinction from the two earlier chapters, the analysis in this study is almost entirely *non*institutional, in terms of the socio-political attributes of the two individual D.A.s. The decision-making of supreme court justices is a highly personal (and, hence, primarily psychological) process, but any district attorney in a large metropolitan jurisdiction necessarily functions primarily as a political administrator and shares with many other persons in a highly institutionalized (and, hence, primarily social) decision-making process. One may question, therefore, whether the authors of these studies have not reversed the emphasis appropriate for their subjects.

Although relatively few of the observable differences between the two protagonist D.A.s could be explained in political terms, the increase in discriminatory treatment of Negro defendants, under the regime of the more recent incumbent, is interpreted as a reflection of the "working-class authoritarian attitudes" of his Old Regular (i.e., the machine's) constituents. This interpretation is, however, speculative, relying upon Lipset's *Political Man* rather than any explicit empirical findings about the attitudes of New Orleans voters. As was also true of the preceding chapter on the Supreme Court, the research design did not encompass any empirical investigation of the paths by which political influence was channeled to the D.A.'s office under either incumbent, although the description of that aspect of the political process was seen as an appropriate item on the agenda for future research (p. 98).

The final chapter discusses the selection of all Louisiana state judges (including the Supreme Court, the Appeals Court, and thirty-one district courts) during the period 1945–60; the resulting sample totaled 159 individuals. Data on the social and political backgrounds of the judges were coded from the official biographies prepared by the judges themselves, and compared for each type of court. The resulting tabulations provide the most comprehensive description of attributes of a set of judges known to this reviewer; they should and will be compared with those of Schmidhauser's study of the justices of the United States Supreme Court, and Torgersen's of the Norwegian Supreme Court. They also can be compared with the other studies in this same volume. For example, earlier (at p. 70) and specifically in regard to Supreme Court justices, it is suggested that " . . . the involvement of judges in elections may prevent their passionate expressions of dissent. Hard-hitting and controversial dissenting opinions in which the judge is singled out in disagreement with the remainder of the Court can serve as campaign documents and can be reprinted and circulated against the judge in his campaign for re-election." But in this chapter, it is revealed (p. 115) that " . . . no supreme court judge was ever defeated [in a bid for re-election]; indeed all supreme court judges died in office, with their judicial boots on. It is understandable that the possibility of defeat at the polls or even serious opposition in election does not figure in supreme court judges' perceptions of their political careers." Further analysis of the data on contested elections, for courts on all three levels, leads to the finding (at pp. 117–118) that "an important factor in the long continuance in office is the relatively slight amount of opposition encountered. If more candidates contested judicial office, there might be a more rapid turnover of officeholders." The chapter concludes with the observation that for Louisiana judges, there "is a recruitment system that is unique among American elected officials." (p. 119). It is difficult to see how the authors possibly can know the extent to which the Louisiana system of judicial selection is different or unusual, in view of their earlier complaint (pp. 99–101) that there has been practically no research on this subject, in relation to other states, during the past quarter of a century, while the chief merit of earlier work lies in its pioneering spirit rather than in its empirical findings.—GLENDON SCHUBERT, *Michigan State University.*

The Politics of Urban Change. BY RICHARD A. WATSON. (Kansas City, Missouri: Community Studies, Inc., 1963. Pp. 81. $2.00.)

As more and more redevelopment projects dot the landscapes of our large cities with apartment buildings, political scientists will pay increasing attention to changes in urban politics brought about by the return of middle and upper class residents to the central city. This monograph by Professor Watson is an effort to measure the political impact in Kansas City of replacing an old, low income, blue-collar, run-down residential area with middle-income housing. The author examines the area with respect to the partisan allegiance of the newcomers, their political participation and interest in issues, and the efforts of political organizations to reach these urban voters. The behavior patterns and the socio-economic characteristics of the apartment dwellers are compared to residents of an adjoining neighborhood similar to the one displaced. A survey questionnaire, analysis of election statistics, and interviews with key leaders were the principal research techniques used.

The findings of the study include observable changes in the voting behavior of the redeveloped area. As expected, Republican electoral strength has shown a considerable increase, climbing from less than 20% in 1950 to 47% in 1960. Yet there is an organizational lag in that the Kansas City Republicans have made little attempt to solidify or buttress this increased support. Conversely, the Democratic organization has continued to use voter-registration drives which may tend to defeat the organization's purpose if the registrants captured vote Republican.

The apartment-dwellers have other characteristics which have an impact on political organizational activity. They have higher political awareness—as measured by identification of office-holders, discussion of political issues, and voter turnout—than the neighboring residents. Yet the political leaders interviewed argued that the new residents are extremely difficult to organize politically. They rarely seek the personal services offered by traditional political organizations. As such, their behavior is consistent with academic commentaries on suburbia as well as fictionalized accounts of "last hurrahs." In addition, the anti-organizational bias is buttressed by the apartment-dweller's zealous desire for anonymity. Missing are the patios which might foster the creation of neighborhood action groups, partisan or otherwise. The political organization has the difficulty of selling its wares to a reluctant and often inaccessible buyer. The Democrats have made some efforts to cope with this by enlisting apartment residents as organizers to dispell some of the animosity toward outsiders, but this and other efforts have not produced unqualified success.

In addition to party organization, other observations are focused upon attitudes toward nonpartisan elections, interest in local policy questions and so on. These, as well as the findings cited above, will be useful to students of urban politics.

A limitation of the study is the sample size of the survey questionnaire. Having only about 150 respondents often makes it difficult for the author to arrive at statistically significant results when key variables are isolated. Additional research covering broader areas of inquiry will be necessary in order to pursue the implications of these variables.—A. CLARKE HAGENSICK, *University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.*

An Autobiography of the Supreme Court. EDITED BY ALAN F. WESTIN. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1963. Pp. 474. $7.50.)

More than at any time since the New Deal period, political scientists, historians and lawyers are illuminating the area of public law and the Supreme Court as an institution by means of books and articles. The books include constitutional histories, commentaries on the Constitution, case books arranged to illustrate the sweep of constitutional development, case books dealing with particular segments of the work of the Court as in the area of race relations and First Amendment freedoms, case books to study the judicial process "in depth," biographies of judges, behavioral studies of court performances, and combinations of various of these categories. In some instances the contributions to thought and to knowledge are substantial; in other instances the overlappings and duplications are more obvious than the contributions.

The present edited volume takes off from the author's earlier edited volume entitled *The Supreme Court: Views from the Inside;* indeed, a few of the articles included duplicate in part reprinted items used in the earlier volume. This one is more elaborate, and some of the materials have great value, although few of the items are unknown to scholars in the field. They include jury charges delivered by Supreme Court justices on circuit during the early years, letters to editors, law review articles, speeches delivered on various occasions, and excerpts from books. The compilation is in no real sense an "autobiography" of the Supreme Court, as the title suggests. The more extensive collection of items comes from the justices of recent years, Justice Frankfurter, to whom the book is dedicated, appearing seven times along with extensive mention in the introduction, Justice Brennan three times, and Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas two times each. The author discusses but makes no penetrating analysis of the nature of adversary proceedings which give rise to the tradition of self restraint on the part of judges with respect to out-of-court commentary on judicial performance and the issues involved in judicial controversy. Scholars delving into the subject matter of out-of-court judicial writings will find helpful not only the materials here reproduced but also the bibliography of such writings as are here assembled, even though that bibliography is incomplete. The volume as a whole will have value as a matter of convenience to some scholars and to beginners in the field, and may be of particular value in libraries of limited dimensions in various colleges throughout the country.—CARL BRENT SWISHER, *The Johns Hopkins University.*

American Bureaucracy. BY PETER WOLL. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1963. Pp. viii, 184. Paper, $1.95; cloth, $4.00.)

American Bureaucracy is a study of administrative responsibility in the Federal government. In it the author is concerned with substance rather than form, with the satisfaction of human needs rather than congruence with tradition and ancient preconceptions. In a rather convincing fashion, he shows that evaluation from this more substantial perspective gives American bureaucracy a reasonably clean bill of health.

He traces the growth of the "fourth branch of government," with its combination of the three "functions" of adjudication, legislation, and execution, a combination which seems to violate the letter of the Constitution. This development, he says, was a response to needs of public policy arising not only out of the exigencies of modern times but, more importantly, out of the inability of the other branches to meet these needs. He convincingly develops this thesis by comparing the bureaucracy with the other branches along four dimensions or variables: (1) the constitutional and legal basis for action; (2) the organizational basis for unified action; (3) the amount and kinds of political support for action; and (4) the amounts, sources, and kinds of information needed for intelligent action. The bureaucracy gets a "good" to "outstanding" score on all of these bases of comparison.

The same considerations that account for the growth of the "fourth branch" guarantee it a considerable amount of independence from the other three. Although it is often pointed out that growing complexity and volume result in a loss of Congressional control, it is not so often pointed out that the same forces reduce the President's control. Only where the President can develop sufficient information to develop a Presidential policy or program, a rare situation, does it even make any sense to talk about Presidential control. Staff assistance to the President is also hopelessly lacking in information, but if built up enough could dominate the President. "There is nothing magical about staff. . . . " Better to leave the power where it is in administrative organs highly responsive to interested constituencies than give it to a politically anemic staff. And why should the President care about this state of affairs? As far as his political needs are concerned, they are met with a pleasing personality and a few key issues.

This growing power and independence of the fourth branch is not a cause for alarm, he says. It may depart from the letter of the Constitution but not its spirit. The fragmented nature of American government and politics assures a fragmented administration, and so the check and balance system is intact. As far as the problem of representation is concerned, the bureaucracy is more meaningfully representative than any of the other three branches. Each administrative agency survives by securing a balance of support over opposition within a legislative constituency (which includes both public and private groups), whereas Congressional constituencies are no longer legislative in any meaningful sense. Congress still has an important role to play as a school for political leaders, in investigations, and in representing other kinds of interests such as state, local, and individual interests. In the final analysis, he says in effect, there is no reason to regard the President, the Courts, or the Congress as precious just because they are mentioned in the Constitution. The new, fourth, independent branch—the bureaucracy—does what it does because somebody has to do it and the others can't.

Despite his assurance that all is well, many people still have the fear that administrative agencies may be too responsive, and selectively responsive, so that administrative government may depart too widely from the reality principle. One suspects that interest group response is highly opportunistic and superficial, near the impulse level. If so, it is difficult to see how a viable national policy can arise out of this milieu, and perhaps more insulation from this kind of feedback is occasionally a prerequisite to policy development.

In reading this book, the old hand will feel that he has trod most of this ground many, many times before. He will wonder why, for instance, he has to go through four pages on the *Myers* and *Humphrey* cases, a discussion every bit the same as that to be found in a dozen or more textbooks in American Government for over twenty years. Apparently, the author combined two ojectives—to write a textbook and to further clarify some concepts and hypotheses about American government. The result will be a real benefit for students of government and administration, but leaves the seeker after new ideas a little resentful. Nevertheless, I am glad I read this book. It sharpened and clarified and supported and perhaps even created some new insights into an important area which one is sometimes tempted to regard as old hat.—VICTOR A. THOMPSON, *Syracuse University.*

The People's Panel: The Grand Jury in the United States, 1634–1941. BY RICHARD D. YOUNGER.

(Providence, R. I.: American History Research Center, Brown University Press, 1963. Pp. 263. $6.00.)

The thesis of this interesting book is partially contained in the title. Professor Younger feels that the grand jury is a populist democratic body. But it is not until we read the concluding chapter that we see the previously unstated basic assumption of the whole book. Professor Younger feels that personal liberty is today endangered largely by big government and that "in the past citizens' panels proved an effective instrument of protest against centralized authority. They remain potentially the strongest weapon against big government and the threat of 'statism'."

To support this position the author discusses the use of the grand jury in the American colonial period and how it became an effective weapon in the struggle against British rule. He fails to explain why federal grand juries during the period of the Sedition Act of 1798 did not protect individual liberty from invasion by federal authority. He does present evidence that *local* or *state* grand juries during the Civil War did attempt to stop the arbitrary curtailment of personal liberties by the Lincoln Administration. The inference here and elsewhere in the book is that a federal grand jury tends to be less of a "people's panel" and more of an instrument of federal power. This same anti-federalist bias is evidenced when the author examines the period of Reconstruction. It is obvious that the author accepts the traditional position that the Radicals were evil men. He concludes that, to the extent that the southern grand juries helped to rescue southern counties from Radical rule, grand juries proved again to be a useful instrument in ridding a "colonial area" of the domination of an unsympathetic central government.

Again the same bias is evidenced when Professor Younger discusses the grand jury in the American West. He notes that in Mormon Utah the grand jury was useful in protecting "a colonial area against outside interference." Of course the interference was from federal officers in the Utah territory and what they were interfering with was Mormon polygamy!

The author ignores the period of the First World War and the subsequent Red Scare. This is a significant gap in any study of an institution which is supposed to protect the individual from governmental invasion of personal liberties. Furthermore the book does not investigate the history of the grand jury after 1941 and thus its role in the Second World War and the McCarthy period is not assessed.

Professor Younger does make a strong case for the grand jury in investigating fraud and corruption in public office and in corporations. Here the grand jury can channel public opinion and turn it to the service of democratic reform.

The People's Panel is a commendable piece of research. Still, the case for the grand jury is yet to be made. It may well be a vital democratic instrument but much of Professor Younger's evidence, contrary to supporting this position, actually shows how the grand jury can become an instrument of parochialism and the servant of governmental tyranny.—H. FRANK WAY, JR., *University of California, (Riverside)*.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE
University of Maryland

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FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. By Hannah Arendt. (New York: The Viking Press, 1963. Pp. 275. $5.50.)

Only a minor part of this provocative book constitutes a report on the Eichmann trial. In the main it is an effort to characterize the role of Eichmann in the historic tragedy of Hitler's Final Solution to the Jewish problem, and the role Jewish leaders played in the destruction of their own people. The trial aspects can be noted briefly. According to Miss Arendt, the trial was dominated not by a desire for justice but for revenge; thus it became not a judicial proceeding but a political show. She is very critical of the trial itself—the way the prosecutor handled the case, the inadequacies of the defense, the substance of the indictment, the role of Ben Gurion, and the fact that Eichmann was tried before an Israeli court rather than an international tribunal. Only the scrupulous conduct of the judges is praised. While many of these criticisms are cogently presented, the reasonableness of the author's judgments is colored by an anti-Zionist bias that pervades the book.

More significant than the trial is the book's concern with Eichmann as a person and with alleged Jewish complicity in Jewish destruction. The portrait of Eichmann is fascinating, brilliantly presented, highly provocative, and in the end false. To Miss Arendt Eichmann is a mediocre bureaucrat of inadequate education, superficial intelligence, and an extraordinarily faulty memory. He was totally unable to look at any matter from the other fellow's point of view or to think from the standpoint of somebody else; hence communication with him became impossible. He was utterly ignorant of everything not directly related to his job, which was transporting people to their death. His bragging was his undoing. Thus he emerges as a banal fellow whose role in the Final Solution was highly exaggerated.

While the author rightly concludes that the prosecution never supported with adequate evidence its picture of Eichmann as Hitler's master criminal, her wholesale substitution of the banal, insignificant, mediocre Nazi for the monstrous Nazi—monstrous in terms of the enormity of the crimes committed against humanity—is too pat and one-dimensional. It is also too convenient, because it suits the author's conception of the totalitarian system to explain in this way the capacity of mediocre persons for participating in unmitigated evil. Eichmann's guilt, which is never denied, is readily explained: he was an agent and a victim of Nazi totalitarianism.

The totality of the moral collapse caused by the Nazis is dramatized most sharply by the depiction of European Jewish community leaders as collaborators with the Nazis in the destruction of Jewish communities. That the genocidal plans of Hitler and Himmler required Jewish cooperation "in administrative and police work" is well known. Indeed Miss Arendt draws heavily on the findings of Raul Hilberg's massive work, *The Destruction of European Jews*. But without benefit of objective, historical research, Miss Arendt rejects Hilberg's anguished, compassionate judgments and substitutes her own, supported by questionable accounts of anti-Nazi activities in France, Italy, Belgium, Bulgaria, and Denmark. For what Miss Arendt asserts is that the enormity of the Jewish catastrophe was the direct consequence of Jewish collaboration. If Jewish leaders had not cooperated by compiling lists of persons to be deported, collecting money to defray the expenses of deportation and extermination, keeping track of vacated apartments, providing police forces to seize Jews and get them on the trains, "There would have been chaos and plenty of misery but the total number of victims would hardly have been between four and a half and six million people." This startling, novel conclusion is reached only by distorting history, especially in understating the significance of the resistance efforts by Belgians, Frenchmen, and Danes in saving the lives of Jews in their countries; and in insisting—without benefit of evidence—that Jewish resistance, even without significant help from others, would have succeeded in saving Jewish lives in the end.

In her discussion of Jewish complicity in the Final Solution, Miss Arendt makes no attempt to explain why Jewish leadership cooperated with the Nazis. The point is crucial since Jewish collaboration is presented as offering "the most striking insight into the totality of the moral collapse the Nazis caused in respectable European society—not only in Germany but in almost all countries, not only among the persecutors but also among the victims." Perhaps the profound irony of this extraordinary book lies in its failure to explain why Jewish leaders cooperated in destroying their own people and themselves—in remarkable contrast with its imaginative effort to explain Eichmann's behavior. Fascinated by incongruities, Miss Arendt leaves the reader with the incongruity of the banal, mediocre murdering Nazi and the Jew as the hated accomplice of evil. While the behavior of the former—whose guilt is never denied—is elaborately analyzed, that of the latter remains unexplained. By providing one standard for judging Jews and another for judging others, the book remains ambiguous and paradoxical. Whether accurate or not, it is often brilliant in speculation about the human condition, but it is not a work of serious scholarship.—MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, *Princeton University*.

Changing Law in Developing Countries. J. N. D. ANDERSON, ED. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963. Pp. 292. $7.50.)

This volume is a collection of fourteen lectures read during 1961–62 at the School of Oriental Studies of the University of London on selected problems of law in territories which have been British colonies or possessions. It is the second of a Praeger series: Studies on Modern Asia and Africa. The lectures, published in the style in which delivered, are devoted about equally to public law and private law problems. In the former category are the discussions of the prescribing authority of the United Kingdom in such territories, independence of the judiciary, and civil and political rights. In the latter are selected problems of property and commercial law, criminal liability, and status and family law. "Developing countries" in the title refers exclusively to some areas in Asia, Africa and the Indian subcontinent where Britain has had an interest. And the contributions do not focus primarily on changing law relevant to economic development, but instead deal with several aspects of political independence and social progress.

Transition of the territories to political independence, and consequent accelerating decline in the prescribing authority of the United Kingdom, is discussed in British constitutional terms (executive, parliamentary and sovereign competence with respect to the different classes of territories). There is a survey of the drafting of constitutions in the Colonial Office, the forms and legal effects of other instruments relevant to the transition period, independence of the local judiciary, fundamental rights, and the legal profession. The lectures on these subjects are rather legalistic, but they do serve as a convenient reference for the lawyer and are useful to the political scientist.

The volume is less successful in dealing with the problems of social progress and the law. All modern legal systems have during their development adapted to or encouraged social progress through relative incorporation of traditional or professional practices, as the early common law applied the flexible legal concept "custom" to feudal, manorial and commercial practices to permit their support and regulation by courts of law. Progress in the territories considered in this volume is limited by continued existence of dual or multiple systems of authority, each of limited effectiveness. The received modern legal system greatly differs from the local native or tribal laws, and the regional Hindu, Moslem or Chinese legal systems. The relevant lectures discuss the problem in terms of legal formula. "Justice, equity and good conscience" is the focus for the most extended discussion of the subject, and the generic term "custom" another. The lecture on Islamic law in Nigeria recounts ineffective legislative attempts to reconcile discrepancies in the different systems of law, and the recent response of "excluding" application of Islamic law under new criminal legislation, which during an interim period will not govern but is merely to "guide" native courts.

The lectures have in the main rendered only historical and anecdotal service on the matters of interrelation of formal and traditional laws. The problem exceeds the capacity of conventional legal terminology, as indicating which legal rule has been applied in a particular case is inadequate to the task of describing its social consequences. Systematic, contextual studies of decision-making and the effective sanction processes in such societies is necessary in order to appraise social intervention, through courts and other institutions, which is designed to modify traditional or local practices.—DENNIS M. O'CONNOR, *University of Illinois College of Law.*

The Craft of Intelligence. BY ALLEN DULLES. (New York: Harper and Row, 1963. Pp. viii, 277. $4.95.)

Most of the literature on political and military intelligence has been written, inevitably, from an extraordinarily partial view of the facts. Allen Dulles, from 1951 to 1961 Deputy Director and then Director of Central Intelligence, is without a peer in his knowledge of the American government's Central Intelligence Agency and the "intelligence community" which has become one of Washington's major, if least observable, industries. Mr. Dulles, more than any other, helped to create and to develop this huge semi-secret bureaucracy.

Paradoxically, Mr. Dulles knows too much to be able to write a very revealing book. His stated motive in writing it was "the desire to put intelligence in our free society in its proper perspective." Thus the book, among other things, is a defense of the CIA. The agency, which plays a pivotal role in the national security policy process, often is portrayed as being beyond the normal checks and balances of the American system. Indeed, some fear it as a potential "state within a state" with too little public accountability and possessed of a tendency to make and apply its own foreign policies. Mr. Dulles assures us that such fears are unjustified and that they constitute but one in a catalogue of "myths" about the agency. He argues that CIA is closely and adequately monitored by the Presidency; that it is checked by other national security agencies; and that it is balanced by careful surveillance from Congressional subcommittees. But Mr. Dulles is not entirely persuasive, because policy control of CIA, and integration of all of its activities with national foreign policy have, on occasion, at least to this reviewer appeared to have been inadequate.

Aside from a defense of the intelligence system, one might also expect that in writing on the "craft" of intelligence Mr. Dulles would deal in new and revealing detail with some of the intellectual tasks which challenge intelligence professionals. But he does so only in a cursory manner. Few details are given, for example, on the advancing science of information retrieval, on the problems of handling massive amounts of data, and producing it into meaningful information for the decision maker. More understandably, he is also circumspect in discussing that particular role of the CIA which he insists upon classifying as "intelligence" but which, in fact, is the separate function of clandestine intervention or political action overseas.

What Mr. Dulles does offer is an excellent and concise summary of some of the more glamorous examples from the history of intelligence, its major collection methods—particularly espionage, on counter-espionage and related subjects, in both the American and Soviet setting. The book's chief value is that of synthesis, because much of this information has been previously published in bits and pieces. It has the added values of containing personal anecdotes and of authenticity deriving from the author's extensive experience and intimate connection with the facts of a secret world.

The book's chief shortcomings are its essentially uncritical approach to the subject, its imprecise distinction between wartime and peacetime—or Cold War—intelligence, or between political and military intelligence problems, and its lack of any really new information about the data-gathering, problem solving, and predictive functions of a modern intelligence service.

For the citizen wishing to be informed the book is a good intelligence primer and offers at least one side of the story. For a college student interested in pursuing a career in intelligence service, the book will serve well as an elaborate and informative recruiting document. For the professional political scientist familiar with previously existing literature and hoping for substantial new insights into the government's increasingly important intelligence system, there are few revelations.—HARRY HOWE RANSOM, *Vanderbilt University.*

The Wine Is Bitter: The United States and Latin America. BY MILTON S. EISENHOWER. (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1963, Pp. xiv, 342. $4.95.)

The Cuban Dilemma. By R. Hart Phillips. (New York: Ivan Obolensky, Inc., 1962. Pp. vi, 357.)

The two books here under review both reflect the personal experiences, prejudices, and predilections of the two authors with respect to current Latin American problems. They differ from each other in that, while Milton S. Eisenhower's *The Wine Is Bitter* covers the entire gamut of our Latin American policy and attempts to offer some constructive criticism of these policies, R. Hart Phillips' *The Cuban Dilemma* concerns itself with Cuban affairs and is, in fact, mainly a detailed account of the events of the first two and a half years of the Castro régime. While both books are rich in factual data which will be useful to future students, Mrs. Phillips' book lacks an index, making it difficult to find specific facts quickly and easily.

Dr. Eisenhower has divided his book into three main sections. The first describes general conditions in Latin America, shows that there is much lack of understanding on both sides, and urges the achievement of a much higher level of mutual understanding as a base for real cooperation. The second section centers largely on the problem of economic cooperation. In some ways this seems to be the best and most useful part of the entire volume. The analysis presented here of the difficulties encountered by raw material producers, such as the Latin American countries, should prove especially helpful to the layman. The third section discusses the policies of the Eisenhower administration toward Latin America, especially the background and beginnings of the Alliance for Progress. Considerable emphasis is placed on the fact that, although President Eisenhower saw the need for more effective policies toward Latin America, his efforts to achieve this goal were largely frustrated. It should be said to the author's credit that, although he understandably tends toward a favorable view of his brother, he is actually quite objective and nonpartisan in his critique. Also noteworthy are the repeated comparisons made between current Latin American problems and comparable problems faced by our own nation in the period of its emergence, the nineteenth century.

Mrs. Phillips' main contribution lies in the fact that she has provided a detailed, sometimes even hour-by-hour, account of events in Cuba during the early years of the Castro régime. Her introduction indicates that she intended to prove by her account that Castro was "always a Communist." This reviewer has yet to be convinced. The author not only fails to present irrefutable evidence to support her contention, but further weakens her case by repeatedly making dogmatic statements which fail to stand the test of critical scrutiny. For instance, on page 142 we are told that when the Cuban delegation in the United Nations voted to admit Red China, this was "the first time a Latin American country had voted against the United States in the international body." Thomas Hovet, Jr., in his study of *Bloc Politics in the United Nations,* shows that in the Sixth General Assembly (1951) the Latin American bloc voted with the majority of the General Assembly ninety-one percent of the time, while the United States was with the majority only fifty percent of the time. Obviously the Latin Americans were not always voting with the United States at this time. That Mrs. Phillips is utterly contemptuous of the Department of State becomes increasingly clear throughout the book. In fact, the contrast between her policy recommendations and those of Milton Eisenhower's are as night is to day.—Louis G. Kahle, *University of Missouri.*

Himalayan Battleground; Sino-Indian Rivalry in Ladakh. By Margaret W. Fisher, Leo E. Rose, and Robert A. Huttenback. (New York: Praeger, 1963, Pp. 176, $6.00.)

This concise, well-documented, logically organized account of the present controversy in the Ladakh region of Kashmir should reach a wide audience. Those interested in any phase of Central Asian affairs, in Communist Chinese expansionism, in Indian foreign policy, or in territorial disputes in international relations will welcome the appearance of this fine example of joint research and exposition. Before its release no careful and complete study of the Indian-Chinese confrontation in one of the remotest regions of Asia was available to the general public, and its timely appearance now lays the basis for an informed opinion on a fascinatingly complex international conflict.

Ladakh has come into prominence in the last decade chiefly because of Peiping's need to control Tibet—the most reliable overland route to Lhasa is through Ladakh—and secondarily as a result of its increasing economic and military development in Sinkiang. But this partially uninhabited region has had an importance in Asian politics that can be at least conjecturally understood from about the seventh century, A.D. Indian influences in Ladakh preceded a "Tibetanization" process, which began in the tenth century and was accelerated after 1300 by the destruction of Buddhist centers in India. Two centuries later the Muslim kingdom of Kashmir extended its control into Ladakh, and in the following centuries Ladakh's political history reveals a fluctuating record of subservience to Kashmir and precarious independence. Finally in the nineteenth century the Dogra dynasty in Jammu conquered the region, which in turn, in 1846, became part of the British Empire as a part of the semi-autonomous state of Jammu and Kashmir.

In their brief but admirable survey of the history of Ladakh the authors discuss two points in controversy between India and China, the relationship of Ladakh to Tibet and China and the eastern boundaries of Ladakh. On the first their judgment is that China has not made a convincing case for Tibetan or Chinese control over Ladakh at any time in the past, despite the gift-bearing missions sent to the Dalai Lama from Ladakhi rulers which continued until recently. The latter, according to the authors and the Indian Government, were symbolic of the Dalai Lama's spiritual authority, not Tibet's political domination, which was non-existent as an administrative fact. On the boundary issue this volume provides us with an invaluable précis of the Sino-Indian diplomatic talks on the question, held in 1960.

Concerning these fruitless talks the authors conclude that in all categories of substantive debate over the evidence the Indians made a far better case than did the Chinese, who "often misrepresented the cited sources" and in general presented "a shoddy piece of work." (p. 99) Five types of material were presented by both sides during the talks to substantiate their opposing border claims in the Aksai Chin region: treaties, maps, tradition, custom, and administrative jurisdiction. Although the documents presented by India are by no means conclusive, they make a better case than China can muster. Indeed, it would seem that the Chinese were not interested in the substance of their presentation and used the talks chiefly to create an impression of being conciliatory. The Indian case, on the contrary, was thoroughly and carefully presented and its preparation turned up more evidence for New Delhi's claims than anyone had suspected was available. But control of Ladakh, following the Chinese building of two roads through Akasi Chin, will not be decided by legal evidence. The present volume gives an abbreviated account of the military developments in Ladakh since the 1959 Tibetan revolt. The authors suggest that India's defense posture in Ladakh is now strong enough to make an all-out Chinese attack on that quarter of the Himalayan border unlikely—hence the concentration of Chinese efforts in October, 1962, on the Assam frontier, which was partly at least a maneuver to force India to give up Aksai Chin. In a wider context they rightly state that the area of open conflict between China and India is not confined to their common border but extends throughout the rest of Asia and even into Africa; one Chinese goal "is the complete control of Southeast Asia," (p. 146) which India must now take measures to counteract.

An appendix contains selections from a rare document, hitherto unavailable in English, a compilation by Meng Pao, Imperial Chinese Resident at Lhasa from 1839 to 1844, which supports the Indian case. The only serious omission from this volume is a topographical map of the region discussed; and the political map is unfortunately rather difficult to use. This book should be regarded as an objective study and a fair interpretation, although it is to be expected that American experts on China will criticize some of its conclusions, scholastic parochialism being what it now is in Asian studies.—CHARLES H. HEIMSATH, *The American University.*

Les Dossiers du C.R.I.S.P. EDITED BY J. GÉRARD-LIBOIS AND B. VERHAEGEN. (Brussels: Centre de Recherche et d' Information Socio-Politiques, 1959–.)

Anyone who has done field research on political developments in an underdeveloped country knows to his chagrin how many lacunae there are in his own work. This is because of the great difficulty of obtaining complete sets of documents, many of which are mimeographed, distributed and soon destroyed, of dating many of these documents he does find, and of discovering the cause in the immediate situation which had led to the issuance of the document or to the use of this or that specific phrase.

It will no doubt come as a surprise to many that one of the countries where this problem is least posed is the Congo. Low on political stability, and therefore high on the issuance of paper, this country has had at least the good fortune to have a remarkable group of self-appointed archivists in the Centre de Recherche et d'Information Socio-Politiques (C.R.I.S.P.) in Brussels. Animated by J. Gérard-Libois and B. Verhaegen, they have been putting out a series of annual documentary histories of Congolese politics, entitled *Congo 1959, Congo 1960,* etc. Ranging between 300 and 1200 closely-printed pages, these collections tie together chronologically, under the major themes of the political year, press releases and interviews, tracts, official documents, Parliamentary motions and speeches, journalist's accounts, electoral and voting statistics with a running narration which aims at eliminating polemic and assuring a minimum of overt bias in the selection. Furthermore, the authors take as their compass the kind of broad view of the Congo context which would make their volumes of maximum utility to researchers with varied special interests. They move back and forth from the national to the local level, looking at those aspects of provincial politics which impinge most directly on national politics. Nor do they neglect the role of outside powers, and of course of the United Nations. These are then basic reference works, for both the scholar and the politician, for both those interested in Congolese politics and those who are concerned with comparative research. They do not substitute for good analysis; they make it possible.

In addition to the annual volumes, there are a number of special studies. François Perin's *Les Institutions Politiques du Congo Indépendant au 30 juin 1960* is a basic constitutional analysis of the system as it was intended to work the day of independence. *Rwanda Politique 1950–1960*, presented by F. Nkundabagenzi, repeats for Rwanda the efforts of the annual Congo volumes. *A.B.A.K.O. 1950–1960*, by Verhaegen, and *Parti Solidaire Africain* by H. Weiss and Verhaegen, are documentary histories of major political parties.

Finally, C.R.I.S.P. issues a mimeographed bulletin entitled "Courrier Africain" and, in collaboration with the Institut Politique Congolais, edits *Etudes Congolaises*, a monthly journal, largely concerned with the Congo but including some material on other parts of Africa. These two periodicals present political, economic, and sociological studies on specific topics such as trade-unionism in the Congo, the history of the Katanga secession, prophetic movements, the development plan, etc. The level of analysis of these articles tends to be quite high, and always concrete. The ensemble of publications of C.R.I.S.P. will provide fruitful work for scholars for many years to come.—IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, *Columbia University.*

The Political Economy of Mexico: Two Studies. BY WILLIAM P. GLADE, JR., AND CHARLES W. ANDERSON. (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1963. Pp. xii, 242. $5.00.)

Mexico finally has entered the select circle of states, such as England, France, the Soviet Union and a few other older countries, about which we know more than the superficialities of government. In discussing most foreign polities even the best trail blazing studies tend to emphasize legal structures and obvious aspects of the political process—formal governmental agencies, the political party system, the role of elites—to the near exclusion of consideration of substantive policy or the governmental-political infrastructures which help formulate and implement policy. Only after a fair amount of good and bad descriptive general material on governmental mechanisms is available do more intensive, depth studies begin to probe the substance of the political process. Because *The Political Economy of Mexico* is such a depth study, it is a welcome addition to the literature, both as a contribution to our knowledge of Mexican government and as a milestone in the study of Latin American politics. One only hopes that further, similar studies dealing with non-economic policy topics will follow the new trail.

The book consists of two independently prepared but related items written by Latin Americanists at the University of Wisconsin. Professor Glade, an economist, contributes "Revolution and Economic Development," which describes the constructive interaction of social, economic and political forces sparked by the Revolution of 1910 to produce a stable and productive environment for material and social modernization. Professor Anderson, a political scientist, supplies "Bankers as Revolutionaries: Politics and Development Banking in Mexico," a case study of the political factors which affect the economic role of these institutions in the country's development.

In their evaluation of Mexico's accomplishments, both authors tend toward the optimistic to a slightly greater degree than would some other students. This optimism probably reflects the nature of the primary sources dictated by the subject matter of their topics—official data, government agency reports and interviews with public officials, none of which are likely to stress the negative. Both Glade and Anderson have worked in Mexico, but not so long as to build into their interpretive processes that almost instinctive skepticism that seems to mark the old Mexican hand.

From the viewpoint of theory building, Anderson's study may be less interesting to political scientists than Glade's. The description of the political influences affecting development bank policy supplies valuable information and insights into the policy process, but its scope necessarily is limited by the highly specific topic. At the same time, Anderson's picture suggests that the factors involved are not unlike those in other countries, a significant finding but not one apt to change our understanding of the political process. Glade, on the other hand, deals with a more encompassing subject, and brings to his discussion consideration of materials which have not been dealt with frequently in the context of Mexican politics. He cites anthropological, social, psychological and sociological studies relating to individual and group motivation, class attitudes and the development of a sense of entrepreneurship, all of which offer a fresh kind of insight into the policy-making process. But the two studies do combine admirably to present a helpful understanding of a hitherto inadequately discussed aspect of Mexican government. This understanding is considerably enhanced by extensive notes and bibliographical citations, although the former would be much more useful if the large amount of factual material they contain were available at the bottom of the appropriate page rather than hidden at the end of the book. The two studies contain a few minor factual errors, about par for this type of detailed investigation, but my strongest reaction is to the fact that some material is outdated. For example, CEIMSA has been replaced by CONASUPO, not a major error but an indication of the slowness with which the machinery of academic presses moves to turn a manuscript into a book.

By an interesting coincidence, *The Political Economy of Mexico* appeared almost simultaneously with Raymond Vernon's *The Dilemma of Mexico's Development* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963). Covering the country's economic system and discussing the relationship of economics to politics in a broader and more inclusive manner, Vernon's book is a perfect complement to that of Glade and Anderson. Where the two authors are rather optimistic, the single writer is somewhat pessimistic; where the latter relates the economic system and the political process more systematically, the former offer a contrapuntal presentation that supplies dimension. Combined, the two books fill a serious gap in our knowledge of Mexican economic policy most successfully. This case of parallel development, as the anthropologists might call it, is further evidence that the pre-conditions for depth studies in politics now exist, and Mexico has indeed entered the circle of select countries about which we can speak with a degree of assurance.—ROBERT E. SCOTT, *University of Illinois.*

Malaya. BY J. M. GULLICK. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1963 Pp. 256.)

Mr. Gullick has written a descriptive study of the world's newest nation. The author is particularly well qualified to discuss post-war Malaysia. Since 1946 he has included among his activities Malayan civil servant, director of a company vitally interested in the country's export economy, and historian and commentator on the Malayan scene.

The speed with which events take place in Southeast Asia is such that although Mr. Gullick's study was completed in 1963, even his title was out-of-date by the end of that year with the formation of Malaysia. This should not detract, however, from a succinct and generally well-balanced account of the situation up to that time. This book is actually in two separate parts, the first an easily comprehended history of the maze of events which brought Malaya from its Malacca trading days through the British raj to the preparation for Malaysia. In this description the author attempts to keep this from merely being a discussion of European activities and is interested in Malayan actions and reactions. The second half of the book, which will draw the attention of political scientists, reviews the institutions, economic and political processes and leaders on the contemporary scene. This section becomes particularly interesting when it reflects the author's own experiences and expertise such as the discussions of economic matters, the anti-communist campaign and the civil service. Two appendices are attached; one a useful elucidation of the tangled question of citizenship and the second population, economic and social statistics of Malaya and Singapore.

While one cannot quarrel with the overall quality of this book, its brevity necessarily leads to a condensation of events which call for greater consideration for the sake of clarity and understanding. This is most noticeable in analyses of current politically complex issues as Federal-State relationships on the East Coast of Malaya. Writing critically about Malaysia is very much different than analyzing its more problem-ridden neighbors such as Indonesia, Burma, Laos and South Vietnam. Since Malaysia remains one of Afro-Asia's few Western-type democracies, maintains the highest standard of living on the mainland of Asia and has established comparatively well-considered economic and social programs, criticisms need to be of a different order, more technical and sophisticated than elsewhere. As a rule Mr. Gullick lives up to his initial promise to be frank in his evaluations although he is more optimistic than many foreign observers with regard to certain Government policies such as the National Language question. While the author does critically evaluate both British and Malayan actions, he does have a habit of relegating some facts and interpretations of a possibly derogatory type to footnotes, as for example his mention of arrests for alleged subversion in 1962.

There is a desperate need for descriptive books of this sort on countries throughout the developing world and if the publisher can continue to bring us these national studies in this, its Nations of the Modern World series, it will greatly aid us in comparative analyses.—FRED R. VON DER MEHDEN, *University of Wisconsin.*

Nordisk Offentlig Rätt. Vol. III. BY NILS HERLITZ. (Stockholm: Norstedt, 1963. Pp. xxvi, 805. Sw.kr. 90.)

Volumes I and II of *Scandinavian Public Law* were noted in the March, 1959, issue of the *REVIEW* (p. 242). Volume I sketched the history of public administration in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. Volume II described the workings of the five national legislatures. Totalling only slightly more than 300 pages, the 1958 works were a prologue to the present tome. Volume III is bound in two parts, with continuous pagination, a single Table of Contents (at the end of the book), and an index which covers the entire series. (Volumes I and II had no indices of their own.)

Volume III is subtitled *Regeringsmakt och Förvaltningsorganisation* ("Government and Administration"). It subsumes much of what we would call constitutional law (structure of government, but not civil liberties), administrative law, and public administration—all of this on a comparative basis. Understandably, the author has had to eschew further comparison to extra-Scandinavian systems.

By describing government in the five countries, Herlitz has contributed significantly to the reader's understanding of his own Scandinavian state as well as to his understanding of the neighboring ones. Confrontation of the five highlights the characteristic features of each, and permits a more incisive appraisal of their differences and similarities than is possible in less systematic and comprehensive approaches.

The separate chapters of the book—e.g., Central Administration, Local Government, Civil Service—are self-sufficient treatises on each topic for each country, with rich citation to further sources. This is a practical reference work as well as a text in comparative government.

When the first volumes were published, Professor Herlitz had already retired from the University of Stockholm and from parliament. With volume III, he threatens to put down his heretofore prolific pen. One can only hope that he will reconsider. In any event, the concluding sentence of the review of the 1958 volumes still holds true: "Much more of Scandinavian letters and science should be made readily available to English speaking audiences, and not least Professor Herlitz' *Scandinavian Public Law.*"—STANLEY V. ANDERSON, *University of California, Santa Barbara.*

The Italian Labor Movement. BY DANIEL L. HOROWITZ. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963. Pp. xiii, 356. $7.50)

As a history of the Italian labor movement, this book is thorough, accurate, and a useful complement to the recent works on the subject by Neufeld and La Palombara. For the most part it tells a well known story, but it does so with scrupulous care and admirable clarity.

For political scientists the book is especially welcome because it affords a basis for understanding the peculiar role Italian unions have played as adjuncts of the political party machines. That Western European labor movements have historically emphasized political strategies more than economic ones is a widely recognized and well documented thesis. Students of labor movements have typically viewed such union operations only as attempts to achieve essentially economic and social objectives through political methods. More clearly than in most countries, we can recognize in Italy that the unions' political engagements have also served as a vital communications channel in the opposite direction. They have given the party organizations access to potential supporters among labor groups who could not be reached through the parties' conventional ideological appeals. During long periods of recent Italian history this has, in fact, been the major union function, both in the center and on the left of the political spectrum. The efforts to use unions for both purposes have repeatedly created tensions within the labor movement and within the political organizations. Horowitz analyzes these skillfully, mainly from the perspective of the historian rather than that of the political scientist.

The book closes, appropriately enough, as an era was ending so far as decision-making on economic issues was concerned, though that fact is clearer now than it was when the book went to press. Largely sterile ideological in-fighting among parties and unions and immobility on economic policy flowing from the polarization into left and center were hallmarks of the first fifteen postwar years; and the book's discussion of the organizational alliances and splits of that era affords a good basis for understanding these phenomena. A beginning of center-left cooperation and a broad interest in economic planning now give promise of creating a new decision-making structure in Italy. It is a development that can be understood only if the historical background this book places in balanced perspective is fully grasped.—MURRAY EDELMAN, *University of Illinois.*

German Administration since Bismarck—Central Authority versus Local Autonomy. BY HERBERT JACOB. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963. Pp. xviii, 224, $7.00.)

This book should elicit the attention of primarily two groups of political scientists: Students of German affairs and students of public administration. It is not however (as the main title would make one believe), an overall history of modern German administration. Its subtitle is more indicative of its contents, but even as specified there the problem is dealt with in an unusual, highly provocative, and thoroughly rewarding fashion.

The author's interest centers around the question of "responsiveness." How does central government make sure that its laws and policies are implemented "in the field"? What major means exist to promote responsiveness among field agents? What are the chief obstacels encountered, and how can they be overcome? Keeping these questions in mind, the author takes up, one by one, the four regimes under which Germans have lived in the past hundred years. He studies the effects which civil service training and organization, the structural and legal framework in which officials have had to act (especially the various types of federalism German government assumed in this period) and similar factors have had on the relation between central and field administration. Besides making full use of German literature and documentation, the author found pertinent material by going into "the field" himself and conducting interviews with German officials. The results are instructive not only for the two groups of specialists mentioned above but also for students of comparative administration, of federalism, etc.

Exactly because it is such a good book one may perhaps be forgiven for measuring it with demanding yardsticks and thus raise two major objections. One refers to scope, the virtually total omission of that "field" which looms largest in a by now overwhelmingly urban society. Besides analyzing special administrations, the study is limited to rural counties and their chiefs (Landraete), omitting cities. But cities have been and are the main units, in Germany, of that "local autonomy" which the author set out to study in its relation to central authority, and the omission is a glaring one.

My second objection is more fundamental. The author analyzes responsiveness in the main without regard to the policies to which field agents were or are to be responsive. Even the problem of loyalty is taken up in a kind of purely technical, detached way, with many figures but where purge equals purge, whether Weimar republicans purge (all-too-reluctantly) reactionary officials, Nazis non-Nazis, post-Nazis former Nazis. He does discuss the impact of different regimes, but again in a fashion where laws and directives equal other laws and directives, whether, in one case, they demand implementation of an unemployment insurance system or a road building program, or whether, in another, it is a question of carrying out orders to put a couple of million Jews to death.

The technicalities of field administration (such as "facile communications," legal and other "controls" of responsiveness, "barriers" to effective implementation) may well be comparable whether the "field" is Auschwitz or Landkreis Miesbach, but the problem of "responsiveness" would seem to be affected not only by the technicalities but also by the kind of regime, its policies, its demands. The history of the German "resistance" under Hitler and of the war crimes trials stands as a record of the non-technical problems administrators may encounter. In reference to imperial Germany the author at one point recognizes this when stating: "The confluence of interests and values among all participants in the political process almost automatically produced responsiveness" (198). Had he followed through he would have found that the problem of responsiveness under Weimar was so different from that in present West-Germany basically because there were great general and political issues at stake in Weimar Germany, and even the central government was never really united on policies to deal with them, while now central government and field agents, non-socialists and socialists (who are no longer real ones), non-Nazis and former Nazis are all basically agreed upon the type of society they administer. And under the Nazis it was the even now still unresolved issue of implementing directives of a regime that gradually revealed itself to those in charge of implementation as a criminal one in the literal (legal and moral) sense of the word. To what degree, why, on the basis of what value standards were administrators responsive (or non-responsive) to such directives? Taking up Germany, of all countries, dealing in its section on Nazism specifically with Himmler's police and SS organization, of all administrative branches, can a book like this afford to disregard such questions? Does not "political" science miss its peculiarly "political" dimension when it overlooks problems of this nature over ever so interesting and stimulating questions of techniques?—John H. Herz, *City College, The City University of New York.*

Mexico and the Americans. By Daniel James. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1963. Pp. 450. $7.50.)

This is not a book to satisfy the methodological sophisticate; there is no attempt to organize according to analytical categories in either qualitative or quantitative terms. Nor is it a scholarly book in the sense of paying heed to academia's accepted canons of documentation. There are even instances, as in the case of reference to the Mexican writer, Maria del Refugio Amaya Díaz de León, when the work involved is held by Mr. James to be the definitive basis for interpretations of a key aspect of Mexican life while the title of the work is omitted in the bibliography and the writer's name from the index. However, the book does offer a broad historical panorama of history, including relations with the United States from the first stirrings of the Independence movement, and the style of writing flows easily permitting maximum coverage in minimum space.

Mr. James does not hesitate to form historical judgements and present interpretations which may give rise to inaccuracies and seeming contradictions puzzling to the lay reader and irritating to the professional historian. Moreover, most of the titans among United States interpreters of Mexican history and politics including Cline, Parkes and Tannenbaum come in for their share of criticism. Thus Cline is corrected for his interpretation of the role of Ricardo Flores Magón in the early 1900's and Parkes and Tannenbaum for their interpretations of Madero, as well as other events and heroes.

Mr. James's presentation centers around two major concerns—the development of Mexican nationalism and the evolution of Mexican-United States relations. In the former there is involved an effort to link together the heroes of Independence and the Reform of the mid-nineteenth century as well as leaders of the great Revolution and succeeding governments of this century. All are viewed as integral parts in a continuing tradition which forms the basis of legitimacy for the present regime. In particular, an effort is made to connect the contribution of the leaders of the Reform, such as Juárez, with the contributions of outstanding figures in the Revolution of 1910–17 and after. We are given in English, perhaps for the first time, a statement of the mystique of the Revolutionary heritage much as a Mexican would explain it. In Mr. James's writing the positive acts of every major leader in the Revolutionary tradition stand out over any negative considerations, and each lineal descendant in the nationalist-revolutionary tradition complements and further adds to the contributions of his forebearers. Thus, Carranza stands as an "intransigent" nationalist against United States interests, Obregón provided the beginnings of "a purely Mexican ideology," Calles should receive credit for terminating successfully the struggle for separation of Church and State begun under Juárez, and Cárdenas—more than Juárez or any other—attained for Mexico "national independence." The ideology of these men and their successors is viewed as purely Mexican, pragmatic and rooted in a continuous historical tradition.

For Mr. James the Mexican nationalism which has developed from the revolutionary tradition has evolved steadily together with the outlook of the United States to provide the basis for growing harmony between the two countries. Mexican nationalism is seen as a force basically hostile to Communism and fundamentally compatible with United States interests. The point is made rather well that present United States-Mexican disagreements hardly match the intensity of conflicts in the 1830's and 40's over Texas and Manifest Destiny nor those of the 1920's and 30's over oil and related questions concerning the rights of United States capital in Mexico.

The book closes with a statement of obstacles to United States-Mexican collaboration at the present time, an evaluation of the service rendered by recent United States ambassadors, an effort to explain quirks in Mexican thinking which might be difficult for the outsider to understand and a reaffirmation of faith in a continually growing harmony between the two countries.

Mr. James understands the Mexicans about as well as a Yankee can hope to do. He is fervent in his effort to explain each country to the other and is sometimes overly zealous in accomplishing his goal, but he has given us an interpretation of Mexican nationalism and the intertwined destinies of the two countries which should make a positive contribution to the process of policy formation on both sides of the border.—L. VINCENT PADGETT, *San Diego State College*.

Islamic Jurisprudence: Shafi'i's Risala. TRANSLATED AND WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY MAJID KHADDURI. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1961. $6.75.)

Specialists in Islamic studies will immediately note that it is the sub-title rather than the title which identifies this translation as a major contribution to the study of Islamic jurisprudence and comparative legal theory. The importance of Shafi'i's Risala was established in the ground breaking research of Joseph Schacht; most notably in his *Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence*, Oxford, 1950. That work should be consulted by anyone concerned, but it may be fair to say quite briefly here that Shafi'i's Risala was the most systematic and logically consistent presentation of Islamic jurisprudential thought of its day. All subsequent work has been influenced by these qualities of Shafi'i. Furthermore, and in a more substantive vein, Shafi'i is credited with substituting the principle of the tradition of the Prophet as the source of law for the pre-Islamic notion of the tradition of the community. After Shafi'i, the principle that the tradition of the Prophet was constitutive served as one of the major cultural mechanisms by which borrowed institutions were "Islamized." Of no less importance to students of Islamic political thought is Shafi'i's treatment of the related problems of consensus and reasoning (analogical deduction) as sources of the law. It is the latter two of the four sources of Islamic law that have played so great a part in the theories of Muslim modernists because consensus could be given a democratic interpretation and reasoning a rationalist and scientific interpretation. The inappropriateness of attributing such an interpretation to early Islamic thinkers is made overwhelmingly clear in this translation and in the very useful introduction. The reader who is unfamiliar with classical Islamic themes ought not be put off by the lengthy treatment of the most important source of Islamic law, i.e. the Qur'an, which precedes the matters here discussed. An understanding of how the Qur'an is used as a source of law is indispensable to an understanding of all other problems of Islamic theory.—LEONARD BINDER, *University of Chicago.*

The New Radicalism. BY BRIAN MAGEE. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963. Pp. 238. $5.00.)

Although first published in Britain in 1962 and in America in 1963, most of *The New Radicalism* was clearly written during 1961, at a time when the British Labour Party was only just beginning to recover from the most traumatic internal crisis in its history. The book is a product of that crisis and cannot be understood apart from the circumstances of its creation. It represents a young parliamentary candidate's reaction to the turmoil within his party, and also part of his effort to influence the long-term future of the party. It can be regarded in two quite different ways: as a polemical contribution to political theory, or as a literary document of general interest to students of British politics.

"Political theory," Bryan Magee declares at the outset, "is one of the most important things in life." Having announced his intention "to re-examine the very foundations of left-wing thinking," he proceeds in the first third of the book to assert the primacy of scientific over oracular modes of reasoning. Acceptance of the logic of scientific method, he argues, leads inevitably to a belief in the values of humility, toleration and freedom. By encouraging critical attitudes towards authority, and by making everyone aware of his own immutable fallibility, free discussion and free institutions have the further effect of promoting equality: "You cannot be a lover of freedom without also being an egalitarian." On explicitly moral grounds, Magee asserts that violence is to be abhorred, veracity cherished, and the fact of moral equality acknowledged. "Caring about other people," he writes, "is the emotional basis of radicalism."

All of this is argued with lucidity and passion, but the author would probably be the first to admit that it contains nothing particularly new. He readily acknowledges his debts to Mill, Russell, Popper and even Wittgenstein. Moreover, he tacitly concedes that this kind of "radicalism" is not easy to distinguish from straightforward "libertarianism" and that belief in the desirability of expanding the range of individual choice constitutes an emotional stance rather than a precise criterion for selecting among policies. These earlier philosophical chapters, however, Magee regards as being of primary importance. "It is these," he writes, "that say what I believe most needs saying on the Left today."

For not all elements in the British Labour Party accept Magee's libertarian assumptions. On the contrary, as he points out, a strain persists in the party of repressive, vulgar-Marxist authoritarianism, dating from a time when the working classes could scarcely hope to better their condition by constitutional means and founded, according to Magee, on socialist theory that came into being "before the rise of modern logic, philosophy and science." Sometimes this authoritarian strain leads British socialists to adopt an ambivalent attitude towards Communism; more often it takes the form of a somewhat self-righteous paternalism. Its specifically Marxist component has, Magee maintains, influenced the social and economic assumptions of a high proportion of Labour's more articulate supporters.

In addition, the party suffers from a certain anomalous conservatism and from what the author calls "opposition-mindedness." Far from being entirely modernist and practical in outlook, Labour often seems—or seemed in 1961—to be hidebound by tradition and more concerned with protest than policy. Part of the explanation, Magee believes, lies in the party's traditional association with the working classes, who tend in any case to be socially conservative and in whom generations of exclusion from power have induced a corrosive "us-them" attitude towards politics. The party has also inevitably attracted the support of a few for whom the purpose of politics is not achievement but struggle, not objective accomplishment but self-expression. On them Magee heaps the full, heavy burden of his scorn.

As a portrait of the British Labour Party, *The New Radicalism* cannot, of course, be accepted as definitive: intended to influence more than inform, it often loses sight of the face for the warts. On the whole the author's descriptions are more compelling than his explanations; frequently he does less than justice to his opponents. But polemics should be judged on their own terms. The book may possibly have influenced already the thinking of a substantial number of Labour supporters. It will certainly be read for many years to come by political scientists seeking clues to an understanding of British politics at the beginning of the 1960's.—ANTHONY KING, *Magdalen College, Oxford.*

Soviet Administrative Legality: The Role of the Attorney General's Office. BY GLENN G. MORGAN. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962. Pp. x, 281 pp. $6.00.)

The study of the Soviet Procuracy (the "Attorney General's Office") is a valuable contribution to Soviet studies. Although Professor Morgan's careful documentation reveals that genuine advances have been made in Soviet legality in recent years, the work also leaves little doubt that such advances have not been accompanied by progress towards "the rule of law" (p. 129).

The post-Stalin system has changed and many of the changes were surely desirable. Whether or not totalitarianism has relaxed with the disappearance of Stalinist terror, however, is another question. Indeed, in the opinion of the reviewer, the Procuracy is but one of several more subtle arms of a totalitarian system that is more efficient than that of Stalin. Professor Morgan's findings are hardly incompatible with this point of view.

Professor Morgan's discussion of the history of the Russian Procuracy is further support of a point first heard in an oral discussion by Professor Julian Towster. The more one learns of Russian affairs, the more he is struck with how little change there really is. Thus, the Soviet Procuracy is not only a revival of a Tsarist instrument of autocratic rule (invented by Peter the Great), but its present form is more akin to the earlier Tsarist Procuracy—that is as it existed prior to the judicial reform of 1864 (p. 21).

Soviet Administrative Legality provides still another perspective for viewing one of the major problems of a monolithic system of rule. Not unlike other systems, the Soviets have found need for creating a complex of agencies to carry out the public business. Leadership is provided by the Party. The various governmental ministries administer the laws. The Procuracy supervises the execution of the laws. Such institutions, and many of their problems, are very familiar to students of comparative constitutional systems. What is unfamiliar, however, and Professor Morgan's book demonstrates the problem again in regard to the Procuracy, is the strength of the tendency for a Soviet agency to encompass everything.

Much of the Soviet criticism of the Procuracy has pointed to the failure of its officials to find their limitations, that is, their inability to distinguish between "general supervision" over the laws and administrative execution. Remembering, however, that there is no independent court (or concept of individual independence, period) in the U.S.S.R. and that the Procurators, like all else, are bound first, last, and always to serving the central Party will, it would be truly remarkable if the Procuracy had not attempted to appear "in the role of 'specialists of all trades' " (p. 159). After all, Communist systems must rest on the assumption that everything is everybody's business, but when this is so, how can institutional efficiency ever be achieved?

Professor Morgan's well documented, thoughtful work leads to a greater understanding of many aspects of the Soviet political system. Unfortunately, however, American doctoral dissertations have, in the reviewer's opinion, far too strong a tendency to concentrate upon pedantic detail that too often is at the expense of more imaginative analysis. That this book was first a Ph.D. dissertation there can be no doubt.—ROY D. LAIRD, *The University of Kansas.*

Africa Must Unite. BY KWAME NKRUMAH. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963. Pp. xvii, 229. $5.95.)

Ghana's President Kwame Nkrumah dedicates the latest restatement of his political creed to the realization of the Pan-African vision. The *Osagyefo* came to the Addis Ababa Conference of Independent African States in May, 1963, with a detailed set of proposals for an African political federation, which went much further than the loosely structured Organization of African Unity finally adopted. *Africa Must Unite* is intended as the fully developed brief for the Ghanaian project.

The greater part of the book, however, is devoted to a scathing indictment of colonialism in Africa, and an analysis of the achievement and consolidation of independence in Ghana. Many of the ideas propounded are, of course, familiar from Nkrumah's public statements, his autobiography, *Ghana*, and the edited collection of speeches published in 1961 under the title, *I Speak of Freedom.* For the student of African politics, the most interesting section is the explanation and defense of a number of aspects of Ghana's domestic policy, many of which have been widely criticized abroad. He argues that the original constitution was imposed upon Ghana by the colonizer as ransom for independence, with such unacceptable (to the CPP) features as entrenched provisions for regional assemblies and traditional authorities. Accordingly, the first appropriate opportunity (1960) was taken to prepare a republican constitution of purely African pedigree, which would assure a strong, centralized state. Authoritarian measures such as restrictions on the press, he maintains, were very reluctantly undertaken because a regionalist opposition was undermining the state itself.

Although the basic themes are the same, there are some discernible nuances which distinguish this from President Nkrumah's earlier works. The indictment of colonialism is rather harsher in tone, perhaps explicable in terms of the sharpening struggle in southern Africa, and Nkrumah's disappointments in the handling of the Congo crisis by Western powers and the UN. There are some surprising bouquets for traditional authorities in general, and *Osagyefo's* old adversary, the *Asantehene,* in particular: "The adaptation of our chiefs to what must, for them, be distressing exigencies created by the changing relations in the national polity, has been remarkable" (p. 84). New light is also shed on the complex and delicate task of Africanizing the administration, as well as the frictions of the period 1951–1957 when Nkrumah was head of government but Gold Coast was still a colony. There is useful elaboration of the Ghana leader's views on the role of expatriate investment, and promotion of economic and social modernization.

On Pan-Africanism, Nkrumah offers a relatively dispassionate analysis of the evolution of events from 1957 leading up to Addis Ababa. He does make clear his doubts whether states associated with the French Community or Common Market can be genuinely independent, but he carefully avoids a polemic tone in describing the days of Casablanca and Monrovia (or Brazzaville) groupings. He suggests as an immediate objective achievement of joint economic planning, a unified military command, and a single foreign policy. Nothing is farther from the mark than the suggestion frequently made that President Nkrumah merely seeks a larger stage for personal aggrandizement; his dedication to Pan-Africanism was shown by the good grace with which he accepted rejection of his own specific blueprint at Addis Ababa in favor of the more limited scheme put forward by Ethiopia.

The book is weakest when it strays farthest from home for its supporting evidence, but a catalogue of small errors would be superfluous here. *Africa Must Unite* is a substantial contribution to our understanding of the rationale for Ghanaian policy. Nkrumah remains a motor force in Pan-African politics, and this major statement of his aims and accomplishments is important to all students of Africa.—M. CRAWFORD YOUNG, *The University of Wisconsin.*

Dimensions of Japan. BY LAWRENCE OLSON. (New York: American Universities Field Staff, 1963. Pp. 403. $6.50.)

Dr. Lawrence Olson, a keen observer of the contemporary Japanese scene has given us a penetrating study of present day Japan in which events personalities, and problems are viewed through Japanese eyes as well as his own. This is a selection of thirty articles taken from some fifty he wrote on political, economic, and social subjects between 1955 and 1965 for the American Universities Field Service.

Dimensions of Japan reflects the author's firm grasp of the subject matter and insights which are the result of observation and analysis aided by his association and sharing of intellectual experience with a number of Japanese. As such it is unique among works which have appeared in the last few years. It ranges widely over such diverse topics as elections, political parties, relations with Asian countries, birth control, divorce, education, ethics, and family budgets.

Japan's speedy economic recovery resulting in one of the world's highest growth rates in her gross national product has been a miracle of the postwar era. By contrast, however, there has been nothing even remotely comparable in the political sphere. To be sure, there have been some noteworthy achievements, but they have been so completely overshadowed by economic achievements that they have paled into relative insignificance, especially in face of the magnitude and variety of political problems vexing the nation.

Among the most urgently needed changes for the nurturing of the democratic process in Japan is the "modernization" of political parties and leadership which are plagued by factionalism. Parties are critically in need of organizational overhauling and streamlining and radical change and improvement in methods of financing. Also, as emphasized by Takeo Miki, an influential member of the Diet and the Liberal Democratic party, "the party men simply have got to study and learn more about how to carry on the business of the Diet." (p. 344)

What makes political party streamlining and regeneration so urgent is the fact that the number of ex-bureaucrats in the Diet has increased greatly in the postwar period. These retired government officials have joined the ranks of the conservative party, gained control of committee chairmanships and are exercising strong influence in the legislative process (p. 161) resulting in the overshadowing of the career party men.

The author brings out the fact that the conservatism of the Socialists is in many respects much more pronounced than is the case with the conservative party and that the Socialist party is in fact constituted of "theoretical incongruities and rival cliques." (p. 235). Today the chief problem facing the Socialist party is how to transcend labor union support and increase support among small industries and farmers (p. 159) in order to rise above a class party. Without this metamorphosis it has little chance of winning an election in the forseeable future.

There exists at present a strong mutual distrust between the conservatives and the Socialists. In fact the stand off of the opposing parties were so fierce that many thoughtful persons despaired at times of parliametary government. (p. 6). But "the Japanese are still buying time for their Western modelled institutions to develop an inner meaning and become a binding faith." (p. 237) Dr. Olson believes that "Japan intends to let nothing stop its efforts to keep up with other countries for the 'latest' whether it be a gadget for the home or for the nation."

It has not been possible in this brief review to give even a fair sampling of the wealth of information and insights that are interspersed throughout this multi-dimensional work. This reviewer feels that *Dimensions of Japan* is a must for the general reader as well as the serious student interested in finding out the *modus vivendi* of Japanese political and social life and especially in getting some idea of the problems of present day Japan.—CHITOSHI YANAGA, *Yale University*.

Evolution or Chaos: Dynamics of Latin-American Government and Politics. BY KARL M. SCHMITT AND DAVID D. BURKS. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1963. Pp. 307. $6.50.)

The authors, who served as State Department research analysts during the later years of the Eisenhower administration, intended this book as a policy guide for the new administration of President Kennedy, urging a continuation and extension of the more liberal United States policy toward Latin America that had come in the wake of the Cuban Revolution. As the authors put it, Mr. Kennedy "beat them to the punch." The Alliance for Progress embodied an awareness of those conditions of change in Latin America that they sought to report. The argument of this book, then, belongs to the literature of reappraisal which was predominant in writing on Latin-American problems in the late 1950's. It adds little that is new to the argument for reform in Latin America.

Although the approach is by now unexceptional, the endeavor was not in vain, for it culminated in a book that would make a fine undergraduate text. It is elementary, presupposing little previous study of the region. However, it is not oversimplified. It communicates well the complexity of contemporary Latin-American politics. It is organized about general problems of the region as a whole, but carefully discusses these in terms of the experience of individual nations.

The book is not burdened by the conventions of textbook organization. One does not feel that the vitality and significance of contemporary Latin-American politics has been anesthetized so that the more inert matter can fit appropriately into chapters on The Land and the People, The Executive, The Legislature, and so on. Rather, the argument flows naturally from an assessment of the spectrum of attitudes and viewpoints competing in the Latin-American political arena, to a consideration of the changing character of the social and economic problems and institutions of the region, through separate chapters on interest groups and parties, and culminates in a discussion of the various types of political systems (traditional dictatorships, competitive systems, non-competitive systems, mass totalitarianism) which represent alternative styles of coping with change in contemporary Latin America.

There are a few surprises, few new twists of theory or interpretation. The authors say the usual things about Stroessner, Somoza, and Castro. The extent of their desire to go out on a limb is probably the statement: "We do not wish to propagate a deterministic philosophy with respect to developments in Latin America, but the evidence of past intransigence, and the unwillingness of hostile forces to compromise political, social, and economic differences, do not lead to optimism for peaceful evolutionary settlements everywhere."

The book is sober, cautious, descriptive, conventional. Nonetheless it is thorough, solidly packed with information about the figures and forces at work in contemporary Latin America. It is particularly recommended to those teachers who want a "sound, basic" text, organized about those contemporary problems of change that are the concern of most students of Latin-American affairs.—CHARLES W. ANDERSON, *University of Wisconsin*.

A Metropolis Votes: The London County Council Election of 1961. BY L. J. SHARPE. (London: The London School of Economics and Political Science, Greater London Papers No. 8, 1962. Pp. vi, 96. 6s.)

In the postwar scurry to examine parliamentary elections under the academic microscope, the analysis of local elections in Britain has received scant attention. For this reason, Sharpe's study of the 1961 election to the London County Council is a welcome addition to the literature on voting behavior.

In the first part of the volume, the author surveys the entire election, describing campaign activities and analyzing the voting returns and the socio-economic background of the candidates. As was to be expected, the turnout of voters was lowest in the socially homogeneous areas. Conservative candidates did not fare well in marginal constituencies, but they made some gains in safe Labour territory, although the percentages of increase are slightly deceiving in light of the low base figure in a number of regions. While the Liberals ensnared votes in both Labour and Tory preserves, their best catches were in the Conservative districts. In the discussion of candidates, several comparisons are made between the winners and losers. Although the LCC is more hospitable to women than most local councils, it is nevertheless a masculine assembly, and it draws upon a narrow spectrum of occupations, chiefly middle-class. Aspirants who carried the Conservative banner were younger than their Labour opponents, and a surprisingly large number of candidates from the three parties were not residents of the districts they contested.

The second part of the study is a depth focus upon the election in the highly marginal constituency of Clapham. Employing an interview sample of 776 electors, the author seeks to investigate the phenomenon of non-voting and the socio-political character of actual voters, linking his data with previous studies when they are comparable. According to the findings, a significantly large proportion of non-voters abstained involuntarily and not because they were apathetic. (There is no attempt, however, to explain why the turnout of Clapham voters is only 47 per cent in a local contest and 76 per cent in a general election.) Voting propensity was highest among older women and among those citizens who had developed local roots through lengthy residence and owner-occupancy. Conversely, abstentions were most frequent among newcomers to the community, renters in private dwellings, and younger women, especially the married group. In terms of social rank, the upper segments of both the middle and working classes exhibited the strongest disposition to vote, but the working class as a whole was slightly ahead of the middle class in going to the polls. This study also discloses a positive relation between voting and the intensity of party allegiance, while suggesting that voters were only a little more knowledgeable about local affairs than non-voters.

The data relating to political choice indicates that agreement with party policies among Labour adherents varied directly with the degree of commitment, while Conservative voters tended to give increased support to the Labour position as their allegiance to the party diminished. In line with other studies, the Clapham survey shows that the Conservative Party appeals to middle-class groups, older voters, and women; Labour, on the other hand, draws heavily upon the working class, the younger age groups, and men.

In addition to presenting useful data in a well-organized fashion, the author captures for the reader the flavor of the campaign. Although he occasionally interrupts his report to inject suggestions for reform, such as party designation on the ballot and increased remuneration for councillors, the digressions do not mar the superior quality of the study. This work helps to fill gaps in our knowledge about voting behavior on the local level, and one hopes that it will be followed by similar studies in sites outside the London area.—JOHN E. TURNER, *University of Minnesota.*

America's Failure in China 1941–1950. BY TANG TSOU. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963. Pp. xviii, 614. $12.50.)

How the Far East Was Lost; American Policy and the Creation of Communist China, 1941–1949. BY ANTHONY KUBEK. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1963. Pp. xv, 480. $8.75.)

Foreign policy can hardly succeed unless deliberated objectives of national interest are brought into close relationship to the political situations to which they are addressed. The necessity for *deliberating* objectives arises from the fact that national interest, in the abstract, is no more instructive than "the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism," in the abstract; in either case, the policy-making complex must produce a decision. But, by definition, the decision must address itself to an external situation for which a different range of information must be evaluated, and about which precision and accuracy are somewhat less certain. Professors Kubek and Tsou are evidently agreed that American policy toward China between 1941 and 1949/1950 "failed," but they are in obvious disagreement on everything else—the decision(s) as to objectives, and the evaluation of the situation(s) to which they were addressed. They have used exhaustive bibliographies and have carefully footnoted the "facts" they consider most revealing, but their judgments are derived from two quite different sets of assumptions, and the reader gains the impression they have been living in two different worlds. Kubek's book carries dust-jacketed endorsements by David Rowe, Patrick J. Hurley, and Robert Morris (former counsel to the Senate's Internal Security Sub-Committee); Tsou's would most probably not have received their endorsements, but this should not concern him.

Kubek's foreword is written by Professor Charles C. Tansill, Tsou's by Professor Hans J. Morgenthau. Each does a good job of characterization, but Tansill throws a stronger block against the critical reviewer by saying that Kubek's volume "will earn the sharpest criticisms of the motley hordes that crowded the Roosevelt and Truman bandwagons," but remains "a *must book* for any American who wants to know why the present sawdust Caesar, Khrushchev, can insult at will the President of the United States and hurl continual threats to 'bury' all Americans." The rest is heady stuff. One may avoid association with Tansill's "motley hordes," I suppose, by not expressing the sharpest criticism within his capability, but Kubek is writing for a different kind of motley horde. He has written a one-sided guide-to-China that will appeal to the John Birch Society and the devotees of Pat McCarran, Joe McCarthy, and other extreme Americanists. Kubek is far more concerned with the Soviet Union and Soviet subversion in the United States and China than he is with American policy toward China, as such. Drawing most heavily on information supplied to congressional investigating committees by parties in interest in the bureaucratic struggle for prestige, power, and influence, Kubek has no difficulty in accepting prosecutor's advocacies as definitive, judicial conclusions. Thus, it is obvious to him that the interest of Harry Dexter White, Alger Hiss, Owen Lattimore and Lauchlin Currie "in Soviet expansion was not merely academic"; and that "Roosevelt, not Stalin, shaped the growth of modern Russia. . . " Reading the committees' documentations, the White, Stilwell and Hurley papers, and other sources, Kubek holds that "the connecting thread drawing them together" is "both a friendly attitude toward Communism on the part of many prominent officials in the Roosevelt-Truman administrations and a belief that in the future, the Soviet and American systems could abide in friendly fashion, . . . " (p. vii). He tells us that the "Communists alone" could not have achieved the China debacle: "The Communist conquest of China was secured by non-Communists who had their own reasons for doing what they did" (p. 448).

Ultimately, Kubek's polemic is concerned with world communism, as though he had found some sovereign solution to that problem. He concludes: "It should be evident that the Communists cannot gain the world unless our own government helps them to do it. . . . If our present objective is *maintenance* of the territorial and administrative integrity of the *United States*, . . . then the mistakes made in China should be repeated no more. But if our basic policy is destruction of the territorial and administrative integrity of the United States—that is, world government—the methods used in China are appropriate for the preparatory Fabian communization of the world" [whatever that means!] (p. 448–449). The trouble is that Kubek sets his scene *in Washington*, not in China, about whose internal affairs he shows no shred of insight. When he speaks of "mistakes made *in China*" and "methods used *in China*" he completely ignores the mistakes and methods of the Chinese government of that day. All is conspiracy: "The betrayal of Asia to world Communism . . . was accomplished by means of complete mobilization of all echelons of Communist infiltration into every important area of American life" (p. 287). Asia? The Far East? It all comes to China: "The Soviet leaders planned, too, to set up a Communist government in defeated Japan. . . . They reckoned without the greater brilliance of one man of incorruptible integrity. The conqueror [*sic*] of Japan became her savior—General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. There was no one to save China. Some tried" (Prospectus).

Professor Tsou brings an entirely different perspective to bear on this tortured subject. For him, the scene of action is *China*. He knows, for example, that China had been at war with Japan since 1937, and that calculations of American policy on some assumption that Pearl Harbor was the decisive point for China are illusory and beside the point. (Kubek, accusing Roosevelt of provoking the Japanese to attack at Pearl Harbor, posits that Hirota might have persuaded the Japanese military to abandon goals in East and South East Asia in preference to some direct action against Soviet territories in the Far East—in total disregard of Hirota's impotence within the dynamics of the Japanese political system.) The Chinese people were by 1941 so deeply committed to the anti-Japanese war that Chiang Kai-shek could not possibly have survived an appeasement of Japanese ambitions, and one of Tsou's most sophisticated themes has to do with the inner tensions of Kuomintang-Chinese Communist politics that would have made Chiang's surrender tantamount to political suicide. Starting historically, Tsou holds that the American open-door policy embraced three ingredients. Two were explicit: freedom for commercial competition, and territorial and administrative integrity for China; one was implicit: that the foregoing were (possibly because of erroneous calculation) to be achieved by peaceful (non-military) means. This combination of idealistic objectives unattended by willingness to implement them by military action persisted into and throughout the anti-Japanese war and its sequel. He therefore assesses the policy problems of World War II against a total background of strategic requirements and historic attitudes, and concludes quite clearly that the United States had not the military capability in the midst of the war of acting militarily to achieve the objectives of the idealistic historic policy toward China. Tsou seems not at all persuaded that the idealistic objectives could have been achieved in China, considering the state in which its affairs were found after 1941, even with the most massive kind of American military commitment.

The hinge of the argument turns around Roosevelt's early decision to consider China as a "great power," a judgment resisted by Churchill. Granting that such a decision logically followed upon earlier verbal commitments to the broad-gauge open door concept, Tsou holds that "the policy of making China a great power . . . never had a chance to succeed," because: (1) four years of war (1937–1941) had already weakened the Nationalist Government "and produced internal developments in China which militated against this optimistic assumption" even before Pearl Harbor; (2) the inability of Chinese forces to defend air bases in "east China" against Japanese capture and the growing success of American naval and air operations in the Western Pacific combined to produce the decision to abandon China as the base for the final assault upon Japan, and to reduce the goal of unifying China to a non-consequential strategic priority; and (3) "Many American officials were not sufficiently aware of the magnitude of the task of making China a strong and friendly power and of the inevitable obstacles to American endeavors to influence the internal developments of that country," so that "purely military projects which promised to produce obvious military results were given priority over military programs [of sustained aid to Chiang] which might have had at least an indirect bearing on the political objective" (pp. 46–47). Tsou is not particularly happy with the result. He identifies errors of interpretation and judgment in implementing American policy, but tends to assess them as carryovers from the excess of idealistic optimism about the Chinese potential—which was steadily eroded as the real nature of the Chiang regime came to be known. (Kubek has held that failure to hold to the ideal of a unified China resulted from the conspiracy; Tsou specifically rejects the conspiracy theory.)

Tsou's conclusion offers a useful, generalized view of the situation after the Korean debacle of 1950, against the previous experience: "Emotional attitudes and unresolved problems reinforce each other to harden Sino-American antagonisms which, in day-to-day struggles, overshadow the long-term Soviet-American rivalry for world leadership. . . . Traditional sympathy for the underdog of the Far East has been superseded by fear of the awakened giant of Asia. . . .One could hardly find a more sobering example of the tragic results produced by a policy of good intentions and high ideals which lacked the foundation of a correlative estimate of self-interest and which was not supported by military power equal to the noble tasks" (pp. 590–591). Tsou has the wit to understand the importance of idealistic attitudes in the American view of the external world, and he does not argue that we should throw them away. What he argues is the Kennanesque case: If you do insist upon interpreting your policy in idealist terms, you must be prepared for disappointment if diplomatic measures are not balanced by appropriate measures of military commitment.

In retrospect, we may see that "territorial and administrative integrity" and " 'great power' status" for China were instrumentalities rather than informed objectives of policy. Now that they have been substantially achieved, but under a hostile aegis, we find them distasteful and would replace them with different instrumentalities—still without having related military power to unambiguous policy objectives. After more than a decade of cold war experience with "political warfare" and the interventionist tactics of "counter-insurgency," we have not yet learned how to make people in such small countries as Laos and Viet-nam behave as we wish, or to accept our national ideals as their own. George Marshall evidently thought it better to let the Chinese hammer out their own solutions than to embroil us in a morass from which he saw no possibility of extrication—particularly when our more limited military capability of that day was being committed to more manageable situations elsewhere in the world. Was that treachery?—H. Arthur Steiner, *University of California* (*Los Angeles*).

Soviet Communes. By Robert G. Wesson. (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1963. Pp. 275. $7.50.)

The existing collective farm in the Soviet Union has become so familiar that we tend to take it for granted. Actually, however, there were, besides the state farm (*sovkhoz*), three types of collective farm (*kolkhoz*) competing for approval from the leadership and the peasants prior to the 1930's. In addition to the *artel* (the surviving type), there was the *toz*, a moderate form in which only the most important field tasks were conducted jointly, and the commune, a "higher" form in which all property was collectivized, most activities (including many household ones) carried out together, and the proceeds often distributed equally.

In *Soviet Communes* Robert G. Wesson has studied exhaustively this latter type of collective farm. He reminds us that, with a few exceptions, the Soviet commune was not a huge unit with administrative functions, such as has become well-known in China. Instead, it usually consisted of perhaps fifty persons who occupied a confiscated estate and who moved into its manor as a communal living quarters.

Communes varied considerably in their practices, and anyone studying them faces serious difficulties. Russian materials are quite incomplete, and statistics are often fragmentary or contradictory. Nevertheless, Mr. Wesson has done an extremely thorough job of piecing together information from a wide variety of Soviet and emigrant sources. One gains the distinct impression that there are few published facts about Soviet communes which have not been included in the book.

Indeed, Mr. Wesson has produced a veritable encyclopedia on communes. The first third of the book consists of chapters on non-Russian communes from New Harmony to the kibbutzim and on the Russian pre-revolutionary communes and the attitudes of Russian political figures and parties towards them.

While *Soviet Communes* is a very valuable sourcebook, it is less successful as an integrated book attempting to "cast light upon the inner springs of the Bolshevik Revolution and the Soviet State."

Even the basic evaluation of the commune emerges somewhat unclearly. On pp. 211–213 there is a convincing discussion of the "impracticality of the commune," partly because of its need for costly construction once all the confiscated estates were occupied. Then, however, we read in the conclusion that poverty is an argument for extreme collectivism. There is the suggestion that "the big, futuristic, mobilizing commune" (which is hardly discussed) might have been most desirable from an economic point of view.

The significance of the demise of the communes in the 1930's is also clouded. Mr. Wesson concludes that this event was part of a general "turn away from revolutionary ideals, from glorious innovation to traditional ways." Yet, he repeatedly asserts that the communes were never really part of the Bolshevik leadership's revolutionary ideas, that the state farms with nationalized property and a worker-like labor force fitted better with Bolshevik ideology, and that Lenin was never enthusiastic about extreme egalitarianism in the short run.

Although the communes are seen as reflections of the passions and primitive forces of "the Revolution," this phrase is defined very narrowly. The book makes clear that the vast majority of peasants were even less interested in the communes than the Bolshevik leadership. (The communes never contained one percent of the peasants, and they were plagued with a serious turnover of membership.) "The Revolution" which they represented appears to have been the exclusive property of the Sectarians, anarchists, Left Social-Revolutionaries, and Left Bolsheviks.

For a person sufficiently interested in communes or early Soviet society to work at this work, it can furnish a number of valuable insights. One cannot help wishing, however, that Mr. Wesson had followed up his impressive research with more care in the organization and integration of his material.—Jerry F. Hough, *University of Illinois.*

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INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW AND ORGANIZATION

The Propaganda Gap. By Walter Joyce. (New York: Harper & Row, 1963. Pp. ix, 144. $3.95.)

Few observers examine U. S. policy in the "Information" field without finding it sorely and somewhat strangely inadequate. Walter Joyce, journalist and senior editor of *Printers' Ink,* is no exception. Starting from the premise that the Cold War is by definition a struggle to influence the minds and loyalties of men by non-military means, Joyce argues first, that propaganda is the major weapon appropriate to ideological conflict; second, that by ineffective use of that weapon, "we are losing the only war we are in"; and third, that an effective propaganda program is not incompatible with a free society. His book is brief, clearly written, and directed to a broad non-specialist audience. It falls well within the author's definition of propaganda: "any word or deed, short of the use of physical force, designed to make others think or act the way the initiator wants them to think or act." The book is a communication calculated to persuade.

The trials of U.S.I.A. are utilized to illustrate the low esteem in which the propaganda function is held by dominant American officials. Joyce reminds us that in two decades our propaganda arm has had five names and twelve directors, and that its annual ordeal at the hands of the redoubtable Congressman Rooney resembles a bureaucratic version of the perils of Pauline. "Left to the mercy of Congress" by successive Administrations and Department of State heads, the Information Agency repeatedly finds itself denied funds because it has failed to accomplish what it was previously denied the funds to undertake. The explanation for both inadequate executive and congressional support Joyce finds in the rather curious American distaste for propaganda; that is, for the self-conscious utilization of communications to achieve specified objectives. This distaste is curious, he believes, in a society that has perfected the techniques and media of persuasive communications, and makes full use of them, not only in the market place, but in domestic politics. Reluctance to manipulate minds does not deter Congressmen from utilizing persuasive communications and motivations research in their own campaigns. But our propaganda program has been oriented largely to informing rather than persuading, and it, like our aid programs, is undertaken without benefit of sophisticated motivations research which would provide a clear picture of the needs, values and expectations of those with whom we attempt to communicate.

The author presents once again the dismal contrast between U. S. and Communist bloc broadcasting and publications programs, between military and information program expenditures (Murrow reminded Congress in 1961 that the total budget request of U.S.I.A. was less than the cost of one Polaris submarine), between the expenditures of U.S.I.A. and the public relations budgets of major private industries. ("The U.S.I.A. budget is less than General Motors spends to sell cars or Proctor and Gamble spends to sell soap.") He argues for a systematic approach to communications objectives; for an end to ethnocentrism in foreign policy execution; for a vigorous propaganda program aimed at persuading; for more comprehensive utilization of private individuals and professional communications experts; for integration of the information program into foreign policy making at the highest level; and for reorganization of the agencies engaged in foreign affairs. His proposal for the reorganization of the agencies of foreign affairs agrees with the recommendations of former Senator William Benton, and a 1960 Brookings Institution report, "The Formulation and Administration of United States Foreign Policy." Briefly, it proposes the establishment of a super Department of Foreign Affairs, which would include cabinet ranking secretaries of state, information and cultural affairs, and economic operations, each possessing coordinate rank and influence in shaping foreign policy. Only such a reorganization would, he argues, end the unjustifiable priority given to traditional diplomacy in the conduct of foreign affairs.

As already suggested, *The Propaganda Gap* is polemical rather than scholarly in character. It will please persons oriented to vigorous political warfare, irritate those whom the author terms "anti-propagandists," and inform general readers of some basic facts about U. S. Information policy. It will be of little use or interest to scholars in the communications and foreign policy fields.—Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, *Trinty College.*

Finnish Foreign Policy: Studies in Foreign Politics. (Helsinki: Finnish Political Science Association, 1963, Pp. 232.)

Two dominant themes emerge from this volume of fourteen essays by as many Finnish authors. The first is, as Ranke saw, the primacy which foreign policy should have over domestic politics if any political system, but especially a less powerful system, is to survive. The second is that, viewed in terms of foreign policy problems Finland is Eastern European rather than Northern European. As a political concept, Eastern Europe can be defined as that part of Europe for which the relationship with, and the proximity of, Russia is the fundamental fact of political life. Perhaps because of the delicacy considered appropriate when addressing a non-Finnish audience, the authors fail almost completely to indicate the high degree to which most Finnish political leaders since the achievement of independence in 1917 have been ignorant of these dominant realities. Only two essays deal with the relationship between foreign policy and domestic politics, and neither is satisfactory. Jaakko Nousiainen's discussion of parties and foreign policy is vague and superficial, while K. Killinen's approach to the press and foreign policy lacks both analytical focus and factual precision. The only contribution dealing specifically with Finnish-Soviet relations is Jaakko Auer's excellent but limited account of post-1944 Finnish reparations deliveries to the Soviet Union. It is regrettable that there are, in fact, no detailed analyses of Finnish policy towards, say, the Soviet Union, Germany, the United Kingdom, or Sweden.

It would seem self-evident that only independent states have foreign policies. Essays by Pentti Renvall and Jaakko Numminen concerning the periods (respectively) when Finland was (before 1809) the last province of the Swedish Kingdom and (from 1809 to 1917) a Grand Duchy of the Russian Emperor therefore are out of place in the present volume, as these authors themselves appear to realize. This symposium could well have been more appropriately entitled "Finland in International Politics." Such a rechristening would also have made more nearly relevant Lauri Hyvämäki's interesting and provocative interpretation of Finland's position in the mainstream of European thought.

Among those previously-unmentioned essays which fall properly under the present title, the most inclusive are Max Jakobson's overview of Finnish foreign policy since 1917 and L. A. Puntila's summary of Finnish neutrality. Erik Castrén, the eminent expert in international law, treats Finland's treaty relations with authority and clarity. Bengt Broms and Jaakko Ilvessalo discuss in a satisfactory manner Finland's policy towards and in, respectively, the League of Nations and the United Nations. Risto Hyvärinen analyzes the Finnish machinery for making and implementing foreign policy decisions. The description of Finnish commercial policy by Nils Meinander is excessively compressed. Pertti Pesonen provides a fascinating and highly original insight into private (but often officially subsidized) Finnish societies for establishing and maintaining international contacts. To this reader, at least, Pesonen's essay comes closest to conveying a lively sense of scholarly inquiry. Some of the other contributions approach perilously close to the style of after-dinner speeches. This literary quality nevertheless makes bearable the unimaginative and inconsistent translation and frequent repetition between essays. There is a useful, but highly derivative, bibliography of works dealing with Finnish foreign policy published in English, French, and German.

Finnish Foreign Policy demonstrates that the study of international politics is still relatively underdeveloped in Finland. A companion symposium dealing with Finnish domestic politics, *Democracy in Finland* (noted in this Review, March, 1961), was much superior in level of analysis. There appear two noteworthy gaps in the present authors' knowledge: that which has yet to be provided by specialized studies into numerous aspects of Finnish foreign policy, and that which could be provided by a greater familiarity with the recent advances, in the United States and elsewhere, in the comparative study of foreign policies. The value of the present volume would have been greatly increased if the latter deficiency, at least, had been remedied.—Marvin Rintala, *Boston College.*

Foreign Aid and the Defense of Southeast Asia. By Colonel Amos A. Jordan, Jr. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962. Pp. 272.)

Since this book was written in 1960, much water has gone over the foreign aid dams of Washington and much blood into the rice paddies of Southeast Asia. Books on foreign aid have come thick and fast over the past years, but in view of the current crisis in Viet-Nam, Colonel Jordan's book takes on a particularly topical importance. The author, a Rhodes Scholar with a Ph.D. degree from Columbia University who is professor of Social Sciences at West Point, obviously has the professional qualifications to write such a study. In addition, he served in 1959 with the committee headed by William H. Draper, Jr., which was one of the many bodies appointed at one time or another by various Presidents to get a "fresh view" on foreign aid—usually with little if any results.

It was in the course of his duties with the Draper Committee that Colonel Jordan went to Southeast Asia, interviewing dozens of American military aid officials as well as some of their native counterparts. In that sense, his book is an "inside job," with the advantages of such an on-the-ground view of things. In many aspects, he is much more candid than some of the civilian aid appraisers; as a military man, he feels that to have given truck-towed medium artillery to the Vietnamese Army when mule-borne heavy mortars would have been just as effective but cheaper and more jungle-going, was, to say the least, dubious. He makes the cogent point—apparently forgotten since, as more and more sophisticated "hardware" joins the Vietnamese fray—that "austerity not only has cost advantages but sometimes also has benefits in military effectiveness."

He also makes the often-neglected point, in his chapter on the "Art of Giving Military Assistance," that the Military Assistance Program is often used by the American military services to get rid of obsolescent matériel at high replacement costs charged off to military assistance. That point, of course, is carefully ignored by those who feel that "foreign aid costs too much." This is, in part, compensated by the appetites of various dictators who, for prestige reasons, demand (and usually get) advanced weaponry whose net military effect is quasi-nil—because it takes more than four supersonic jet fighters to become a military power—but whose political effect is a small-scale arms race which can become very complicated when the Communist bloc suddenly steps into the arena and begins to provide matching weapons for the other side.

Some points which Jordan makes in passing require (and should have been given by him, as a social scientist) more emphasis. There is the now carefully hushed-up fact that the Pentagon advocated, *as early as 1958*, a substantial reduction in the Laotian armed forces on the sound ground that the Laotians ("ours," at least) would never fight. But the military realists were overridden by the civilian saber-rattlers on the other side of the Potomac with their so-called "hardnosed" policies. Laos got itself a big army, paid for by the U. S. Its disasters are now an unfortunate part of Asian history. Jordan also states that more than 100,000 (!!) foreign soldiers have been trained *in* the United States in the past decade. This makes the military of 80-odd countries by far the *largest* single foreign group to have come in direct contact with the United States. A study is long overdue on the relationship between the rise in military coups d'état and the foreign training received by the plotters; for it is totally impossible to give a small group of men a tremendous edge in firepower and combat effectiveness over the rest of the population without (unless they receive, along with it, a strong dose of civics) exposing them to the temptation of using their newly-acquired knowledge as a highroad to political power.

All that, unfortunately, does not come out as clearly in focus in Jordan's book as it does, for example, in John D. Montgomery's *The Politics of Foreign Aid: American Experience in Southeast Asia*, also published by Praeger at about the same time. Jordan, on the contrary, concentrates on the techniques—and, even more so, on the technicalities—of military-aid giving to the point where very often it is difficult to differentiate between the "officialese" of the bone-dry Draper Report and the author's own style. But it is understandably difficult for an officer on active duty to express personal views and opinions—particularly critical ones—on a subject that is as sensitive as military assistance in Southeast Asia, and in a manuscript which has to be submitted to security review. It is no doubt the latter which is responsible for the numerous countries "X", "Y", and "Z", with which the book deals.

Even so, Colonel Jordan reaches some conclusions which, in the parlous Southeast Asian situation of today, have not lost their validity. "Military assistance," writes Jordan, " . . . is not a flexible instrument. As it commits the donor's prestige to a greater degree than other kinds of aid, once begun it cannot easily be reduced or terminated."

That truth is now slowly sinking in in many places, and with a vengeance.—BERNARD B. FALL, *Howard University.*

The Abolition of War. BY WALTER MILLIS AND JAMES REAL. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1963, Pp. 217. $4.50.)

Some books on public affairs are attempts to move men to act; others seek simply to inform through analysis or through the description of new or unnoticed data; *The Abolition of War* is, however, a persuasive effort to cause people to change their minds.

The first four chapters develop a theme that is now quite familiar: that military preparations and the resort to war in international relations were functional practices until some time in the nineteenth century. Since then, the "war system" has become increasingly dysfunctional so that, at present, a massive use of military force wholly fails to accomplish the results traditionally expected of it. Millis and Real appear to be completely sure that "military power [has been] raised to so dreadful a magnitude as to be unusable in either war or politics" (p. 58). It is on this basis that they declare that the abolition of war is possible. They view the growth of the national security establishment, devoted to the unending creation of new weapons systems, with vast dismay. This is not merely because it continues to increase destructive capacity, but more because the technological preoccupation "has quietly eroded the consciences and sensibilities of modern man . . . and fractionated the attitudes and unconscious behavior of all of us living in a world overwhelmed with these objects" (pp. 69–70), and it reflects the anachronistic concepts about the role of military force.

A chapter is devoted to an examination of various favored approaches to disarmament, deterrence, arms control, and political solutions. These approaches are judged to be inadequate and largely futile because they seek changes that are short of the necessary change of uprooting the "war system," itself.

In a further probing of the contemporary dilemmas of international politics that includes a discussion of power (a discussion that is innocent with respect to the more recent theoretical writings on power and influence), the authors set the stage for their solution. The way out is, in essence, that men must change their minds. The war system, having become unworkable and obsolete, is propped up by a framework of myths. There is a curiously Calvinist or Marxist tone in this part of their argument. The erosion of the old myths and the changes of ideas are held to be processes that are certain to occur, since even the heads of the great states acknowledge that they must, but there is an underlying sense of urgency throughout the book that suggests to the reader that he should be doing something. Yet, at last, the advice to the individual is to think about all this and not be taken in by the notion that there are specific procedures and plans to stop wars or bring about disarmament. The final formula is "hard thought leading positively toward the construction of the new world order" (p. 216). Is this not what we have heard before—try to think the right way and lean in action either toward the transcendental design or historical inevitability?

What is the political scientist who takes the "scientist" term seriously to think of a book of this type? First, it is clearly a popularization of a stream of contemporary thought and the discussion should be judged, perhaps, in that light. Second, from what is known about persuasive communication on public issues, the political scientist might guess that readers who share the outlook of Millis and Real will take their arguments and assertions as the truth while those tending toward the opposite outlook will regard them as so much nonsense. Finally, is it possible that a skeptical but thoughtful political scientist could distress various advocates and actionists by asking, very seriously, if it has been established, "beyond reasonable doubt," that the "war system" is a real-world phenomenon, distinct and separate enough that it can be set against all the organizational and technological innovations that allegedly make it dysfunctioning and obsolete? He might be thinking, for example, in terms of a "mix" of old and new functions or forces—a "mix" that would set certain limits and potentialities on international behavior. Or, he might merely long to see the research that would show to what extent the calloused conscience or the compartmentalized mind prevails among the practitioners of world affairs. Could there be an influential few in the defense establishment who really would like to work themselves out of their jobs or, perhaps, a respectable number in the intelligence community who hate "dirty tricks?"—CHARLES A. MCCLELLAND, *San Francisco State College.*

Law and Politics in Inter-American Diplomacy. BY C. NEALE RONNING. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1963, Pp. 167. $5.95.)

The purpose of this book is, in the words of the author, to assess "today's battered 'rules' [of international law] in the light of the requirements of a hemisphere already quite different from the 'world community' in which those rules emerged." He accomplishes his purpose in clear and readable prose.

Mr. Ronning's research into the shifting patterns of state behavior in applying the principles of international law leads him to several important conclusions. He sees, for example, that in such matters as extending recognition to new governments, treatment of aliens and their property, intervention in the domestic affairs of sovereign states, diplomatic asylum and the varying claims to territorial waters, the traditional rules of conduct and responsibility are more and more being called into question. New patterns are emerging in response to the Latin American attitude that many of the rules reflect the interests of the large and powerful states. This is particularly true with respect to investments and property. The result of this trend is that the legal currents of the hemisphere are at present "rough, muddy and of uncertain direction."

A second conclusion naturally follows: that the primary emphasis today seems to be more on freedom of state action than on adherence to the traditional rules of state intercourse. In the tense and troubled atmosphere of the sixties, individual states freely interpret and apply the rules in the light of their own political aspirations. Political expediency is not new in the multi-state system of course, but there has been a tendency among observers of Latin American affairs to regard the members of the OAS as more meticulous than others in their observance of international "law."

In an excellent chapter on recognition, Mr. Ronning discusses the emergence and application of two opposing doctrines: The American Doctrine which grants recognition upon the fulfillment of certain objective requirements and the Doctrine of Legitimacy which adds various subjective requirements as a price for recognition. Latin American states have historically been interested in removing the institution of recognition from the realm of politics, but the demands for social reform and explosive political forces have brought about a situation in which many states in the hemisphere are themselves vigorously applying subjective requirements before extending recognition to new regimes. States do consult together on the matter, but action is still unilateral. The principle of recognition is at present firmly enmeshed in domestic and international politics.

The rules governing the treatment of aliens and their property and investments also are feeling the impact of the new forces. Land reform and nationalization of industry are becoming symbols of the social revolution. Direct state action such as expropriation and new tax and labor legislation is now the principle source of conflict between states in Latin America and those whose nationals invest in them.

On the subject of non-intervention, Mr. Ronning sums up the case nicely when he says "Quasi-legal instruments in the form of declarations and resolutions against communism, dictatorship and social injustice become more and more precise at the very time that declarations and resolutions against state intervention become stronger and more comprehensive."

The book is informative, sound and timely. It will be a useful tool in the study both of contemporary international law and politics as they appear in the hemisphere.—Leo B. Lott, *The Ohio State University.*

The United States and Israel. By Nadav Safran. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963. Pp. X, 341. $5.95.)

This volume, one of the series of the American Foreign Policy Library, is intended to furnish the American reader with the background needed to understand the problems connected with U. S.-Israel relations and to help him make up his mind concerning their future shape. Accordingly, it is Israel, the foreign country, rather than the United States, that serves as focus of attention. The reader is introduced to the history and pre-history of that country, to the rational considerations and the emotional involvements which cause people to assume toward it a friendly, a cautiously skeptical or an outright hostile attitude, as well as to its social and political set-up. The actual story of American-Israeli relations is told but briefly, without details, and is dealt with as part of a wider picture of the cold war, of Arab and Jewish national renaissance movements, and of international politics generally.

If, on the strength of the title, anyone had sought in the book a full and documented diplomatic history of U. S.-Israel relations, he would have turned away disappointed. Studies such as F. Manuel's *Realities of American Palestine Relations*, J. C. Hurewitz's *Middle East Dilemmas*, J. C. Campbell's *Defense of the Middle East* (all recommended by Safran for further reading), or articles such as those by S. Halperin and I. Oder, each within its special scope, fulfill this particular task in a much better way. But if Safran's book does not quite live up to the title's implied promise, it contains much which the title had not promised, *viz.* a treatment of the subject against its local, regional, American and generally international backgrounds. Inasmuch as our understanding of a problem gains by its presentation within a wider context, Safran's study serves a useful purpose indeed.

The treatment itself is characterized by a sympathetic, though not uncritical, attitude toward Israel. The author believes Israel to be, on balance, justified on moral and deserving of support on political grounds. The present reviewer, sharing as he does this basic attitude, will certainly not disagree with Dr. Safran's views. Indeed, unless one excepts Israel from the U. N. Charter's fundamental assumption that existing self-governing states are entitled to continued peaceful existence, condones threats of war and destruction when directed against Israel in the face of modern revulsion against aggression, and, of all peoples, excludes Jews—and that after Hitler—from the application of the national self-determination principle, it is difficult for anyone to take issue with the book's premise. The author does his best to present differing views as strongly and fairly as he can, but follows up this presentation with an argument in favor of his own thesis.

What detracts somewhat from the value of the book as a source of information, is the utter lack of references. Proliferation of foot-notes in scholarly works has been frequently criticized. Here we witness the opposite phenomenon, *viz.* their complete absence. A serviceable list of suggested readings appended to the volume tells us where to get additional information, but not a single statement in the text is specifically identified by source, and all of them have to be taken on faith. This feature makes the book a summary for the general public rather than a guide for academic study. As for the statements themselves, they are, on the whole, fair and accurate. Still, the reader is occasionally apt to be misled. Thus, within the Russian "pale of settlement," there was no "ghetto system" (p. 11); the U. S.-British

Palestine Convention not only "refers" in its preamble to the Balfour Declaration but, moreover, incorporates the entire text of the League of Nations Mandate (p. 38); treaties are not submitted in practice to ratification by the Knesset (p. 90); nor do judicial appointments require Knesset confirmation (p. 91).

In a study of this kind, an author's suggestions regarding future policy represent his very personal and subjective contribution. To criticize them would be but to substitute the critic's for the author's evaluation. Dr. Safran's recommendations on the score of future American policy toward Israel can be epitomized by the passage: "An effort should be made to cultivate its [*i.e.* Israel's] confidence that, though the United States cannot, for obvious reasons, give it the security guarantee it seeks in the form of an alliance, she will stand by her moral commitments in time of crisis . . . " (p. 291). It is a different question whether, at this time when even formal alliances are deservedly regarded with a great deal of skepticism, and assuming that this kind of assistance represents the limit of what the United States can do within the framework of her global policy, Israeli leaders may be expected, or even advised, to consider it as a sufficient basis on which to ground their country's survival. What the answer to this question is likely to be, can be easily gauged if one assumed for a moment that the roles were reversed. But both the question and the answer are matters for Israelis, not for Americans, to ponder. From the vantage point of American foreign policy, Safran's recommendations seem to have gone as far as realism allows.—BENJAMIN AKZIN, *The Hebrew University.*

The Defense of Berlin. BY JEAN EDWARD SMITH. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1963. Pp. ix, 431. $6.95.)

American foreign policy, Tocqueville said, "is eminently expectant; it consists more in abstaining than in acting." Jean Edward Smith's book is evidence of the currency of Tocqueville's remark. *The Defense of Berlin* is a narrative history, clearly and unpretentiously written, of American—and to a lesser extent, Western—responses to Soviet policies on Berlin from wartime military moves to Lucius D. Clay's "final" public appearance in Berlin, on May Day, 1962.

Mr. Smith saves us the job of searching for the perspectives from which he writes by making them explicit in two quotations which introduce the book. His policy position is manifest in his choice of Khrushchev's words in August, 1961, a few days before the Wall went up. "The experience of history teaches that when an aggressor sees that he is not being opposed he grows more brazen. Contrariwise when he meets opposition, he calms down. It is this historic experience that must guide us in our actions." And his moral position is clear enough when he includes Robert Frost's *Mending Wall* which, as we all have come to know, begins, "Something there is that doesn't love a wall, that wants it down!" From these positions Mr. Smith offers what we have not had between covers, a documented description of the course of events and construction of Western policies from General Eisenhower's refusal to let political considerations sully his military decision to halt at the Elbe, through General Clay's unauthorized decision to begin the airlift and Khrushchev's inconclusive ultimatums, to the "new realities" of the period following the Wall.

As the narrative emerges from primary and secondary sources it is increasingly a general and finely-meshed indictment from which few escape. Truman began weakly but matured facing the blockade; the Eisenhower Administration carried on adequately for several years but faltered in dealing with Soviet threats to sign a peace treaty with East Germany. And the Kennedy Administration first permitted policy to drift to Europe and then sought eased tension by accommodating the Soviets in Berlin.

In one of his few departures from the narrative in order to take a slightly more systematic view of policy-making, Mr. Smith near the end of the book notices a commonplace distinction in official American thinking on Berlin. On one side is the "hard-line school" associated with Acheson, Dulles, and certain elements in the Pentagon and State Department. And on the other, of course, is the "soft-line school," pejoratively identified variously as the "Rusk-Stevenson-Bohlen group" and the "Stevenson-Bohlen group." This distinction, if introduced earlier, might have been a peg on which to hang a running analytical complement to the chronicle. As it is, the distinction begs for development. The same may be said of the rather more interesting contention at several crucial points that Western policy on Berlin has been most effective when determined by the immediate responses of diplomatic and military officials *in Berlin* to Soviet tactics. In this sense the book is a Berlin's-eye view of postwar East-West relations. This just may be a good perspective; perhaps the tail should wag the dog in this case, but we need a fuller description of the animal before judging.

The book contains several maps, a bibliography, and a detailed chronology of events from 1941 to 1962.—DONALD R. REICH, *Oberlin College.*

The Organization of American States. BY ANN VAN WYNEN THOMAS AND A. J. THOMAS, JR. (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1963. Pp. xii, 530. $10.00.)

This book is by all odds the most comprehensive study of the OAS that has yet appeared. Because its authors are experts in the field of international law, its main thrust is a close legal analysis of the numerous treaties, conventions, resolutions, and other legal instruments associated with the founding of the OAS in 1948 and with the functioning of its many organs and agencies. But the study is not entirely legalistic in approach. Now and again, especially in the second half of the book. the authors lift their eyes from the basic documents to examine the way in which various legal principles have worked out in practice. Such inquiries bring the reader face to face with the conflicts and tensions that beset the hemisphere—long-standing disharmonies and disorders which have limited the effectiveness of the OAS but at the same time justified its existence. Despite a few conspicuous failures, traceable mainly to the tenacity with which the non-intervention principle is still clung to in certain quarters, the OAS has slowly but surely advanced the cause of peace and democracy in the Americas. This book leaves one with the feeling that but for the OAS the situation in the hemisphere today might well be a lot worse.

The study is divided into four sections. Book I consists of two brief chapters on the historical background. Book II, "Legal Characteristics and Organizational Structure of the OAS," deals with the constitutional law of the organization. Its four chapters are mainly commentary on the Bogotá Charter of 1948 as it relates to the legal nature of the OAS, membership in it, and the structure and powers of its component organs. In this last category the provisions concerning decision-making bodies (the Inter-American Conferences, the "Meetings of Consultation" of the Foreign Ministers, and the OAS Council) receive special attention. Book III, "The Principles of the OAS," examines the international law of the Americas. Among the topics canvassed in the eight chapters of this section are the doctrines of the sovereignty and equality of states, the all-important principle of non-intervention, the question of recognition and non-recognition, and the system of collective security established by the Rio Treaty of 1947 and reaffirmed by the Charter of Bogotá. Book IV, "Functions of the OAS," discusses the legal issues and, to some extent, the political problems involved in carrying out the main purposes of the OAS, which the authors boil down to two: ensuring the peace of the hemisphere and promoting human welfare. Its six chapters deal with such questions as the resort to collective security measures, peaceful methods of settling disputes between states, and types of inter-American cooperation in the solution of economic, social, cultural, and juridical problems.

There is a good deal of rather tedious repetition in all this, for each chapter tends to be a self-contained essay. Historical developments are traced and retraced, and key provisions of treaties, charters, and resolutions recur time and again as different OAS agencies or functions come under scrutiny. Certain incidents, such as the imposition of sanctions on the Dominican Republic in 1961 and the exclusion of Cuba from the OAS in 1962, are reviewed *de novo* in each of several chapters. But the repetitions do underline the authors' admirable conscientiousness, which has made of this book a fine example of meticulous legal scholarship.

From the standpoint of the political scientist, however, it is only a two-dimensional analysis. Relying almost exclusively on official documents—the texts of legal instruments, the reports of conferences, the formal statements of governments, and the like—the study lacks depth. It deals only with actions (and mainly formal, legal actions at that), never with actors. Eschewing any consideration of the role of personalities, it leaves the reader with little sense of how the OAS really works.

The book leaves unexplained, for example, a fact which it duly records, namely, that the OAS Council has played a much more vigorous and effective role in the pacific settlement of disputes and in the handling of other crisis situations than that which anyone reading the relevant charters and treaties could have expected it to play. A study of the individuals who have served as president of the Council or otherwise provided leadership in its deliberations might throw some light on this significant development. The Inter-American Peace Committee and the Commission on Human Rights are other agencies whose influence has been rather remarkable but remains unaccounted for by our authors' approach. Here again an inquiry into interpersonal relations and decision-making processes would doubtless yield information essential to a full understanding of those agencies and of the OAS itself. Finally, the very different impact of the OAS Secretary General and the UN Secretary General on their respective organizations cries out for a comparative analysis that would take account of the different personalities and policies involved.

But these are tasks for political scientists, and it is asking too much to demand that lawyers do the job for us. We can only record our indebtedness to Professor and Mrs. Thomas for having done their own work so well.—Henry Wells, *University of Pennsylvania.*

Nuclear Ambush: The Test Ban Trap. By Earl H. Voss. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1963. Pp. xxvii, 612. $6.50.)

This book, by the diplomatic correspondent of the Washington *Sunday Star*, is an account of the central issues in the nuclear test-ban negotiations through March 1963. It is much more than a casual journalistic effort. Mr. Voss has made a careful analysis of the verbatim records of the 1957 London meetings of the UN Disarmament Subcommittee, the 1958 Conference of Experts, and the two Technical Working Groups of the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, and of the relevant hearings of the Senate Subcommittee on Disarmament and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. The book is replete with academic paraphernalia—a chronology covering the period from 1945 through mid-March 1963, a liberal interspersing of quotations, ample citations, and two appendices. In addition, it contains much data gleaned from close day-to-day observation of and personal contact with participants in the events under consideration. Finally, it is written in a felicitous style.

Alongside these significant merits, the book also has limitations. It lacks a theoretical substructure. Had the analysis been grounded on a more elegant conception of decision-making processes, the author might not have concluded that most of the varying attitudes toward the test-ban negotiations stemmed from "the wide difference of opinion in this country on what the true intentions of the Soviet Union are . . . " (p. 499). Surely this is too simple a notion, many other differences of a factual and value nature have been involved, estimates of the significance of tactical nuclear weapons, and one's tolerance of the risk of nuclear war, to name only two.

The book has a narrow focus, as is indicated by the principal sources. Although the technical discussions are analyzed in detail, the diplomatic negotiations receive scant attention. Events external to the negotiations, such as Sino-Soviet relations and the evolution of NATO strategic doctrine, are ignored or treated in a most summary fashion. The definitive account will have to take a broader view, otherwise the course of events cannot adequately be explained.

The author's occasional selectivity in choosing his evidence presents a more serious limitation. Mr. Voss neglects to mention that the 1957 Western package proposal of partial measures included, along with a test-ban, permission to transfer nuclear weapons to then non-nuclear powers if their use were limited to situations of "individual or collective self-defence," thus allowing the negation of one of the putative advantages of a test-ban. Later, he describes the controversy in Technical Working Group II between American and Soviet scientists concerning the seismic magnitude that should be assigned to underground nuclear detonations without mentioning that some of the American scientists involved subsequently told Congressional committees that they felt that the American position had elements of weakness.

Although not a polemic, the book argues a case. The essential theses are: "radioactive fallout from nuclear weapons tests generated fears that were wholly unfounded" (p. 5); important progress is likely to be made through continued testing of nuclear weapons; a test-ban covering all environments could not be controlled, especially in view of the "complete ineffectiveness of on-site inspection" (p. 455) as a means of identifying underground shots; and, there is a high probability that the Soviet Union engaged in clandestine nuclear weapon tests during the three-year voluntary moratorium which lasted from the fall of 1958 until the fall of 1961; thus, the book's title.

Mr. Voss does not explicitly suggest alternative courses to those which were pursued. He does, however, condemn the secrecy which surrounded aspects of the negotiations. Admittedly the public debate suffered as a result of secrecy in this case, yet there are perils to public negotiations and most agree that keeping at least some security information private is not totally disfunctional. To argue the case for openness, one must also deal with these points.

Beyond these broad themes, many other things emerge from this account. The unpreparedness of the United States in 1958 for serious arms control negotiations is clearly portrayed, as is the slowness with which the government undertook the necessary scientific research. The tension and division within the Eisenhower Administration concerning the test-ban negotiations is amply documented.

In addition, Mr. Voss touches on a deeper and more fundamental problem when he points out that "scientific progress frequently left the diplomats discussing difficulties that had disappeared or become irrelevant" (p. 534). Indeed, had not a chapter been added dealing with the improved technical situation as revealed in early 1963, thereby blurring the signature in the Foreword dated December 5, 1962, his book would have suffered a similar liability.

In sum, this book is a valuable account of the test-ban negotiations, but not a complete account.—HAROLD KARAN JACOBSON, *The University of Michigan.*

Greece and the Great Powers. BY STEPHEN G. XYDIS. (Thessaloniki, Greece: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1963. Pp. xxi, 758. $10.00.)

The plethora of titles appearing each year in the field of international relations makes one particularly suspect of the monograph. Unless the title suggests a field of inquiry particularly close to one's own interests, it is likely to be passed over. But students of American government! Don't pass over this book. Although the author contends that his study is "first and foremost" an analysis of Greek diplomacy from 1942 to 1947, it is considerably more than that: It is a revealing narrative of American assumption, albeit reluctantly, of post-war diplomatic, military, and economic responsibilities in the eastern Mediterranean region; it is a study of micropower politics played against the backstop of Great Power conflict; it is a detailed examination of the tools (including military forces) and techniques of post-war diplomacy; and it is a vivid portrayal of how unofficial sources can both set the limits of international discourse and serve as harbingers of events to come.

The author opens his study with a detailed description of the diplomatic relations between the government-in-exile and Britain, Russia, and the United States. Despite axis occupation of Greece, the government-in-exile was already (1942) pushing for early realization of Greek territorial claims and post-war reconstruction assistance. Particularly revealing in this connection is the "Memorandum on the Greek claims, Submitted to the U. S. Government June 12, 1942" (Annex III). While Greek claims to Cyprus were gently voiced, those for Northern Epirus (southern Albania) were vigorously and frequently brought forward.

The "Greek Question" encompassed far more, of course, than mere territorial adjustments. From October, 1944 to March, 1947 Greece served as the very epicenter of that evolving conflict between the Anglo-American bloc and the Soviet Union that ranged from Poland to Iran—a conflict marked not by the clash of arms, but rather a conflict of diplomacy, of propaganda, and of unmistakable military demonstrations.

To this budding Cold War the American response was marked by its ambivalence. The legacy of "Hullian" diplomacy, with its stress on universalism, augmented by traditional American "Balkanophobia," made Washington hesitant to move from the level of diplomatic perception to one of effective action. At the same time, Soviet pressures against Greece, Turkey, and Iran demanded concrete demonstrations of resistance from the United States. It is precisely at this point that the Forrestalian style moves to the fore. The tool used was the U. S. Navy. Borrowing heavily on the detail amassed for his doctoral dissertation, Mr. Xydis traces the historical development of what would ultimately become the Sixth Fleet, analyzing along each step of the way, the political implications of this nautical gambit. In the end this Forrestalian perception of the international context moved Greek-American relations from the level of mutual indifference to that marked by the "Truman Doctrine." As the author so aptly puts it, "from the lofty intentions of the Yalta Declaration the United States had . . . descended . . . into the realm of drachmas and mules" (page 501).

Turning to the negative side, the author's concern for detail was found to frequently overshadow his concern for relevancy. Too often the labyrinth of minutia (e.g. the operational radius of Hellcats and Corsairs) led this reviewer away from the central argument. Still, it is better to err with too much than too little. Another criticism of more modest calibre is that a map of northern Greece would have been infinitely preferable to photos of U. S. aircraft carriers!

In no way are these criticisms intended to weaken the central point: this is a solid, substantial book that has much to say to many.—Richard H. Pfaff, *University of Colorado.*

The American Secretaries of State and their Diplomacy, Vol. XI: *Frank B. Kellogg—Henry L. Stimson.* By Robert H. Ferrell. (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, Inc., 1963. Pp. 360. $7.50.)

The first ten volumes in the series *The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy,* edited by Samuel Flagg Bemis, were published between 1927 and 1929 by Alfred A. Knopf; the present volume marks the continuation of that series, being the first of six additional planned volumes that will carry through the Secretaryship of Christian A. Herter. In *Kellogg—Stimson,* Robert H. Ferrell (who is also the general editor of the new series) views his subjects through the screen of a conventional diplomatic history of their years in office. The screen, unfortunately, does not illuminate; it merely restricts both visibility and insight.

On several occasions Mr. Ferrell describes the ceremonial words of public officials as "fulsome"—a fulsome error for a chronicle of diplomatists!—B. C. C.

The United Nations: a Short Political Guide. By Sydney D. Bailey. (New York and London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963.)

The well-known author of *The Secretariat of the United Nations* and *The General Assembly of the United Nations* here provides us with one of the best short accounts of the United Nations in operation. The elementary is combined with the analytical and the esoteric is avoided. The tone is appreciative and the discussion of problems practical. Case studies add a great deal. Chapters deal with purpose, structure, groupings, peace-keeping, disarmament, decolonization, refugees, and perspective, and there are ten useful factual appendices. The author concludes that "The United Nations does not end the need for statesmanship. It is an instrument at the disposal of states, to be used or misused or ignored." This is a good up-to-date book for the general reader, and for general courses in international relations in which the United Nations is one of many topics considered.—L. P.

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NEWS AND NOTES

NOTICE TO CONTRIBUTORS

Space limitations and the ever-increasing volume of requests received by the REVIEW prohibit the publication of notes relating to lecture series, symposia, seminars or new graduate programs sponsored by individual institutions.

Items relating to staff appointments and promotions will be accepted from department chairmen only.

WASHINGTON OFFICE ACTIVITIES

Congressional Study Project—A major project involving research on Congress was initiated under Association auspices shortly after the first of the year. Providing for a comprehensive study of the problems of Congressional organization and operation, this project was made possible by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York.

The Association will administer the project. It will be carried out under the direction of Professor Ralph K. Huitt, of the University of Wisconsin, and is scheduled for completion in two years.

In addition to the research program, the grant provides for a series of conferences among political scientists, for continuing consultation between the project's research staff and members of Congress, and for establishment of an Advisory Committee of outstanding political scientists interested in the general field of Congressional operations.

Results of the study are to be published in an appropriate manner in monograph and book form.

Review Reprinting—For the past several years the Association has been negotiating with a number of firms interested in securing reprint rights for out-of-print issues and volumes of the *American Political Science Review*. These negotiations are now complete, and the Association recently signed a contract with one of the world's largest reprinting firms, the Johnson Reprint Corporation, with headquarters in New York City and branch offices in Los Angeles, London, Frankfurt and Milan.

As approved by the Association's Executive Committee, the contract provides for high quality reprinting of all out-of-print issues. This means that Volumes I to V, for instance, which have been out-of-print for many years, will once again be available to libraries, institutions and individuals by July, 1964.

Additionally, the Johnson firm has agreed to take over sales of back issues of the *Review;* these will continue to be available to purchasers at a price established by the Association. Further details of both the reprinting and back issues arrangements will be announced by the Association and by the Johnson Reprint Corporation. Meanwhile, back issues may be ordered directly from the Johnson firm at 111 Fifth Avenue, New York 3, New York.

Annual Meeting Site—The Association has completed arrangements for the 1965 Annual Meeting, which will be held in Washington, D. C., September 8 to 11. Headquarters for the meeting will be the Sheraton-Park Hotel, and rates of $8.00 for single rooms and $12.00 for twins will apply for all Association members attending. (These rates are $1.00 less in each category than were in effect during the 1962 Annual Meeting in Washington.) Pre-registration cards will be mailed to all members well in advance of the meeting date.

Senate Youth Program—The Association, within the framework of its Social Studies Project, conducted the second Annual Senate Youth Program during the week of January 27. Participating in the Program, financed by the William Randolph Hearst Foundation, were 102 high school student leaders—two from each state and the District of Columbia.

On the program during the week were meetings with the leadership of both Houses of Congress and top level Executive Branch officials. In addition, the students spent time as interns in Senatorial offices and attended a series of seminars and lectures conducted by political scientists and other experts in the field of government and politics.

Legislative Seminar—During the week of February 10, the Association co-sponsored the second in a series of legislative operations seminars for career Federal executives, Civil Service Grades 15 to 18. This seminar program was inaugurated last year, at the request of the U. S. Civil Service Commission, in an effort to enhance the career civil servants' knowledge and understanding of executive-legislative relations through an examination in depth of Congressional functions and processes. A third seminar, also to be conducted by political scientists, members of the House and Senate, and Executive Branch officials, is scheduled during the month of May.

PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

The Conference on Soviet and Communist Studies of the American Political Science Association met in New York in September for its annual business meeting. Marshall D. Shulman, Fletcher School, retiring chairman, presided. George Fischer of the department of government at Cornell University was elected vice-chairman for 1963–64 and chairman for 1964–65. Robert C. Tucker of Princeton University, the present chairman, appointed a nominating committee composed of Louis Nemzer, Ohio State University, chairman; Alex Dragnich, Vanderbilt University; and George Fischer. The guest of honor, Louis Fischer, spoke on his forthcoming biography of Lenin.

The Society for International Development held its sixth world conference in Washington, D. C., March 16–18, 1964. The theme of the conference was "Human Factors in International Development: Motivations and Methods"

OTHER ACTIVITIES

ACCESS TO THE RECORDS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The Department of State has recently revised its rules governing access by researchers to its records. For many years the records of the Department have been divided for this purpose into three periods: open, restricted, and closed. The open period formerly ran through 1929; the restricted period covered 1930 through 1941; the closed period was from 1942 to the present. The new regulations retain the same three periods for access purposes, but the fixed dates have been removed in favor of a system of progressive opening geared to the publication of the Department's series *Foreign Relations of the United States*. Thus the closed period is now defined as the period in advance of the *Foreign Relations* series, and the beginning date of the closed period will be advanced automatically as the volumes in that series are published. The restricted period is defined as the ten years in back of the closed period, and the open period covers the records prior thereto.

Since the *Foreign Relations* volumes have now been published for 1942 and are being released for 1943, this means that the terminal date of the restricted period has been advanced to 1943 while the terminal date of the open period has been advanced from 1929 to January 1, 1933.

Applications for access to records of the open period may be made direct to the National Archives, Washington, D. C. 20408. Applications for access to the restricted period should be made to the Historical Office, Department of State, Washington, D. C. 20520. Access to documents of the restricted period will be granted liberally to serious scholars, subject to review of their notes. It is not the Department's policy to grant access in the restricted period to undergraduates.

William M. Franklin
Director, Historical Office
Bureau of Public Affairs

December 1963.

Recent accessions in research material at the Harry S. Truman Library include papers of David D. Lloyd and David H. Stowe, former Administrative Assistants to President Truman; a large organized clipping file from the Democratic National Committee library; and a collection of photostats and carbon copies of documents from the Weizmann Archives in Israel.

Grants-in-aid are available from the Harry S. Truman Library Institute, up to a limit of $1,000 each, for projects involving the Truman administration and the history and nature of the Presidency. The policy of the Institute is to favor grants to promising graduate students and young scholars. Applicants should write to Philip C. Brooks, Director of the Library, who is also Secretary of the Institute, to obtain application forms and to ascertain whether the Library has sufficient materials on their topics to warrant issuance of grants.

Sharon Boen was on leave from her teaching position at Northern Michigan University during the fall semester, 1963.

George F. Brasington was elected secretary of the Southern Political Science Association at its annual meeting in Gatlinburg on October 31 through November 2.

Robert O. Byrd, professor of political science at North Park College, Chicago, has been appointed director of the African Conferences and Seminars Program of the American Friends Service Committee. His headquarters will be in Lome, Togo.

Eugene P. Chase, professor emeritus at Lafayette College, is serving as special consultant to the president of Lafayette for 1963–64.

Carl Q. Christol, chairman of the department of political science and professor of international law at the University of Southern California, has returned to the university after having held the chair of international law at the U. S. Naval War College during 1962–63. While at the War College he prepared the Naval War College Bluebook on "The International Law of Outer Space."

D. Jay Doubleday, assistant professor of public administration at the University of Pittsburgh, is serving in the University's project in public administration at the Central University in Quito, Ecuador.

Julian Franklin is on leave from Columbia University for the spring term and is continuing his research in Europe.

Louis L. Friedland, department of political science at Wayne State University, is engaged as research analyst for the Michigan State Commission on Legislative Apportionment.

John M. Gaus, professor emeritus of Harvard University, was appointed visiting professor of government and research specialist in the institute of government research, University of Arizona, for the fall 1963 semester.

Donald R. Gerth, associate dean of students at San Francisco State College, has been granted leave in order to accept an appointment as associate dean of institutional relations and student affairs for the California state colleges.

Robert T. Golembiewski, assistant professor in the department of management, University of Illinois, is a visiting lecturer for 1963–64 in the department of industrial administration, Yale University.

Fred I. Greenstein, Wesleyan University (Conn.), is compiling a listing of the various studies conducted by social scientists of public reactions to the assassination of President Kennedy. He would appreciate hearing from anyone who has participated in such research.

C. Herschel Jones, professor of political science at Bucknell University, has been appointed chairman of the State Civil Service Commission by Governor Scranton.

Leo B. Lott, department of political science, Ohio State University, has assumed the editorship of the News and Notes Section of the Review, replacing Ralph A. Straetz, New York University, who resigned as editor in December, 1963.

Edwin B. McPheron of the department of government at Indiana University has been named coordinator of the Indiana legislative assistantship program for 1963–64.

John Martz, assistant professor of political science at the University of North Carolina, conducted research in Venezuela during January and February, 1964.

Elwyn A. Mauck, professor of public administration, University of Pittsburgh, will be on leave during 1963–64 to serve as head of the University of Michigan's program in public administration in Taiwan.

Malcolm Moos is a visiting professor of government in the department of public law and government at Columbia University for the spring term.

Robert Mowitz, department of political science at Wayne State University, spent the summer months in the Pentagon in Washington acting as consultant to the economic adviser to the Secretary of Defense.

Harding C. Noblitt, professor of political science at Concordia College, has been appointed by Governor Karl F. Rolvaag of Minnesota to the Governor's Citizens Council on Aging.

Paul A. Pfretzschner, of the department of law and government of Lafayette College, is a Fulbright fellow at Trinity College, University of Dublin, Dublin, Ireland.

Edward Lee Pinney, associate professor of political science at Washington and Lee University, was elected to the executive council of the Southern Political Science Association for a three-year term.

Robert J. Pitchell, associate director of the institute of public administration at Indiana University, has been appointed president of Roosevelt University.

John P. Plamenatz, Fellow of Nuffield College, Oxford, is a visiting professor at Indiana University during the second semester, 1963–64.

Joseph Pois, professor of public administration, University of Pittsburgh, is serving as a member of the State Department Advisory Committee on International Organizations.

Allan Richards resigned his position at the University of New Mexico on February 1, 1963, to accept employment with the Agency for International Development in Latin America.

Edward B. Richards of Texas Wesleyan College was a visiting associate professor in government at the University of Arizona during the 1963 summer session.

Leonard Rowe has been appointed visiting associate professor of political science at the University of Michigan.

Wendell G. Schaeffer, associate dean in the graduate school of public and international affairs, Pittsburgh University, has been appointed dean of the University of Pittsburgh faculties at the Central University in Quito, Ecuador.

Richard C. Snyder, chairman of the political science department at Northwestern University and president's fellow for 1963–64, is a visiting fellow for the year at Western Behavioral Sciences institute, La Jolla, California.

Richard W. Staveley has returned to San Jose State College after teaching for a year and a half at the University of Queensland in Australia.

S. Laird Swagert has resigned as professor of political science at San Jose State College to serve full time on the staff of the Stanford research institute at Palò Alto.

Peter A. Toma, associate professor of government returned to the University of Arizona from research leave.

Robert Warren, on leave from the department of political science at the University of Washington during the winter and spring quarters of 1964, is serving with Resources for the Future, Washington, D. C.

Maurice Waters has returned to Wayne State University's department of political science after a research absence of three years.

Norman Wengert, department of political science, Wayne State University, has been appointed acting associate dean of the college of liberal arts. He is also currently serving as an advisor on natural resources to the governor of Georgia.

Robert G. Wesson, who has returned from a post-doctorate at Oxford, has been appointed visiting assistant professor of political science at Bates College.

STAFF APPOINTMENTS

Dean Alfange, Jr., has joined the department of government and law, Lafayette College, as an instructor.

Chadwick F. Alger was promoted to the rank of associate professor of political science at Northwestern University, effective September, 1963.

Robert Boynton has been appointed visiting assistant professor in the department of political science at the University of North Carolina for the academic year 1963–64.

Jack D. Brooks has accepted an assistant professorship in the department of political science and public administration, San Jose State College.

J. Leo Cefkin has been appointed chairman of the department of history and political science at Colorado State University.

Eugene P. Chase, department of government and law, Lafayette College, became professor emeritus in June, 1963.

Don Clare has been appointed assistant professor in political science at Wayne State University.

Orville G. Cope has been appointed assistant professor in the department of political science at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.

Geoffrey Cornog has accepted an assistant professorship in the department of political science and the institute of law and government at the University of Georgia.

Dean R. Cresap, professor of political science at San Jose State College, was elected mayor of Palo Alto in the 1963 spring election..

Joseph Cropsey has been promoted to the rank of associate professor in the department of political science at the University of Chicago.

Shen-Yu Dai, formerly of Northern Illinois University, has joined the staff of Colorado State University as an associate professor of political science.

Richard Dawson has joined the faculty of Washington University as an assistant professor of political science.

Thomas R. Daye, formerly with the bureau of government at the University of Wisconsin, has joined the department of political science at the University of Georgia as an assistant professor.

Joel R. Dickinson has accepted an instructorship in political science at Tarkio College, Tarkio, Missouri.

Richard R. Dohm has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Northern Michigan University.

Lewis Edinger, formerly of Michigan State University, has joined the faculty of Washington University as professor of political science.

Henry W. Ehrmann has been appointed chairman of the department of government at Dartmouth College for the period 1963–65.

John W. Ellsworth has joined the staff of Colorado State University as an assistant professor of political science.

James C. Finlay, S. J., has become chairman of the department of political philosophy at Fordham University, replacing Joseph C. McKenna, S. J., who is presently serving as educational consultant in Lagos, Nigeria.

Miodrag Georgevich has been promoted to the rank of associate professor and named head of the political science department at Northern Michigan University.

John Gilbert, was promoted to the rank of professor of political science at San Jose State College.

Rebecca Grajower has joined the staff of Harpur College, State University of New York, as an instructor in political science.

Michael Haas has been appointed lecturer in the department of political science and public administration, San Jose State College.

Roger W. Haigh has been appointed an instructor in the department of political philosophy at Fordham University for the academic year 1963–64.

William A. Hambley, Jr. was appointed assistant professor of political science at Northern Michigan University for the 1963 fall semester.

Wolfram F. Hanrieder has been appointed research associate of the center of international studies at Princeton University for the academic year 1963–64.

John H. Hedley has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of Tulsa.

Franklin C. Houn has resigned his position at the University of Nebraska to become associate professor in the department of government at the University of Massachusetts.

Charles G. Jackson has been promoted to the rank of associate professor at Bloomsburg State College.

Dean Jaros has been appointed assistant professor in political science at Wayne State University.

John J. Kennedy has been appointed chairman of the department of government and international studies at the University of Notre Dame, effective July, 1964. Professor Kennedy has been a member of the Woodrow Wilson department of foreign affairs at the University of Virginia.

Teruo Kobayashi was appointed assistant professor of political science at Elmira College, effective September, 1963.

Byung Chul Koh has joined the faculty of Louisiana State University as an assistant professor of government.

Jerry Lansdowne of the department of government, University of Arizona, has accepted a teaching appointment at California Polytechnic College, San Luis Obispo.

George A. Lipsky, formerly of the National Academy of Sciences, is now professor of political science at Wabash College.

Clifford Lytle has accepted an appointment as assistant professor of government at the University of Arizona.

Benjamin M. May, Jr., has accepted an appointment as assistant professor in the department of government and law at Lafayette College after being associated during the last academic year with the Russian Research Center at Harvard.

David Mayhew has been appointed an instructor at the University of Massachusetts.

Douglas H. Mendel, Jr., has been appointed an associate professor in the department of political science at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.

M. A. K. Menon has been appointed an assistant professor in the Asian studies program at Skidmore College.

Lester W. Milbrath was promoted to the rank of associate professor of political science at Northwestern University, effective September, 1963.

David W. Minar was promoted to the rank of associate professor of political science at Northwestern University, effective September, 1963.

Thomas Mongar has accepted an instructorship in political science at the University of Washington.

Henry J. Morganthau has been appointed to the Albert A. Michelson Distinguished Service Professorship at the University of Chicago.

Baldev Raj Nayar has been appointed assistant professor of political science at California State College at Hayward.

Harold L. Nieburg has accepted an associate professorship in the department of political science at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.

Joseph L. Nyomarsky of the University of California has been appointed to the rank of assistant professor of political science, effective February, 1963.

Nancy W. Percy has been appointed lecturer in the department of political science and public administration, San Jose State College.

Steven Petkov has been appointed instructor in the department of political science, Temple University.

Kenneth Prewitt, formerly of Stanford University, has joined the faculty of Washington University as assistant professor of political science.

Maurice Ramsey has been appointed vice chairman of the department of political science at Wayne State University. He will act in the absence of the chairman during the latter's appointment as acting associate dean of the college of liberal arts.

Jorgen Rasmussen has accepted an appointment as assistant professor of government, University of Arizona.

Edward Renwick has accepted an appointment as instructor at Southwestern Louisiana State College.

James W. Roberts, formerly of the University of North Carolina, has been appointed instructor of political science at the University of Pittsburgh, effective January 3, 1964.

Victor G. Rosenblum was promoted to the rank of professor of political science and law at Northwestern University, effective September, 1963.

Conrad P. Rutkowski has been appointed an instructor in the department of political philosophy at Fordham University for the academic year 1963–64.

Edwin H. Rutkowski has been appointed chairman of the department of political science at the University of Detroit.

Lester G. Seligman of the University of Oregon has been promoted to professor of political science. He is a visiting professor at the Weizman institute of science at Rehovoth, Israel, for the academic year 1963–64.

Will J. Selzer has been promoted to the rank of professor of political science at Drexel Institute of Technology.

William Wayne Shannon has accepted an appointment as assistant professor of government at Louisiana State University.

Barbara J. L. Shockley has been promoted to the rank of associate professor at Bloomsburg State College.

Raymond S. Short has resigned as chairman of the department of political science, Temple University.

Robert W. Stern has been appointed assistant professor of government at Wells College, effective September, 1963.

Harry P. Stumpf has been promoted to assistant professor of political science at Colorado State University.

Anwar Syed, formerly of Fels institute, University of Pennsylvania, has been appointed assistant professor at the University of Massachusetts.

Morgan Thomas is serving as acting chairman of the department of government and law at Lafayette College during the academic year 1963–64.

Efraim Torgovnik has accepted a position in the bureau of government research, University of Rhode Island.

Dale Vinyard has been appointed assistant professor in the department of political science at Wayne State University.

Alden D. Voth, formerly of Upland College in Upland, California, has accepted a position as assistant professor in the department of political science and public administration, San Jose State College.

Arpad von Lazar has been appointed visiting assistant professor in the department of political science at the University of North Carolina for the academic year 1963–64.

James E. Watson has been promoted to associate professor of political science and education at San Jose State College.

Elliot White has been appointed instructor in the department of political science at Temple University.

Joseph Willard has resigned from the department of political science at Northern Michigan University.

Thomas Phillip Wolf was appointed assistant professor of government at the University of New Mexico, effective September, 1963.

Byongman Yoon has been appointed instructor in political science at Middle Tennessee State College.

IN MEMORIAM

Cullen Bryant Gosnell, for thirty-seven years a member of the political science department at Emory University, died at his home in LaGrange, Georgia, on August 16, 1963.

V. O. Key, Jr., Jonathan Trumball Professor of American History and Government, who died on October 4, 1963 at the age of fifty-five, was one of those rare spirits who combined total commitment to a life of scholarship and public service with an innate warmth and kindliness that won the affection of all who knew him. Although plagued by ill health, he worked, with his wife's understanding support, without surcease or interruption, joyously and creatively, leaving behind him a record of professional achievement which commanded world-wide acclaim. An imaginative innovator and impeccable craftsman, he belonged to that small company of scholars about whom it can truly be said that they move forward the frontiers of their disciplines.

Born in Austin, Texas on March 13, 1908, his childhood was spent in the West Texas town of Lamesa, where his father practiced law and farmed. After two years at McMurray College in Abilene, Texas, V. O. transferred to the University of Texas where he received his B.A. in 1929 and an M.A. in 1930. From Texas he moved to the University of Chicago to study for the doctorate. The Chicago school of political science under the imaginative leadership of Charles E. Merriam was then at the height of its influence. Experimental and innovative, it turned for its laboratory to the actualities of political and administrative behavior. Under Merriam's direction Key completed a dissertation on "The Techniques of Political Graft in the United States" and laid the basis for his lifelong interest in the systematic study of political behavior and motivation. It was at the University of Chicago that he met Luella Gettys, herself a political scientist; and they were married in 1934.

After receiving his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago in 1934, Key taught for a short period at the University of California in Los Angeles and then moved to Washington, where he served first as a staff member of the Committee on Public Administration of the Social Science Research Council and later as a research technician with the National Resources Planning Board. In 1938 he joined the faculty of Johns Hopkins University, where, except for three years of war service with the U. S. Bureau of the Budget, he remained until 1949, rising through the ranks to become Professor and Chairman of the Department of

Political Science. In 1949 he accepted an appointment at Yale University as Alfred Cowles Professor of Government and Chairman of the Department. Two years later he became a member of the Harvard University Department of Government, which held out the lure that he would be freed from administrative chores. Once on the scene, he assumed more than his fair share of the common burden, served as chairman in 1953–54 and for many years as a Syndic of the Harvard University Press.

His scholarly career was extraordinarily productive. In addition to a constant stream of first-rate journal articles, distinguished books followed one another with almost clock-like regularity. *The Administration of Federal Grants to States* appeared in 1937. Two years later came *The Initiative and Referendum in California*, in collaboration with W. W. Crouch. *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups*, which was published in 1942, quickly established itself as the leading textbook in the field and retained its place through successive editions. His *Southern Politics*, which appeared in 1949, was a major achievement. Honored by a Woodrow Wilson Foundation Award, it remains to this day a model of systematic regional political analysis. In 1954 he published *A Primer of Statistics for Political Scientists*. Intended for student use, it was also persuasively designed to overcome the resistance of recalcitrant professional colleagues to the use of quantitative methods in studying political behavior. Two years later his *American State Politics* marked a fresh demonstration of the power of rigorous quantitative analysis in the hands of a master political scientist. *Public Opinion and American Democracy*, published in 1961, represented the most searching study of the relations of public opinion to the American political process yet to appear. He worked full speed to the very end. In the months preceding his fatal illness, he finished the fifth edition of his text book on Political Parties and had almost completed a new manuscript on voting behavior. In 1958 Key was honored by his professional colleagues with the Presidency of the American Political Science Association.

Key's devotion to the scholarly enterprise did not exclude extensive outside service. He advised all three levels of government and also the scholarly foundations. At the national level he served as a consultant to the Social Security Board, the Natural Resources Planning Board, and the Bureau of the Budget and, in his last act of public service, as a member of President Kennedy's Commission on Campaign Costs. The Maryland State Planning Commission and the Baltimore Commission on Efficiency and Economy benefited from his advice and research in the years when he taught at Johns Hopkins. He was a member of the Board of Directors of the Social Science Research Council and Chairman of its Committee on Problems and Policy.

V. O. Key demanded much of himself, and he gave endlessly to others—to colleagues all over the country, and to his students at Harvard, California, Hopkins and Yale. [And, it may be interpolated, to this REVIEW, in promptly and painstakingly reading and criticizing manuscripts submitted in his field.—MAN. ED.] He was a genuinely modest and self-effacing man. He depreciated his own accomplishments and loved nothing more than to pay tribute to the good work of others. He was free with the encouraging word, but superlatives were not bestowed lightly. When he spoke them, they were meant full measure. His devotion to his subject was absolute, but he refused to take himself seriously. Whether in conversation or on the printed page, there was always the wry turn of phrase, amusement at the variety of man's folly, and sympathy for the human comedy. At the same time he was deeply committed to democratic and humane values; his rare moments of anger were reserved for those who betrayed them.

His simplicity, his unpretentiousness, and his easy natural courtesy made him friends in all circles. From his native West Texas he brought with him an openness to people, an involvement in their joys and tribulations, and a desire to be neighborly and helpful in every way. His great human qualities were never more radiantly displayed than in the last months of his life in hospital where his thoughts were constantly with others and where staff and fellow patients alike spoke of him with love and even a touch of awe. Staunch and courageous to the end, he accomplished much, but for V. O. Key the work that was important was the work still to be done.—ALEXANDER GERSCHENKRON, ARTHUR MAASS, ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, DON K. PRICE, JR., MERLE FAINSOD.

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

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

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
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
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
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

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

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

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
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

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

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